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Abstract 
 
What is the reason behind the current fascination with and heightened expectations from 
international legal accountability? Are we indeed faced with an unprecedented increase in the 
volume of egregious crimes committed, condoned, or initiated by states and high ranking 
officials, bureaucrats and soldiers, the kind of multiplication and spread that fundamentally 
challenges our faith in the capabilities of domestic jurisprudence? Is international criminal law, as 
it applies to categories of crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, equipped to be 
a panacea for all ills of the recalcitrant nation-state system? Could we curtail mass assaults on 
human dignity, the kind of violence that flourished in myriad forms with the advance of late 
capitalism, through international courts alone? What is the ultimate aim of adjudicating the most 
egregious infractions of the internationally sanctioned human rights regime? Is it simply a matter 
of coming up with the newest methods and most efficient strategies of codification to punish the 
protagonists of organized political violence? Is international criminal law striving to develop a 
shared understanding of, and golden standards for, acceptable behaviour of states and 
governments, their agencies and institutions? Do these efforts not suffer terribly from the 
institutional idealism pertaining to current accountability regimes in public international law? 
Where do judges, activists, scholars, public intellectuals, NGOs and INGOs stand in a truthful 
appraisal of the complex amalgam of international criminal law and the dynamic processes of 
globalization? Do relations between the core and periphery, the Global South and the centres of 
traditional international law, post-colonial societies and neocolonial powers, matter at all in this 
state of euphoria concerning developments in international criminal law pertaining to universal 
jurisdiction?  
 
I start this work by answering this last question in the affirmative. In Chapter I, I examine the 
emergence of a transnational regime of accountability in international law and reevaluate the 
claim that, at least in principle, universal jurisdiction overrides private legal norms. After 
introducing the debate on legal pluralism and Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL), I redefine the concept of international law as transnational law within the context of 
globalization, with particular emphasis on the situational qualities attributed to states and 
societies in the Global South. I then discuss distinguishing features of international accountability 
regimes and the mechanisms used by institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
for the production of legal and jurisdictional certainty under diverse circumstances. I conclude 
this debate with a critical evaluation of accountability regimes in international law concerning 
universal jurisdiction. I use the premises of the third wave of legal pluralism and purport a theory 
of reflexive transnational law that could re-contextualize universal jurisdiction, an issue further 
debated in a later chapter on Hybrid Courts. In Chapter II, I analyze universal jurisdiction in 
international law with reference to debates on the State as a privileged legal actor. I rely on the 
body of work associated with critical international relations scholarship and look for alternative 
approaches to the static perception of the state in international law. In Chapter III, I strive to 
provide an inlet for universal jurisdiction in certain cases of criminality while identifying a 
framework that is not of dubious normative or legal validity. In effect, reformulating universal 
jurisdiction anew is a necessary shift of focus given the contested history of the very enterprise of 
international law in the Global South. To this end, I again look at TWAIL scholarship and other 
contesting voices emanating from the Global South that relate to international criminal law in 
	 iii	
challenging ways. In Chapter IV, I examine the historical and political underpinnings of the legal 
definition of crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are supposed to have a collective 
legal dimension with respect to both their victims and their perpetrators. These crimes take place 
only in the context of a widespread or systematic attack, and in a societal setting that condones or 
supports their committal. Instead of a static interpretation of these crimes, I offer a historicized 
conception and propose a wider justification for their prosecution through locally adapted 
universal jurisdiction measures. This caveat has important implications as to which crimes could 
be justifiably prosecuted and punished by domestic, hybrid or international courts, as discussed in 
Chapter V on Hybrid Courts. I also contend that the scope of the area of international criminal 
justice that deals with basic human rights violations should be wider than is currently 
acknowledged, in that it should include violations that have a collective dimension. These 
arguments are then further developed in Chapter VI, on collective responsibility. The conclusion 
of the thesis offers a debate based on examples from transitional justice settings, and suggests 
that fragmentation in international law is not only a fact but also a necessity to overcome the 
impasse of its tainted legacy in the Global South. Crimes against humanity and the universal 
jurisdiction dictum pertaining to their adjudication constitute no exception to this state of affairs, 
and if we are to proceed with adjudication of the most egregious and heinous crimes, we must 
allow for localized and domesticated interpretation of these crimes rather than strict legislative 
dictation ordered by international institutions such as the ICC. As such, limitations to universal 
jurisdiction lead us to a reformulation of accountability from within international criminal law.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
APRIL is the cruellest month, breeding 
  
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing   
Memory and desire, stirring   
Dull roots with spring rain.   
Winter kept us warm, covering      5 
Earth in forgetful snow, feeding   
A little life with dried tubers.   
  
  
  What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow  
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,  20 
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only   
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,   
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,  
And the dry stone no sound of water. Only   
There is shadow under this red rock,  25 
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock),   
And I will show you something different from either   
Your shadow at morning striding behind you   
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you;   
I will show you fear in a handful of dust. 
 
T.S. Eliot (1888–1965). The Waste Land. 1922.  
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This work is a concerted attempt to achieve an informed interpolation between ethics, 
politics and legal scholarship on international law, with reference to the specific category of 
universal jurisdiction as it pertains to crimes against humanity. It posits that critical perspectives 
from the Global South, combined with a transnational understanding of international law and a 
committed inclusion of political judgment and collective responsibility for mass crimes, would 
create a radically different framework for the debate on the normative underpinnings and 
procedural qualities of universal jurisdiction in international criminal law.  
In this vein, the dissertation in hand brings together three seemingly distinct areas of 
scholarly endeavour: jurisprudential debates on international criminal law, international relations  
and international law scholarship on state sovereignty, and applied political philosophy. It strives 
to offer a compelling view of the future of international legal reasoning and legal theory 
concerning the workings of accountability regimes in the Global South. It purports a critical 
analysis of the prescriptive norms and institutions of modern international criminal law in the 
area of universal jurisdiction, and argues with courage and caution that international law has the 
capacity to advance values concerning the sanctity of human life, as long as it is not regarded as a 
closed and rigid system leading to the perpetual victimization of states and societies in the Global 
South.  
 Numerous international lawyers approved of the 1999 bombing of Serbia by the members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, despite the fact that some felt it was not compatible 
with a strict reading of the UN Charter on matters of concern for state sovereignty.1 The 
argumentative techniques through which international law scholars tried to abide by their moral 
intuitions despite the obvious legal incoherence pertaining to the case of Yugoslav wars signifies 
a general turn to ethics in legal theory, especially in the field of international criminal law. The 
shallow and often hazardous moralization involved in justifying pro forma application of 
jurisdictional maxims such as those present in crimes against humanity legislation constitutes a 
similar challenge. If we are to avoid the danger of international criminal law becoming a 
behemoth of an oppressive instrument, put to the service of the foreign policy choices of states 
																																																								
1 See Martti Koskenniemi, "‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International 
Law" (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 159. 
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and constituencies marked by power and privilege, it must assume the prowess of deliberation 
and persuasion rather than relying entirely on heavy-handed institutionalization and codification. 
 The question is, in the absence of widespread consent and with minimal threat of 
coercion, why sovereign states are expected to obey international law. This dissertation 
approaches the subject matter from a different angle: rather than why they should, I venture to 
ask why states choose to embrace certain core principles of international criminal law. In the 
following pages, the question of what compels domestic constituencies to owe allegiance to a 
higher set of rules, when each country has its own law of the land, will be treated with care, given 
the damning history of international law as seen from the Global South. The prevailing legal 
realist view holds that countries act simply out of self-interest, and that if they consent to 
international law, they only consent to norms and principles to regulate matters of common 
interest in which they are involved. Here, the emphasis remains squarely on the state as the 
ultimate unit of international law. This dissertation is written against such a presumption; it 
purports to understand international criminal law as a transnational phenomenon shaped by 
multiple legal actors, the state being only one of them. At the same time, international courts such 
as the International Criminal Court (ICC) should not be made into a modern-day messiah of 
international criminal law. This debate is very difficult to hold, more so even than questioning the 
sanctity of the state in international law, particularly in an area such as crimes against humanity, 
given their heinous nature. In the following pages, these two debates—namely, criticism of state-
centric views of international law, and considerations of the limits of universal jurisdiction in 
international criminal law—inform each other and are brought together under the aegis of the 
concept of political judgment. Though rich in examples from the field of international law and 
international institutions pertaining to adjudication of crimes against humanity, the theoretical 
contribution of this work lies in the challenges it poses for received wisdom on the foundations of 
international criminal law, and its critique of the practical ambitions of the international legal 
system of accountability established since World War II. 
 In this vein, in the first half of the dissertation, the concept of state sovereignty and its 
derivatives in international law are unpacked using the tools of comparative politics and 
international relations scholarship, as well as pioneering work in the area of international law. 
The second half is allocated to the debate on adjudication of crimes against humanity in the post-
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ICC era. The lens through which this composite analysis is achieved is the jurisprudential basis of 
crimes against humanity legislation in international law. Since 1945, the role played by political 
judgment in the deliverance of justice in international criminal law has assumed unprecedented 
proportions, given the extreme nature of the crimes listed under this body of laws. This 
dissertation, however, takes issue in this regard with both of the existing models, namely, the 
dualist and monist renditions of international law. Briefly, the dualist perspective claims 
international law to be alien to domestic law.2 It characterizes international law as imposing and 
undemocratic, and thus only appropriations of it through internal deliberation are deemed 
acceptable. This approach is typical of the dominant trends in American and German 
jurisprudential thought, as well as some of the emergent critiques from the Global South, 
particularly among the Muslim-majority countries and East Asia. The monist perspective, on the 
other hand, is the darling of international law scholars with an institutionalist bent, particularly 
regarding the issue of universal jurisdiction. Monism advocates 'universal principles,’ applicable 
in all contexts due to their claimed normative superiority. In this regard, the ICC’s embrace of 
crimes against humanity constitutes a prime candidate for critical analysis, as the core crimes 
enlisted in the Court’s enabling statute are indeed a colossal affront to the whole of humanity, 
and yet there are significant problems regarding the path followed by their adjudication. 
According to the monist perspective, particularly in international criminal law, no caveats should 
be accepted or even proposed, and the standards set by institutions such as the ICC are to be 
accepted as non-negotiable in their nature. Exceptions are made only due to procedural delays, 
and even then these are regarded a matter of providing sufficient evidence in due time, rather than 
affecting the normative and legal validity of the legislation itself. 
 In this context, the present work poses the question of whether a third perspective is 
possible—not as an in-between, but as one based on a more dynamic understanding of 
international criminal law. The discussion presented in each of the six chapters indicates that, 
especially in the Global South, if international criminal law’s adjudication mechanisms and 
procedural aspects are emphasized at the expense of its core normative premises, the whole 																																																								
2 See Harold Hongju Koh, "Trasnational Legal Process" (1996) 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, and Abram Chayes & Antonia 
Handler Chayes. The new sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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enterprise runs the risk of becoming suspect. Specifically, this work is constructed around two 
methodological investigations. The first one attempts to unpack the normative framework within 
which international law is commonly perceived. This effort guides the line of questioning 
framing the first three chapters of the thesis. The presumed alignment of international and 
domestic law in the area of universal jurisdiction constitutes the example on which such an 
inquiry is based. The second methodological investigation is built upon the Arendtian notion of 
political judgment, as opposed to the procedure-oriented understanding of international criminal 
law. Here, the aim is to shed light on how different interpretations of core jurisprudence could be 
reconciled without excessive dependency on an overarching institution such as the ICC. The case 
in point is again crimes against humanity legislation and its multiple reiterations at the level of ad 
hoc, regional, and hybrid courts. This latter methodological investigation is undertaken in the last 
three chapters of the present work.  
 All of the chapters of this dissertation deal with concerns about the larger debate on 
international law and problems of incongruity among the spheres of domestic and international 
law. This is done with a desire to move forward, as the case at hand is that of egregious and 
unforgivable crimes committed by states against their own people. To this end, the chapters on 
universal jurisdiction and hybrid courts present findings from criminal law trials and case law in 
order to showcase the interaction and fluidity connecting these two spheres of juridical action—
the domestic and the international. Vis-à-vis the domestic sphere, one is forced to acknowledge 
the importance of national norms about the constitution of criminality, due to their socio-political 
effectiveness and long-term legitimacy. Meanwhile, when the frame of analysis is shifted to 
international [criminal] law, one has to deal with an uncomfortable reality that marks the field: it 
does not have a history of egalitarian decision-making, equal participation, or transparent and 
regulated relations.3 Secondly, there appears to be a problem concerning the unaddressed nature 
of the divide separating international humanitarian and human rights law from other spheres of 
international law, in terms of whether and when one can put a caveat on value pluralism. Thus 
far, the question of whether jurisprudence pertaining to erga omnes crimes could be legitimately 
relativized—just as states negotiate trade or labor laws, for instance—has largely been avoided 																																																								
3 See Jean Cohen, "Whose sovereignty? Empire versus international law" (2004) 18 Ethics & International Affairs 1. 
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due to the very nature of the violence embodied by these acts. There are certain absolutes in these 
select areas, absolutes that could go against demands emanating from local circumstances. On 
these issues, international criminal law avoids the notion of political deliberation like the plague, 
for fear of allowing future reversals or tempering with the unacceptability of crimes that fall 
under crimes against humanity legislation. What we are faced with on the ground, however, 
reveals a rather different reality of the adjudication of these egregious crimes.  
 At this point, Hannah Arendt’s work is introduced in earnest to the debate on international 
criminal law. In Arendt’s analysis of crimes against humanity, the Aristotelian notion of politics 
as engagement and the Kantian notion of reflectiveness in judgment are brought together to make 
sense of how to put the unforgivable to trial. Though Arendt's work on political judgment was 
left unfinished, as she was working on it at the time of her death, she left us enough to work with, 
especially when read alongside the work of Karl Jaspers and others on the notion of collective 
responsibility for societal and political crimes. Here, a distinction is made between the validity of 
all possible moral persuasions—the old-fashioned legal pluralism argument—versus adherence to 
an overall jurisprudential framework while remaining open to pluralistic participation and 
interpretation of legislation at the domestic and regional levels. Specifically, this dissertation 
posits that the Arendtian notion of political judgment allows for engagement, deliberation and 
involvement, and thus offers us a democratic promise for the global application of international 
criminal law. Its cutting-edge quality can be identified as that of politics of persuasion. Here, 
judgment would not allow for absolutes. In cases such as crimes against humanity, however, one 
is obliged to consider certain absolutes in order to establish criminality and thresholds of 
admissibility for evidence. The only way to resolve this dilemma is to claim that taking an 
absolute stance against such crimes is morally defendable. In other words, everyone would as a 
matter of the very basis of their humanity potentially agree that certain acts constitute egregious 
crimes. This is perhaps similar to the universal codification of murder—other than in proven 
instances of self-defense—as a crime within the domestic sphere. However, another difficulty 
emerges here: how to separate the jurisprudential approach that accepts differences in normative 
political judgments pertaining to the adjudication of crimes against humanity from the 
aforementioned monist defense of universal jurisdiction? This is the critical junction that the 
debate on universal jurisdiction has arrived at in the post-ICC era. As argued in the following 
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pages, formations such as hybrid courts in the Global South attending cases of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity point to possible new directions that could be taken.  
 The main practical concern fueling all of these inquiries is the following: one cannot force 
jurisprudential maxims of international organizations such as the ICC upon societies that are 
violating the basic principles framing crimes against humanity legislation unless there is a degree 
of value convergence in place. The issue them becomes how to find a normative common ground 
upon which domestic courts would willingly incorporate bodies of international law such as ICC-
led legislation if and when the need arises, and also hand over criminals to venues like the ICC 
for trial if they are unable to pursue the case, without such cooperation being seen as yet another 
hegemonic intervention.4 Instead of appearing as a stable set of normative demands, international 
law is better understood as an aspect of hegemony-building and maintenance, but which can also 
be used as a technique of articulating political claims in terms of legal rights and duties against 
the powers that be. Accordingly, the looming controversies in international law concerning the 
use of force, the law of peace, human rights, trade and globalization in effect reflect strategies 
through which political actors seek to make their preferences appear to be universal, or to 
confront the universality claims of others. However, how much purposive ending of life through 
organized political violence, and its justification by the very institutions responsible for 
protecting individuals and communities, could be open to negotiation? Thus, the question 
remains: how can one proceed from the Arendtian notion of the involved, negotiating, persuasive 
strategy/act of producing judgments to the adjudication of justice in cases of crimes against 
humanity? Unless one is open to institutional and dialogical interventions, building up normative 
commitments from the bottom up, how could international criminal law provide a genuinely 
common language of jurisprudence for egregious acts exemplified by crimes against humanity? 
 In a larger context, international law in general, and international criminal law in 
particular, is facing new challenges in the post 9/11 era, though only some of these are related to 
the emergence of the ‘new terrorism’ discourse in international politics. Reservations about the 
																																																								
4 On the issue of the hegemonic purchase of international law, see Detlev F. Vagts, "Hegemonic international 
law" (2001) 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 843; Martti Koskenniemi, "International law and hegemony: a reconfiguration" (2004) 
17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197, and, Nico Krisch, "International law in times of hegemony: 
unequal power and the shaping of the international legal order" (2005) 16 European Journal of International 
Law 369.  
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role and function of international law in domestic affairs are on the rise. These range from 
marked skepticism about the authority and utility of international law vis-à-vis local conditions, 
to caution about how international law could be effected within the domestic sphere without 
undermining the foundations of the legal systems at the local level. The European Union is a case 
in point, showing how even the most elaborate regional efforts for juridical unification can 
backfire in unforeseen directions.5 Across Europe, the debate about the relevance of international 
law is beginning to be conducted in such pointed language that a constant underlining of the 
dangers and limits of constitutional adjustments to ‘foreign law’ has become the tenor of 
domestic contestations.6 Law that falls beyond the purview of domestic legislation is in effect 
characterized as fundamentally anti-democratic and top-down. This point of view is no doubt 
paralleled by a highly negative perception of the legitimacy of international law, as it is reduced 
to a mechanism that obligates states to justify their local/national practices if they deviate from a 
supposedly universally coded but relatively alien set of standards. National protectionism also 
propagates the already mentioned monism/dualism dichotomy in law, portraying international 
law either as an external body of law capable of penetrating the national legal order without 
democratic consent, or as a corpus of alien jurisprudence that must be rigorously filtered through 
the prism of national constitutional law if it is to accrue any benefit for local constituencies.7  
In the face of mounting challenges to international law’s legitimacy—at least in select 
areas of jurisprudence such as crimes against humanity legislation—priority must be given not to 
prescriptions for an institutionally-mandated procedural straightjacket, but rather to elucidating 
minimal normative consensus and emphasizing political processes that hinge upon the persuasive 																																																								
5 Concerns regarding the role of international law are particularly evident in contemporary, post-failed Constitution 
Europe. In Germany, for instance, the federal constitutional court has positioned itself as a bulwark between the 
national legal system and the two European legal orders the court is a part of—namely, the European Union and the 
European Court of Human Rights. In the United Kingdom, long before Brexit, the government sought to derogate 
from the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in specific cases related to terrorism. See 
Karen Alter, Establishing the supremacy of European law: The making of an international rule of law in Europe. 
Oxford University Press, 2001; Lisa Conant, Justice contained: law and politics in the European Union (Cornell 
University Press, 2002); Alec Stone & Thomas Lloyd Brunell, The judicial construction of Europe (Oxford 
University Press, 2004), and, Rachel A. Cichowski, The European court and civil society: litigation, mobilization 
and governance (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
6 See the debate presented in the Special Issue of American Journal of International Law, in particular Gerald 
Neuman, “The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation” (2004) 98 American Journal of 
International Law 82 and Roger Alford, "Misusing international sources to interpret the constitution" (2004) 98 The 
American Journal of International Law 57.  
7See Jonathan Turley, “Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence” (1993) 44 Hastings Law Journal 
185.  
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function of law and legal norms as political judgments. This alternative formulation could 
possibly result in the refashioning of international criminal law, not as dictated by an overriding 
and authoritative discourse, but as a normative enterprise and an evolving negotiation conditioned 
by legitimate and locally endorsed judgments. In this new framework, international and 
constitutional norms could be understood as contextually interrelated rather than as conflicting 
legal points of reference or frames of jurisprudential meaning. 
According to the traditional dualist perspective, the ultimate legitimate source of legal 
norms is the democratic process itself. Accordingly, international norms—even those concerning 
human rights—are domestically enforceable only to the extent that they are incorporated into 
existing legal order through acts of statutory legislation.8 As such, the relationship between 
public international law and domestic law is constructed as a tenuous interaction between two 
separate realms. This point of view is deeply affected by concern that international norms can 
have an immediate and/or unmediated effect on domestic legal structures and choices. When such 
interventions are allowed to take place, the argument goes, they will lead to the emergence of an 
unaccountable judiciary answering only to its own professional norms of conduct at the expense 
of domestic legal and political prerogatives. Hence we witness the equation of international law 
with the abdication and delegation of [national] sovereignty. Such an objection, often expressed 
in terms of the cultural or institutional incompatibility of international jurisprudence with local 
settings, assumes that norms of public international law potentially clash with local democratic 
commitments. This is a particularly sore point, which clouds the horizons of international human 
rights activism by challenging the local legitimacy of their demands and claims. Equally 
worrisome, however, is questioning of the status of the moral principles and political reasoning 
present in international criminal law. These bodies of law are perceived as falling outside the 
bounded community of the nation-state and thus lacking a proper grounding.9 This deep-rooted 
suspicion of international law is commonly justified by means of a contractarian view of 																																																								
8 See Gerald L. Neuman, “Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance” (2003) 55 Stanford 
Law Review 1863.  
9 Seyla Benhabib, “On the Alleged Conflict Between Democracy and International Law” (2005) 19 Ethics and 
International Affairs 85; Allen Buchanan, Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for 
international law (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2007); Gregory Shaffer, "International law and global public 
goods in a legal pluralist world" (2012) 23 European journal of international law 669; Nico Krisch, "The decay of 
consent: international law in an age of global public goods"(2014) 108 American Journal of International Law 1; and 
Charles De Visscher, Theory and reality in public international law (Princeton University Press, 2015).  
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democratic legitimacy of law, vehemently defended both in the North and the Global South in the 
name of state sovereignty. Accordingly, the domain of constitutional law takes on an intrinsic 
epistemological priority over the purportedly uneven and unpredictable domain of international 
law.  This position is based on the assumption that there is a high level of social and political 
convergence in the domestic sphere capable of providing a unique moral texture to domestic law.  
Unfortunately, in contemporary international law discourse, this lack of ‘universal 
justification’ is hardly ever taken seriously and thus is only dealt with summarily, as a legal detail 
rather than a substantive issue. At this point, the following pages will argue, the plot thickens. It 
is true that the origins of international law are not based on consensus. The whole enterprise owes 
its existence to laws of war, treaty obligations, customary practices and unequal and yet binding 
contracts, always protecting the sanctity of the Westphalian state system. However, the resultant 
historical fragmentation of international law into parallel regimes such as trade, environment, 
human rights, international criminal law, et cetera, signify international law’s failure to become a 
panopticon-like structure.10 This fragmentation could indeed be regarded as a result of law’s 
intimate relationship with power, politics, hegemony, discontent, indeterminacy and change.  As 
such, international law could be portrayed, in opposition to the presumed purism of the domestic 
legal system that reflects a solid political contract among citizens, as a complex platform of 
conflicts, negotiations, and legal regime-building strategies. These issues are discussed in detail 
in the chapter on transnational law and fragmented regimes of accountability in international 
criminal law.  
From international law's inception in the Grotian legal tradition onwards, international 
legal discourse has been shaped by a constitutive tension between a view of law as having a 
contractual genesis, and a view of law as reflecting conflictual moral claims dictated by the 
specific demands of contending parties.11 This tension in turn feeds into two competing accounts 
not only of legitimation but also adjudication. The former account, which relies upon private law 
metaphors such as delegation and trusteeship, emphasizes the necessity of deference to the will of 
states as representatives of political communities. Its alternative, on the other hand, prioritizes the 																																																								
10Martti Koskenniemi & Pkivi Lein, “Fragmentation of International Law: Postmodern Anxieties” (2002) 5 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 556.  
11 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International 
Law 1.  
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emergence of common normative principles in the conduct of legal reasoning and delivery of 
justice.12 The latter account also proposes the possibility of a common global legal enterprise of 
adjudication based on the juxtaposition of constitutional and international legal systems in select 
areas. In situations where legal standards differ, and where an international body might interpret 
an act in a way that runs counter to settled features of domestic constitutional law, international 
law is suggestive of adjustments to be made to the domestic constitutional realm. Examples of 
this could yield both positive and negative results for domestic constituencies, as is deliberated 
upon in critical debates on public international law. Ultimately, however, this scenario 
substantiates the dualists’ ultimate fear: the erasure of the domestic legal order and its 
adjudicative acquis. As the present work suggests, international criminal law needs to rise to the 
challenge of surpassing these two opposing accounts of adjudication and to come up with a 
judgment-oriented model for the realization of an alignment between international and domestic 
legal spheres.  
Needless to say, constitutions do more than merely provide legal guarantees for the 
individual by protecting her freedoms against the interventions of public authority, i.e. the state, 
or other individuals, communities and corporate bodies. Constitutions also indicate that the state 
has a protective function regarding the rights spelled out by the constitution, including 
guaranteeing equal access to their use. Meanwhile, the programmatic and open-ended content of 
fundamental rights cannot be determined by or derived from the traditions of constitutional or 
administrative law sui generis. Furthermore, excessive widening of the province of judicial action 
could lead to courts outgrowing their role as catalysts of justice provision, and their becoming 
political actors themselves at the expense of actual politics. Consequently, they could become 
drawn into the very center of political conflicts and controversies. Tackling interpretive 
disagreements, in this context, could no longer be considered simply a matter of debating the 
inner meanings of law itself. Once constitutional adjudication is involved in the resolution of 
political-epistemic conflicts, the integrative portal of constitutional law is faced with the 
impossible task of replacing political dialogue. In legal theory, the dualist perspective rejects the 
validity of international law based on a similar logic. The dualists insist that within a 																																																								
12 It is true that international norms are bound by contractual regimes. Meanwhile, legal codes such as those 
exemplified by crimes against humanity legislation indicate absolute terms as a result of which they are expected to 
be endorsed in statu nascendi.   
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heterogeneous and morally divided society—whether defined in domestic or international 
terms—law should mainly assume the function of establishing a stable framework of rules of 
interaction, and nothing more. Law, then, is to reveal itself qua law. Consequently, judicial 
discretion built into the process of adjudication is limited to clarifying the antecedent meaning of 
law and monitoring compliance. This kind of unabashed extrapolation from domestic 
constitutional law debates to the workings of international law is a commonly used strategy. 
Though the argument merits attention, it hides the essentially hegemonic nature of legal systems 
in the domestic realm, as well. This issue is particularly critical for developing a deeper 
understanding of state criminality, both within the domestic sphere and from a transnational point 
of view.13  
Another key dimension of this larger debate on law’s legitimacy pertains to voluntary 
compliance with law.14 No doubt visible guarantees of institutional and third-party enforcement 
cannot be identified as the only reasons for why such compliance occurs. In democratic 
constitutional regimes, the absence of morally reprehensible means for ensuring compliance to 
law, such as torture, rape or slavery, implies (at least in principle) that members of the constituent 
political community are bound by a common ideal of justice, above and beyond particularistic 
factors such as ethnic, religious, historical and cultural identities. Could there not be a similar, 
underlying agreement concerning a common ideal of justice in international criminal law? As 
already stated, the difficulty about international law is that a contractual ideal of justice cannot be 
claimed as the origin of existing legal systems beyond the confines of the modern nation-
state.15 In this specific context, evolving standards of international law are regarded as subject to 
mechanisms of structurally ‘incomplete’ approval processes exemplified by treaty and customary 
law. As such, legal institutional practices such as the adjudication of crimes against humanity are 
considered lacking in legitimacy. Their adoption requires a common agreement about their 
normative framing. However, since they are triggered at the behest of aggrieved individuals and 
as ex post facto developments in de-nationalized or hybrid settings, involved states tend to detest 																																																								
13 See Gregg Barak, ed. Crimes by the capitalist state: An introduction to state criminality (SUNY Press, 1991); Nina 
Jørgensen, The responsibility of states for international crimes (Oxford University Press, 2000); Rothe, Dawn 
L. State criminality: The crime of all crimes (Lexington Books, 2009); David Luban, "State criminality and the 
ambition of international criminal law" in Accountability for collective wrongdoing (2011): 61-91.  
14See Frank Michelman, “Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United 
States and South Africa” (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 1378.  
15See Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice” (2005) 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs 113.  
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platforms of adjudication such as those required by crimes against humanity legislation. Contrary 
to the assertions of contractarian or dualist models of international law, rights and rulings that are 
defined above and beyond the state are intrinsically political rather than procedural. If perceived 
as such, international law neither seeks nor depends on full adoption of its codes by constitutional 
regimes, otherwise known as the expectation of law’s working itself pure.16 The Hayekian values 
of certainty, stability, and efficiency are no doubt as important for the workings of international 
law as they are for domestic law; however, conflation of the boundaries of political communities 
such as those purportedly represented by contemporary states with ethical prerogatives is a 
dangerous fiction for all concerned. Such a conception of a institutionally closed, historically 
self-referential and normatively sealed system of domestic law as a coherent and self-reliant legal 
edifice stands in direct opposition to the production of legal norms concerning state criminality 
exemplified by crimes against humanity legislation.  
In conclusion, if international criminal law is re-introduced as an engaged practice of 
aligned adjudication and, in tandem, as a persuasion-based strategy of new norm production 
rather than the emphasis being placed on criminialization of select states, its potential for re-
contextualizing international law and introducing a new dynamism to local understandings of 
justice may readily unfold. International criminal law is normative by necessity, and it requires 
the active usage of political judgment at a systemic level. Wishing otherwise only leads to 
disastrous results, as seen in the widespread reactions to ICC indictments across the Global 
South. Normative conduct with legal legitimacy cannot be limited to the domestic constitutional 
realm. The remaining question is whether such a reflective and involved account of legal 
legitimacy presents us with the required ability to rise above particular frames of meaning in such 
a way as to enable valid cross-communal judgments concerning mass criminality. Here, justice as 
an ideal endorsed by international criminal law would have to operate as a competing template 
that shows the limitations of our own local intuitions. Would this perspective allow for certain 
acts to be ruled out universally, such as those coded by crimes against humanity legislation? No 
matter how the ideal of justice is perceived and ethically patterned—in the case of international 
criminal law, reference has to be made to the Eurocentric historical background of the emergent 
legal regimes—singularly violent moral commitments cannot be justified as the cornerstone of a 																																																								
16 See David Dyzenhaus, “The Genealogy of Legal Positivism” (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 39. 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normative structure within which valid political judgments can be reached. In other words, legal 
actors who have committed crimes against humanity cannot justify their actions based on the 
perceived needs of a given constitutional order, whether European, post-colonial, or otherwise. 
Vis-à-vis crimes against humanity legislation, the line of demarcation in terms of normative 
legitimacy cannot be addressed within the confines of how political communities govern 
themselves. In this regard, this dissertation posits that salvation for international criminal law in 
this particular area would come from a ‘thin’ rather than a ‘thick’ universalism. Ultimately, a 
substantive theory of judgment is required to combat the excesses of universalism, 
institutionalism, legal realism, legal positivism, contextualism and relativism. Understanding the 
role of genuine politics in the formation of legal judgment is an essential part of this endeavor. 
Indeed, it is this particular aspect of legal judgment that determines the path of both its making 
and its application in divergent contexts. The world of international criminal law outside the 
confines of the Hague calls for genuine exploration as a conceptual project as well as a moral 
imperative.  
I. METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation uses applied legal theory and comparative international law as its two 
prime methodological tools in the building and exposition of its main arguments and findings 
about global applications of crimes against humanity legislation. Its chronological focus is the 
post-WWI period of adjudication of international crimes, with a particular emphasis on post-2002 
developments following the entering into force of the Rome Statute. The overall theoretical 
framework guiding the present debate on universal jurisdiction and crimes against humanity is 
indebted to the approach to international law developed and articulated by third generation of 
legal pluralism and TWAIL [Third World Approaches to International Law] scholarship. The 
particular debate on collective responsibility, on the other hand, uses concepts utilized in applied 
political philosophy as they pertain to international criminal law. The examples referenced 
throughout the text are drawn from international criminal law jurisprudence and case material 
related to state criminality exhibited in both the global North and the Global South. However, the 
critical lens used to analyze the overall developments in international criminal law and related 
accountability regimes prioritizes the experiences of societies in the Global South.  
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International law’s discontents and excesses have always been exhibited at their starkest 
along its peripheries, a realm that has otherwise come to be known as the Global South.17 The 
relationship between the peripheries and the core of international law has been historically 
captured by TWAIL scholarship. However, as TWAIL scholars readily attest, the Global South is 
not solely defined by victimhood but by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic relations, shifting 
and changing class alliances, and regional hubs of power and accumulation, rather than being the 
southern part of a globe neatly divided into two. The complexity and multiple tensions within the 
Global South are symptomatic of the general state of affairs in late capitalism. And yet, this is not 
simply a case of the periphery mirroring what happens at the core. There are voices, forces and 
opportunities that emanate from the Global South that take issue with, challenge and alter the 
very enterprise of international law as it is shrouded on a pedestal at the core.  
In response to the growth of international law’s involvements in the global management 
of resources, movements of goods and people, and sustaining and embellishing accumulation 
regimes across the Global South, there emerged a strong call against some of the key tenets of 
international law since the 1990s. For instance, alter-globalization activists found their voice in 
alternative governance models built upon North-South and red-green alliances, bringing together 
organized labor, environmental groups, women's groups, and indigenous groups. Similarly, 
different genres of protest movements began to propose alternative frames of reference both for 
seeking justice and challenging traditional limits of adjudication in areas devastated by organized 
violence, both political and economic. These distinct, albeit overlapping, responses to 
international law, coming from legal scholars and in particular human rights lawyers linked with 
the Global South, as well as activists and civil society groups, are indicative of a new conceptual 
model for how we work with, translate, undo and redo international law.  
 
 
																																																								
17 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “International Law and Its Discontents: Rethinking the Global South” (2012) 106th 
American Society of International Law Proceedings, p. 176, March 2012. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2304309 [25.04.2017]  
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A. TWAIL: Both Methodology and Theory18 
In this dissertation, I apply the rich and layered conceptual framework inherited from 
TWAIL scholarship, combined with the activism and scholarship nexus in the Global South, to a 
very specific area of international criminal law, that of universal jurisdiction as it pertains to 
crimes against humanity. My point of departure is not the implications of the global application 
of crimes against humanity legislation in international public law since the end of the Cold War. 
Rather, I strive to elucidate the limitations of this particular legal construct’s applicability in a 
rigid and ahistorical frame of reference dictated by centralized institutions such as international 
courts. As a conceptual counterpoint to such an absolutist take, I argue that normative strategies 
centered on the twin concepts of culpability/collective responsibility and human dignity could 
offer a conceptually coherent and politically buoyant alternative. Furthermore, I argue that there 
is an urgent need for a new frame of reference concerning erga omnes crimes and jus cogens 
norms in order for international criminal law to speak to the realities of societies in the Global 
South. This cannot be achieved through a simple reiteration of the conceptual precision of crimes 
against humanity legislation, or the threat of universal jurisdiction pointing to trial at any court in 
any constituency as seen fit. Indeed, there is an impasse concerning applications of international 
criminal law, but in particular concerning crimes against humanity legislation in the Global 
South. In this regard, critiquing state-centric notions of sovereign power or underlining the 
hegemonic role played by international law in calcifying inherent power relations across the 
globe only provides the beginnings of a critical conversation. In the following pages, I argue that 
we need to go much further and dare to imagine a different path, leading to adjudication of 
crimes against humanity much closer to where these crimes are committed. I also suggest that, on 
the normative plane, the dictum of universal jurisdiction must be domesticated through 
acceptance of collective responsibility for mass crimes and state criminality.  
Critically navigating through the prevailing perspectives on international law, legal 
pluralism, transitional justice, and legal ethics, this dissertation suggests that the current global 
restructuring of legal regimes of accountability is reproducing subjectivities of marginalized, 
dispossessed and deinstitutionalized groups in such a way that the terrain of political struggles are 																																																								18 	See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Critical Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL): theory, 
methodology, or both?" (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 371.	
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reduced to symbolic trials and formulaic sentencing. Here I propose an alternative outlook, 
obliging the spirit of facing our own demons in the Global South and asking substantive ethical 
questions about culpability, legal accountability, and societal responsibility concerning egregious 
crimes that states and societies commit against their own people.  
A major consequence of the global restructuring of economies, societies and states in the 
Global South has been the twin processes of further market integration and privatization of what 
were once common or public goods, on the one hand, and unprecedented social exclusion, 
precariousness, and dispossession on the other.19 These processes naturally resulted in further 
growth of the marginalized, displaced and deinstitutionalized subaltern classes, who often 
became the natural targets for mass political violence at times of societal crises linked with 
internal or regional conflicts. Standard international law debates on post-conflict legal regimes 
and transitional justice measures barely touch base with this reality of structural inequalities that 
preceded mass political violence.20 In this spirit, this dissertation seeks to understand and 
transform the way in which legal regimes of accountability affecting the Global South are studied 
in international criminal law. The emphasis is on the larger historical context surrounding these 
legal regimes and the limitations faced when law is used as the only or supreme tool for the 
identification and remedy of injustices.  
Ultimately, I remain concerned with institutional formalization of ideals such as universal 
jurisdiction for societal and political mass crimes in international criminal law. Similarly, the 
emergence of set forms of punishment for crimes falling under the purview of crimes against 
humanity legislation, as enshrined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
deserves critical questioning. In this vein, this work strives to provide an account of 
interpretations of crimes against humanity legislation against the terrain of self-realization, self-
organization and genuine political engagement with the past in the Global South. It is written 
against apocalyptic and dystopian narratives detailing the usurping and hegemonic monstrosity of 
international law as much as against the universalistic preaching of it. This constitutes a vital 
challenge to dominant narratives of international criminal law both from within the status quo 
																																																								
19 Asef Bayat, “From Dangerous Classes' to Quiet Rebels' Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South” 
(2000) 15 International sociology 533.  20	Anne Orford et al. The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016)	
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and, to a degree, from the trenches of critical legal studies scholarship. There are inherent limits, 
as well, to the standard readings of legal pluralism as the savior for all ills of international law.  
Conceptually speaking, the Global South is one of the many “gray spaces” positioned 
between the “whiteness” of legality/certainty, and the “blackness” of 
irregularity/destruction/death. The vast expansion of such gray spaces in contemporary 
geographies of conflict reflects the emergence of new types of power relations, which are 
facilitated and managed by regimes in the Global South themselves. Traditional uses of 
international law have been a lynchpin of this order, providing tools and methodologies to 
classify, contain and manage deeply unequal societies. As a possible corrective horizon enabling 
analytical and normative interventions, I propose focusing on the notion of societal/collective 
responsibility as a counter-weight to the oppressive dilemmas marking the current discourse and 
practice of international law as it pertains to crimes against humanity, the most universal of all 
crimes defined under its aegis.  
 Overall, in this work I propose two kinds of upheaval. First and foremost, I insist that the 
story about post-Nuremberg embodiments of crimes against humanity should no longer be told as 
one where the states and societies in the Global South are striving hard to establish or 
operationalize accountability regimes, yet have only a few  
“success stories.” Nor should the accent remain on the universalistic analysis of international 
criminal law with its focus on the core legal institutions, since their authoritative take on crimes 
against humanity has proven to be inadequate, inappropriate, or incomplete. My findings imply 
that as a new generation of TWAIL scholars, we must identify the potential, and the limits, of an 
external imposition of international criminal law without serious contextualization in both 
historical and normative terms. Crimes against humanity legislation, and their domestication, are 
sorely needed by the societies in the Global South—but not in the format in which they have 
been offered thus far.  
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B. The Neverland of International Law, or, Searching for the Global South21 
How is the concept of the “Global South” to be understood in the context of international 
(criminal) law? Though this is not the main focus of the present work, it is a very important part 
of the metholodogical framework utilized throughout this work. This question is also central for 
dealing with gross and egregious crimes committed in the Global South, ones that cannot 
currently be addressed within the domestic legal setting in which the crimes were committed. 
Applications of the existing dominant conceptual framework of international law to such cases 
only produce more of the same: repeat scenarios of the universalization of international human 
rights and humanitarian law, despite the opposing histories of these bodies of jurisprudence and 
their meaning in the North and in the South. As a conceptual counterpoint to neutralized 
universalization, and as an activist strategy towards rights protection and demands for 
accountability, the need for greater conceptual precision in the analysis of international criminal 
law should be reiterated. Chronologically speaking, the term “Global South” began to be used to 
overcome the hierarchical or ideological implications of designations such as the Third World.22 
It is also preferred if one refuses to attach epistemological privileges to adjectives of 
“developing” or “developed” as both are applied to the Global South. In the context of 
international law, the term owes its legitimacy mainly to TWAIL scholarship. This poses the risk, 
then, of the Global South becoming a moniker for people who engage in “alternative approaches” 
to international law. In other words, just as revolutions eat their own children, the very coinage of 																																																								
21 Neverland is a fictional location featured in the works of J. M. Barrie, a Scottish children’s literature writer. It was 
first introduced as "the Never Never Land" in the theatre play titled Peter Pan, or the Boy Who Wouldn’t Grow Up, 
staged in 1904.  It is thus commonly known as the home of Peter Pan, who refused to grow up; the concept connotes 
eternal childhood, hence my reference to it in this specific context.  
22 The idea of the Third World dates back to the late 1940s or early 1950s. In the aftermath of the Second World 
War, it was increasingly used to try and generate unity and support among an emergent group of nation-states whose 
governments were reluctant to take sides in the Cold War. These leaders and governments thus displaced the “East–
West” conflict with the “North–South” conflict. The rise of Third Worldism as an ideology, on the other hand, 
coincides with the 1950s and 1960s, and was closely connected to national liberation projects and forms of 
regionalism in the erstwhile colonies of Asia and Africa, the former mandates and new nation-states of the Middle 
East, and the “older” nation-states of Latin America. Exponents of Third Worldism in this period linked it to Pan-
Asianism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Americanism. The weakening or demise of the first generation of 
Third Worldist regimes in the 1960s and 1970s was followed by the emergence of a second generation of Third 
Worldist regimes that articulated a more radical, explicitly socialist, vision. By the 1980s, however, Third Worldism 
was in dramatic decline. As a world-historical movement, Third Worldism emerged out of the activities and ideas of 
anti-colonial nationalists and their efforts to bring together interpretations of pre-colonial traditions and cultures with 
the utopianism embodied by Marxism and socialism, to sustain post-independence projects. On the history of the 
term Third World, see Mark Berger, "After the Third World? History, destiny and the fate of Third Worldism" 
(2004) 25 Third World Quarterly 9.  
	 20	
the term Global South introduced the risk of marginalizing the political and intellectual niche it 
demarcates. Still, it is not only TWAIL scholars who hold onto it, and persistently so. Marxist 
and neo-Marxist critics of contemporary international legal regimes have long pointed out that 
the grid of international law is determined by the distribution of political and economic power, 
which in turn created the phenomenon of Global South in the first place.23 Accordingly, contrary 
to what the term “international” implies, there is not and never was substantive equality across 
the contemporary canvas of nation-states. Nor is there a reason to believe that a global regime of 
universal justice could be built upon or sustained within the existing system, due to the multiple 
layers of historical injustice that have gone perpetuated, unattended or unresolved for centuries. 
The Global South thus emerges as a domain at least partially paralyzed by the zealous plans for 
its recuperation and neocolonial re-incorporation via the laws, politics, economies, and cultures 
of the North.  
This kind of nihilism concerning the reach and potency of international law is not 
exhausted by the debates on the North-South divide. The issue assumes even darker tones and 
more complicated dimensions in terms of South-South relations. Since present work’s focus is on 
problems and concerns addressed from within the states and societies in the Global South, this is 
of utmost significance here. Unequal relations within the Global South are often left unattended, 
only touched upon in terms of the common resistance to the hegemonic nature of North-South 
relations. Despite this tendency, and if such ruminations on neo-imperialist/post-colonial law can 
be set aside momentarily, another perspective on international law as it relates to the Global 
South emerges. This new vista relates to the “internal potential” of adaptations of international 
law in the Global South, without removing the necessary emphasis on power relations or 
historical contingencies.  
Across the Global South, depending on our choice of delimiting or defining criteria, there 
exist patterns of injustice and abuse that do not only stem from the historic or current 
interventions of the North. Equally important is the admission that there is indeed law in the 
																																																								
23 For an interdisciplinary historical account of the flirtatious relationship between Marxism, the Left in general, and 
legal theory, see Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement: Another Time, a Greater Task 
(Verso Books, 2015); Wesley Gould & Michael Barkun, International law and the social sciences (Princeton 
University Press, 2015); Barbara Stark, ed., International Law and its Discontents: Confronting Crises (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
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Global South, rather than its being a lawless place, or its legalities simply being a simulacrum of 
“Western Law.”24 The key issue in this changed context is to decipher variant forms of legality 
above and beyond the classic legal pluralism debate. Taking into consideration tensions endemic 
to fragmented and overlapping legal regimes is a good starting point for the task at hand.25 
Secondly, the Global South encompasses a rich canopy of political entities including not just 
post-colonial nation-states, but also autonomous regional governance structures, federal 
frameworks, overseeing public bodies such as regional courts and regulatory institutions, civil 
society organizations, social and political movements, and embedded transnational actors such as 
INGOs.26 In other words, it is not a mass of ex-colonial semi-states without teeth to bite, or a sea 
of non-descript societies totally subservient to the interests of the North.27 Societies in the Global 
South are not replicas of a post-colonial or post-imperial master model. Rather, they harbour their 
own class structures, variant patterns and regimes of capital accumulation and labor control, and 
different strategies of extraction and amassing of wealth. They also exhibit a wide range of 
regional alliance-building trends and a canopy of constitutional arrangements that regulate the 
relations between state and society. Consequently, it is apt to suggest that the Global South 
possesses a multitude of “unique characteristics” as an object of international law and 
administration, in particular international criminal law, rather than being a derivative of legal 
realities emanating elsewhere, in the proverbial North.  																																																								
24 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 1998).  
25 Legal pluralism has become common currency in many contemporary debates on law, globalization and post-
coloniality since the 1980s. Its most recent proponents claim that a new form of global legal pluralism represents 
both the most accurate description of law in a global context and the best normative option. At the descriptive level, 
transnational legal pluralism is indeed considered more reliable than state-based accounts. At the normative level, 
legal pluralism is similarly trusted to open up spaces for previously unheard voices. On the issue of the limitations of 
legal pluralism, however, see Mariano Croce & Marco Goldoni, "A sense of self-suspicion: global legal pluralism 
and the claim to legal authority" (2015) 8 Ethics & Global Politics 1; Jiří Přibáň, "Asking the Sovereignty Question 
in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio-Legal Theories of Constitutional Power 
Operations" (2015) 28 Ratio Juris 31; Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering pluralism: A conceptual framework for 
understanding the transnational legal world (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009).   
26 For an all-encompassing debate on non-state actors in international law, see Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & 
Cedric Ryngaert, eds., Non-state actors in international law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015). 
27 On the methodology of writing through the prism of the Global South, see the seminal work of Boike Rehbein, 
Critical Theory After the Rise of the Global South: Kaleidoscopic Dialectic. Vol. 5 (Routledge, 2015). Also see R. 
Connell, Southern Theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in social science (Polity Press, 2007); G. Therborn, 
“Entangled Modernities” (2003) 6 European Journal of Social Theory 293; S. Randeria, “Entangled Histories of 
Uneven Modernities: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial India” in: Yehuda Elkana, 
et al. (eds.) Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of Connectedness (Campus Verlag: 2002) at 
284-311; S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities” (2002) 129 Daedalus 1; Anthony Giddens, “Living in a Post-
Traditional Society” in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens & Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition 
and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Polity Press, 1994).  
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Most of all, the Global South is understood as a politico-economic designation broadly 
indicating the contours of the uneven development patterns of historical capitalism.28 The term 
term contains all necessary references for histories of colonization, de-colonization, and post-
coloniality, as well as structurally conditioned material and political inequalities cozily coupled 
up with state-induced injustices. However, these factors by themselves do not explain how 
international criminal law works or how it could work. Uneven development does not suffice as a 
shortcut to societal accountability and collective responsibility. With these convictions in mind, 
in the rest of this chapter debates on universal jurisdiction in international criminal law are 
addressed, not from the vantage point of a North imposing law and order onto the Global South, 
but from the angle of mitigation and litigation in the context of emergent hybrid regimes of 
accountability within the Global South itself. In particular, the possibility of a regime of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” regarding crimes against humanity committed by 
states against their own citizenry will be brought into focus.29 The over-used dichotomies of 
North/South, developed/developing and First World/Third World offer no new or substantive 
clues here. Urgent questions persist, but we must look for answers elsewhere. For instance, how 
could we think through, rather than simply think about, unequal distributions of material wealth 
and political power at a global scale, vis-à-vis their effects on the Global South? How do we deal 
with societal crimes committed within the Global South by regimes themselves? Could specific 																																																								
28 The critical literature on the subject includes Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of 
international law. Vol. 37. (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry, eds. The 
practice of human rights: Tracking law between the global and the local (Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Bhupinder S. Chimni, "Third World approaches to international law: a manifesto” (2006) 8 Int'l Comm. L. Rev. 3; 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, eds,. Law and globalization from below: towards a 
cosmopolitan legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Newness, imperialism, and 
international legal reform in our time: a TWAIL perspective" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171; Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, International law from below: Development, social movements and third world resistance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: law, globalization, 
and emancipation (Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
29 For international criminal law regimes, the importance of the notion of crimes against humanity (CAH) is two-
fold. These are offensive acts against human dignity committed as part of widespread or systemic attack against 
civilian populations. They can be a series of events or a one-time event, planned and committed by state or non-state 
organized groups, supported by a distinct policy or ideology. As such, they are not context-bound. Secondly, they 
signify a sense of justice that hinges upon dictates of the public conscience. See Eveylon Mack & Corrie Westbrook, 
"Does Customary International Law Obligate States to Extradite or Prosecute Individuals Accused of Committing 
Crimes against Humanity" (2015) 24 Minn. J. Int'l L. 73; Leila N. Sadat, "Codifying the ‘Laws of Humanity’ and the 
‘Dictates of the Public Conscience’: Towards a New Global Treaty on Crimes Against Humanity" in On the 
Proposed Crimes Against Humanity Convention, Morten Bergsmo & Song Tianying, eds. (Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher 2014) at 17-46; Cherif M. Bassiouni, "Crimes against humanity: the case for a specialized convention" 
(2010) 9 Wash. U. Global stud. l. rev. 575.  
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needs of criminal justice, as they pertain to universal jurisdiction, be served within existing 
domestic legal frameworks, but via novel forms of collaboration facilitated through hybrid 
mechanisms—through which the South can use international criminal law or international human 
rights law jurisprudence for its own internal purposes?  
Ultimately, neither supporters of the universal jurisdiction paradigm, nor the group of 
scholars whom we might call “international law universalists,” can be trusted with the task of 
articulating an adequate notion of justice pertaining to most egregious crimes committed by states 
against their own people. Both offer solutions that don’t fit, and insist on priorities and methods 
that don’t deliver. Once all is said and done in some criminal court, the work of creating a more 
just society has only begun.30 Furthermore, the biggest obstacle to developing a more nuanced 
and grounded approach to mass crimes is already an erosion of the North/South divide. The 
greatest impediment to reaching a substantive understanding of the legitimacy, efficacy, or even 
possibility of international law in both the Global North and the Global South is the ascription of 
preconceived consequences to democratic constitutionalism, which owes its crowned position to 
the persistence of the statist paradigm in international law. Viewed in its lens, anything 
“international” looks suspect due to its presumed lack of legitimacy. Accordingly, legal practices 
emerging under the UN Charter, or courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), or general customary international law, are declared 
to be troubled by unique problems of coherence, efficacy and legitimacy, problems which 
national domestic law supposedly does not suffer from. Statist constitutional thinking distorts the 
assessment of multifocal, transnational, and in general pluralist legal practices. It exaggerates the 
value of domestic constitutional practices, to the point of casting a thick cloud of suspicion over 
any form of legal normativity beyond state-made law. Last but not the least, statism—particularly 
the kind that is coupled with international law universalism—neglects the connection between 
domestic legitimacy and efficacy and the wider regional or global contexts in which public law 
practices unfold. This is yet another instance of misguided separation. National and transnational 
legal and political practices are much more closely connected than conventional legal wisdom of 																																																								
30 There are myriad examples of universalist international law scholarship, as it dominates the theoretical debates in 
this field. Suffice it to say, some make a stronger case than others, and they therefore constitute worthy interlocutors 
for the ongoing debate on the applications of universal jurisdiction as seen from the perspective of the Global South. 
See for instance the overviews provided by Dennis Patterson, "Cosmopolitanism and Global Legal Regimes" (2015) 
67 Rutgers UL Rev. 7; and Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in international law (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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either kind allows us to acknowledge. 
To summarize, the statist paradigm of democratic constitutionalism, along with its idealist 
distortions leading to the presumption of absolute legitimacy of state law (and the faux realism of 
rejecting all law beyond the state-made kind), constitute the framework within which 
international law is most commonly imprisoned. The efficacy of domestic constitutionalism is so 
exaggerated that, especially in the area of human rights law, it reaches dangerous proportions. 
The standard reason given is a quotidian argument about the lack of domestic constitutional 
provisions for international human rights law, with repeated references to the enactment of 
emergency measures at times of breakdown of civil order and civil war. Meanwhile, law remains 
fragile and vulnerable to social and political forces both inside and outside the domestic sphere. 
In addition, national domestic law is often conditioned by and dependent upon the wider legal 
and political context in which it takes shape. Legal scholars of the TWAIL persuasion know this 
all too well. Perhaps one may go so far as to argue that the statist framing of international law, in 
the form of a renewed devotion to democratic constitutionalism, is just another Westphalian 
fantasy par excellence, albeit replaying itself some 400 years later and in a distinctly post-
colonial context.  
At this point, a cautionary note is necessary. The limited scope of universal jurisdiction 
for select crimes such as crimes against humanity, and its careful application through institutions 
such as hybrid courts, as discussed in the upcoming pages of this dissertation do not constitute 
proof that international law is inherently legitimate. An ethically cloaked international legalism 
suggesting that we all have an innate disposition to appreciate law in select areas of criminality 
and violence, otherwise known as the common sense approach to law, is not a requirement for 
endorsing hybrid courts, either. Nonetheless, it is apt to insist that the statist paradigm suggests 
falsely that state-level law concerning restorative justice for political violence and mass crimes 
must or can be framed solely at the domestic level. The presumption that there is a fundamental 
difference or an unsurpassable separation between state law and law beyond the state, at least in 
the realm of public law, is itself not only false but also anathema to the very history of human 
rights struggles. In this vein, horizontal connections among burgeoning international, regional 
and hybrid adjudication mechanisms, as well as vertical relations between international courts 
and domestic ones, are the axes upon which universal jurisdiction in the Global South must be 
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scrutinized.  
Since the foundation of the ICC, there have been substantial changes in the ethos as well 
as the methods underlying the operationalization of international criminal law in the Global 
South. Whereas the norm that once informed international adjudication was the top-town 
imposition of legal precepts, there is now a growing body of hybrid jurisprudence, as well as an 
emergent class of national jurisprudence conversant in international criminal law. Indeed, a close 
look at the contemporary international judicial landscape would quickly draw our attention to the 
role of national courts in applying international law, despite the myriad jurisdictional and 
normative conflicts and compliance problems pertaining to universal jurisdiction in select areas 
such as crimes against humanity. This seems to be the way South for top-down approaches to 
international law, a predicament that I intend to stand against throughout this work.  
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Chapter I. Beware the Gift of a White Elephant31: Topographies of Universal Jurisdiction in 
International Law, Legal Pluralism and the Curious Case of the International Criminal Court 
 
INTRODUCTION 	 Legal theory has long accentuated the institutional distinctiveness of law from other areas 
of society, portraying law as discrete, internally coherent and thus self-referential and almost 
autonomous.32 To distinguish law from other normative elements in society, one does not need to 																																																								
31 The White Elephant refers to a valuable possession whose cost, and in particular the cost of its upkeep, exceeds its 
supposed usefulness; it is regarded as a metaphor signifying an elegant liability. The term derives from the sacred 
white elephants kept by traditional Southeast Asian monarchs in Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. To possess a 
white elephant was historically regarded as a sign that the monarch was ruling with justice and the kingdom was 
blessed with peace and prosperity. However, since the animals were considered sacred and laws protected them from 
labour, receiving the gift of a white elephant from a monarch was both a blessing and a curse: a blessing because of 
the animal’s sacred nature, and a curse because the animal could not be put to practical use and was very costly to 
look after and keep alive.  32	In his The Concept of Law ([1961] 1994), Herbert L. A. Hart provided a canonical analysis of the relation between 
law, coercion, and morality, and addressed the question of whether and when law should be conceptualized as a 
coercive order or as a moral command. In Hart’s view, there is no logically necessary connection between law and 
coercion or between law and morality. He also takes a stance against imposing a misleading appearance of 
uniformity on different kinds of laws and on different kinds of social functions that law may perform. Instead, he 
posits the existence of variety in the content, mode of origin, and range of application of law. Accordingly, laws that 
impose duties or obligations on individuals are described by Hart as “primary rules” of obligation. In order for a 
system of primary rules to function effectively, he then argues that “secondary rules” will be necessary to provide an 
authoritative statement of the primary rules. Secondary rules allow legislators to make changes in the primary rules if 
the primary rules are found to be defective or inadequate. They also enable courts to resolve disputes over the 
interpretation and application of the primary rules. The secondary rules of a legal system thus include rules of 
recognition, rules of change, and rules of adjudication. Meanwhile, secondary rules themselves, i.e. the formal 
qualities of law, do not guarantee delivery of justice in and of themselves. If the primary rules are not sufficiently 
clear or intelligible, then there may be uncertainty about the obligations that have been imposed on individuals. 
Neither are primary rules sufficient, in and of themselves, to establish a system of laws that can be formally 
recognized, changed, or adjudicated. Primary rules must be combined with secondary rules in order to establish a 
legal system. A second distinction Hart introduces is between “external” and “internal” points of view with respect to 
how the rules of a legal system may be described or evaluated. The external point of view is that of an observer who 
does not necessarily have to accept the rules of a given legal system. The internal point of view, on the other hand, is 
that of individuals who are governed by the rules of a given legal system and who accept these rules as standards of 
conduct. According to Hart, there are two minimum requirements that must be satisfied in order for a legal system to 
exist: private citizens must obey the primary rules of obligation, and public officials must accept the secondary rules 
of recognition, change, and adjudication as standards of official conduct. Finally, according to Hart, there is no 
necessary logical connection between the content of law and morality, and the existence of legal rights and duties 
may be devoid of any moral justification. For this debate, see HLA Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals” (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. Hart’s interpretation of the relation between law and morality 
significantly differs from that of Ronald Dworkin, who in his Law’s Empire (1986) suggests that every legal action 
has a moral dimension. Dworkin rejects the concept of law as acceptance of conventional patterns of recognition, and 
describes law as an interpretive process combining jurisprudence and adjudication. In this general context, 
international law is seen as problem-laden by Hart, since it may not possess all of the elements of a fully developed 
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negate the fact that law is indeed a broad phenomenon. One immediate way in which law’s 
multidimensionality, complexity, and lack of unity can be identified is to look at law beyond state 
boundaries. In this sense, looking at the contemporary legal landscape in the age of late 
capitalism and globalization is both challenging and rewarding for the attempt to capture the 
complexities of law. Meanwhile, the historical fact of the coexistence of multiple legal orders 
says nothing as to their moral worthiness or capacity for justice. In this sense, recognition of the 
complexity and plurality of contemporary legal regimes is only the starting point for present-day 
legal theory.  
In this opening chapter, I will endeavour to answer the question of why we should care 
about the contemporary multiplicity of legal regimes, otherwise known as transnational law, in 
the specific context of accountability for state criminality. If state interests and domestic judiciary 
interpretations of international law are by and large coincident with preferences of national 
political leadership and local legislative concerns, what would be the point in reaching for a 
theory of international law that is not fixated on the Westphalian order of things? How are we to 
appreciate the consolidation of customary law and regulatory regimes that go above and beyond 
the direct mandate of the executive powers of states and domestic justice systems? State-centric 
accounts of international law no doubt entertain a rather rigid view of international law and of the 
actors who occupy the contemporary legal universe. In contradistinction, alternative accounts 
discussed in this chapter provide a depiction of international law as transnational law and, as a 
result, present us with a different topographical view of accountability regimes. In this changed 
context, international-cum-transnational law is seen as a complex deliberative process. 
Furthermore, international law is seen as a battleground for multifarious interests and actors, only 
one of which is the state, each trying to determine legal or semi-legal outcomes and judicial 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
legal system. International law may lack secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. International 
legislatures may not always have the power to enforce sanctions against nations who disobey international law. 
Finally, international courts may not always have jurisdiction over legal disputes between nations. In 
contradistinction, according to Dworkin legal theory does not merely identify the rules of a legal system, but also 
interprets and evaluates them. A complete legal theory must consider not only the relation between law and coercion 
(i.e. the force of law), but also the relation between law and rightfulness or justifiability (i.e. the grounds of law). On 
this issue, also see Herbet L.A. Hart, "The New Challenge to Legal Positivism (1979)" (2016) 36 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 459 [the reprint of the original lecture delivered in 1979], and Andrzej Grabowski, “The Missing Link 
in the Hart–Dworkin Debate” (2016) 36 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 476.	
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processes to their benefit at a global level. 33  This alternate take on international law 
acknowledges the inherently plural (though not necessarily pluralist) composition of law, and 
engages with the multiple processes involved in the making and utilization of such law. This 
determination, in turn, is crucial for fostering a systemic understanding of jurispathic and 
jurisgenerative dimensions of international law, and could lead to a fruitful expansion of theories 
of jurisprudence concerning state criminality beyond the domain of domestic legal regimes.34  
 The question that guides this chapter’s discussion of the fragmented, plural and 
transnational nature of contemporary international law is whether the nomos (normative universe) 
of Robert Cover’s jurisprudential account of law, when applied to a global context, is 
substantively different from what we are accustomed to dealing with in national, domestic 
contexts.35 This discussion also lends itself to addressing the tension between ideas of monism 
and pluralism in legal scholarship. As I already outlined in the opening of this work, legal 
monism signifies a pervasive positivist understanding of law as a unified structure of valid rules 
and principles contained within a solid institutional framework.36 Legal pluralism, on the other 																																																								
33 For a promising and hopeful account of the making of international law in the era of transnational politics and 
global economy, see Janet Koven Levit, "A bottom-up approach to international lawmaking: the tale of three trade 
finance instruments" (2005) 30 Yale J. Int'l L. 125. Also see Ralf Michaels, "The re-state-ment of non-state law: the 
state, choice of Law, and the challenge from global legal pluralism" (2005) 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1209; Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, "The role of law in counter-hegemonic globalization and global legal pluralism: lessons from the 
Narmada Valley struggle in India" (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 345; Paul Schiff Berman, "Global 
legal pluralism" (2006) 80 Cal. l. Rev. 1155; Ralf Michaels, "The true lex mercatoria: law beyond the state" (2007) 
14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447; Peer Zumbansen, "The law of society: governance through 
contract" (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 191.  
34 Robert Cover theorizes “jurisgenesis” or the creation of legal meaning as a process that is not reliant on the state or 
any given central authority. Instead, the normative world or nomos within which jurisgenesis occurs is defined as the 
amalgamation of multiple social, historical, cultural and political factors, leading to various “interpretive 
commitments.” In Cover’s work, the pronouncements of judges and legislatures constitute only a particular nomos 
that cannot encompass all that is possible in terms of creation of legal meaning. In this sense, state law in its 
traditional definition is not considered the central or superior source of jurisgenesis. Cover’s work on Talmudic 
traditions and other renditions of law provides examples of several religious communities inhabiting a distinct nomos 
in the context of their religious commitments. These traditions identify their own paradigms for lawful behaviour and 
reduce the state-made law and its impositions to one element in their normative environment.  In other words, while 
each nomos is constituted in part by state or central law, each has a different interpretation of it. Amongst this 
plenitude or plurality of laws, Cover argues that the function of the state is jurispathic, or disciplinary and violence-
prone, rather than enaged in norm creation. The function of the judge in this context is defined as suppressing the 
plurality of law by choosing one interpretation as the official and justiciable one. See Robert M. Cover, "Nomos and 
Narrative” (1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4.  
35 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 21. 
36 The epistemological foundations of legal monism were most succinctly theorized by the Vienna School of 
Jurisprudence and its leading proponents, on the basis of its crucial elements: the Grundnorm, the hierarchy of 
norms, and the unity of the law. Subsequently, the theory of legal monism was developed and defended against both 
dualism and pluralism in terms of its explanatory power in describing the trigonal relationship between national law, 
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hand, emphasizes the multiplicity of legal practices and the hybridity of socio-political platforms 
upon which legal edifices are built in the forms of institutions, rule-based structures, and regimes. 
At least for the last two decades, legal pluralism has already become common currency in 
contemporary debates on law and globalization, its main claim being that a form of global legal 
pluralism represents both the most accurate description of law within globalization and the best 
normative option. At the descriptive level, global legal pluralism is considered more reliable than 
state-based accounts. At the normative level, global legal pluralism is understood as providing a 
platform for opening up the legal realm to previously unheard voices.37  
In the following pages, I argue that in the area of international law, the transnationalist 
view allows current debates on legal pluralism to serve in the construction of a new 
understanding of law in a global context, albeit with important limitations. The still operational 
conservative emphasis in legal theory on the singularity, uniformity, harmonization, and totality 
of legal systems, depending on the context within which law is discussed, could be relaxed both 
empirically and normatively through the ethos of legal pluralism combined with a re-inscription 
of international law as transnational law.38 In this case, the study of international law would no 
longer be circumscribed by inquiries about how we maintain the integrity of law as a system. It 
would also not be limited by the need to be socially responsive, adaptive, culturally inclusive and 
respectful of existing normative systems.39 Instead, it would allow as much attention to injustice 																																																																																																																																																																																			
regional law, and public international law. On the philosophical foundations of monism, see Luke MacInnis, "Two 
Concepts of Monism: Axiomatic and Asymptotic" (2015) 77 The Review of Politics 603. For critiques of monism, 
see Roderick Macdonald, "Metaphors of multiplicity: civil society, regimes and legal pluralism" (1998) 15 Ariz. J. 
Int'l & Comp. L. 69; Mirjam Künkler and Yüksel Sezgin, "The unification of law and the postcolonial state: The 
limits of state Monism in India and Indonesia" (2016) 60 American Behavioral Scientist 987; Violeta Moreno-Lax 
and Paul Gragl, “Introduction: Beyond Monism, Dualism, PluralismThe Quest for a (Fully-Fledged) Theoretical 
Framework: Co-Implication, Embeddedness, and Interdependency between Public International Law and EU 
Law" (2016) 35 Yearbook of European Law 455.  
37 See Peer Zumbansen, "Transnational legal pluralism" (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 141; and Emmanuel 
Melissaris, Ubiquitous law: legal theory and the space for legal pluralism (Routledge, 2016). No doubt, legal 
positivism's failure to adequately capture the complexity of contemporary legal orders makes legal pluralism all the 
more preferable as a descriptive theory of law. However, legal pluralism does not necessarily offer a normatively 
desirable view of law, unless it is supplemented by a theory of critical legal justice. On the limits of legal pluralism, 
see Sionaidh Douglas Scott, Law after modernity (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013).  
38See Margaret Davies, "The Ethos of Legal Pluralism" (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 317. Also see Jonathan 
Crowe, "The limits of legal pluralism" (2015) 24 Griffith Law Review 314; and Margaret Davies, Law Unlimited 
(Routledge, 2017). This debate continues amongst legal theory scholars and remains loyal to the format that was 
originally defined by the Hart-Raz-Dworkin exchanges.  
39 This said, scholars such as John Griffiths make the point of distinguishing between “weak” and “strong” pluralism. 
Weak legal pluralism indicates that differences are recognized and managed by a dominant legal system. An example 
for this in the area of international law would be the ironing out of inconsistencies between laws of the state and laws 
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and discontent as to harmonization and consent. Indeed, the presumed conflict and perpetual 
conceptual tension between a depiction of a singular, all-controlling international law with 
universal applicability and one of co-existing legal orders within a complex web of relations is an 
outmoded view. Quasi-legal decision-making bodies (such as hybrid courts or regulatory bodies), 
the internal governance systems of large organizations, alternative modes of dispute resolution 
and arbitration, regulative systems with a global reach, and myriad other forms and settings that 
produce legal or law-like effects clearly indicate the multiplicity of legal regimes at the 
transnational level, encompassing the domestic, the international, and a third dimension that 
cannot be reduced to either of the first two, the global.40 The critical issue is how to read this 
complexity within a historical context that includes state-based domestic jurisprudence without 
prioritizing it at the expense of all else.  
 The persistent focus on the singularity of legal discourse as an internally coherent system 
or on the institutional qualities of legal regimes, including the more recent version focusing on 
novel forms of constitutionalism, has become a source of frustration for a growing number of 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
dictated by international bodies and covenants, a practice commonly known as harmonization. This definition, 
however, leaves out the importance of judiciary interpretation during and after the adaptation process. Perhaps better 
examples would be arbitration tribunals and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms operating within the 
parameters of existing national legal systems and in full regard of constitutional principles and premises. It should 
also be noted that the recognition of such normative/substantive differences, to the extent that they are contained and 
sealed within the realm of dominant law, does not constitute a threat to the doctrine of centralism. In contrast, 
“strong” legal pluralism is defined as the irreducibility of differences of legal doctrines and/or applications and 
procedures under the rubric of a singular institutional authority such as a state or an international court. Thus, in the 
context of strong legal pluralism, two or more legal regimes co-exist in tandem and there is endemic tension between 
different legal orders, and a dynamic and often conflictual relationship exists between the different bodies of law 
attending to same or similar realms. It is also important to note that this is not simply a matter of jurisdictional reach. 
The aforementioned tensions and conflicts may pertain to the substantive elements of the law, as well. In this latter 
context, the claims of singularity and centrality are inherently unstable and self-contradictory. See John Griffiths, 
“What is Legal Pluralism?” 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1 (1986). On varieties of legal 
pluralism without direct reference to international law, see inter alia, MB Hooker, Legal pluralism: an introduction 
to colonial and neo-colonial laws (Clarendon Press, 1975); Sally Engle Merry, "Legal pluralism" (1988) 22 Law & 
Society Review 869; Paul Ricoeur, “The Plurality of Sources of Law” (1994) 7 Ratio Juris 272; Martha-Marie 
Kleinhans and Roderick MacDonald, “What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society 25; Brian Tamanaha, “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism” (2000) 27 Journal of Law & Society 
296; and Christoph Eberhard, “Towards an Intercultural Legal Theory” (2001) 10 Social & Legal Studies 171 
(2001). Meanwhile, in the area of theories of jurisprudence, whether Dworkin’s work delivers a legal pluralist ethos 
remains debatable, as he is often accused of reducing the pluralism of the community that bestows a meaning onto 
law into a singular entity with a definable set of moral values and normative choices. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's 
empire (Harvard University Press, 1986). 
. 
40 See Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Law” in The Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 2006), 738-
754. 
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legal scholars and legal practitioners.41 State law by and large continues to be paraded as a 
superior enterprise, characterized by its coherence and internal consistency, and by its autonomy 
from other, non-state-related normative domains. In this context, the first question I will attempt 
to answer here is whether legal pluralism, when applied to international law, could produce the 
desired change of optics and allow for a focus on multiplicity, diversity, and conflict.42 The next 
question is to what extent a legal pluralistic frame of reference would allow us to understand the 
inner dynamics of fragmented and sometimes overlapping accountability regimes in international 
law, particularly in relation to the phenomenon of state criminality. This latter inquiry will be 
undertaken through a discussion of universal jurisdiction.  
 
 I. APPLICATIONS OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TOPOGRAPHICAL 
 OUTLOOK 
The tenuous relationship between international law and theories of jurisprudence, as 
briefly touched on in the introduction to this chapter, has traditionally created a barrier to the 
establishment of a framework within which international law could be understood from the point 
of view of legal theory. To say the least, international law was posited as lacking the second order 
rules and regulations defined by H.L.A. Hart and thus lacking in substantive tenets of a genuine 
legal system.43 In the nexus of international law and international politics, on the other hand, the 
relationship appears to be somewhat less troublesome. Often, international relations scholars 
would look for three elements in order to determine the existence of a legal system: a legal 
concept, a structure or framework capable of supporting its operationalization as law, and the 
political consensus to recognize it as law.44 This mode of thinking promises to look beyond the 
debate over ‘legal norm creation’ in international law, and to expand analysis of the relationship 																																																								41	See Stephen Gill and A. C. Cutler, New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge University Press 2014). 	
42 The term “two optics” as a methodological approach was originally coined by Robert Keohane. See Robert 
Keohane, “International relations and International law: Two optics” (1997) 38 Harward International Law Journal 
487.  43	See Jeffrey Danof, Steven Ratner & David Wippman, International Law: Norms, Actors, Process (Kluwer Law, 
2015). 
44 See Paul F. Diehl, Charlotte Ku and Daniel Zamora, The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of 
Normative and Operating Systems 57 INT’L ORG 43 (2003). For introducing me to this literature first hand, I am 
indebted to Craig Scott’s and Ruth Buchanan’s graduate seminars on Transnational Law and Peer Zumbansen’s work 
on the subject undertaken at Osgoode Hall Law School.  
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between theories of jurisprudence and international law. Consequently, it dwells on international 
law’s effectiveness and target constituencies. From this perspective, international law is not seen 
only as a coherent collection of rules, prescriptions, and aspirations governing the conduct of 
states and other international actors through legal processes and jurisdictional negotiations; it is 
described as a complex structure composed of norms, actors, processes and institutions. 
Interventions by international relations scholarship has also cut short the somewhat stale 
conversation on treaty implementation and compliance. In its place, their work invites us to turn 
our attention to institutional and system-wide normative characteristics of international law, as 
well as to the authority and governance structures endemic to its operations.  
 In order to achieve such an insight from within legal scholarship, and not only with 
reference to international relations theory pertaining to international law, a broader frame of 
analysis is needed around the nature of law and its internal and external meanings, as the scale is 
enlarged to global dimensions. In the following pages, I will provide a brief account of select 
debates in the history of legal pluralism scholarship and their applications to international law. 
The sequence starts with a broad overview of legal pluralism and the legacy of the New Haven 
School. It then proceeds with a specific branch of international law scholarship, TWAIL (Third 
World Approaches to International Law) and its effects on our thinking in terms of understanding 
international law. This short overview concludes with contemporary interjections made by legal 
theorists who strive to bridge the gap between jurisprudential scholarship and studies of 
international law from a radical, reflexive or critical legal pluralism perspective, otherwise known 
as third-generation legal pluralist scholarship. Although my very modest attempt at creating a 
topography of critical approaches to international law could no doubt include the rich and layered 
debates exemplified by the work of critical legal studies scholars, feminist legal theorists, critical 
race theorists, postcolonial debates on justice, and other very important schools of thought, these 
are not explicitly included. This is due to the limitations posed by my choice of focus, legal 
pluralism and what it can and cannot offer for rethinking accountability regimes in international 
law.  
 Until recently, legal pluralist scholarship was divided into two main debates. ‘Classical’ 
legal pluralism refers to anthropological and socio-historical analyses of legal systems of ex-
colonial or post-colonial societies, which had dual or multiple legal systems derived from 
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indigenous pre-colonial folk, communal, or customary law on the one hand and imperial law on 
the other. In contrast, ‘second wave’ legal pluralism entertained the insight that all societies, 
formerly colonized or not, are composed of multiple ‘semi-autonomous’ fields of normative 
control and legal discourse. This latter position purported the co-existence of many forms of law, 
the majority of which are non-territorial, non-state, local, or international, and horizontal rather 
than hierarchical. Both schools of legal pluralism concentrate on legal plurality, and challenge the 
presumption that state law is singular or indeed a superior source for legal meaning or conduct. 
However, they have paid scant attention to the jurisprudential characteristics of the plurality of 
legal discourses, except in the debate initiated by the work of Robert Cover and continued by 
Gunther Teubner and David Trubek.45  I will call this the ‘third wave’ of legal pluralism, 
whereby legal scholarship developed a rich analytical approach for the study of different modes 
of law and the struggle amongst them in terms of co-existence within a dynamic normative 
landscape embodying imminent tensions. In this context, the work of contemporary legal scholars 
such as Ruth Buchanan, Marti Koskenniemi, Rajagopal Balakrishnan, and Issa Shivji, among 
others, attends to the conundrums of international law. This latest debate does not assume that 
pluralism in law is merely exhibited in a multiplicity of ‘semi-autonomous’ systems separated by 
territory, culture, or history. Rather, an attempt is made to theorize law as a process in which 
legal actors, legal subjects and legal norms are interdependent and effected by power and politics 
at large. The third wave took the legal pluralist premise that law cannot be defined according to a 
fixed set of criteria one step further, and began to ask what ‘other’ criteria are to be used for the 
identification of different forms of law and legal regimes, distinct from those espoused by 
canonized theories of jurisprudence. As legal pluralism began to be reframed by critical 
international law scholarship from within the Global South, the establishment of a theoretical 
nexus between a plural view of law and the various manifestations of socio-economic and 
																																																								
45 See Gunther Teubner, “The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism” (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 
1443; Gunther Teubner, “The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violation by ‘Private’ Transnational Actors” 
(2006) 69 The Modern Law Review 327; Gunther Teubner, Constitutional fragments: societal constitutionalism and 
globalization (Oxford University Press, 2012). Also see David Trubek, Yves Dezalay, Ruth Buchanan, and John R. 
Davis, “Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of 
Transnational Arenas” (1993) 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 407; David Trubek, Jim Mosher and Jeffrey S. Rothstein, 
“Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor Relations” (2000) 25 Law & Social Inquiry 1187, and Andrew Lang, 
World trade law after neoliberalism: Reimagining the global economic order (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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political power became manifest.46  
Theoretically speaking, understanding legal plurality is conditional upon the recognition 
of irreducibly different accounts and experiences of law at a global scale. In this sense, there is a 
need for the legal pluralism debate to move beyond empirical descriptions of different legal 
regimes as straightforward socio-legal facts. Precisely in such a spirit, the third wave of legal 
pluralism attends to the conceptual complexities inherent in the production and maintenance of 
legal regimes in a world-historical context. This genre of thinking about law and legality is 
capable of attending to the ways normative systems are construed as discursive practices rather 
than mere products of institutions. In addition, the ideals of closure and order are coupled with an 
appetite for disorder, chaos, change, and exceptionalities that prove the rules. In this sense, as 
Brian Tamanaha redefines it, the central question of legal pluralism can no longer be the different 
forms that ‘law’ takes, but what law is in its multifarious definitions 47  Appreciation of 
incommensurably different conceptualizations of law can lead to a reflective analysis of the 
historical specificity of mainstream Western definitions of law, as seen in TWAIL scholarship.48 
Furthermore, by moving beyond descriptive recognition of the multitude of legal or law-like 
normative systems, a critically oriented pluralism could point to the inherent diversity of legal 
regimes at a global scale—and so allow for the discussion of plural sources, plural modes of 
reasoning, and complex and contradictory forms of interaction between different legal regimes.  																																																								
46 By now, this particular school of critique has already progressed through two historical phases: TWAIL I and 
TWAIL II. While TWAIL I had a heavy focus on colonization and the hegemonic use of international law by 
powerful nations, TWAIL II was more engaged with international institutions and the impact of globalization as well 
as possibilities of resistance. Overall, TWAIL scholarship had to respond to a series of new challenges with the 
global rise of populism and oppressive conservative politics. Specifically, it needed to refocus on the inconsistent 
and untenable use of international law and the necessity to rethink our understanding of international law in terms of 
global injustices. See Madhav Khosla, "The TWAIL Discourse: The emergence of a new phase" (2007) 9 
International Community Law Review 291, and Karin Mickelson, "Taking stock of TWAIL histories" (2008) 10 
International Community Law Review 355.  
47 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, "The folly of the'social scientific'concept of legal pluralism” (1993) 20 Journal of Law 
and Society 192; Brian Z. Tamanha, "A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism" (2000) 27 Journal of Law and 
Society 296.  
48 As discussed by Peer Zumbansen, Ruth Buchanan and others, there are strong connections between long-standing 
legal sociological insights into pluralistic legal orders and present concerns regarding the fragmentation of law 
outside of the nation-state. Within the nation state, legal pluralism was initiated by contestation of concepts of legal 
formalism, of the alleged unity of the legal order and institutionalized norms, despite the coexistence of different 
levels and sites of norm creation. Contemporary calls for a just, democratic and equitable global legal order, 
including debates on the “fragmentation of international law” or “global administrative law,” take place in the same 
spirit. On this issue, see Ruth Buchanan, "Writing resistance into international law" (2008) 10 International 
Community Law Review 445, and Peer Zumbansen, "Transnational legal pluralism" (2010) 1 Transnational Legal 
Theory 141.  
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Finally, in terms of jurisprudential debates, law is incapable of grounding itself, and its 
conceptual foundations rest on other elements that are traditionally regarded as outside law. 
These elements also provide the contextual meaning of law in socio-political terms. Acceptance 
of the necessary relationship between internal and external elements of law is a foundational 
premise of legal pluralism.49 Indeed, critiques of the autonomy and separateness of law began 
with questioning the internal coherence of law.50 In this sense, the third wave of legal pluralism is 
of direct use for the study of international law in a global context, and more specifically for 
attending to what emerged as transnational law in the age of late capitalism and neo-
colonialism.51   
A. The Legacy of the New Haven School 	 During the roughly four decades in which the concept legal pluralism has been used in 
legal scholarship, it has become a subject of many a politically charged debate. Starting with 
Brian Tamanaha’s article on the ‘folly of legal pluralism’ (1993), attention was drawn to the 
‘legal pluralist movement’ associated with the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism and 
the Journal of Legal Pluralism. Tamahana argued that equalizing normative orders that are 
fundamentally different from each other and calling them all ‘law’ was a questionable practice. 
Still, reserving the concept of law for only state-made law leads to an essentialist and ahistorical 
conception of law, and legal pluralism was guilty as charged for being the first one pointing to 
the elephant in the room.52  
 Indeed, legal pluralism is an essential component of thinking about law above and beyond 
the state, both domestically and globally. In this section, I will discuss how, applied to the critical 
understanding of law developed by legal pluralism, these two frames, local and global, inform 
each other. The subject matter of this work is universal jurisdiction and accountability regimes 																																																								
49 See Gunther Teubner, "Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law" (1983) Law and society review 239. 
50 See Gunther Teubner, Law as an autopoietic system (Oxford/Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers, 1993), Hugh 
Baxter, "Autopoiesis and the Relative Autonomy of Law" (1997) 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1987, and Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Law's relations: A relational theory of self, autonomy, and law (OUP USA, 2011).  
51 I define neo-colonialism as colonialism stripped of its formal qualities but nonetheless producing the same set of 
effects, such as structural dependence, depletion of resources including human capital, and the subsuming of 
societies under the rubric of political alliances.  
52 See Gunther Teubner, "The two faces of Janus: Rethinking legal pluralism" (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1443, and 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann, "Who’s afraid of legal pluralism?" (2002) 34 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 37. 
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pertaining to state criminality. Therefore, my priority will be to understand the workings of law at 
the global scale, although in the latter half I will also engage with the debate on legal judgment as 
it relates to state criminality in situ. In this vein, transnational law provides a direct entry to the 
discussion of the relationship between globalization, historical capitalism and law. The scope of 
analysis and conceptual aspirations delivered by the term transnational law are markedly different 
from what pertains to traditional depictions of international law. As marked by the canonized 
Yale lectures of Philip Jessup, transnational law challenges the frame of thinking that long 
characterized international law, and supplements it with a framework that allows grasping the 
plurality of interactions among state and non-state actors as well as between states.53 Yet these 
observations are far from having received general acceptance. Many still ask whether 
transnational law indeed promises a different conceptual framework than the one habitually 
utilized by scholars and practitioners of international law. A related question is whether 
transcendence of national frontiers is the main criteria for deeming forms of law and practices of 
regulation ‘transnational’ and, if so, whether this is enough to require a significant change of 
focus in legal scholarship. Does the observable increase in the multitude of norm-producing 
institutions and actors constitute a good enough reason for coming up with a different term for 
the legal universe that lies beyond the nation-state while also encapsulating it? What is the main 
impetus behind the uprooting of ‘dearly-held convictions of jurisdictional boundaries and 
competences’?54 Would it not be better to refer to the phenomena under discussion as the ‘law of 
globalization’ rather than transnational law?  
 These questions have a relatively long history in the realm of legal scholarship and, what is 
more, they are not unique to the area of international law. As the debates examined in this section 
will reveal, the role of law within dispersed and fragmented spaces of norm production has been a 
familiar topic since the early days of legal pluralism and critical legal studies.55 What is perhaps 																																																								
53 Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956). As Peer Zumbansen argues as well, this chapter 
traces the development of the concept of transnational law to Philip Jessup's Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School 
in 1955. Jessup famously challenged the doctrinal and conceptual boundaries of both public and private international 
law to suggest that another concept would be more adequately suited to capture the myriad normative and 
transactional relations across national borders. Transnational law has since become a promising perspective from 
which to assess the regulatory challenges arising in late capitalism. See Peer Zumbansen, "Law after the welfare 
state: Formalism, functionalism, and the ironic turn of reflexive law" (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 769.  
54 Jessup (1956) pp. 72–7, cited in Zumbansen (2008), supra note 38. 
55 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Regime-
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new is the thorough consideration of the effects related to power and legitimacy of law at a global 
scale.56 Yet again, this shift in focus constitutes a significant challenge to the state-centered view 
of not only international law, but also constitutional and regulatory law. Furthermore, the 
recognition of private actors’ and organized interests’ growing relevance for law and legal 
regimes allows for a much more nuanced and dynamic understanding of the relationship between 
state and non-state actors, among states, and, between various legal actors and institutions in 
general. The growing complexity of de-centered or multi-centric socio-legal and political 
discourses around transnational activities requires an equally diverse and flexible frame of 
reference. The term ‘transnational,’ conjoined with pluralism, is supposed to be that very 
panacea.57 However, a change of terms alone by no means produces all-encompassing solutions 
to theoretical or practical problems. Besides, there is an ongoing debate within the field of 
transnational law over the characterization of this field, i.e. whether it is fluid, semi-structured 
and cooperative, or a mirror image of power inequalities, antagonistic relations, and anarchistic 
tendencies projected onto the area of law.58 Transnational law, deemed neither domestic nor 
international but both and more, is thus equally important for constitutional and administrative 
law in a global context. For some, transnational law is where real change will emerge, dethroning 
the monstrosity of global capitalism and neo-liberal empires. For those who hold this viewpoint, 
transnational law, by way of providing a platform for new forms of governance, is expected to 
overcome the alleged separation of domestic and international realms and provide a global sense 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
Fragmentation of Global Law” (2004) Michigan Journal of International Law 999.  
56 See Peer Zumbansen, "Defining the space of transnational law: legal theory, global governance, and legal 
pluralism" (2012) 21 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 305.  
57 See Paul Schiff Berman, "From international law to law and globalization" (2004) 43 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 485, 
and Paul Schiff Berman, "A pluralist approach to international law" (2007) 32 Yale J. Int'l L. 301.  
58 The former debate is best represented by Anne-Marie Slaughter’s work. The latter viewpoint, on the other hand, is 
vividly discussed by Mary Kaldor, Anthony Anghie, James Tully and Robert Wai. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
“International Law in a World of Liberal States” (1995) 6 European Journal of International Law 1, and her 
“Judicial Globalization” (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103; James Tully, Strange multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an age of diversity (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Robert Wai, “In the Name of the 
International: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Internationalist Transformation of Canadian Private 
International Law” (2001) 34 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 117; Mary Kaldor, "Civil society and 
accountability" (2003) 4 Journal of Human Development 5 and her Global civil society: An answer to war (John 
Wiley & Sons, 2013); Antony Anghie et al, The Third World and International Order: Law, Politics, and 
Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international 
law (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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of transparency for legal conflicts and clashes of interest.59  
 Against this introductory background on transnational law, and at the juncture of 
international law and legal pluralism scholarship that led to the debate on transnationalism, the 
New Haven School played a pivotal role. Its scholars, including Myers S. McDougal, Harold D. 
Lasswell and Michael Reisman, were among the most influential groups of legal thinkers in the 
field of international law since WWII.60 In their spirited response to Cold War realism, they put 
their faith in legal processes, rules, and norms, at the expense of the might of naked power in 
world politics. Theirs was a choice made in the name of recognizing the transformative normative 
power of what they saw as international legal practices. Their departure both from legal 
positivism and political realism61 saved them from the pitfalls of a doctrinal quest for ‘what law 
is’ in the international arena. Instead, they turned their gaze to issues concerning how non-state 
law is created, how it operates, how it affects domestic decisions, and how it influences the 
shaping of multiple forms of legal regimes. The legacy of the New Haven School is perhaps best 
summarized in two basic questions: What is international law made of, and, who makes it? 
Deriving from these two questions, other concerns emerged, such as determining whether 
international law is primarily a system of edicts or rather a complex process with indeterminate 
ends. 
 In their charting of the topography of international law, adherents of the New Haven 
School fundamentally challenged the foundational assumptions about the nature of law and legal 
regimes that had dominated legal scholarship until then. The School’s main impetus for engaging 
in this kind of critique was their belief in the possibility of ‘bottom-up international law making’ 
with respect to the codification of international rules and norms, as opposed to a top-down 
																																																								
59 See Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukowina: Legal pluralism in the world-society" (1996) and Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, eds. Law and globalization from below: towards a cosmopolitan legality 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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understanding of formal legal systems obsessed with state sovereignty.62 They certainly did not 
regard the nation-state as the primary lawmaker. They also refused to privilege treaty law as the 
preeminent form of international law. They denied that international law was simply an elite-
orchestrated process of hegemonic power-building under the cloak of legality. Instead, they saw 
it as an uneven and yet lively battlefield of variant stakeholders and interests. Consequently, it 
became possible to regard international law as a legal universe made up of multiple and semi-
overlapping lawmaking communities. As such, a new account of it could be given. Almost fifty 
years after the School’s protests against nationalist and power-centred conceptions of 
international law, an influential group of American law professors launched a new attack, but this 
time riding the tide of neo-conservatism in United States. Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, in 
particular, emerged as two of the leading spokespeople for the neo-conservative study of 
international law, though their followers come from what may be called a ‘rainbow coalition’ of 
ideologies within a growing international audience.63 In the ensuing debates critiquing the 
isolationist US stance against international law and the current responses to neo-conservative, 
formalist, and doctrinal trends in legal scholarship, one could sense a strong resemblance to the 
stance taken by the New Haven School back in 1970s.64 In this sense, there emerged a tradition of 
critique adjusting to the demands of the changing times. Along that trajectory, there are at least 
three other schools, namely TWAIL, Critical International Law and Radical Pluralism debates, 
which take issue with international law as it has been traditionally perceived and taught.65 
However, they take the inequalities and historical injustices endemic to the current state of world 
capitalism as their point of departure, rather than a mainly internal critique of how international 
law works within the West. These latter bodies of scholarship therefore have more kinship with 
the articulation of international law as globalization of law or transnational law, and are prone to 
overlook the nation-state much more readily. Though the legacy of the New Heaven School is 
indeed an important one, to globalize this kind of critique requires a vision that looks above and 
beyond the way things appear  from the Global North alone. 																																																								
62 See Levit, Janet Koven, "Bottom-up international lawmaking: reflections on the new haven school of international 
law" (2007) 32 Yale J. Int'l L. 393.  
63 See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The limits of international law (Oxford University Press, 2005).  
64 The foundational piece many refer to as the bedrock of legal pluralist debates is Robert M. Cover, “Nomos and 
Narrative” 
65 I am heavily indebted to Obiora Okafor for introducing me to the nuances of and vast literature on TWAIL 
scholarship, as one of the leading figures of the second/third generation of TWAIL scholars himself.  
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B. TWAIL Scholarship and the Radical Pluralism Debate  	 Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) is a critical approach to international 
law that has assumed a distinguished status in the overall questioning of the history and legacies 
of international law, an endeavour that started with the first and second waves of legal pluralism 
discussed above. However, TWAIL comes with a marked distinction. It is an approach to law 
that is unified by a particular set of concerns endemic to the application and imposition of law in 
the Global South. It draws its methodology primarily from the history of the encounter between 
international law and colonized peoples and post-colonial societies. In this regard, TWAIL shares 
a common heritage and an arsenal of analytical tools with post-colonial studies, feminist theory, 
critical race theory, critical legal studies, and Marxism, as well as with legal pluralism. TWAIL 
scholarship prioritizes in its study the power dynamic between the largely Developed Core and 
the mostly Dependent Periphery in the world capitalist economy, following the terms used by 
world systems analysis.66 Overall, it highlights the role of international law in legitimizing the 
subjugation and oppression of societies in the Global South. Although TWAIL scholars strive to 
avoid presenting the “Third World” as a unified, coherent place and instead put emphasis on the 
shared experiences of underdevelopment, imposed dependency, and marginalization, they also try 
to salvage at least some parts of the overall project of international law to aid struggles for justice 
in the Global South. Contemporary TWAIL scholarship has it origins in works of jurists such as 
Georges Abi-Saab, F. Garcia-Amador, R. P. Anand, Mohammed Bedhaoui and Taslim O. Elias. 
These were later joined by Antony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Karin Mickelson, Obiora 
Chinedu Okafor, Wa Makau Mutua, Balkrishnan Rajagopal, and Issa Shivji, who are from post-
colonial societies themselves.67 In the remainder of this section, I will first discuss the TWAIL 																																																								
66 See Immanuel Wallerstein, The modern world-system I: Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European 
world-economy in the sixteenth century, with a new prologue (Univ of California Press, 2011). 
 
67 As references to the ongoing debates within the TWAIL scholarship, see inter alia, Anghie, Anthony, et al. The 
Third World and International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003; Obiora Chinedu 
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theory, methodology, or both?" (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 371; Anthony Anghie, "TWAIL: 
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World Approaches to International Law for International Human Rights Law" (2008) 10 International Community 
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project and its significance for the debate on transnational law. I will then concentrate particularly 
on Koskenniemi’s work and one of his most vocal critics within the larger context of legal 
pluralism, although he is not a TWAIL scholar himself.  
 As already stated, TWAIL is a legal theoretical discourse that offers an in-depth critique 
of the current international law regime from a Global South perspective. The frame of thinking 
used by scholars associated with TWAIL represents a distinct form of historical analysis 
concerning the development of international law. TWAIL scholarship adheres to the description 
of international law as a set of practices that lead to the continual subordination and 
marginalization of the experiences of Third World societies, in particular legal activists and 
scholars. Makau Mutua describes Bandung, Indonesia as the symbolic birthplace of the TWAIL 
discourse, although the school is heavily indebted to the Non-Alignment Movement as well.68 
Overall, TWAIL emerged as a response to repressive and disciplinary strategies of de-
colonization in the Global South. It was developed due to the urgent need for a historical 
approach to understand why liberation projects in the post-colonial world could hardly ever were 
able to deliver what they promised. TWAIL scholarship also attends to historical experiences in 
non-European and post-colonial societies that have given rise to a unique form of political 
consciousness about the law.  
 As such, TWAIL scholarship is dedicated to unpacking the uses of international law as a 
medium for the creation and perpetuation of racialized hierarchies, to historicizing the 
development and evolution of international law as a repressive universalist discourse, and to 
critically assessing its uses for the subordination of peoples and their realities across the Global 
South.69 TWAIL claims to be counter-hegemonic, anti-hierarchal, and also coalition-prone. 
Keeping with the spirit of legal pluralism though not necessarily identifying with it, TWAIL 
discourse thus assumes a moral equivalence of cultures and peoples. It is in this light that it 
considers the current regime of international law as illegitimate, since what exists today is seen as 																																																																																																																																																																																			
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being based almost entirely on the intellectual, historical, and cultural experiences of one 
particular region of the world—that is, Europe. Finally, TWAIL is positioned as a reconstructive 
project that aims at eradicating the conditions of underdevelopment in the Global South. Since 
international law has been instrumental in regulating encounters between Europe and the rest of 
the world through the rules of both sovereignty and self-determination, TWAIL scholars argue 
that international law has been used for the forced assimilation of non-European peoples into a 
legal regime that they had no voice within.70 In order to build strong alliances to counter the 
position that post-colonial societies have been locked into, TWAIL scholarship has asserted itself 
through the formation of transnational movements committed to de-centering the European-North 
American domination of international law.  
 Despite this highly charged political stance, TWAIL scholars still express the need to be 
self-critical, aware of the limitations of the school and the voices it may have yet excluded. The 
emphasis of this discourse is on the international legal regime’s complicity in the maintenance of 
colonial legacies during the post-colonial era. In this context, international law is depicted as 
neither neutral nor impartial. Rather, it is marked by its indifference to human suffering and to its 
own complicity with historical injustices. Mutua describes the relationship between the 
international legal regime and its players through the metaphor of savages-victims-saviours.71 
Accordingly, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery in international law. 
The victim, on the other hand, is described as a human being whose dignity and worth have been 
violated by the savage. The victim is perceived as powerless, and thus in need of external 
intervention. Of course, the victim is non-white, highlighting the racial divide endemic 
particularly to human rights discourse in international law. The saviour, then, refers to the 
Eurocentric nature of the dominant international law paradigm, constructing Europe as 
normatively superior.  
																																																								70	Seth Gordon, “Indigeneous Rights in Modern International Law from a Critical Third World Perspective” (2007) 
31 Am. Ind. LR 401.  
71 Wa Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights” (2001) 42 Harvard 
International Law Journal 201. Also see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, "From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, 
Social Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions" (2000) 41 Harv. Int'l. LJ 529; Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, International law from below: Development, social movements and third world resistance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, "Counter-hegemonic international law: rethinking human rights 
and development as a Third World strategy" (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 767.  
	 43	
 One of the most significant critiques of the international legal system offered by TWAIL 
scholarship is related to the fact that the pioneering roles played by non-Western activists, judges, 
legal scholars and human rights actors are not at all acknowledged in the universal human rights 
discourse. In this vein, Issa Shivji argues that a re-conceptualized rights regime is needed to 
challenge the hegemonic logic of international law by unpacking its imperialist and statist biases, 
while at the same time providing space for registering Third World people’s abilities to resist 
hegemony.72 Overall, TWAIL scholars take a decided stance against the promotion of a sense of 
naturalness of international law, and treat it as a political project of homogenization in its current 
form. They assert that the lack of attention to influences from the Global South within human 
rights law leads to a significant erasure of the legitimacy of the discourse, since problems are to 
be solved without reference to those involved and affected in the first place. The inconspicuous 
erasure of race and racial hierarchies within the human rights discourse and the international legal 
system in general is read as a pathology of self-redemption masking the international hierarchy of 
race and colour re-entrenched in the global system of capitalist relations. In this light, TWAIL 
scholars push for opening up the discourse of international law, and strive to create a balance 
between individual and group rights, giving more substance to social and economic rights, 
relating rights to duties, and addressing the relationship between the corpus of law and global 
economic systems.73  
 Although state sovereignty and the right to self-determination offer some tools through 
which one could assert the dignity that is so central to self-actualization, it is critical for the 
system to be reformed not only from the point of view of human rights applications but, more 
generally, from within the realm of international law. In this regard, TWAIL scholarship, 
although internally fragmented, thus far has iterated a strong argument concerning the importance 
of an in-depth understanding of the power dynamics and historical realities at play in 
international law. TWAIL discourse attacks widely accepted norms of international law that both 
victimize and blame the peoples of the Global South. As it invites more actors onto the stage, it 																																																								
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detests normative hierarchies in the construction of international law as a regime of hegemonic 
practices. For these reasons, although not formally included in the registers of legal pluralism 
scholarship, I believe there is a valid case to be made for TWAIL scholarship to be construed as 
part and parcel of what I call the third wave of legal pluralism.  
 
C. Radical Pluralism and Beyond 	 In the remainder of this discussion of legal pluralism, I will concentrate specifically on 
Marti Koskenniemi and Ruth Buchanan’s work on international law and globalization. This 
choice is by no means meant to suggest that the work of other legal scholars is not important in 
marking the contours of radical pluralism. Peer Zumbansen and Gunther Teubner’s works, in 
particular, are far too influential to omit from any such discussion.74 But for the purposes of this 
chapter, I choose this duo of legal scholars, as the second of them engages in a debate with the 
first from within legal pluralist discourse itself, while also utilizing many of the conceptual 
reference points of the latest phase of legal pluralism, including Teubner’s work.   
 From the late 1980s onwards, Koskenniemi engaged in an embedded discussion on 
international law, the tenor of which was spelled out in his From Apology to Utopia: The 
Structure of International Legal Argument (first published in 1989). In this early work, 
Koskenniemi presented a critical view of international law as a discursive practice that attempts 
to remove the political from law as well as from international relations. If allowed to function this 
way, international law would be nothing more than either an irrelevant moralist utopia or an 
apology to global power politics. In his later work, including The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The 
Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001), Koskenniemi diversified his agenda on the 
discussion of international law. He first developed an intellectual history of international law, and 
then offered a critique of that history. This led to a highly pessimistic account of the content and 																																																								
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workings of international law, wanting it to be more than what it now is. In this sense, 
Koskenniemi follows a similar trope to what one finds in Michael Mandel’s, Tony Evans’ or 
Steve Ratner’s critiques of different branches of international law.75 Overall, Koskenniemi seems 
to have finally given up on the formal, classical legal ideal of international law in search of a 
normatively endowed, Kantian ideal.  This was perhaps to be expected, as he is an intellectual 
historian of the tradition of international law rather than a jurist. In fact, his critique of 
international law eventually led him to study even the methodology of the profession.76 This new 
turn in his work is most observable in the International Law Commission (ILC) Report titled 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law (2007), finalized by Martti Koskenniemi himself. The report organizes and 
synthesizes the various debates and discussions that relate to the breaking up of international law 
into several distinct regimes.  It also presents practical suggestions for mitigating some of the 
problems often associated with increasing fragmentation.  
 At this point, I turn to Ruth Buchanan’s critique of Koskenniemi’s work and her 
reintroduction of legal pluralism, not as historical critique or background for policy suggestions 
but as a legal theoretical method of dealing with international law while critically addressing its 
contradictions. In her work, Buchanan provides both a critique of and a possible alternative to 
Koskenniemi’s internal remedies for the failings of international law.77 She argues that as long as 
globalization is reframed as an external problem for legal theory, the solutions envisaged will be 
determined by the limited parameters of already existing legal discourses. Global legal pluralism, 
on the other hand, could invoke or illustrate the multiple, diverse, and contested sources of law 
on a transnational plane and could allow us to think about law differently, rather than focusing on 
how to respond to globalization within existing frameworks of legality. Buchanan, like TWAIL 
scholarship, is squarely opposed to a positivist conception of law.  She also refutes the reduction 																																																								
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of legal plurality to descriptive claims and instead subscribes to it as an ethos and a form of 
critical theory. Her approach to legal pluralism takes as its starting point a critique of the 
tendency to think of law as a privileged domain of aspiration, responsiveness and precision. She 
thus endorses an understanding of legal forms and institutions as both contingent and revisable, 
to allow for opportunities for those whose interests are inadequately addressed by current 
institutions and legal regimes. 
 Specifically, Buchanan’s critique of Koskenniemi is two-fold. She states that while law and 
politics are interrelated, legal discourses cannot be equated with political outcomes. Moreover, 
she argues that while a critical investigation of the politics of law can be quite helpful in 
revealing law’s failures and exclusions, this kind of analysis does not shed light on the production 
of law, or on the capacities of legal subjects to contest, change, or add legal meanings. Although 
she appreciates Koskenniemi’s attempt to imagine law as inherently plural, her emphasis is more 
on the plurality of law-creating subjects. In comparison to Koskenniemi’s worries about 
diplomats, jurists and international lawyers, Buchanan would like to think of a much wider range 
of law-creating subjects. She also refuses recourse to a unifying image of a constitutional 
moment, and instead chooses to live with a “radically legal pluralist” topography of multiple and 
diverse subjects and regimes, and a transnational legality without a centre or normative hierarchy. 
The implication of her reframing of international law is that emergent transnational regulatory 
regimes need not be reduced to relations of superior/inferior based on the degrees of their “legal” 
or “constitutional” nature. Instead, echoing the work of Cover, Teubner, and Trubek78 among 
others, Buchanan presents international law as an amalgamation of competing, interpenetrating, 
and mutually constitutive regimes at a transnational scale.79 She hopes that by allowing such 
plurality to be perceived, public discussion about the emergence and evolution of transnational 
legal norms might include a much wider range of institutional and discursive mechanisms. In 
summary, in my view, Buchanan’s unique contribution to the third wave of legal pluralism 
debate is her insistence that we give up our obsession with legal forms and start dealing with 																																																								
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matters of substance, content, and agency, and frame these in terms of processes rather than 
formal rules. For her, the lens of legal pluralism leads us to understand the construction and 
contestation of normative frameworks by legal subjects. This, in turn, is what is called the 
reflexive approach to the relationship between law and politics in the international realm, 
whereby competing normative claims are engaged, negotiated and compromised in the name of 
law. 
 
II. TRANSNATIONAL NATURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
MULTICENTRICITY OF LEGAL PRACTICES 	 In this section, I will narrow down the debate on the applicability of legal pluralism to 
international law to the specific field of accountability regimes in international criminal law, the 
subject matter of this dissertation. A well-functioning accountability regime in international law 
may well be the ultimate dream of legal scholars and jurists. However, the crystallization of a 
unitary legal system is an elusive goal, still yet, if ever, to be realized.80 Coherence and efficacy 
in the overall international legal order, with its fragmented and diversified legal regimes, could 
not be achieved by any given set of primary rules. The multitude of ‘secondary rules’ in 
international law—referring to Hart’s list of recognition, change and adjudication—is a constant 
force to be reckoned with. Nor could we do away with the proliferation of ‘third party forums’ or 
hybrid organs in international law, without the attached cost of eradicating variant forms of 
dispute settlement or domestic politics integral to both law-making and adjudication at the 
national or regional levels. If we follow the lead of Jonathan Charney, who gave up on the dream 
of a unitary regime of international law as early as 1988, clearly pronouncing so during his 
Hague Lectures, cross-fertilization and variegation are to be seen as improvements to the overall 
quality of international law, rather than a gradual undoing that must be opposed at all cost.81 
Observable changes in the global network of legal systems, indicative of a decisive move from an 																																																								
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exclusive focus on state parties further, undo the majestic assumption of structural unity in 
international law. In this case, how could we pronounce an international “accountability regime 
that is far-reaching, flexible, adaptable, and yet does not amount to a cacophony of legal 
practices? Furthermore, is it desirable to have such a regime, and one that is based on 
synchronizations and alliances in the face of histories of discontent and injustice?  
 No doubt, this set of questions is of import not only for international criminal law, but 
have implications for all areas of international public law. However, these concerns are 
particularly troubling for international criminal law due to the heavy weight of jus cogens norms 
and ergo omnes obligations that dictate a regime of universal jurisdiction in areas such as crimes 
against humanity. Furthermore, in the institution of permanent courts such as the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), universal jurisdiction delivers the meaning of rules of legal codification 
through a model of diffusion from a central legal authority. The general understanding is that the 
Rome Statute providing the guidelines for this procedure is built upon a long history of treaty and 
customary international law and, as such, does not lack democratic accountability. However, the 
way it was designed to be ratified and embedded in the constitutional realm of individual states 
has thus far been far too positive law-oriented, and does not take into account the socio-political 
investment required for full adoption of the codification of international crimes that fall under the 
ICC’s mandate, the prime example being crimes against humanity. In this regard, while an 
increasing number of legal practitioners, observers, and scholars make observations about the 
hybridization, fragmentation and cross-fertilization of international law—and indeed opt for the 
term transnational law in its place—legal discourse in the field of international criminal law has 
gone in the other direction and become increasingly more focused on centralization and 
standardization, with the universal reach of a single institution and jurisgenerative conduct 
identified as its raison d’etre. My argument here will be that institutions like ICC, when looked at 
under the lens of transnational law, in fact perform a double action. They engage in both 
jurisgenerative and jurispathic conduct, though which one of these practices is more important 
for the legacy and saliency of the institution, or indeed for the effectiveness of punishment of 
international crimes, remains undetermined. To put it differently, institutions such as the ICC 
engage in both primary and secondary rule-making in contemporary accountability regimes, 
though often their conduct is discussed almost entirely as one or the other.  
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A. Fragmentation in International Law and the Fragile Balance of Primary and Secondary 
Rules in Accountability Regimes 
Concerns about the increasing diversity of secondary rules and the desired unity of 
primary rules of international law reveal themselves fully in the context of debates on the sources 
of international law, responsibilities of legal institutions, and normative conflicts. As suggested 
earlier in this chapter, the relative autonomy of a wide range of regimes co-existing in the area of 
international law is seen by some as a guarantee of its growing effectiveness in terms of its 
primary rules, rather than as jeopardizing the unity and coherence of the overall substantive 
structure of the international legal order.82 In other words, diversification and differences in 
interpretation are seen as an integral part of the general enterprise, and hence secondary rules are 
not considered to constitute a threat to primary ones. Furthermore, the apparent coherence of the 
doctrines espoused by international courts and tribunals is taken as further proof that it is possible 
to talk about a single, unitary accountability regime in international criminal law that can 
accommodate the variations between judgments produced within international, domestic and 
regional legal regimes.83 In this context, if we are to talk about an accountability regime in any 
branch of international law, there has to be an identifiable remedial potential of judicial functions. 
There is, of course, a significant difference between substantive and remedial law. The former is 
generally understood to stand for statutory or written law that governs the rights and obligations 
of those who are subject to it. Therefore, it defines the legal relationship of individuals and the 
society, or the relationship between society and the state. Remedial law, on the other hand, is a 
version of procedural law, and it comprises the rules by which a court hears and determines what 
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happens in civil or criminal proceedings. In other words, procedural law—including remedial 
law—provides the method and means by which substantive law is made and administered. While 
substantive law defines rights and duties, procedural law is defined as the body of legal rules that 
provides the machinery for enforcing those rights and duties. The principle of delivering and 
promoting justice requires both substantive and procedural law. In Hart’s language of 
jurisprudence, law has to embody a strong link between primary and secondary rules, which then 
necessitates both internal and external accountability in the area of international law. Organs of 
international law are not only fragmented, but they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction and 
face a variety of claimants, the state constituting only one amongst many. These multiple fora 
entertain different procedural rules and substantive norms, and are thus likely to yield different 
results attending to the same case. Their limited locus standi and restrictive jurisdiction does 
affect their competency.  However, if we go back to the debate on transnational law within legal 
pluralism, neither variations in procedures nor oscillations in competency stand as a death 
sentence against a nascent legal regime. Instead, it is possible to argue that in the area of 
international law, and specifically with regards to accountability regimes, work on primary and 
secondary rules is to be undertaken almost simultaneously. This is precisely what organs such as 
the ICC have embarked upon. In that sense, determination of the success of a regime of universal 
jurisdiction should not be undertaken solely in terms of whether domestic courts adapt the Rome 
Statute, or the depth and width of harmonization practices at a global scale. Equally important is 
the spirit of the laws endorsed by organs like the ICC. We must turn our attention to the primary 
rules of international criminal law falling under such legal bodies’ mandate, and examine whether 
the Court initiated a process of transnational regime formation in this regard.  
 
B. The Project of International Law and the Jurisprudential Promise of ICC: Disciplining the 
Domestic Realm through International Criminal Law? 
 Public international law is commonly viewed as oscillating between a Kantian 
cosmopolitan ethos and harmonized adjudication regarding conflict of laws and other 
	 51	
jurisdictional matters at the international level.84 Regimes of trade law, human rights law, 
environmental law, and of course international criminal law are all testimony to the latter 
tendency, in varying degrees. The former, cosmopolitan impetus to manage and resolve “global 
problems,” on the other hand, often finds its best expression in the form of institution-building 
with an international reach and a purportedly global mandate. Traditional legal-political 
responses to institutional developments in the area of international legal regime formation—
namely, constitutionalist defense tactics disputing the accountability of transnational institutions, 
or invitations extended by the legal pluralism of earlier decades celebrating institution-building as 
a possible platform for dialogue—seem inadequate to deal with the task at hand: defining the 
project of international law in the age of late capitalism, neo-colonialism, and globalization. 
Meanwhile, the knee-jerk reaction of reducing international public law to a phantom mechanism 
built to advance functional objectives of neo-liberal harmonization, and serving only the interests 
of the powerful, is also a somewhat misleading take on this issue. Surely, aspects of the 
managerial vocabularies of international regulatory and legal practices fit the definition of an 
overarching plan of neo-liberal global constitutionalism, as do the markedly negative 
implications for the Global South of acts committed by select international institutions. However, 
not all new formations in the area of public international law can be explained by these broad 
strokes. 
 The establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court is one area that has a 
double promise vis-à-vis the post-WWII history of public international law. Strictly speaking, the 
ICC does not allow legal pluralist renditions of criminality in its chosen areas of authority. 
Despite the worries about it being an integral part of the neo-liberal agenda of forcing post-
colonial and post-imperial societies into submission for further capitalist expansion and deeper 
forms of accumulation, its nexus lies in the area of what may be called ‘disciplining practices’ 
emanating from a normative standpoint regarding egregious crimes such as war crimes, genocide, 
slavery, and crimes against humanity.85 Its existence also owes much to widespread NGO 
movements both within Europe and from the Global South, as these actors struggled for decades 																																																								
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and made alliances to counter the US hegemonic position in the area of international criminal law 
prior to the foundation of a permanent criminal court.86 This aspect of the ICC’s history gave the 
institution an unusual degree of legitimacy for an institutional organ with such outreach 
potential—or at least this was the case at the outset.  Last but not the least, the regime of 
international criminal law envisaged by the ICC cannot be grasped merely through the language 
of sovereign acts of states culminating in customary practices or treaty obligations. This signals a 
“transnational” quality concerning the ICC’s mandate. The institution is designed to resolve cases 
of state criminality within the parameters of a legally identified exercise of international public 
authority based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. As such, the subject matter of 
international crimes such as crimes against humanity does not refer to disputes arising between 
states or states and high-ranking individuals. Rather, it primarily concerns the criminal acts of 
states against their own societies.  
 In terms of its jurisdictional reach, the ICC operates on the principle of 
complementarity/subsidiarity. Thus, the first choice for adjudication of crimes falling under its 
jurisdiction is identified as domestic courts acting in accordance with domestic law, or 
specialized hybrid tribunals subject to supervision by domestic courts.  However, the founding 
document of the ICC—the Rome Statute—clearly indicates that in cases when such remedies are 
deemed not available or not realizable, general international consent authorizes the adjudication 
of such crimes by the ICC itself. Whether resolved by resort to domestic or international courts, 
international crimes falling under the ICC’s mandate are therefore squarely identified as matters 
of international law. The criminal law regime attending to them is to be distinguished from 
reciprocal and consensual adjudication as dictated by treaty law. Furthermore, the ICC is a court 
of prosecution, and not a civil court. In this context, international criminal law as codified by the 
ICC is not based on the regulation of a relationship between juridical equals. Following the 
standard criminal law format, it accrues a privileged position to the party representing public 
authority, whether this is the ICC or a domestic court, and calls upon those who allegedly 
committed crimes against the society. In this case, the latter party is in principle defined as the 																																																								
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whole of humanity. If so, the ICC, as one of the prime institutional embodiments of what may be 
deemed transnational law, acts as a semi-autonomous international adjudicative body that 
reviews and passes judgment upon individual conduct in the international public sphere.  
 The ICC is semi-autonomous because its decisions are insulated from higher court 
supervision or judicial review mechanisms, and its ties with the UN are symbolic rather than 
legislative. It is international because its authority derives from a treaty, the Rome Statute, as well 
as customary understanding of the crimes listed under its jurisdiction. Constituted at the 
transnational level, the ICC embraces the role of disciplining the governmental actions of states 
and individuals committing crimes against societies and communities, as defined by the 
conceptual architecture of international criminal law. In this context, what makes the ICC a 
noteworthy specimen of transnational law is not its reach per se. Nor is it the ICC’s inevitable 
exposure to and yet determined resistance against forces of legal fragmentation and hybridity in 
the global realm. The ICC’s capacity for legal norm and conduct building is worthy of attention. 
Owing to the transnational dictate of the ICC’s mandate, tribunals established under the law of 
individual states are invested with authority to try crimes defined by the ICC on the basis of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. As such, the ICC produces and perpetuates a legal discourse, 
even when it does not try a given case itself. Based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
although the ICC is uniquely removed from the domestic legal system of any given state, its 
codes are to be integrated into the domestic enforcement structures of all states. As a result, the 
power of this institution to make and enforce legal claims of criminality stands apart from its 
predecessors such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo military trials, or other international courts such 
as the International Court of Justice. Mainly for this reason, the regime of international criminal 
law as embodied by the ICC should be recognized as constituting an exceptionally important and 
powerful manifestation of transnational law. No other system of court-based international 
adjudication has as much sway in terms of substantiating forms of criminality and enforcing 
methods of adjudication within a global compass. Even if a given state has not signed and ratified 
the Rome Statute, the dictate of universal jurisdiction obliges its articles to be considered as 
positive international law, and thus to be taken into direct consideration in the domestic realm.  In 
this context, it would be apt to identify ICC-based codification of international crimes as the full-
fledged exercise of a disciplinary regime with transnational qualities. This is symptomatic of a 
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certain strand of institutional developments in the area of public international law readily 
identified by the third wave of legal pluralist scholarship. In order to understand the workings of 
the regime of international criminal law, the manner in which ICC operates needs to be examined 
closely. This includes topics such as the court’s determination of the exhaustion of all local 
remedies, leading to the establishment of hybrid tribunals based on the principal of universal 
jurisdiction, and the adaptation of the Rome Statute by domestic courts, with the implications of 
this process for national criminal law. While all of these issues clearly invite further inquiry, the 
remainder of this chapter will only focus on the politico-legal reasoning upon which the 
ratification of the Rome Statute in the realm of domestic law has been envisaged, and how this 
process relates to the “international law as transnational law” debate. 
 
C. International Criminal Court and the Ideal of Complementarity in International Law 
 A key statement that defines the ICC’s ideal role in public international law was uttered in 
2003, just after the Court’s founding, by none other than Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor 
of the Court. As he was sworn into office, he declared that “the absence of trials before this 
Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major 
success.”87 The legal reference here is to the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle,88 which 
permits the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over a serious international crime only if no State is 
willing and able to prosecute the crime itself. The determination of the likelihood that defendants 
will receive due process in national proceedings is part and parcel of this legal stipulation89 The 																																																								
87Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, June 16, 2003, Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief 
Prosecutor, quoted in ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper (2003), cited in Kevin Jon Heller, “The 
Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process” (2006) 17 
Criminal Law Forum 255.  
88Article 1 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC’s jurisdiction “shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.” Article 17(1), in turn, specifies the four situations in which the Court must defer to a national 
proceeding, along with their exceptions. These are the following: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by 
a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided 
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of sufficient 
gravity to justify further action by the Court. Citation from Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (1998), art. 1 and art. 17.  
89In principle, the ICC guarantees defendants all of the procedural protections required by the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It cannot, however, impose these principles upon national courts whereby 
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fact that most national criminal justice systems may not provide such guarantees in states where 
atrocities have been committed, or where a civil war ensued, no doubt renders this idealistic 
picture somewhat incomplete. In some instances, ICC deferrals may in fact expose the alleged 
perpetrators of atrocities to national judicial systems that may not be interested in or capable of 
providing them with due process. This in turn may increase the likelihood of wrongful 
convictions, which in turn would erode the ICC’s legacy, if not credibility. Furthermore, the ICC 
was never envisaged as an appellate body to review decisions of domestic courts or indeed as a 
human rights monitoring organ. In this regard, making decisions about the legality of procedural 
matters in domestic courts in cases related to international crimes does not fall within its 
mandate. At best, the Court has the authority to determine the unwillingness or inability of a state 
party to prosecute on a case-by-case basis, inquiring whether national proceedings were fair 
given the totality of the circumstances in each particular setting. However, if a trial proceeds in a 
national court, the ICC has no authority to vacate a national conviction resulting from a trial 
deemed not to have been conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of 
due process that the court itself embraces.90 In other instances, the ICC’s identification of specific 
crimes may never be fully approved by the domestic courts that claim jurisdiction over the 
criminal trial of alleged individuals. A case in point is that of Augusto Pinochet, and the 
“Bermuda triangle” that formed between the Spanish Judge who claimed universal jurisdiction to 
try the retired dictator for crimes against humanity, the British House of Lords that erred, at least 
to an extent, on the side of diplomatic immunity, and the domestic courts that were at best 
hesitant to try the case.91 Similar examples can be found in cases of the ICC’s direct or indirect 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
alleged perpetrators are to be tried. On this issue, see Mark S. Ellis, “The international criminal court and its 
implication for domestic law and national capacity building" Fla. J. Int'l L. 15 (2002): 215; Jann Kleffner, "The 
impact of complementarity on national implementation of substantive international criminal law" (2003) 1 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 86; Dwight Newman, "The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, 
and a Distributive Problem" (2004) 20 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 293; Carsten Stahn, "Complementarity, amnesties and 
alternative forms of justice: some interpretative guidelines for the International Criminal Court" (2005) 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 695; Simeon Sungi, "Is it pragmatism or an injustice to victims? The use of plea 
bargaining in the International Criminal Court" (2015) 7 Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology 21; 
and Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and international criminal law (Routledge, 2017).  
90 See Marta Bo, "The Situation in Libya and the ICC’s Understanding of Complementarity in the Context of UNSC-
Referred Cases" (2014) 25 Criminal Law Forum No. 3-4; Minhas Majeed Khan and Abbas Majeed Khan Marwat, 
“International Criminal Court (ICC): An Analysis of its Successes and Failures and Challenges Faced by the ICC 
Tribunals for War Crimes" (2016) 11 Dialogue 243. 
91 On the Pinochet trial, see Cath Collins, Katherine Hite, and Alfredo Joignant, eds., The Politics of Memory in 
Chile: From Pinochet to Bachelet (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013); and Accatino, Daniela, and Cath Collins, 
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involvement in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Lebanon and Iraq. Therefore, the issue of 
complementarity could be said to provide more questions than answers in the area of public 
international law. However, if we shift our lens from public international law to transnational 
law, another picture emerges.  
 
D. The Mandate of International Criminal Court: Jurisprudential versus Political Realities  
In reality, the discrepancies observable in the application of universal jurisdiction of the 
ICC’s codification of international crimes are indicative of the gap between the jurisprudential 
and political dimensions of accountability regimes in international law. The issues and concerns 
articulated above are informed by my conviction that in order to make a categorical observation 
about international legal institutions with a transnational mandate, we must first attend to the 
underpinnings of their legal operations as well as the symbolic and political value of their 
jurisdictional characteristics. Determining of the significance of ICC-like institutions with respect 
to the grand project of launching a post-Westphalian era in international law is a crucial step in 
this direction. Indeed, the ICC has commonly been presented as a tour de force heralding a new 
age, wherein state interests are trumped by universal, transnational, and of course humanitarian 
ones. Similarly, from a jurisprudential point of view, the Rome Statute is considered to have 
made a marked change in the attribution of responsibility and the curtailment of impunity for 
crimes of grave nature and wide scope. Historically speaking, the trend that started with the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials significantly lost steam during the Cold War years.92 Following the 
cascade of developments in international criminal law, including the endorsement of the 
International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo in 1946, the charting of the Genocide 																																																																																																																																																																																			
“Truth, Evidence, Truth: The Deployment of Testimony, Archives and Technical Data in Domestic Human Rights 
Trials" (2016) 8 Journal of Human Rights Practice 81.  
92 On the trajectory of developments linking the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to the emergence of the ICC, see inter 
alia, Steven Fogelson, "The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise" (1989) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 833; Robert 
Wolfe, "Flaws in the Nuremberg Legacy: An Impediment to International War Crimes Tribunals' Prosecution of 
Crimes Against Humanity" (1998) 12 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 434; Steven Ratner, Jason S. Abrams, and 
James L. Bischoff, Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law: beyond the Nuremberg legacy 
(Oxford University Press, 2009); Hans-Peter Kaul, "The Nuremberg Legacy and the International Criminal Court-
Lecture in Honor of Whitney R. Harris, Former Nuremberg Prosecutor" (2013) 12 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 
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Convention in 1948, the Geneva Convention on armed conflict in 1949, and the attached Code of 
Offenses against Peace and Security of Mankind, and subsequent UN covenants related to human 
rights law, not much more was done. Until the unfolding of the catastrophic events in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the constitution of a stable system of substantive international law to 
attend to human rights atrocities committed during war or peace was not a priority for UN 
bureaucratic and legal circles. This was despite the fact that crimes against humanity were not at 
all absent from the international scene, including a wide range of disturbing developments in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. 
In summary, the unique area of intersection that the international tribunals of the 1990s 
came to embody—signifying a calculated overlap between international human rights law, 
humanitarian law, and international criminal law—was perhaps intimated and yet by no means 
fully articulated by the immediate post-war trials and the trajectory that followed from them in 
international criminal law. Even the International Law Commission resumption of work in 1983, 
after a long hiatus of almost 35 years, was tainted by the debate among states concerning how to 
define “aggression” committed by states.93 It took another 13 years to reach a state of semi-
resolution in the form of a Draft Code. The culmination of these efforts finally came in the form 
of the constitution of a permanent International Criminal Court in 2002. Yet, for jurisdiction-
related matters, whether this should be regarded as a watermark remains far from obvious. What 
could be argued with much greater comfort is that the ICC is part and parcel of a sea change in 
norm creation and norm inducement at the transnational level. Its internal logic may be at odds 
with the traditional operations of international law, and from that angle, universal jurisdiction 
lacks jurisdictional certainty. If, however, universal jurisdiction is taken as a discursive tool 
honed to circumscribe domestic variations in the determination of criminality in categories 
delineated by the ICC, then the matter will assume novel dimensions, as will be discussed in the 
last two chapters of this work.  
 
 
																																																								
93 For details of this process, see Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta. Cassese's international criminal law (Oxford 
university press, 2013).  
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a conceptual map (hence the use of 
“topography” in its title) of select examples of existing scholarship on the workings of 
international law as it pertains to the dictum of universal jurisdiction. Though the review 
presented here is by no means comprehensive, it is symptomatic of most pronounced trends in the 
current reconfiguration of the debate on the nature and reach of international law. In this context, 
I analyzed the merits and failings of the model of centrifugal diffusion in international law in the 
context of accountability regimes particularly in light of the claims made by select schools of 
thought related to legal pluralism. Beginning from the foundational premises of the third wave of 
radical legal pluralistic scholarship, I commenced an examination of the normative boundaries of 
the applicability of international criminal law codified by a transnational body such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in local and national settings. This examination will be 
continued throughout the rest of this thesis. With particular reference to crimes against humanity, 
and attending to the institutional, normative and political aspects of universal jurisdiction, the 
following chapters will analyze the context and efficacy of attempts at their adjudication in the 
Global South. The aim of this opening chapter was to foreground this debate in legal theory.  
The history of politico-legal practices leading to the foundation of a permanent court is 
primarily Europe-bound, though its emergence involved a strong component of Global South and 
non-state participation. As is, ICC’s mandate defined by the Rome Statute has far-reaching global 
implications. Indeed, a crucial part of its operations and the principle of universal jurisdiction 
embraced by the court depend on the unassailable equation of morality and law, particularly in 
the case of crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, studies of international politics indicate the 
absence of a widespread ethics of responsibility or societal engagement to provide international 
criminal law with a final say in this area. Hence we witness a clearly identifiable contradiction 
between the mandate of a transnational legal institution and the realities of the application and 
adaptation of international law produced or endorsed by it. This is a delicate disjuncture, and one 
that cannot be handled solely by legal pluralism in its early or later versions.  
The original concern behind the debate on the ICC presented in this opening chapter was 
to determine whether international tribunals and courts indeed embody a new kind of relationship 
between socio-political, substantive/normative, and legal aspects of public international law and 
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thus constitute an exemplary case for transnational law. A related query was whether 
international criminal law has achieved the status of a transnational legal regime and assumed a 
position above and beyond the interests and immediate involvement of the states and societies 
affected by it. If so, could it indeed sustain the kind of criticism that was raised by schools of 
thought such as TWAIL scholarship? The answers to both lines of questioning proved to be 
highly conditional. Here, the issue is no longer the codification of law or even juridification 
processes themselves. In public international law, codification customarily refers to the 
articulation of binding legal rules, otherwise knows as “positive law.” The “codification 
movement” in legal conduct emerged out of the post-Enlightenment context, and took root in 
European societies during the late 18th century in the form of civil and criminal codes. It reached 
its high point with the enactment of the French Napoleonic Code in 1804.94 No doubt the 
relationship between domestic and international criminal codes, and in particular the embedding 
of international law within constitutional or domestic criminal law is a complex one. However, 
the applicability of transnational law in domestic contexts is only a small part of the problem. 
Legal pluralism scholarship reveals that the substantive meaning of law in changed contexts and 
scales is a much more significant issue in the workings of transnational law.  
In the specific case of international criminal law, this body of law has long been 
considered an “autonomous branch” of criminal law, as it only deals with “international crimes.” 
Similarly, the institutions within which such crimes are to be adjudicated have been designated 
courts and tribunals, set up to try legal and natural persons who have incurred an international 
criminal responsibility. This is a distinct category in comparison to criminal responsibility as it 
has been defined within the domestic context, or later on, in cases of crimes against humanity and 
genocide that impose upon any given constituency the obligation of universal jurisdiction. In the 
context of the ICC, international criminal law clearly departs from the classical understanding of 
international law as an amalgamation of treaties and conventions regulating relations amongst 
states. Yet it never comes close enough to domestic jurisdiction in terms of having the 
expansiveness to deal with crimes that are the business of the state or society within which they 																																																								
94 The Corpus Iuris Civilis was the formal compilation of Roman law commissioned by the sixth-century Roman 
emperor Justinian. Alongside scripture and Greek philosophy, it no doubt ranks as one of the major classical texts 
studied or cited by medieval and modern political theorists including Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius, Bodin, Grotius, 
Hobbes, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Tocqueville, and Weber. See Neil MacCormick, Robert S. Summers, 
and Arthur L. Goodhart, eds., Interpreting precedents: a comparative study (Routledge, 2016).  
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were committed, or upon whom costs and damages were inflicted. Neither does it entirely 
manage to become transnational, as the court’s emergence was predicated upon state consent and 
the continuation of its operations also demand long-term state support. Heren lies the conundrum 
for legal scholars and international jurists alike. Although the ICC and similar transnational 
organs are not predicates of a unified legal system whereby national laws would be deemed 
second-order unless evidently on par with the Court’s mandate, they nonetheless strive for the 
establishment of universal rules of adjudication for crimes codified under their aegis. 
Consequently, they push for the enforcement of standard practices via public international law. 
However, the way they go about implementing this “project” matches the definition of 
transnational law, due to the nature of fragmented, overlapping regimes held together through 
persuasion, disciplining strategies, harmonization practices and at times brutal force.  
 The notion of a global order is highly contested amongst scholars of international law. 
Global disorder, a multiplicity of regimes, and polycentric systems concepts are much more 
readily embraced in describing the status quo in this field of law.95 The unique offer of radical 
legal pluralism and reflexive legal theory scholarship is that such disorder is not to be seen as 
symptomatic of chaos. On the contrary, it is regarded as the expression of clashes of interest, 
conflicts of norms, and different articulations of the desire for socio-political change.96 In this 
positioning of diversification as a necessary feature of transnational legal regimes, the tensions 
endemic to institutions such as the ICC and their mandates begin to appear pro forma. However, 
the real question about the viability of universal jurisdiction in international criminal law remains 
unattended to. The issue is not how to make domestic courts and legal systems adapt the ICC’s 
definition of criminality, and adjust their codes of legal conduct according to what the Court 
dictates as proper adjudication. Whether individual accountability provides meaningful sanction 
and could deter governments and societies from committing gross human rights violations is not 
the issue here, either. Even in the presence of a comprehensive criminal code substantiated by an 
enforcement architecture, limitations exist and will continue to exist. Diverse norms entertained 
by different domestic constituencies as to what constitutes a crime against humanity, the power 																																																								
95 See Jeffrey Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, and David Wippman, International Law: Norms, Actors, Process (Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business, 2015). 
96 See Alexis Galán and Dennis Patterson, "The limits of normative legal pluralism: Review of Paul Schiff Berman, 
Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders" (2013) 11 International journal of constitutional 
law 783.  
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dynamics affecting the identification of problem cases, as well as the determination of the venue 
and form of trials directly influence both the scope of international criminal law and the set of 
mechanisms available for its practice. In other words, the Rome Statute ratification package is 
imbued with structural variations that are regarded as permanent features of transnational law in 
other instances. The grand project of selective and targeted erosion of state sovereignty in the 
name of a higher common good for global society may well be an esteemed legal prescription;its 
socio-political validation, however, is an entirely different matter.97 As the practices of public 
international law evolved, they did so in the context of conflicts of interest, wars, negotiations, 
and partial ramifications under the shadow of global power struggles and historically embedded 
forms of domination. Therefore, appraisal of the attainability of the goal of institutionalizing 
accountability for crimes against humanity requires that legal scholarship expand beyond the 
realm of criminal liability and setting up evidence-based fair trials.  
 Transnational law, as tackled by recent debates within legal pluralism debates, is one venue 
within which we may be able to link accountability regimes to other areas of law in a global 
context. This would not only reduce the burden of the ICC’s exceptional status regarding the 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. It could also bring us closer to the 
substantiation of injurious acts exemplified by crimes against humanity legislation in local 
contexts through domestic absorption of the normative address of this specific category of crimes 
exemplifying state criminality. In conclusion, as I have highlighted, the historical use of notions 
of universality and objectivity in international law first and foremost served First World socio-
economic and political interests. One of its end results has been the codification of conditions that 
sustain old and new forms of dispossession across the Global South. As evidenced by analysis of 
the premises upon which the ICC operates, these interests have now taken on a transnational 
character and are being pursued through an elaborate network of meta-regulatory regimes 
beneficial to emergent transnational capitalist classes cutting across the North and the South.98 																																																								
97 For an interesting counter-argument, see Holmes, Pablo, “The politics of law and the laws of politics: The political 
paradoxes of transnational constitutionalis" Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 21.2 (2014): 553-583. Holmes 
subscribes to the view that transnational constitutionalism could be achieved in a fragmented manner and through 
local politicization of core principles of justice. On this issue, also see Turkuler Isiksel, "Global legal pluralism as 
fact and norm" (2013) 2 Global Constitutionalism 160. 
98 As a former graduate student of Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi and a research fellow of Fernand 
Braudel Center, I am indebted to the vision of historical capitalism they developed back in the 1980s. In particular, I 
am very much at home with the late Arrighi’s take on global class formations, not just in economical but also in 
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Transnational legal regimes are most often used to diffuse neoliberal economic reforms on a 
global scale, resulting in the embedding of various legal precepts in domestic political and socio-
economic settings. Critical international law scholars appear somewhat ambivalent in their efforts 
to craft disciplinary proposals for revealing this dark underbelly of the global legal order, with the 
exception of the approaches of TWAIL and post-Marxist legal pluralism. While a reflective type 
of global legal pluralism recognizes the legitimacy of lawmaking as executed by non-institutional 
actors, the field of legal theory remains perplexed as to how we reconcile the pursuit of legal 
accountability in a highly stratified and unjust world.99  
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Chapter II. In the Beginning, there was the State? A Critical Review of Compliance to  
International Law regarding Universal Jurisdiction 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The last hundred years have given us at least three attempts at the creation of an 
institutionalized system of international criminal law. The key issue involed in this idea’s 
prominence is that of universal jurisdiction. The notion of a universally enforceable criminal law 
dates back to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.100 This was also when the idea of an international 
criminal court first emerged;101 the realization, implementation, and application of such a court, 
however, were not tried until after World War II. To address the crimes committed under the 
National Socialist regime in Germany, an international military tribunal was erected in 
Nuremberg, based on the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which was 
followed by the Tokyo Tribunal.102 Later, after the Cold War, the United Nations decided to 
establish ad hoc courts against the backdrop of gross humanitarian law violations in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Then in 1998 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) was adopted, which came into effect on July 1, 2002. The ICC was followed by various 
internationalized and hybrid courts, set up inter alia to cope with the conflicts in Kosovo, Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia. All of these post-ICC institutions sought the ideal of a 
standardized legal frame of reference for international crimes. Alas, this did not alleviate the 
problem of the state-centric nature of international criminal law.  
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the issue of causes of compliance (or lack thereof) to 
international law in the larger context of the debate concerning the emergence of a standardized 
frame of reference for universal jurisdiction. This is a continuation of the questioning developed 
in the first chapter concerning the nature of the transnational law as it applies to the condition of 																																																								
100 See the classic work of Ian McTaggart Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (Manchester 
University Press, 1984). Also see Mark Eugen Villiger, Customary international law and treaties: a study of their 
interactions and interrelations, with special consideration of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Vol. 7. (Brill Publishers,1985).  
101 See Gerry Simpson, Law, war and crime: war crimes, trials and the reinvention of international law (Polity, 
2007).  
102 For the actual text of the Charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp [25.03.2017].  
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states and societies in the Global South, During the last few decades, the long-standing divide 
between those who believed that international rules have an effect on shaping state behavior and 
those who saw such rules as epiphenomenal or, worse, as imposed, has given way to an 
increasingly complex debate. The proliferation and evolution of international legal agreements, 
organizations, and judicial bodies in the aftermath of the Cold War years (1947-1991) provided 
the background for the heightened attention paid to the role of international law in determining 
interstate and transnational politics. In particular, the phenomenon of legalization and 
adjudication of state criminality under the aegis of international criminal law raised several new 
questions. What factors affect the choice to resort to international law? When is such a recourse a 
choice and when is it imposed? Upon whom is international law imposed and under which 
circumstances? Does the use of international law make a difference in how states behave when 
faced with their own criminal conduct? What issues emerge from critiques emanating from the 
post-colonial world and the Global South at large concerning the use and abuse of international 
criminal law? These are just a few of the rather troubling concerns emerging in the post-ICC 
landscape of international criminal law. 
In this chapter, I will present a survey of some of the recent developments in the study of 
compliance to international law in both international relations (IR) and international law (IL) 
literature with a specific emphasis on universal jurisdiction. Here, compliance is distinguished 
from the related but distinct concepts of implementation and effectiveness.103 Broadly speaking, 
the focus of the present discussion is not compliance with treaties, but rather with the broader 
category of rules that constitute “customary international law.” Based on a critical review of 
some of the major theories advanced by IR and IL scholars from 1980s onwards, my aim is to 
identify a number of common questions that guide the debates in both fields concerning the 
nature of international criminal law, in particular with reference to the notion of universal 
jurisdiction. In studies on international criminal law, comparatively little attention has been paid 
to theoretical questions pertaining to universal jurisdiction. This chapter focuses less on the 
lawfulness of universal jurisdiction and more on the way the basic concept is treated by these two 
bodies of scholarship in the context of how they relate to the state as the basic unit of 																																																								
103 Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International law, international relations and compliance" in Carlsneas, 
Risse & Simmons, eds. Handbook of International Relations (Sage, 2002).  
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international law.  This is of utmost importance in terms of developing a robust framework for 
furthering the debate on state criminality and identifying the limits of international criminal law 
for introducing, operationalizing or enforcing criminal jurisdiction measures based on an 
overarching, formulaic regime of accountability.		
I. NEMO ME IMPUNA LACESIT? THE ETHOS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION104 
Universal jurisdiction is a specific legal doctrine dictating that domestic courts try and 
punish perpetrators of a select set of crimes so heinous that they amount to crimes against the 
whole of humanity, regardless of where they occurred or the nationality of the victim or 
perpetrator, which otherwise constitute the standard nexus requirements in international law. 
Under its purview fall piracy, slavery, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and 
genocide.105 Universal jurisdiction thus constitutes a significant departure from the traditional 																																																								
104 This Latin phrase, literally meaning “no one assails me with impunity,” was the motto of the Royal Stuart 
Dynasty of Scotland from the reign of James VI onwards (1578-1580). It was also adopted as the motto of the 
Scotish regiments in British Army. See Norren Burrows, "Nemo Me Impune Lacessit: The Scottish Right of Access 
to the European Courts" (2002) 8 Eur. Pub. L. 45.  
105 At present, there are two main approaches to universal jurisdiction. The first seeks to apply the procedures of 
domestic criminal justice to violations befitting international criminal law standards. This is done with reference to 
legal codes embodied in United Nations conventions, or via authorization by national prosecutors to bring offenders 
into their jurisdiction through extradition from third countries. The second approach is endorsed by the ICC and is in 
accordance with its founding treaty of Rome Statute. The closest analogous historical concept to the contemporary 
notion of universal jurisdiction is hostes humani generis [enemies of the human race]. However, this particular term 
has only been applied to pirates, hijackers, and outlaws whose crimes were typically committed outside the territory 
of any state. A state engaged in adjudicating crimes based on universal jurisdiction backs its claim on the grounds 
that the crime committed is considered an international crime. The best example of this to date was Belgium’s 1993 
law of universal jurisdiction, though it was amended to reduce its scope in 2003. The creation of the ICC did not 
reduce the need to create further domestic universal jurisdiction laws, since the Court is not entitled to judge crimes 
committed before 2002. For further debate on the intricacies of the concept of universal jurisdiction, see Slaughter, 
Anne-Marie, and William Burke-White, "An international constitutional moment" (2002) 43 Harv. Int'l LJ 1; 
William Burke-White, "A community of courts: toward a system of international criminal law enforcement" (2002) 
24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1; William Burke-White, "International legal pluralism" (2003) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 963; William 
Burke-White, "Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration" (2003) 38 
Tex. Int'l LJ 729; David Wallach, "The Irrationaity of Universal Civil Jurisdiction" (2014) 46 Geo. J. Int'l L. 803; 
Abhimanyu George Jain, "Universal civil jurisdiction in international law" (2015) 55 Indian Journal of International 
Law 209; Aisling O'Sullivan, Universal jurisdiction in international criminal law: the debate and the battle for 
hegemony (Routledge, 2017); and Erik Voeten, "Competition and Complementarity between Global and Regional 
Human Rights Institutions" (2017) 8 Global Policy 119.  
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approach to international criminal law that requires a direct connection between the prosecuting 
state and the particular crime. States could enact national legislation granting domestic courts the 
power to assert universal jurisdiction over particular crimes as well as international courts such as 
the ICC having the power to litigate. However, the scope and content of universal jurisdiction 
laws vary significantly among states. Although domestic implementing legislation may be 
necessary for national courts to exercise universal jurisdiction, the contemporary framework of 
international conventions and international customary norms provide the legal grounds for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by states parties even without such a prerequisite.  
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction asserts that for a select body of “international 
crimes,” the perpetrators in question should not escape trial by invoking doctrines of either 
sovereign immunity of states that is used as a standard defense of domestic capabilities, or, the 
sacrosanct nature of national frontiers again based on the principle of state sovereignty. 
Proponents of universal jurisdiction further argue that it is not always possible to prosecute 
crimes by the states in which they were committed. For example, after a devastating conflict or 
war, states may lack the necessary legal infrastructure and resources to carry out an investigation 
and prosecution. Alternatively, governments may intentionally fail or refuse to prosecute a crime 
that occurred within their territory. Crimes and conduct subject to prosecution may have been 
sanctioned or supported by the state itself, or the perpetrators of such crimes may be serving as 
government officials or could have allies within the ruling regime. Thus, there may be a lack of 
political will to pursue investigations, preventing the prosecution of alleged crimes. At least in 
theory, in the absence of accountability, other states may seek to initiate prosecutions on the basis 
of universal jurisdiction in order to prevent impunity and provide justice for victims of such 
crimes. At least some states may feel that they have a common interest, if not obligation, to 
punish perpetrators of serious crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.106 States may also be under 
pressure to pursue prosecutions due the presence of a perpetrator within their borders, led by the 																																																								
106 Recent examples of universal jurisdiction cases include: the prosecution and conviction of Nikola Jorgic, a former 
leader of a paramilitary Serb group, and Novislav Djajic, a Serbian soldier, by German courts for acts of genocide 
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1997); the extradition request by a Spanish Court seeking to try former 
Chilean President Augusto Pinochet for crimes such as torture, murder, illegal detention, and forced disappearance 
(1998); the prosecution and conviction of two Rwandan nuns, Sister Maria Kisito and Sister Gertrude, by a domestic 
court in Belgium for war crimes committed during the 1994 Rwandan genocide (2001); and the investigation and 
indictment of the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré, by a Belgium court for crimes against humanity, torture, 
war crimes and other human rights violations committed during his presidency in Chad (2005). 
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desire for their territory not to be a safe haven for criminals. Generalizing this stance to the entire 
system of states as an absolute rule, however, is a different matter. 
Indeed, I would posit that universal jurisdiction remains a controversial principle and 
practice in international law due to the state-centric nature of the very enterprise, as well as the 
power dynamics that shape the relations between states, regions and international courts. In this 
context, there are three instances that need to be re-examined to provide full background to this 
peculiar body of jurisprudence. With the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, President Woodrow 
Wilson’s new agenda for Europe led to the development of the League of Nations, and the 
emergence of the Permanent Court of International Justice.107 As a result, this court was seen as a 
victor’s court. In 1945, the allied powers replaced the (by then defunct) League with the United 
Nations, which was followed by the establishment of Nuremberg and Tokyo military trials.108 
These too have been generally named as trials that led to victor’s justice, despite the very valid 
reasons for which they tried war criminals, albeit one-sidedly. The UN Security Council itself 
proved heavily problem-laden in terms of misuse of its powers during the Cold War years. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in November 1989, for instance, the permanent 
members of the Security Council cooperated in the unprecedented UN-backed strike against 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This is commonly cited—both positively and 
negatively—as the beginning of a “new world order.”109 The Iraq decision was followed by the 
establishment of two ad hoc tribunals for the prosecution of crimes against humanity regarding 
the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994). Considerations of the desirability and 
sustainability of emergent institutionalized organs of international law such as the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)—which is widely considered as the third call for the adjudication of 
universal jurisdiction—developed against this background. The ICC has also been under heavy 
attack from states in the Global South, as well as some in the West, who claim that it delivers 
justice based on very selective criteria and picks its cases according to political reasons rather 																																																								
107 See Yves Beigbeder, International justice against impunity: Progress and new challenges (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2005); and Bill Bowring, The degradation of the international legal order?: the rehabilitation of law and 
the possibility of politics (Routledge, 2008).  
108 See the historical piece by Robert Walkinshaw, "The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials: another step toward 
international justice" (1949) 35 American Bar Association Journal 299.  
109 See Mara Bustelo, Whose new world order: what role for the United Nations? (Wm Gaunt & Sons, 1991); Maz 
Singer & Aaron B. Wildavsky, The real world order: Zones of peace, zones of turmoil (Chatham House Pub, 1996); 
Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order: Fully Revised and Updated (Springer, 2008); and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A new world order (Princeton University Press, 2009).  
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than purely justice-related ones.110 In this “new world order,” which is the historical context for 
the full-fledged embrace of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, the state is not disappearing. 
Instead, it may be apt to argue that it is unbundling into separate, functionally distinct parts. In 
addition, regional hubs of economic activity, political alignment, power, and hegemony are 
becoming more pronounced. In such a multifaceted environment, courts, regulatory agencies, 
executives, and legislatures are networking with their counterparts across the globe, espousing a 
transnational system of governance and regulation.111 This has been the reality of neoliberalism 
since the 1990s. And yet, curiously, both international law and international relations scholarship 
on international criminal law lag somewhat behind and lack answers to many of the most 
pressing challenges of the 21st century. Dominant schools of thought in this field continue to 
hold the state so dear that all else fades into the background. In my opinion, this is the real 
tragedy of the debate on universal jurisdiction, more so than the letter of the law itself or the 
uncertainties concerning its application.  
 
 
 
																																																								
110 On critiques of ICC, see Shadrack Gutto, "Created and Limited by Politics: A view of the ICC from 
Africa" (2003) 12 African Security Studies 127; Emmanuel Saffa Abdulai, "The Standoff between ICC and African 
Leaders Debate Revisited" The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society (ed.), Oxford Transitional Justice Research: 
Debating International Justice in Africa (2010); Wendy Laverick, Global injustice and crime control (Routledge, 
2016). 
111 See Mark Rupert. Ideologies of globalization: contending visions of a new world order (Routledge, 2012). 
According to Rupert, the impoverishment of mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship, especially in the 
bastions of academic power and respectability in the Global North, led to a willful conceptual blindness as to 
mutually constitutive relations of governance/resistance at work in the production of global politics. This is 
happening despite the rise of powerful transnational social movements seeking to reform or transform global 
capitalism. Critical scholars of world politics have developed conceptual vocabularies with which to reconstruct 
aspects of these governance/resistance relations. However, they have very limited influence over the mainstream of 
IR scholarship. For Rupert, Stephen Gill and others, Marxian theory provides critical leverage for understanding the 
structures and dynamics of late capitalism, its relationship to the modern state, and class-based power dynamics. 
These works no doubt offer a conceptual vocabulary suitable for articulating a transformative form of politics. Here, 
however, my focus is limited to analysis of the damaging effects of the mainstream arguments, as they often set the 
tone for both academic training and the politics of international law. See for instance, the classic work of Stephen 
Gill and David Law, "Global hegemony and the structural power of capital" (1993) 26 Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations 93.  
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II. TWO SHIPS PASSING AT NIGHT? INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS112  
International law and international relations scholarship, as two interrelated and yet 
separate disciplinary forms of knowledge, have traditionally approached the phenomenon of 
universal jurisdiction from different and sometimes opposing perspectives.113 Consequently, their 
understandings of the establishment of the ICC and its juridification of international crimes 
exemplify rather contradictory treatments of universal jurisdiction. This is only partly due to a 
conception of international law—seen as the study of the kind of law that governs states and 
other international actors in their relations with each other—as prescriptive and heavily 
normative. In effect, international relations scholars have long self-identified their field as the 
analysis of the behaviour of states, and have been descriptive or explanatory but rarely openly 
prescriptive. Following the emergence of regime theory, theories of institutionalism and 
institutional realism, and in particular with the revival of liberal international relations theories, a 
rapprochement began during the 1990s.114 As a result, a select but well-respected group of 
political scientists posited that the development of international law should be regarded as an 
explanatory factor in the analysis of state behavior. Similarly, an increasing number of influential 
legal scholars have become increasingly interested in understanding the workings of international 
politics in order to make full sense of the context out of which legal developments emerged, and 
later on were sustained or negated. In the IL field, scholars such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and 
Robert Keohane identified at least three ways that international lawyers and international law 
																																																								
112 I owe this analogy to the influential article by Philip Alston, "Ships passing in the night: the current state of the 
human rights and development debate seen through the lens of the Millennium Development Goals" (2005) 27 
Human rights quarterly 755. Needless to say, Alston’s take on the millennium goals is less than enthusiastic.  
113 See Craig Barker, International law and international relations (A&C Black, 2000); and David Armstrong, Theo 
Farrell, and Hélène Lambert. International law and international relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012). In 
the second decade of the 21st century, scholars of international law and international relations seem to have 
rediscovered one another. The result is a burgeoning "IR/IL" literature, in which international law scholars employ 
IR theories in the analysis of international law and institutions. They also challenge IR theories by reasserting the 
distinctive role of law in global politics. The most substantive examples of these come from TWAIL scholarship. See 
Karin Mickelson, "Rhetoric and rage: Third World voices in International Legal discourse" (1997) 16 Wis. Int'l 
LJ 353; David Fidler, "Revolt against or from within the West-TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future 
Direction of International Law" (2003) 2 Chinese J. Int'l L. 29; Antony Anghie & Bhupinder S. Chimni "Third 
World Approaches to International Law and Individual Repsonsibility in Internal Conflicts" (2003) 2 Chinese J. int'l 
L. 77; Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Newness, imperialism, and international legal reform in our time: a TWAIL 
perspective" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171; Branwen Jones, Decolonizing international relations (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006); and Bhupinder Chimni, "Third World approaches to international law: a manifesto" (2006) 8 Int'l 
Comm. L. Rev. 3. 
114 See Gerry Simpson, "Two liberalisms" (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 537.  
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scholars could use IR theories: to diagnose international problems and formulate better legal 
solutions; to explain the structure and function of particular international legal institutions; and to 
examine and re-conceptualize particular institutions of international law as well as international 
law as a domain in its own right.115 Despite the rapprochement of the recent years, it is worth 
noting that the legacy of past divisions, not only between these two disciplines but also within 
each of them, continues to cast a shadow on the study of international law in general, and 
universal jurisdiction in particular. For instance, there are several conflicting versions of what IR 
or IL scholars consider the international political system that provides the foundations for 
international law. First and foremost, there is the classical international relations conception of a 
world composed of regulated states, a vision that makes very little distinction between the 
process of international legalization and the creation of international institutions.  According to 
this approach, the process of legalization is seen as the impetus behind institutionalization and 
regulated practice of rules.116 In this context, distinct formations such as the ICC are accepted as 
simply reflecting enduring sets of rules and norms in international politics. Accordingly, 
decision-making processes in international law and their potential to shape the future 
expectations, interests, and behaviour of international actors is a natural continuation of 
international politics.  																																																								
115 Along with Kenneth Albott, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Robert Keohane develop an empirically based conception 
of international legalization to show how law and politics are intertwined across a wide range of institutional forms. 
Their theory of international legalization has three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. For them, 
obligation connotes that states are legally bound by rules or commitments and therefore subject to the general rules 
and procedures of international law. Precision means that rules are definite, unambiguously defining the conduct they 
require, authorize, or proscribe. The last dimension, that of delegation, grants authority to third parties for the 
implementation of rules, including their interpretation and application, dispute settlement, and further rule-making. 
They argue that these dimensions are conceptually independent, and that their various combinations produce a 
variety of international legalization projects. Accordingly, the spectrum extends from “hard” legalization associated 
with domestic legal systems to “soft” legalization where written law is largely absent. This is a heavily 
instrumentalist reading of international law. Alas, it dominates the IR scholarship on international law. See Kenneth 
Abbott, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Robert Keohane, "The concept of legalization" (2000) 54 International 
organization 401. Also see Robert Keohane, Power and governance in a partially globalized world (Routledge, 
2002) as well as Anne Marie Slaughter’s earlier work, “The New World Order” (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 183.  
116 See Judith Goldstein, M. Kahler, Robert Keohane, & Anne Marie Slaughter, “Introduction: Legalization and 
world politics” (2000) 54 International organization 385. Also see Judith Goldstein, Legalization and world politics 
(MIT Press, 2001). For a critique of this approach, see Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, "Alternatives to 
“legalization”: richer views of law and politics" (2001) 55 International Organization 743. Finnemore and Toope 
argue that the legalization approach to the politics of international law is unnecessarily narrow. They posit, and I 
agree, that law is a broad social phenomenon that is deeply embedded in the practices, beliefs, and traditions of 
societies. Understanding its role in politics requires attention to the legitimacy of law, to custom and law's 
congruence with other social practices, to legal rationality, and to the framework within which adherence to legal 
processes finds articulation.  
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On this issue, of whether legalization is simply a reiteration of the political status quo or 
whether it offers and reflects something more, international law theorists harbour a rather 
different set of opinions. At least in critical IL scholarship, international legal institutions are not 
at all seen as equal units. Furthermore, they are attributed a jurisgenerative function. 117 
Particularly from the perspective of global legal pluralism, IL scholars emphasize the inevitability 
and even desirability of multiple legal and quasi-legal systems purporting to regulate and direct 
legal actors in international law.118 No doubt, the resulting plurality creates conflict between 
norms embraced by different actors. However, it is presumed that legal systems must be equipped 
to address how best to respond to the realities of conflicting demands and normative frameworks. 
In this sense, and contrary to mainstream IR literature, in the context of critical IL studies law is 
described as a platform for struggle. This line of inquiry also has a constitutional dimension, as it 
questions the constitutive character of communities and their relationships with other 
communities, be they international, transnational, national, or subnational. In this regard, 
international law is not to be solely jurispathic, and bodies of law such as universal jurisdiction 
are not juridified to silence all other and competing interpretations of what constitutes an 
international crime. The idea is to bring different voices into the debate on what international law 
ought to be, thereby creating at least the possibility that past injustices may be addressed if not 
remedied. In mainstream IR scholarship, as already discussed, the degree to which a legal 
institution’s rules are obligatory, the precision of these rules, and the delegation of legal authority 
to third parties to interpret, implement, and monitor these rules determine the strength of a legal 
institution.119 According to these criteria, the ICC appears as an exceptionally effective institution 
in international law, and the same applies to the process of universal jurisdiction. The ICC 
applies and promotes a codified set of laws reified by the principle of jus cogens, and it is an 
independent international court with a consent-based statute that is in turn expected to be 
enshrined within the domestic legislation of signatory states parties. As such, it constitutes a 																																																								
117 See Ingo Venzke, "The role of international courts as interpreters and developers of the law: working out the 
jurisgenerative practice of interpretation" (2011) 34 Loy. LA Int'l & Comp. L. Rev 99.  
118 See Paul Schiff Berman, "Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for Managing Global Legal 
Pluralism" (2013) 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 665.  
119 See for instance, Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, norms, and decisions: on the conditions of practical and legal 
reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1991). For a critique of 
mainstream scholarship on this point, see John Agnew, "The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of 
international relations theory" (1994) 1 Review of international political economy 53.  
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prime case for affirming that international rules and norms have a causative effect on the 
behavior of states and societies, rather than merely being an outcome of already established 
consent or brokered arrangements.120 This is an interesting point of convergence between the 
liberal institutionalist theorists of IR and the normative theorists of IL. Indeed, the work done 
under the banner of liberal institutionalism has a close affinity with that of idealist/normative 
legal scholarship on international law, though the former may go so far as to wish for a 
conception of a morality-based politics and a widespread mode of transgovernmentality in 
international relations.121 The idealist perspective holds that human nature is both desiring and 
capable of mutual aid and collaboration. Furthermore, states are considered only as one group of 
actors in the international community, along with nongovernmental organizations, regional 
organizations, transnational corporations, and of course individuals, who are seen as the 
constituent units of the international system. Therefore, the idealist/normative stance emphasizes 
the importance of international law’s confronting the state as well as other international actors, in 
the name of moral norms and principles aspiring to the sustenance of the common good.122 The 
spirit of such a take on international law is enthusiastically shared by liberal institutionalist 
scholarship in IR.123 The result is an amorphous project of intellectual zeal, characterized by a 
maximum degree of expectation from international law with a minimum degree of cynicism.  
																																																								
120 The international law literature on the merits of the ICC, and in particular on the importance of the juridification 
of crimes against humanity is expansive and still growing. However, as foundational pieces, see Paul Kahn, 
"Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order" (2000) 1 Chi. J. 
Int'l. L. 1; Immi Tallgren, "The sensibility and sense of international criminal law" (2002) 13 European Journal of 
International Law 561; Mark Drumbl, "Collective violence and individual punishment: The criminality of mass 
atrocity" (2004) 99 Nw. UL Rev. 539; Jürgen Habermas, "The constitutionalization of international law and the 
legitimation problems of a constitution for world society" (2008) 15 Constellations 444; Gerry Simpson, Law, war 
and crime: war crimes, trials and the reinvention of international law (Polity, 2007); Sara Kendall & Sarah Nouwen, 
"Representational practices at the International Criminal Court: The gap between juridified and abstract victimhood" 
(2013) 76 Law & Contemp. Probs. 235.  
121 See Anne-Marie Slaughter & Jose E. Alvarez "A liberal theory of international law" (2000) 94 The American 
Society of International Law 24; Jose Alvarez, "Hegemonic international law revisited" (2003) 97 The American 
Journal of International Law 873; Jose Alvarez, "International organizations as law-makers" (2005) 31 Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review 3.  
122 For a historical critique of this perspective, see Martti Koskenniemi, The gentle civilizer of nations: the rise and 
fall of international law 1870–1960. Vol. 14 (Cambridge University Press, 2001). For its political critique, see 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International law from below: Development, social movements and third world resistance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
123 On the history of this school of thought, see Charles Kegley. Controversies in international relations theory: 
Realism and the neoliberal challenge (St. Martin's Press, 1995); Jeffrey Checkel, "The constructive turn in 
international relations theory" (1998) 50 World politics 324; Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal international relations 
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The history of the idealist-realist debate in IR theory shows that it was initially framed by 
the realist camp, who constructed a unified “idealism” as a straw man to justify their theories of 
global politics. The paradigm of idealism turned out to be very close to the staged antagonism 
embodied in the sovereignty/anarchy discourse of the interwar years.124 Either way, the winner-
takes-all approach that shaped the traditional IR theories readily found a counterpart in IL 
scholarship. At the same time, the darker conception of international law characterized by realist 
discourse, amounting to an account of a world of self-interested states with calculative goals, 
never entirely disappeared. Historically, this vision was endorsed and promoted by the core 
academic institutions of IR in the Global North.125 Ultimately, it provided sustenance to the view 
that the state is and will remain the inviolable actor in both international politics and international 
law. Realist, and later on neo-realist, perspectives also insisted that states act solely in their own 
self-interest, and that any international intrusion challenging state sovereignty is unjustifiable.126 
This take on state sovereignty has been upheld with reference to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, 																																																																																																																																																																																			
theory: a social scientific assessment. No. 1-2. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Harvard University, 
2001).  
124 Here, the aim of academic scholarship was defined as understanding dynamics of international cooperation and 
discord. Theories of how international institutions work were developed in this context. The assumption of 
substantive rationality has proved a valuable tool in pursuing such knowledge. From the 1990s onwards, the 
intellectual predominance of the rationalistic approach has been challenged by a reflective approach, stressing the 
embedding of contemporary international institutions in the larger socio-political realm. See Mark Neufeld, 
"Reflexivity and international relations theory" (1993) 22 Millennium-Journal of International Studies 53; Ted Hopf, 
"The promise of constructivism in international relations theory" (1998) 23 International security 171; Stefano 
Guzzini, "The ends of International Relations theory: Stages of reflexivity and modes of theorizing" (2013) 19 
European Journal of International Relations 521.  
125 See Peter Spiro, "A Negative Proof of International Law" (2005) 34 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 445; Jack Goldsmith 
& Eric A. Posner, "The new international law scholarship" (2005) 34 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 463, and Andrew 
Guzman, How international law works: a rational choice theory (Oxford University Press, 2008). According to 
Guzman, for instance, one of the key reasons that lead states to comply with international law in the absence of 
coercive enforcement mechanisms is a concern for their reputation for compliance with international legal rules. 
Guzman believes that such a reputation is valuable precisely because it allows states to make credible commitments 
to one another in various areas of international law. In true form as a realist theorist, he considers the strategic 
decisions states make as a reflection of realpolitik in the area of international law.  
126 Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that identifies power as the most important 
factor for analysis of interstate relations. Although it was first outlined by Kenneth Waltz back in 1979 [reprinted as 
Theory of international politics (Waveland Press, 2010)], it made a strong comeback in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. Alongside neoliberalism, neorealism continues to be one of the most influential contemporary 
approaches to international relations. Neorealism reformulates the classical realist tradition of E.H. Carr, E. H. 
Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr in such a way that it is adapted to most recent developments in transnational 
politics. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Alfred Knopf, 1948); Richard Ashley, "The poverty of 
neorealism" (1984) 38 International organization 225; Robert Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (Columbia 
University Press, 1986); David Baldwin, Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate (Columbia 
University Press, 1993); Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012).  
	 74	
prohibiting interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state barring specified 
circumstances.127 Supporters of this view thus posit that international rules and norms are of 
consequence only if they are in the self-interest of the states implicated by them. The resulting 
opposition between idealist/normative and realist views of international law affected both 
disciplines, but is particularly explicit in IR scholarship. Meanwhile, the difference between 
“instrumentalist” versus “normative” lenses for examining international politics and international 
law led to a foundational crisis in both fields. As an alternative, Robert Keohane made the 
observation that international [legal] institutions are a crucial site for the alignment of interests 
with norms. As such, he argued, a composite approach, bridging realism with idealism, is called 
for.128 Indeed, this debate between realists and idealist-cum-liberals has reemerged as an axis of 
contention multiple times since the Cold War years. In its latest form, the debate is concerned 
about the extent to which state action is influenced by structures as opposed to process and 
institutions.  
It is in this context that liberal institutionalism came to define the golden medium between 
realism and idealism (though it stands closer to the latter than the former). Historically, there 
have been both normative and positivist versions of liberalism, and thus liberal takes on 
international law have produced both descriptive and prescriptive scholarship. The most current 
version of liberal scholarship is built on the assumption that the “international community” 
comprises a range of actors both within and across state boundaries, and accepts that state 
interests are to be regarded as a complex product of the interests of actors within each state, as 
well as among states and other actors. Liberal scholarship of late also assumes a variety of regime 
types. Yet it openly privileges the liberal state, for the simple reason that it looks at trends in 
warfare and extended internal strife. In that sense, this model also has widespread currency 
among scholars of democratic development, human rights, and, of course, international law.129 																																																								
127 Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter reads: “[j]urisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.” For the full document, see UN Codification Division Publications at 
http://legal.un.org/repertory/art2_7.shtml [25.03.2017].  
128 See Robert Keohane, "International institutions: Can interdependence work?" (1998) Foreign policy 82; Robert 
Keohane, After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy (Princeton University Press, 
2005), and, Robert Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism" in Security Studies: A Reader (Routledge, 2011).  
129 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Liberal international relations theory and international economic law" (1994) 10 Am. 
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Still, liberal institutionalism hardly provides all the answers, or even manages to ask all the 
critical questions. Yet another venue for the debate regarding the role played by international law 
in international politics, and the possibility of universal jurisdiction in select areas such as crimes 
against humanity, has been post-conflict versus process-oriented understandings of international 
institutions. The former is based on the assumption that it is only in the aftermath of a major 
conflict, such as a world war or regional catastrophe, that actors in international politics would 
cooperate and use incentive to come up with common solutions. These attempts, however, are not 
regarded as having an accumulative effect. In this sense, the post-conflict model of international 
law’s emphasis on “crisis periods” is very much in line with realist and neo-realist schools of 
thought in international relations scholarship. Inherent in the post-conflict model is the 
observation that the display of collective or even consultative will tends to dissipate within a 
limited period of time, and states as well as other relevant actors return to their self-interest 
guided motivations. What is left is the memory of cooperation calcified in international treaties 
and institutions, which can become relics if they do not cater to the changing interests of their 
framers. This model, needless to say, fails to pay attention to the fact that stability and lack of 
war, in many cases, have enough appeal to be pursued afterward in the name of self-interest. In 
contrast, the process-oriented model of developments in international law emphasizes continuity 
rather than rupture, and is favourable to the idea of cumulative effects. For instance, according to 
this perspective, the emergence of institutions such as the ICC is directly linked to a series of 
evolving practices since the founding of the League of Nations.130 Just as the clash between 
normative and instrumentalist optics identified by Keohane and others reflects paradigmatic 
differences about how to understand international law in general and universal jurisdiction in 
particular, so too does the more friendly-looking debate between conflict-related versus process-
oriented approaches to international institutions, as each produces a radically different kind of 
scholarship with practical implications. In the following pages, a select set of specific debates 
influenced by these currents of scholarship will be examined. Here, only brief attention will be 
paid to the specificities of crimes against humanity legislation and how it relates to international 
relations and international law scholarship. The basic premises of how universal jurisdiction is 																																																																																																																																																																																			
 
130 See Vesselin Popovski, "International Criminal Court: A necessary step towards global justice" 2000 31 Security 
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defined in international law and international relations scholarship constitutes the first step 
towards an all-encompassing analysis of the legal-juridical conception of crimes against 
humanity. 
 
III. THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE AND DOMESTIC/INTERNATIONAL DICHOTOMIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW  
Since H.L.A. Hart’s seminal work The Concept of Law (1961), international law has been 
commonly described as embryonic, and often treated as quasi- or soft law.131 This is mainly due 
to the state-centric conception of law itself. The question of what makes international law “legal,” 
and international relations’ inquiries about international order (moral as well as political) and 
what sustains or undoes it, are interrelated.132 Whether it is possible to make this relation within 
the dominant paradigms in either IR or IL scholarship, however, is highly questionable. Perhaps, 
then, the job of the legal theorist who is at also home with international relations theories is to 
examine how political communities behave in response to international legal predicamens, while 
vehemently refuting the assumption that each community exists in isolation from the rest of the 
world. Kenneth Waltz, a well-known representative of traditional international law scholarship, 
long insisted that international relations and international law are both akin to a complete system, 
composed of an overarching structure and interacting units. In Waltz’ work, structures define the 
relations of units based on an ordering principle, referring to the way in which the units of the 
system relate to each other. Specifically, Waltz spoke of two kinds of ordering principles: those 
characterized by relations of equality and those characterized by relations of superiority and 
subordination. At the state level, in the corresponding domain of domestic law, Waltz depicted a 
hierarchy within which select actors had legitimate power to command. International relations, 
however, is based on the concept of sovereign equality and therefore, at least to him, seemed 
																																																								
131 See Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) Harvard law 
review 593; Ronald Dworkin, ed. The philosophy of law (Oxford University Press, 1977); Herbert Lionel Adolphus 
Hart, The concept of law (Oxford University Press, 2012).  
132 See Randall Schweller, "The problem of international order revisited: A review essay" (2001) 26 International 
Security 161.  
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much more open to anarchy than the domestic realm.133  
Half a century later, although there is a growing body of work in international relations 
scholarship dealing with the issue of international, law including debates on human rights, 
humanitarian intervention, environmental issues, and international organizations, international 
law as a concept is still defined primarily in a positivist and practice-oriented manner, with the 
underlying sense of its propensity for anarchy. In IR theories on international law, either 
assumptions of anarchy constitute the ordering principle of interstate relations as Waltz once 
theorized, or discourses of hegemony and empire are seen as sustained through the edifice of 
international law. Both are posed in opposition to a desirable social order based on justice and 
fairness at the global level, which is of course the cosmopolitan call. In other words, according IR 
analysis, international law either cannot sustain true legitimacy, or when it does, it cannot provide 
a common language to promote justice and equality. For the “anarchy” school, international law 
is devoid of an enforcing authority, while for the “hegemony” school, it is structurally incapable 
of limiting excessive exercises of power or correcting injustices, defined both in historical and 
contemporary terms.134 As already mentioned, this state of affairs in international relations theory 
stands in stark opposition to the claims of traditional legal scholarship on international law, as the 
latter attribute an independent force to norms, legal rules and, of course, international legal 
institutions and organizations.135 If state behaviour is driven primarily by immediate material 
interests, then normative factors and rules would have no significant impact on international 
politics in the absence of an enforcement agency or a hegemonic power structure.136 On this 
issue, liberal institutionalist and realist camps of IR theories converge. While liberal 																																																								
133 See Kenneth Waltz, Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis (Columbia University Press, 1959). Also see 
his later work, including Kenneth Waltz, "The stability of a bipolar world" (1964) Daedalus 881; Kenneth Waltz, 
"The emerging structure of international politics" (1993) 18 International security 44; as well as Kenneth Oye, 
"Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies" (1985) 38 World politics 1.  
134 See John Mearsheimer, "The false promise of international institutions" (1994) 19 International security 5. 
Meanwhile, the latest wave of liberal institutionalist scholarship asserts that, although international anarchy impedes 
cooperation among states, it can nevertheless affirm the central tenets of the liberal institutionalist tradition that states 
can achieve cooperation and that international institutions can help them work together. For a diametrically opposed 
critique of the order despite anarchy argument, see Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order 
(Springer, 2008).  
135 For a critical history of the field, see Karen Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, politics, rights 
(Princeton University Press, 2014).  
136 See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon Press, 1963); Christine 
Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law (Oxford University Press, 1990); as well as Christine Gray, 
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institutionalist scholars differ from realists in their emphasis on states’ ability to cooperate, they 
nevertheless rely on the same basic assumptions about the self-interested nature of states.137 As 
such, it is argued that states follow legal rules only when there is a clear and tangible incentive. 
 Consequently, at least two of the dominant schools in IR theory treat international law as 
an exogenous phenomenon eliciting context-dependent degrees of compliance. In other words, 
international law is posited in fundamentally instrumentalist terms vis-à-vis international politics. 
Of course there are other schools of international relations, such as constructivist and 
poststructuralist scholarship, which have long challenged the basic assumptions of both realist 
and liberalist renditions of international law.138 Of these, constructivists tend to emphasize the 
relational nature of all things international, and put emphasis on the importance of norms and 
their institutionalization in relation to the identities and interests of states.139 Still, they rarely 
engage in debates on the nature of international law. This is because international relations and 
political science are primarily constituted as disciplines premised on the Hobbesian opposition of 
anarchy and order. If this opposition could be rejected, it would become possible to account for 
pervasive asymmetries in international politics and law. However, this kind of dichotomous 
thinking rarely emerges from the registers of traditional IR scholarship. Consequently, while 
norms such as sovereignty or human rights are given extensive exposure in constructivist 																																																								
137 See José Alvarez, "International organizations as law-makers" (2005) 31 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 3; 
José Alvarez, "International organizations: Then and now" (2006) 100 The American Journal of International 
Law 324. Alvarez is best known for his claim that international organizations with a global reach have changed the 
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legal culture among those who designed the international law institutions back in the late 1940s.  
138In the context of an unfolding process of neo-liberalization, these alternative schools of thought strive to identify 
new terrains of resistance that crystallize as a result of the struggles of subaltern groups who contest the 
marginalizing consequences of this process. They decipher law-making as a complex and contradictory practice that 
seeks to negotiate a compromised equilibrium. The struggle is between, on the one hand, subaltern groups vulnerable 
to marginalization and yet capable of mobilization, and, on the other, the dominant classes and groups whose 
economic interests are linked to the exploitation of spaces of accumulation. See for instance, Douglas Litowitz, 
"Gramsci, hegemony, and the law" (2000) 2 Brigham Young Uni. L. Rev. 515. Also see Jeffrey Checkel, "The 
constructive turn in international relations theory" (1998) 50 World politics 324, and Emanuel Adler, 
"Constructivism in international relations: sources, contributions, and debates" (2013) 2 Handbook of international 
relations 112.  
139 See Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Challenge of Security in a Changing World" (1989) 43 Journal of International 
Affairs 119; Nicholas Onuf and Frank F. Klink, "Anarchy, authority, rule" (1989) 33 International Studies 
Quarterly 149; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics" 
(1992) 46 International organization 391; Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and authority in international politics" (1999) 53 
International organization 379; Nicholas Onuf, World of our making: rules and rule in social theory and 
international relations (Routledge, 2012).  
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scholarship, there has been little regard to actual mechanisms and procedures linking the idea of 
legitimate statehood to norms and institutions belonging to the realm of international law.140 
Instead, the focus on norms and common identity construction led constructivist analysts to 
develop a neo-Kantian kind of utopianism.141 In this regard, their interventions proved similar to 
those entertained by liberal institutionalist or idealist IR scholarship, praising increased 
legalization and institutionalization while blocking a view that would reveal the dysfunctional 
aspects of norm development and implementation. In contrast, poststructuralists analyze and 
criticize underlying structures and concepts such as sovereignty and statehood, and intentionally 
blur the distinction between domestic and international politics. In their work, law becomes a 
means and never an end in and of itself.142 And yet, while the deconstruction of taken-for-granted 
categories is a valuable undertaking, poststructuralist approaches in IR have been either reluctant 
or simply unable to develop an alternative framework to understand international law in its 
relation to international politics.143 Thus, it is apt to suggest that they did not radically diverge 
from the IR convention of neglecting international law. Indeed, despite theoretical and 
methodological differences, most IR approaches to international law regard it essentially as a 
constraint on state behavior. Law is treated as a construct that defines legitimate forms of 
violence. Meanwhile, this perspective totally misconceives the role international law plays in 
both the making and sustaining of state identities and state legitimacy. It also perpetuates the 
dichotomy of domestic and international domains identified by poststructuralist analysis. Though 																																																								
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global era (Sage, 1999). Also see Molly Cochran, Normative theory in international relations: a pragmatic 
approach (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Richard Shapcott, Justice, community and dialogue in international 
relations (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Janna Thompson, Justice and world order: A philosophical inquiry 
(Routledge, 2013).  
	 80	
plenty of work is done in IR on the legitimacy of sovereign states and their use of force leading to 
systemic political violence, institutionalized forms of exercise of power via international 
regulatory regimes are rarely included in this matrix, nor is the international legal system and its 
workings. If attention could be shifted, from the classical problems concerning the legitimacy of 
the sovereign state and its relations with other states and international actors to the intersection 
between domestic and inter/supra-national politics, the question of the relationship between law, 
legitimacy and normative consensus building would gain traction. 
Returning to the canon of IR theory, an interesting figure is worthy of note, as one of the 
most vocal critics of the modern system of law, domestic or otherwise. This is Carl Schmitt. 144 
Schmitt criticizes international law’s regulatory character, due to his fear that it undermines the 
political nature of international relations. This view suggests that law does not work merely 
through sanctioning, but also through the normalization and neutralization of contention in an 
existing political order. If so, law is to be seen as a product of social practices and political 
relations, rather than an external and calcified imposition based on the threat of force. 
Furthermore, what distinguishes law from other discourses is that it provides the basis for social 
organization and political order across the whole spectrum of modern societies, liberal or 
otherwise.145 Meanwhile, in order to fulfill its functions, law must be perceived as distinct from 
the social order it is embedded in and the conflicts it is meant to regulate. It is also posited as 
different from traditions and habits.146 The result is the positing of a theory concerning the self-
referential nature of law and its distance from abstract morality.147 This definition of law has been 
taken apart, not only by international relations scholars but within the domain of legal scholarship 																																																								
144 See Carl Schmitt, Political theology: Four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (University of Chicago Press, 
1985); Carl Schmitt, The concept of the political: Expanded edition (University of Chicago Press, 2008); Carl 
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145 See Brunnée, Jutta, and Stephen J. Toope, "International law and constructivism: elements of an interactional 
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147 See Martti Koskenniemi, Walter Rech, and Manuel Jiménez Fonseca, eds., International Law and Empire: 
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itself, as well. Scholarship associated with the critical legal studies movement is exemplary in 
this regard.148 Indeed, the links established in the realm of domestic/municipal law between 
power, law, and sovereignty are also present in the context of international law. Furthermore, 
while law is generally understood to limit as well as legitimize the use of force, the international 
legal system relies heavily on another function of law: its ability to define targets and regions for 
legitimate political action that performs a regulative function. In other words, the authorization of 
acts that lead to the regulation of political actors (both state and non-state) is an equally important 
aspect of international law.149 In this sense, public international law bears quite a few similarities 
to domestic administrative law. Still, the international legal system seems to critically depend on 
the maintenance of domestic sovereignty, as this guarantees the internal consolidation of 
power.150 As a result, international law first and foremost regulates the division of the world into 
sovereign territorial units, as well as dividing oceans, airspace, and natural resources, and added 
to this list are law’s direct and indirect involvements in the management of the world economy.151   
In other words, international law has unique functions that cannot be discussed solely in 
the language of municipal/domestic law, but cannot be totally separated from it, either. No matter 
how contested the validity and power of international legal regimes may be, international law 
symbolizes the institutionalization of mores, norms, and practices at a scope larger than the 
domain of the state itself. The effectiveness of a legal system in an international context cannot 
be measured only or primarily in terms of its enforcement capacity. Rather, the whole arsenal of 
means it deploys for deterring violations of its rules, as well as unique techniques in developing 
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and legitimizing these rules, must be taken into consideration.152 Contemporary international law 
requires the allocation of authority within a complex system of legal prescriptions. As 
international law has extended to areas as diverse as the management of global commons, 
migration, trade, environmental regulation and human rights, the consequences of breach of 
international legal obligations have become increasingly complex to determine. There are special 
secondary rules within general international law concerning state responsibility in these areas. 
However, states do not constitute self-contained international legal regimes. International legal 
regimes are larger than the sum total of states they potentially bind, and possess different 
qualities. The next question in this context is to determine whether the function of international 
law with regard to statehood is merely “declaratory,” or, whether it is “constitutive.” If it is the 
latter, obligation would be the determinant of the legal character of international law. If the 
former, force would win the day. As IR scholar Louis Henkin (1979) pointed out many years ago, 
even in domestic societies individuals obey law out of fear of extra-legal consequences. In so 
many words, punitive mechanisms are not always necessary.153 Legality is to be defined as an 
ongoing process that involves institutions and practices as well as rules and enforcement 
mechanisms. Indeed, as already mentioned, particular criteria are adopted, such as those proposed 
by the contributors of the influential special issue of International Organization (2000) regarding 
how to define international legal institutions, which include precision and delegation as crucial 
dimensions of legal regimes. 154  Still, such criteria do not automatically give a definitive 
normative value to international law, nor do they guarantee that increasing international 
legalization would lead to the betterment of the world, whichever way progress may be defined. 
This is yet another point of critical exchange between international law and international relations 
scholarship. Adherents of critical international legal studies have already pointed out how law 
can and does reinforce existing social structures and tendencies towards violence and injustice 
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through its capacity for reification, mystification and legitimation.155 At this point, the necessity 
of establishing bridges between domestic and international understandings of law becomes all the 
more apparent. To be more specific, international law establishes criteria for membership for both 
state and non-state actors in international legal systems, as well as identifying the rights and 
duties of involved actors.156 As such, it legitimizes and reproduces certain kinds of relationships 
while forbidding or chastising others. International law is thus engaged in the creation, 
legitimation and regulation of relations in both the domestic and non-domestic spheres.157 What 
has so far been emphasized excessively is its inter-state dimensions. This is despite the fact that, 
through its institutions and practices, international law has a direct involvement not just in the 
regulation of state behavior but also in the very production of the definition and norms of 
statehood. International law does not only endorse and stabilize the parameters within which 
actors engage with each other. It also establishes the criteria by which to distinguish legitimate 
actors, and how they are to be constituted within the system at large. 
Here, the language of constraints adds an interesting dimension to the debate on the 
relationship between international law and statehood. The liberal institutionalist school of 
international relations theory generally equates international law with external constraints—that 
is, norms and norm enforcement mechanisms to control behaviour of actors in terms of specific 
rights and obligations.158 The choice between compliance and non-compliance, especially in the 																																																								
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absence of an enforcing authority, is a problem, but only to a limited degree, as this argument 
posits that states and other international actors cannot exist in isolation from each other and 
therefore they ought to comply. Meanwhile, the identity of an actor is substantively affected by 
its involvement in the making and acceptance of international law as well as the specific forms of 
its appropriation in the domestic sphere.159  To this end, in their work on the power of 
international organizations, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2014) claimed that 
international legal structures are actually essential in the creation of the very actors they 
implicate.160 For instance, international bureaucracies specify responsibilities, set and diffuse 
norms, and classify and organize information and knowledge. Similarly, international treaties, 
conventions, and organizations invent, standardize or redefine legal, social and political 
categories. International law, in this context, is not simply an abstract code but is constitutive of 
the political, social and economic structures that it seemingly relies on.161 In other words, the 
legality of international law does not spring from its centralization or from developing 
mechanisms for its authoritative enforcement. Force-based formulation of law fails to account for 
how international law works. It is the inter-relational and constitutive characteristics of 
international law that provide it widespread legitimacy with hegemonic undercurrents. In 
summary, law in general is not an autonomous field of norms and coded practice. In the same 
manner, international law specifically cannot be understood without particular moralities and 
normative frames of reference dispensed by the actors upon which it exerts influence. Even the 
positivists’ requirement to base legal obligation in consent or custom instead of normative 
notions of justice does not alleviate this condition of interdependency. According to Martti 
Koskenniemi (1990), law must demonstrate its distance from politics in order to be able to set 
normative standards applying to all subjects regardless of their political preferences, and, in equal 
measure, in order to avoid being degraded into an instrument of apology for the state’s interests. 
These two requirements are ultimately self-contradictory, a problem which is reproduced at the 
level of international law. Even the celebrated notions of collaboration or compliance in 																																																								
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international law depend on sufficient prior knowledge of the rules, with clear normative content 
and significance. The disciplinary practices of international organizations, institutions, and 
regimes play a crucial role in this process of learning, choosing and interpreting. They help 
international law present norms as derived from and justified by necessity or consent, often both. 
As such, international law obtains its meaning in relation to the practice of interpretation 
performed by the very actors subjected to it, who are not limited to the state. Dividing this 
process of interaction into external and internal, inside and outside, and then treating each part as 
autonomous makes no sense if one is to understand how international law operates.  
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW VERSUS THE STATE? THE TEST CASE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Thus far, I have discussed what constitutes international law within an interdisciplinary 
framework. Here, I will take this debate one step further and unpack the dominant 
conceptualization of international law further in the specific context of universal jurisdiction. 
This is in order to identify the pattern that underlies the application of the principle at a global 
scale and to assess the state of scholarship and critical thinking regarding its operationalization. 
As already stated, international law is traditionally defined as the body of law that regulates the 
activities of entities accepted as possessing “international personality.”162 Historically, such 
entities were defined as states, whether nation-states or imperial states. 163  Contemporary 
renditions of international law include the affairs of international organizations (both IGOs and 
NGOs) and multi- and transnational corporations, as well as individuals engaged in certain kinds 
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of acts considered the business of international law.164 International organizations established by 
treaties, for instance, are deemed subjects of international law and thus capable of entering into 
agreements among themselves and with states. Despite this well-constructed façade of formal 
legal principles, scholars outside the legal domain tend to argue that international law has been 
and remains a singularly normative regime. In the same spirit, the question of whether 
international law is harnessed to the achievement of common values, or instead serves the 
function of protecting the status quo that keeps powerful states powerful, if not rendering them 
more powerful, also remains open to lively debate, as witnessed in the case of TWAIL 
scholarship. Although traditional legal scholarship purports that the necessity of international law 
arises from the need to ensure a process that can regulate competing demands and establish a 
framework for predictable and agreeable behavior by recognized political entities, non-legal, 
Marxist, post-colonial or legal pluralist renditions of international law clearly argue that all states 
are not equal and they do not benefit equally from international law. 165  Finally, while 
international law sets the criteria for a legal system that has a say over, and beyond, the states and 
other legal entities it encompasses, it is also constricted by the very entities—in particular the 
state—which it claims to have a mandate upon. This sub-section takes up precisely this last point: 
the endemic difficulty in international law vis-à-vis how to address the state in the context of 																																																								
164 See Karen Alter,  The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, politics, rights (Princeton University Press, 
2014); and Math Noortmann, August Reinisch, and Cedric Ryngaert, eds., Non-state actors in international law 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).  
165 In large brushstrokes, legal international law scholars such as Michael Byers, Christopher Hardin, Rosalyn 
Higgins, Martti Koskenniemi, Janne Nijman, and Maurizio Ragazzi among others have argued for something unique 
about international law as linked but definitely separate from international relations and politics. On the other hand, 
critical and Marxist/post-Marxist international relations scholars such as Andrew Carty, Antonio Cassese, Daniel 
Drache, J. S. Hsiung, David Kennedy, Robert Keohane, Frederick Kratochwil, Oran Young, John Vasquez and 
Alexander Wendt invested their energy in dismantling the edifice of international law supposedly standing on its 
own rights and providing a higher plane of truth if not morality or order. Finally, scholars of interdisciplinary 
background and/or inclination including Kenneth Abbott, Emanuel Adler, Robert Beck, Jonathan Charney, Anthony 
D’Amato, Richard Falk, Louis Henkin, Morton Kaplan, Stephen Krasner, Charlotte Ku, Anne-Marie Slaughter, John 
Ruggie, Gery Simpson, and Thomas Weiss tried to create a middle ground and they thus engaged in insistent 
attempts of interdisciplinary dialogue. The list provided here is not exhaustive by any means, though it is 
representative of key schools of thought. For further discussion on the unfolding of this debate, see Martha 
Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, eds., Back to basics: State power in a contemporary world (Oxford University 
Press, 2013); David Lake, "Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism 
in International Relations" (2013) 19 European Journal of International Relations 567; Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, 
and Colin Wight, “The end of International Relations theory?" (2013) 19 European Journal of International 
Relations 405; and Ken Booth and Toni Erskine, eds., International relations theory today (John Wiley & Sons, 
2016). For a general critique of the apolitical and foundational accounts in legal theory, see Allan Hutchinson and 
Patrick Monahan, eds. The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Carswell, 1987); Richard Posner, "The problematics of 
moral and legal theory" (1998) Harvard Law Review 1637; Akbar Rasulov, "CLS and Marxism: A History of an 
Affair" (2014) 5 Transnational Legal Theory 622.  
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universal jurisdiction. 
The following pages are thus devoted to analysis of the relationship between the state and 
(international) law, as it has been canvassed by legal scholarship on the issue of universal 
jurisdiction. Although the general call of international law is not limited to issues related to the 
state, the state occupies a rather central position in both legal and practical aspects of this domain 
of jurisprudence. To start with, as the existence of a state presupposes control of and jurisdiction 
over a well-defined (i.e. bordered) territory, international law naturally deals with the acquisition 
of territory, state immunity, and the legal responsibilities of states in their conduct with each 
other. It is also concerned, by derivation, with the treatment of individuals within state 
boundaries, based on the assumption that there must be a comprehensive regime dealing with 
group rights, treatment of aliens, rights of refugees and migrants, and human rights, as well as 
international crimes. Also included within its mandate are the maintenance of international peace 
and security, arms control, settlement of disputes and regulation of the use of force in inter-state 
relations. In the event of the outbreak of a war, there are historically referenced principles of 
international law concerning how to govern the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of 
prisoners. Finally, international law is utilized in attempts to govern issues relating to the global 
environment, the global commons such as international waters, global communications, global 
labor migrations, and of course, world trade. Consequently, a large canopy of supranational 
organizations and international bodies has been created to provide mechanisms through which 
disputes between states and other international entities can be resolved through arbitration and 
mediation. This wide spectrum of dictates provided by and discharged under the rubric of 
international law certainly seems to provide enough justification for the assumption of a self-
sufficient and well-established legal system. Still, when a country is recognized as a de jure state 
with a sovereign right to exist, it also has the right to refuse to engage or participate in any of the 
activities of supranational bodies, or to declare the decisions made by a conglomeration of states 
to be non- or selectively binding. 
In other words, so far as international law promotes treaty obligations, or refers to 
customary law understanding of the historically defined obligations of states, one could speak of 
a minimum degree of normative unity. Meanwhile, no matter how powerful international courts, 
regulatory bodies, and other non-state organs may have become, the extent to which their rulings 
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or judgments can be enforced is limited by and dependent upon the cooperation of concerned 
states and other international actors, and thus pertains to the domain of international politics.166 
The relationship between national sovereignty and international legality has direct implications 
for the debate on international jurisprudence, as well.167 Since they do not possess independent 
enforcement mechanisms, other than in cases related to humanitarian intervention and select 
cases of humanitarian law, international organizations associated with practices of international 
public and criminal law, as well as international courts and tribunals, have to co-ordinate their 
activities with national courts. As these two sets of bodies by and large do not have concurrent 
jurisdiction, their relationship is primarily based on the principle of complementarity. If the 
jurisdiction of these two sets of bodies is regarded as concurrent, however, or if international law 
is to supersede nation-state-based law, problems arise. Although the concept of universal 
jurisdiction is inherently important to the operations the ICC as an international body with a 
global mandate, its power to enforce its decisions and judgments is almost entirely dependent 
upon the endorsement of the very actors whose behaviour it seeks to affect. Of course, as 
witnessed in the cases of European Union or the African Union, groups of states can create 
politico-legal bodies at the regional level with overlapping provisions for juridical authority, thus 
challenging the model that prioritizes domestic or nation-state based jurisprudence.168 In such 
cases the aim is the regulation and harmonization of judicial relations amongst member states 
under the rubric of transnational institutions with declared legislative and, though limited, judicial 
powers. For instance, within the domain of European Union, the European Court of Justice 
assumes jurisdiction as the ultimate appeal court for member states’ understanding and 
implementation of European law.169 Its authority can only be denied if a member state withdraws 																																																								
166 See Andrea Bianchi, ed., Non-state actors and international law (Routledge, 2017).  
167 See the canonical article, Anthony D'amato, "Trashing customary international law" (1987) 81 The American 
Journal of International Law 101.  
168 See Manisuli Ssenyonjo and Saidat Nakitto, "The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights 
‘International Criminal Law Section’: Promoting Impunity for African Union Heads of State and Senior State 
Officials?" (2016) 16 International Criminal Law Review 71.  
169 Both scholarly debates and empirical evidence about the normative legitimacy of one of the oldest, busiest and 
most powerful international courts in the world, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), show the Court 
thus far fulfilled the criteria that courts should be fair and unbiased, that their rulings should be politically acceptable 
and legally sound, and that they should operate openly and transparently. While the CJEU has historically enjoyed a 
high degree of normative legitimacy, recent decades have witnessed charges of bias, of undue judicial activism, and 
poor legal reasoning, concerning the Court. As such, the Court has been caught up in a broader crisis of EU 
legitimacy. See Mauro Cappelletti, "Is the European Court of Justice" running wild"?" (2015) 3 European Law 
Review 311.  
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from the European Union itself. However, to assume that international law in general operates 
based upon similar principles is naïve at best, and illusionist at worst.170 Although there may be 
exceptions, most states enter into legal commitments to other states or other international entities 
with reference to historical relations, and often as a result of subtle or overt coercion, rather than 
out of adherence to a body of law claimed to be of higher normative status than their own both in 
its essence and in its mandate. Thus it is absolutely necessary to state that international law 
cannot exist in isolation from the domain of international politics and history. What is curious is 
how this could have escaped the vision of international law scholars for almost a century. The 
presumptions surrounding the workings of the principle of universal jurisdiction are a clear case 
in point in this regard.  
CONCLUSION 
Do international law and international politics scholarship cohabit the same or at least 
cognate conceptual spaces when it comes to the discussion on international law, and in particular, 
the state? How does each articulate the reality of an “international system” commonly identified 
as the bedrock for universal jurisdiction?171 In this chapter, I made the case that, although it 
makes little sense to study these two fields of inquiry independently, an integrated theory of 
international law and international relations is yet to come into full existence.172 It is true that 
starting with the efforts of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, the progenitors of the New 
Haven School’s studies in international law, an important niche was carved out to this end.173 
Their use of theories of national politics and domestic law to rethink the nature and definition of 
international law produced some noteworthy results. Here one should also cite the international 																																																								
170 For a long duree analysis of the effects of regional courts, see Lauren Benton, Law and colonial cultures: Legal 
regimes in world history, 1400-1900 (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
171 Anne Burley and Marie Slaughter, "New directions in legal research on the European Community" (1993) 31 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 391.  
172 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, "Intellectual Diversity in the Legal Academy" (2014) 37 Harv. JL & Pub. 
Pol'y 137; and Oona Hathaway, Larry Johnson, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “An Introduction: The Effectiveness of 
International Law" (2014) Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting Vol. 108.  
173 See their later work, such as Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and society: A framework for political 
inquiry (Transaction Publishers, 2013), in addition to their canonical work published back in 1943: Harold Lasswell 
and Myres S. McDougal, “Legal education and public policy: Professional training in the public interest" (1943) 
52.2 The Yale Law Journal 203-295. I personally use this latter piece in class today, in the year 2017, and students 
still relate to it with interest. Supporting my opinion on this particular issue, see Martha Minow, "Archetypal Legal 
Scholarship: A Field Guide" (2013) 63.1 Journal of Legal Education 65-69. Minow was a long-serving dean of 
Harvard Law School when she published this piece.  
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Legal Process School pioneered by the work of Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and 
Louis Henkin. These scholars keenly sought to explore the impact of international legal rules on 
international political processes. 174  Their task was to determine the extent to which law 
influences and shapes how societies behave. Both of these approaches were developed in tandem 
with ongoing work in the domain of international relations at the time. Back in the 1970s, the 
young discipline of international relations disdained what the dominant group of realist scholars 
saw as the moralism of international law. It is in this context that select international legal 
scholars attempted to offer a theoretically articulate response concerning the nature of 
international law—a response that set the tone of the debate presented in this chapter.   
As already discussed, during the 1990s a third approach emerged among legal scholars 
who claimed to study law in its full context. Rather than canvassing political dimensions of select 
international legal problems, this new body of scholarship attempted to re-think international law 
vis-à-vis the entire system of international relations. Members of this school such as Anne-Marie 
Slaughter strongly believe that international relations theories have much to offer in terms of 
conceptualizing the basic architecture of “the international legal system.” They thus encouraged a 
significant degree of congruence between the framing of international law and the models used 
by international relations theorists. In this new context, we saw the emergence of a shared 
analytical framework between international lawyers and legal scholars, and political scientists 
and international relations theorists. Liberalism and realism entertain fundamentally different 
assumptions about international politics, such as those related to the identity of primary actors, 
the relationship of non-state actors to state institutions, and determinants of inter-state and 
transnational relations. Still, the pages above have demonstrated that, overall, the most prominent 
aspect of IR theory pertaining to international law, regardless of the particular leanings of the 
authors, has been its emphasis on different types of states, based on domestic political structures 
and ideological dispositions. Ultimately, the framework of classical international law scholarship 
is predominantly based on the premise of sovereign equality rather than differences amongst 
states. 																																																								
174 See Louis Henkin, "International law as law in the United States" (1983) 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555; Louis Henkin, 
International law: politics, values and functions: general course on public international law M. Nijhoff, 1989; 
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "Compliance without enforcement: state behavior under regulatory 
treaties" Negotiation Journal 7.3 (1991): 311-330; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty 
(Harvard University Press, 1998).  
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Is it possible to re-imagine international law by looking at it through the critical lens of IR 
theory? This is exactly what some of the younger generation of international legal scholars have 
been aspiring to do. Gerry Simpson’s work constitutes a remarkable example of such an 
endeavor. 175  Whether this kind of scholarship can achieve a re-charting of the field of 
international law remains to be seen. What is rather obvious, however, is that the debate on 
universal jurisdiction reveals the underbelly of traditional international law scholarship, which is 
characterized by its overreliance on the state as a unit of analysis, combined with a 
methodological avoidance of a theory of the state. About a century ago, Lassa Oppenheim argued 
that (legal) scholarship can and should separate the tasks of presenting an analytic report of legal 
practice and engaging in a critique of the deficiencies of existing rules or institutions.176 Indeed, 
many of the challenges for IL scholarship have proved also to be enduring ones—the issue of 
state sovereignty constituting a paramount example. The current tendency to overload 
international law with expectations results at least in part from shunting transnational norms, 
private standards and national regulations under the rubric of the state, without paying due 
attention to their interconnections as well as separate logics. A systematic study of the relations 
between different normative and prescriptive structures in international law also remains absent, 
barring debates on transnational law. In this larger context, dealing with the state in a historical 
and conceptual manner rather than in a calcified way is essential for understanding the workings 
of international law. 
This chapter is written to provide a critical examination of key themes in contemporary 
legal studies on international law in relation to the work done by international relations scholars, 
with a specific focus on universal jurisdiction. Its central question was how the conceptualization 
of the state shapes the context as well as the contents of studies of international law across 
disciplines. The issue here is not whether legal scholarship on international law lacks awareness 
of debates on the state outside of its field. At least in the Anglo-American tradition, theorists of 
international law openly attack legal positivism and its heavy reliance on state-made law from 
within the discipline. Canonical volumes in this regard include the deconstructivist understanding 																																																								
175 See in particular his Great powers and outlaw states: unequal sovereigns in the international legal order 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
176 See Lassa Oppenheim, The Future of International Law. Vol. 1. (Library of Alexandria, 1921). Also see Lassa 
Oppenheim and Hersch Lauterpacht, International law: a treatise. Vol. 2. (Longmans Green, 1952).  
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of international law exemplified by the work of D. Kennedy in his International Legal 
Structures; Martti Koskenniemi's From Apology to Utopia, which criticizes the liberal political 
discourse within which traditional studies of law is situated; and the work of Frederick 
Kratochwil on norms.177 These texts have made it clear that the assumption of an Archimedean 
point from which one can impartially judge the common good for all states has long been null 
and void. Nor can inter-state consent as the foundational process of customary law be taken for 
granted.  
In this case, could we conclude that despite the lack of a common lexicon between IL and 
IR scholarship on the issue of international law, this field of inquiry has moved well beyond the 
excessive normative and isolationist dispensation that once characterized it? For students of 
international law of all persuasions, it has now become basic knowledge that normative principles 
in international law, as elsewhere, receive definitive meanings only in the context of social and 
political practices. This does not mean that legal scholarship has totally and unconditionally 
given up its “transcendental” aspirations for the realization of an international legal system and 
the practice of universal jurisdiction in select areas. Still, there is growing awareness of 
conflicting traditions and political trajectories, which leads to questioning of the very principles 
upon which the edifice of international law is built. Similarly, it seems that current scholarship 
from within the field has finally managed to trivialize the old and tired controversy of natural law 
versus legal positivism, and to an extent also the jargon of soft versus hard law. Still, we continue 
to struggle with the difficulty of finding an objective legal standard to define justice in the 
context of international criminal law. Questions such as how binding normative decisions are 
made for the entire community of international actors on the basis of presumed or partial consent 
continue to haunt the field. Similarly, the very idea of a self-imposed obligation is in 
contradiction with the implication that pacta sunt servanda or jus cogens were originally defined 
in relation to one actor’s interaction with others. As a result, the question of whether, when and 
how international law is to be considered binding is perpetually deferred, along with the Janus-																																																								
177 See David Kennedy, International legal structures (Nomos-Verlag-Ges.,1987); David Kennedy, "A new stream 
of international law scholarship" (1988) 7 Wis. Int'l LJ 1; Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of systems, boundaries, and 
territoriality: An inquiry into the formation of the state system" (1986) 39 World Politics 27; Friedrich Kratochwil, 
Rules, norms, and decisions: on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and 
domestic affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1991); Martti Koskenniemi, From apology to utopia: the structure of 
international legal argument (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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faced, absent but always present referent of the state.178  
Consequently, in the study of international law and, in particular, of universal jurisdiction, 
we witness a decisive conflation of the subject and the object of analysis, the state. In some 
circles, the possibility of the emergence of an external normative order representing an 
autonomous system of legality may still be all the.179 As a counter-measure, I have argued here 
that the current grammar of legal theory pertaining to international law must address the state 
from a critical distance, as already suggested by IR scholarship.180 These two distinct disciplines 
have long been striving in parallel, although for different reasons, to show how international legal 
institutions emerge, change, work and fail. As demonstrated in this chapter, varied efforts, 
particularly since the 1980s, have brought IR and IL scholars together through collaborations in 
scholarship, the trading of ideas, and the formation of new journals open to crossing the once-
solid divide. Yet even when studying the same phenomenon, the state for example, these two 
fields often seem unaware of, if not indifferent to, the insights available on the other side of the 
disciplinary divide.181 As I have proposed here, as far as the state is concerned the academic 
analysis of universal jurisdiction constitutes a subset of scholarship on international law, and is 
subsumed under the general premises of how international law is understood to be working. 
Although comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of universal jurisdiction in 
opinions and declarations on international law by IL and IR scholarship, conclusions as to the 
“lawfulness” of universal jurisdiction bring us back to critical issue of the state. Conflation of 
states’ jurisdiction to prescribe their criminal law and the manner of that law’s enforcement 
renders the permissibility of the enforcement of universal jurisdiction rather suspect. State 																																																								
178 The general principles of law, cited as one of the sources of international law under Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute, are drawn provided they are uniformly applied and felt as obligatory and necessary. As such, one could 
argue that principles such as jus cogens denationalised international law by making them subject to general 
principles of law or to a combination of such principles with national law. However, international law is a historical 
construct, and the phase that emerged after the ending of colonial empires clearly indicates the progressive recovery 
of sovereignty by states, or at least an ongoing struggle to this end.  
179 See, inter alia, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A new world order (Princeton University Press, 2009), and her most recent 
work, Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World (Yale 
University Press, 2017).  
180  See David Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Hélène Lambert, International law and international relations 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and David G. Victor, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art” (2014) 108 AJIL 597; Karin Fierke and Knud 
Erik Jorgensen, Constructing International Relations: the next generation (Routledge, 2015).  
181 See Dinah Shelton, "International law and ‘relative normativity’" (2014) 2 International Law 159. 
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practices in favour of universal jurisdiction over crimes that fall under general international law 
cannot be explained by the state itself. Neither can they be understood through a state-centric 
conception of international law. A systemic approach is required, one that takes into account all 
the nuances addressed in the previous chapter that underline the transnational characteristics of 
international law.   
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Chapter III: The Long Road from State Sovereignty to Jus Cogens and Back Again: Travels in 
the Global South 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a situated critique of interpretations of the phenomenon of fragmentation 
as it is manifested in international law. The issues addressed here specifically deal with collisions 
between international law and state sovereignty, and incompatibilities between the various 
international law regimes in terms of their effects in the Global South.  This debate has direct 
repercussions concerning the merits and applicability of crimes against humanity legislation 
under the purview of universal jurisdiction principle. The expansion and diversification of 
international law has been possible partly through the rise of specialized regimes that have no 
clear relationship to each other, are not subject to coordination, and are not based on anything 
other than power-related hierarchical relations. In this sense, assuming harmony and internal 
unity to be the foundational characteristic of international criminal law is a prescriptive 
suggestion more than a historical reality. Furthermore, conflicts between these regimes present 
problems of overlap, uncertainty, and divergence in public international law. Similarly, 
specialized bodies of international law come into conflict over what international law means, and 
how to define compliance. They also often disagree on the meaning of particular treaties or rules 
in international law, the relationship between these, and who should have the authority or 
jurisdiction to interpret them with certainty. These disagreements lead to increasingly divergent 
decisions concerning international law obligations. Last but not the least, such conflicts have 
their origins in the long history of the post-imperial and post-colonial roots of international law 
and, as such, traditional rules of resolution have proven to be most unsatisfactory. While some of 
the self-contained and regional regimes claim exceptionalism or primacy over other rules of 
international law, we also have international legal bodies such as the ICC that claim to be the 
harbinger of truth in adjudication. In view of these problems, this chapter seeks to highlight select 
kinds of interaction between these multiple regimes of accountability that provide actual political, 
legal, and historical content to the long-debated fragmentation of international law. The chapter 
concludes with the suggestion that the plurality of regulatory institutions, normative values, and 
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adjudication fora in international law is in fact a very necessary component of the existing system 
of accountability.182 Seeking unity and coherence of international law without addressing the 
violent histories it represents and through the application of traditional legal techniques to 
harmonize adjudication is a futile exercise at its best, and a very antagonistic one at its worst. 
As already discussed in the opening chapter of this work, the fragmentation of 
international law is a substantial enough issue to have merited even an official recognition. To 
this end, back in 2000, the International Law Commission decided to add to its program of work 
the topic “Risks ensuing from the fragmentation of international law.”183 The proliferation of 
international criminal courts and tribunals is part of this much larger debate on fragmentation. In 
this context, theories of fragmentation and constitutionalization have traditionally been presented 
as antagonistic accounts of the global legal order. While fragmentation theorists posit a non-
hierarchical set of relations between general and specialized areas of international law, adherents 
of constitutionalization theory depict a grand transformation from horizontal and consent-based 
roots of law towards a hierarchal structure built upon commonly shared fundamental 
principles.184 The proliferation of international courts and tribunals has been recognized as a 
factor that muddies the perfect picture of constitutionalization, supporting the fragmentation 
thesis in international law. Indeed, the development of a series of specialist or regional regimes of 
legal accountability is often perceived as posing a risk to the coherence and presumed 
homogeneity of international law.185 On the reverse side of the coin, institutional fragmentation is 
also seen as a key factor that has strengthened the role of specialized regimes including the WTO, 
EU, regional human rights and environmental regulation bodies, and so on. In such a varied 
landscape of legal accountability and regulation, the question of what to do with normative 																																																								
182 In this vein, see Ibrahim Gassama’s work, including Ibrahim Gassama, "Dealing with the world as it is: 
Reimagining collective international responsibility” (2013) 12 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 695; Ibrahim Gassama, 
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183 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Regime-collisions: the vain search for legal unity in the 
fragmentation of global law" (2003) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 999. Also see Gerhard Hafner, "Pros and cons ensuing from 
fragmentation of international law" (2003) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 849 in the same, canonical, issue.  
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constitutionalisation in the global legal order" (2017) International Journal of Law in Context 1. Murray and 
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185 For a counter-argument, see Christian Leathley, "An institutional hierarchy to combat the fragmentation of 
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conflicts between co-existing regimes is no longer an abstract one. The Chairman of the ILC 
Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law, Martti Koskenniemi, was thus almost 
forced to emphasize the maxim of lex specialis in his report in order to address the relation 
between these seemingly self-contained regimes and general international law. Meanwhile, lex 
specialis suffers from a marked degree of conceptual vagueness. The fragmentation of 
international law made new types of conflicts visible, namely those between different and 
antagonistic normative orders, and heightened some of the old ones concerning historical 
injustices. As such, lex specialis may not be enough to address the current challenges faced by 
international law. As argued in the opening chapter of this work, a transnational approach may be 
able to soothe at least some of these anxieties. Combined with the double forces of reflexive legal 
pluralism on the one hand, and TWAIL scholarship on the other, it may indeed be possible to 
chart a different trajectory for understanding the present and future of international law in its 
heavily fragmented modus operandi.186 
Interestingly, in the area of international criminal law (ICL), much of the recent worry 
over fragmentation originated from the collision between the ICJ and the ICTY (International 
Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia) over the “overall control-test” in the Tadić case, 
where the ICTY departed from settled ICJ law on the attribution of liability and the qualification 
of the nature of an armed conflict, employing instead a standard of “effective control.”187 Twenty 
years after the establishment of the ICTY, the fragmentation/pluralism debate proliferated to yet 																																																								
186 For a political economy-based understanding of fragmentation, see Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, "The 
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negative conclusion. The Court also held that the broader “overall control” test enunciated by the International 
Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Tadić did not apply, on grounds of inefficient basis for claiming 
state responsibility. ICTY had to establish in Tadić whether the armed conflict in Bosnia was internal or 
international. However, as no rules of international humanitarian law were of assistance in this case, the Tribunal had 
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valid for imputation of conduct of organized armed groups to a particular state. The test was based on judicial 
precedents and state practice. For a detailed analysis of these two conflicting interpretations of the Tadić case, see 
Antonio Cassese, "The Nicaragua and Tadić tests revisited in light of the ICJ judgment on genocide in 
Bosnia” (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 649. For an entirely opposing argument on the case, see 
Davis Tyner, "Internationalization of War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia's Folly in Tadic” (2006) 18 Fla. J. Int'l L. 843.  
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new heights. With a well-developed body of ad hoc tribunal case law, an emerging body of case 
law at the ICC, hybrid systems like the Cambodia Tribunal, and increasing number of domestic 
prosecutions under the dictate of universal jurisdiction, the co-existence of fragmentation and 
pluralism has become a serious matter for legal realists, legal positivists, and monists alike. 
While there are still those who express concern over heterogeneity in ICL, many branches of 
recent scholarship acknowledge international criminal law’s pluralistic nature and, instead of 
striving for unity, call for ways of addressing this plurality.188 All the same, ICL continues to 
hover between cosmopolitan ethos and technical specialization while effectively attempting to 
displace all other possible routes to attaining justice.189 This is despite the fact that questions of 
illegitimacy, discrimination, and asymmetry in its application, as well as the conflicts lying at the 
roots of its formation, cannot be wished away.190 As argued by the latest generation of TWAIL 
scholars, notwithstanding ICL’s historically troubling past and violent track record, international 
criminal justice is still embraced, at least in some parts of the Global South, as a potentially 
emancipatory project. And yet, the main impediment to the fulfillment of such a desire remains 
ICL’s continuing operational selectivity and geopolitical bias. Is ICL indeed capable of 
overcoming deficiencies in national legal systems? When a state is incapable or unwilling to 
punish, could there be a reliable and impartial agent such as an international or hybrid court to do 																																																								
188 See Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, "Fragmentation of international law? Postmodern anxieties" (2002) 15 
Leiden Journal of International Law 553. As Koskenniemi and Leino argue, successive International Court of Justice 
presidents have expressed concern about the proliferation of international tribunals and the resultant substantive 
fragmentation of international law. Yet international law has always lacked a clear normative or institutional 
hierarchy. The problem thus appears to be about how new institutions began to use international law to further their 
interests, especially interests that were not pronounced in traditional domestic law settings. I fully agree with the 
authors that jurisdictional conflicts indeed reflect divergent political priorities, and that they cannot be done away 
with the sheer force of administrative co-ordination. As such, these types of anxieties perhaps signal an increased 
awareness of the realities of international law.  
189 On this issue, see the excellent analytical monograph of Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: 
Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Also see Robert Cryer, 
et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Also see 
the amicus brief prepared by him and three other legal scholars and submitted before the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, on the issue of whether large-scale atrocities directed against members of a state or 
organization’s own armed forces can constitute crimes against humanity: Robinson, Darryl, et al, “Amicus Brief of 
Professors Robinson, De Guzman, Jalloh and Cryer on Crimes Against Humanity (Cases 003 and 004)” (2016). In 
my view, Cryer’s work stands out in the standard canon of international criminal law texts, inter alia, Fabian 
Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals (Brill, 2008); 
Ciara Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues 
(Springer, 2008); Birgit Schlütte, Theory and Practice of the ICJ and the International ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda 
and Yugloslavia (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution 
and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
190 See John Reynolds and Sujith Xavier, "‘The Dark Corners of the World’ TWAIL and International Criminal 
Justice" (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 959. 
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the job? Is ICL capable of offering pragmatic solutions to the partiality and/or ineffectiveness of 
national legal systems sans politics?  
In this chapter, I answer these questions firmly in the negative.191 In particular, I argue 
that ICL in and of itself cannot provide a panacea for the partiality, lack of accountability, and/or 
ineffectiveness of national legal systems concerning mass political crimes.192 This leads us to yet 
another set of questions. If ICL and the values it promotes are provided by international entities, 
what sort of legitimacy could these legal organs claim by virtue of the letter of the law they 
purport to adhere to? In my view, this is another embodiment of the consitutionalization 
argument par excellence. For the protagonists of ICL as a universalist enterprise, this is called 
“robust internationalism.”193As such, the international character of the courts and tribunals tasked 
with applying ICL is seen as sufficient to successfully fulfill their mission. This argument is 
implicitly recognized by the institutional founders of ICL, and is also reflected in its key 
doctrines. Meanwhile, neither of the principal legal responses to the current multiplicity of legal 
regimes is adequate. Pluralism divides too much and isolates unnecessarily and perhaps 
dangerously, while constitutionalism unites even where there are no grounds for the presumption 
of universality in international law. The emergence of multiple regimes of accountability perhaps 
resembles the rise of nation-states at the dusk of the European Empires. As nations were 
imagined into being, so are legal regimes.194 Reducing international law to a mechanism for 																																																								
191 In this vein, see Sujith Xavier, False Universalism of Global Governance Theories: Global Constitutionalism, 
Global Administrative Law, International Criminal Institutions & the Global South. Diss. (Osgoode Hall Law 
School Toronto, Ontario, 2015). 
192 The controversies arising from International Criminal Court interventions in Africa are a case in point. The 
deployment of the powers to refer and defer ICC cases central to Article 16 of the Rome Statute and the manner in 
which the UN Security Council has employed this power has led critics to conclude that geopolitics has severely 
undermined the judicial independence of the ICC. It is also argued that the drafting history of Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute reveals the political origins of the law and the manner in which historical inequalities were woven into the 
very fabric of this foundational document. If so, violence and inequality live on through international law, and 
contemporary ontologies of international criminal law cannot escape the politics of its making. Acknowledgement of 
root causes of current forms of violence in postcolonial states remains a necessity. What is needed most, at this point, 
is a rethinking and reworking of how complementarity and cooperation might work more effectively for the future of 
international criminal law, knowing its history. See Kamari Maxine Clarke and Sarah-Jane Koulen, "The Legal 
Politics of the Article 16 Decision: The International Criminal Court, the UN Security Council and Ontologies of a 
Contemporary Compromise” (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 297. 
193 See Miriam Gur-Arye and Alon Harel, “Taking Internationalism Seriously: Why International Criminal Law 
Matters” In Jens David Ohlin, ed. Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
Legal Research Paper No. 16-21 (2017). 
194 See the classic text, Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism (Verso Books, 2006). 
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advancing the functional objectives of a universal mega-state, or to an instrument for powerful 
states’ policy implementations at a global scale, is far too simplistic.195 Debates over pluralism 
and fragmentation suggest alternative accounts of how international law works. Regional legal 
bodies, quasi-legal regimes, sub-national rights struggles, hybrid criminal tribunals, restorative 
justice projects, societal reconciliation mechanisms, global social and political movements for 
substantive legal reforms are not to be considered as a complement to international law. They are 
part and parcel of it.  
 I. LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: LINGERING QUESTIONS 
 The regime of international law is illegitimate.      
        Makau Mutua196 
In this section, I will focus on perceptions of the legitimacy of international law in the 
Global South. This is an essential discussion for understanding the limits of universal jurisdiction 
in terms of its global application. In this specific context, as was the case with the overall critique 
of international law, I will turn my attention to TWAIL scholarship. Almost two decades ago, 
James Thuo Gathii published a critical overview of the Special Symposium Issue of the Harvard 
International Law Journal titled “Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and 
Scholarship on Developing Countries to International Legal Theory.”197 There, he stated that 
what began as a lecture series during the 1990s at the Harvard School of Law has grown into a 
noteworthy enterprise worthy of international law scholars’ attention. This special issue on 
“international law and the developing world” was planned as a flagship publication to alert the 
world of legal scholarship to a renewal in interest, research, and publication in the area of Third 
World contributions to the field. Gathii noted with pride that the articles included in the issue 
explored important and novel ways of understanding the most urgent themes in international law 
affecting “developing countries” over the last several decades, and the challenges these societies 
face in the new millennium. The articles listed here were penned by a broad range of scholars 
with varied experiences, perspectives, and national backgrounds, though with a common focus on 																																																								
195 See Elies van Sliedregt and Sergey Vasiliev, eds., Pluralism in International Criminal Law (OUP Oxford, 2014).  
196 Citation from Makau Mutua, “What Is TWAIL?” (2000) 94AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31.  
197 Thuo James Gathii, “Alternative and critical: the contribution of research and scholarship on developing countries 
to international legal theory” (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 263. 
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the interaction between international law and the Global South.198 They fit into roughly three 
distinct theoretical frameworks in terms of their contributions to international legal theory. The 
first set of articles provided an explanation of international law as culturally constitutive and 
historically contingent. Obiora Okafor’s work in the collection, for instance, underlined the 
frailty of the nation-state model in Africa, as a legacy of the impositions of Eurocentric notions of 
legitimacy on culturally heterogeneous landscapes, which in turn led sub-state groups to view it 
as illegitimate.199 Similarly, Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s piece engaged in an alternative reading of 
international legal history, showing how Third World resistance was an important factor, often 
totally overlooked or underestimated in the expansion, consolidation, and renewal of 
international institutions.200 These pieces signaled the coming trend of critical historical analysis 
of international law as seen, perceived, and experienced in the Global South. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, this approach constitutes the main pillar of the methodologies used to decipher 
perceptions and formulations of international criminal law from within the Global South.  
The other two theoretical frameworks celebrated in the aforementioned special issue are 
also of great significance. The second called for international law to play a mediating role in 
addressing some legal gaps in the global restructuring of capitalism, while the third one was built 
on the premise that notions of international law, development policy, or even local customary 
practices do not have predetermined outcomes. These are themes and departure points that have 																																																								
198 Adding further clout to the issue was the fact that the keynote address of the symposium was delivered by the 
former Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, Christopher G. Weeramantry, who is widely respected 
for his sense of justice, fairness, and historical perspective when addressing international law. Examplary of the tenor 
of his work, see Weeramantry, Christopher Gregory Universalising international law. Vol. 48. (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2014). 
199 See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "After martyrdom: international law, sub-state groups, and the construction of 
legitimate statehood in Africa” (2000) 41 Harv. Int'l. LJ 503. Also see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Newness, 
imperialism, and international legal reform in our time: a TWAIL perspective” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171; 
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Critical Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL): theory, methodology, or 
both?” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 371. Okafor’s later work rendered TWAIL scholarship a 
widely acceptable alternative to mainstream methodologies in international law. In all the cited interventions, he 
directly engages with the question of whether TWAIL is a theory, a methodology, or both, and who has the right to 
define and determine the meaning of these terms other than the legal positivist school of thought. Accordingly, 
TWAIL offers both theories of, and methodologies for, analyzing international law and institutions as a broad and 
historically conscious approach. 
200 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, "From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the 
Expansion of International Institutions” (2000) 41 Harv. Int'l. LJ 529, as well as Balakrishnan Rajagopal, 
International law from below: Development, social movements and third world resistance (Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) and Balakrishnan Rajagopal, "Counter-hegemonic international law: rethinking human rights and 
development as a Third World strategy” (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 767. 
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been developed significantly over the last fifteen years, particularly under the aegis of legal 
pluralism and transnational law. Overall, it would be accurate to suggest that TWAIL scholarship 
achieved its initial goal, securing growing number of followers as a school of thought. It has been 
able to drive home the point that international law’s claims to universality must be replaced with 
an acceptance of legal and normative pluralism, and that international law squarely bears the 
imprint of the hegemonic architecture of North-South relations starting with European 
imperialism, colonialism, and now neo-colonialisms. It is also true that new generations of 
African, Middle Eastern and Indian international law scholars have produced increasingly subtle 
readings of how international law functions across the North-South divide. Within this first 
generation of international law scholars from the Global South, thinkers like Elias Olawale 
Taslim and Sinha Prakash had already argued that Africa in particular, and the Global South in 
general, had participated in creating the civilizational pluralism from which international law was 
created.201 Scholars like U.O. Omozurike, S.B.O. Gutto and Mohammed Bedjaoui, however, 
insisted that despite all its potential for plurality, international law continues to reflect the 
structural and economic inequalities produced by former colonial rule.202  
By the time the third generation of scholars joined this conversation, new debates were 
already unfolding within TWAIL itself. The work of Antony Anghie and Siba Grovogui, for 
instance, traces the origins of international law and identifies distinctions made by leading jurists 
such as Vitoria between Europeans and non-Europeans. Their analysis clearly signal continued 
wariness concerning the legacy of contemporary international law doctrines and institutions. 
Indeed, overall TWAIL now provides an insistent counterweight to the overwhelming dominance 
of American and European legal scholarship, offering alternatives to traditional paradigms of 
understanding and producing knowledge about legitimacy in international law. Speaking from a 
variety of views on the nature and implications of the hegemonic Euro-American framing of 
international law represented by liberal internationalism, institutionalism, constitutionalism, and 
of course by neo-conservative realism in international law scholarship, TWAIL scholars have 
been asking very difficult questions, not only about the legitimacy of law but also about the 																																																								
201 See Mark Toufayan, "When British Justice (in African Colonies) Points Two Ways: On Dualism, Hybridity, and 
the Genealogy of Juridical Negritude in Taslim Olawale Elias” in African legal theory and contemporary problems 
(Springer Netherlands, 2014): 31-70.  
202 See Anna Krueger, "Conference Report: The Battle for International Law in the Decolonization Era” (2016) 49 
VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 80.  
	 103	
origins of the existing state system.203 The critical issue here is not so much producing accounts 
of countervailing or “more authentic” notions of legitimacy, but opening up a space for scholarly 
and political projects that are capable of formulating change while acknowledging genealogies of 
injustice. In the following pages, working from within the TWAIL perspective, I will refute some 
of the key arguments commonly used in defense of the neutrality of international law, though to a 
somewhat unusual end: to foreground jus cogens norms in a more palatable context for the 
societies in the Global South. These norms form the foundations of universal jurisdiction and, as 
such, they are essential in understanding the unfolding trends in the adjudication of crimes 
against humanity at a global scale.  
In the case of jus cogens norms, my opinion is that even inclusive legal positivism and 
new forms of legal pluralism do not succeed in estranging themselves adequately from the 
traditional, apoliticized conception of international law.204 It is true that legal positivism, unlike 																																																								
203 Though by no means an exhaustive list, the selections below all raise the same question of how to formulate 
change once we identify where things went wrong: See D. Kennedy, “The disciplines of international law and 
policy” (1999) Leiden Journal of International Law, 12(01), 9-133; Okafor, O. C., “Critical Third World approaches 
to international law (TWAIL): theory, methodology, or both?” (2008) International Community Law Review, 10(4), 
371-378; Fidler, D. P., “Revolt against or from within the West-TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future 
Direction of International Law” (2003) Chinese J. Int'l L., 2, 29; Mutua, M., & Anghie, A., “What is TWAIL?” 
(2000) In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law at 31-40; Ngugi, J., “Making 
new wine for old wineskins: can the reform of international law emancipate the Third World in the age of 
globalization” (2002) UC Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y, 8, 73; Fidler, David, ”Revolt against or from within the West-
TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law” Chinese J. Int'l L., 2, 29; Okafor, 
O.C., “Newness, imperialism, and international legal reform in our time: a TWAIL perspective” (2005) Osgoode 
Hall LJ, 43, 171; Okafor, O. C., “After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of 
Legitimate Statehood in Africa” (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 503.  
204On the issue of how to salvage legal positivism, and how the effort fails, see Koskenniemi, Martti, The gentle 
civilizer of nations: the rise and fall of international law 1870–1960. Vol. 14 (Cambridge University Press, 2001); 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International law from below: Development, social movements and third world resistance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003); Gerry Simpson, Great powers and outlaw states: unequal sovereigns in the 
international legal order. Vol. 32 (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Martti Koskenniemi, From apology to 
utopia: the structure of international legal argument (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Anthony Anghie, 
Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international law. Vol. 37 (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Very 
pointedly, back in 2004, B. S. Chimni argued that a growing network of international institutions now constitutes a 
nascent global state in order to realize the interests of an emerging transnational capitalist class, to the disadvantage 
of subaltern classes in the third and first worlds. Underpinning this emerging imperial global state, Chimni saw a 
web of sub-national authorities that represent, along with non-governmental organizations, its decentralized face and 
thus produce a false impression of an incomplete project. Chimni contended that these developments seriously 
undermine substantive democracy at both inter-state and intra-state levels. Though his work also ventured into 
whether and how international institutions, including courts, can be reformed, the process he proposed hinges upon 
statist reforms initiated and supported by powerful global social movements. In this regard, there was no merit 
attributed to legal positivism whatsoever. Accordingly, it is not the form, but the content, that really matters. See 
Bhupinder S. Chimni, "International institutions today: an imperial global state in the making” (2004) 15 European 
Journal of International Law 1.  
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other views on the nature of law and its command upon societies, could give us a sensible 
explanation of law useful for a theory of historical change; but it does so only if we turn it upside 
down. I contend that if canonized debates about the legitimacy of international law were to shed 
their state-centric approach along with their Eurocentricity, and if the field could be re-
contextualized in terms of histories of capitalism and the legacy of North–South relations, a much 
richer discourse on international law would emerge. Prior to the emergence of TWAIL as a 
formidable school of thought, the conventional view tended to characterize “Third World legal 
discourses on international law” as ad hoc and reactive rather than as a distinctive mode of 
analysis.205 Given that we have now reached a juncture where, for a growing number of scholars, 
thinkers, and legal activists, TWAIL offers both theories of and methodologies for analysing 
international law and its institutions, we must reframe the questions of both legitimacy and 
universality in international law. In the following pages, I will make a concerted attempt in that 
direction.  
II. THE QUESTION OF THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SEEN FROM THE GLOBAL 
SOUTH: A CHANCE TO START ANEW? 
Post-Cold War rejuvenation of enthusiasm about international law has been attributed in 
part to the way that “critical legal scholarship,” in particular the TWAIL work, has reshaped the 
discipline and provided it with new sensibilities and perspectives, increasing its appeal to larger 
audiences.206 Still, the increasingly textured, adversarial, and divisive debate among international 
relations scholars about how to embrace the study of international law is a clear indication of how 
																																																								
205 Mickelson, K. (1998), “Rhetoric and rage: Third World voices in International Legal discourse” Wisconsin 
International Law Journal, 16(2), 353-419.	
206 Debates have indeed intensified in recent years about the utility of international law scholarship. This is despite 
the fact that traditionally, the courts and other state authorities have identified scholars of international law as 
holding a special place of privilege and stature in the interpretation of international law. Changing trends in 
jurisprudential categories of scholarship between “the law of nations,” “international law,” and “human rights” does 
not tell the whole story in this regard. For a detailed discussion on historical trajectories in international law 
scholarship, see Hugh Kindred et al, International law, chiefly as interpreted and applied in Canada (Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 2014); Gregory Shaffer, "The New Empirical Turn in International Law 
Scholarship” (2014) 108 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 369; Yannick Radi, "In Defence of ‘Generalism’in International 
Legal Scholarship and Practice” (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 303; Sergey Vasiliev, "On 
Trajectories and Destinations of International Criminal Law Scholarship” (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 701.  
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Herculean such an attempt is. 207  In the previous chapter, I suggested that one way that 
international law and international relations scholarship could converge, in more than tangential 
ways, is to re-conceptualize the State. Indeed, I believe that when the state is problematized in 
each of these domains, rather than being treated as a political given or a historical fait accompli, a 
real chance for dialogue may emerge.  
In this section, I will first identify the historical importance of the state in the emergence 
of international law from the perspective of the Global South. I will then examine select 
examples of the classical mode of thinking in legal scholarship on international law in terms of 
the perception of its building blocs and key conceptual tools for understanding how law works in 
this specific instance. I will conclude the section with a brief discussion of the treatment of the 
state in particular, and power in general, in international law scholarship, and underline the 
possibility of a different take on this particular issue for the future studies of international law.  
There are a series of fundamental conflicts over both the meaning and workings of 
international law as it relates to the history of the nation-state since the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648). Well into the mid-1800s, the classic form of the state was a multi-ethnic empire.208 The 
populations of such states belonged to many ethno-religious groups and spoke different 
languages. These empires were often dominated by particular ethno-religious groups, and, the 
language of these groups were declared to be the language of public administration. The identity 
and the composition of such ruling groups changed over time, however. Internal state structures 
																																																								
207 As already discussed in the previous chapter, the relationship between the discipline of international relations and 
international law scholarship swings between comfort and discomfort. The question is whether international relations 
theories are becoming the preferred discursive framework for contemporary practitioners and academics of 
international law. The older desire for certainty over contention, action over discourse 
and simplicity over complexity seems to have been replaced by asking large, systemic questions about how 
international law creates legacies and effects changes in international politics. On the dominant currents of 
contemporary IR scholarship on international law, see Karin Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen. Constructing 
International Relations: the next generation (Routledge, 2015); and Ken Booth and Toni Erskine, eds., International 
relations theory today (John Wiley & Sons, 2016).  
208 On the resilience of the Westphalian state, see the exchange between David Koller, "The End of Geography: The 
Changing Nature of the International System and the Challenge to International Law: A Reply to Daniel 
Bethlehem” (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 25; and Carl Landauer, "The Ever-Ending Geography 
of International Law: The Changing Nature of the International System and the Challenge to International Law: A 
Reply to Daniel Bethlehem” (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 31-34. For a counter argument, see 
Andrea Bianchi, ed., Non-state actors and international law (Routledge, 2017). Also see Claus Kreß, "Major Post-
Westphalian Shifts and Some Important Neo-Westphalian Hesitations in the State Practice on the International Law 
on the Use of Force” Journal of the Use of Force and International Law 1.1 (2014): 11-54.  
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also exhibited a considerable degree of variation despite the overarching imperial format.209 
Finally, some of the smaller European states were not ethnically or religiously diverse, and yet 
possessed considerable territorial sovereignty due to their “successful” imperial and colonial 
expansion strategies. In examining these “smaller” states prior to the advent of the nation-state, 
one must keep in mind either their religio-political significance, as in the case of the Vatican, or 
their overseas connections, as in the case the Netherlands, when judging the political power they 
possessed and the bargaining power they could levy in their dealings with other states.210  
It was against the background of this general imperial mold that, from the late eighteenth 
century onwards, and for reasons far too complex to be adequately covered here, the ideal of the 
nation-state took root. The origins of the nation-state are highly contested.211 Canonical figures in 
the field such as Benedict Anderson have even suggested that nationalism was actually a product 
of what happened in the overseas colonies. It was “over there” that the spark was set off, giving 
the idea peoples ruled by imperial powers that “another world was possible.”212 For many other 
scholars, however, it is from within Europe that we should read the histories of both the nation-
state and nationalism, initiated by the transformations of the absolutist state on the Continent.213 
Across Europe, some regions grew into nation-statehood through unification by trade and 
political integration, while others were brought in by military force and invasions—for which the 																																																								
209 See Antony Anghie, "International Law and the Pre-History of Globalisation” (2015) 33 Sing. L. Rev. 3. In his 
work, Anghie examines the issue of how imperialism has impinged on theorization of international law in great 
detail, with particular attention paid to different historical periods. In this context, imperialism emerges as a 
distinctive experience that has generated new questions and concepts concerning our understanding of the operations 
of international law, and its effects on the world in general and not just the empires themselves. Specifically, Anghie 
posits that although imperialism has been crucial to the development of international law, for much of the last 
century the emphasis of the debate on international law shifted elsewhere. As a result, “colonial questions” have been 
reduced to political issues that could not implicate the great theoretical concerns of the time. See Antony Anghie, 
"Imperialism and International Legal Theory” The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law. 2015.  
210 The work of world-systems theorists on the history of the modern state system is of special import here. In 
particular, see Immanuel Wallerstein, Modern World-System in the Longue Duree (Routledge, 2015). 
211 See the work of Anthony Smith, Nations and nationalism in a global era (John Wiley & Sons, 2013); and 
Anthony Smith, Nationalism and modernism (Routledge, 2013).  
212 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (Verso 
Books, 2006); as well as Pheng Cheah and Jonathan Culler, Grounds of comparison: around the work of Benedict 
Anderson (Routledge, 2013).  
213 See Eric Hobsbawm, The age of extremes: a history of the world, 1914-1991, Pantheon Books, 1995; Eric 
Hobsbawm, Age of Capital: 1848-1875. (Hachette UK, 2010), and Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 
1780: Programme, myth, reality (Cambridge University Press, 2012). Also see John Breuilly, Nationalism and the 
State (Manchester University Press, 1993); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five roads to modernity (Harvard 
University Press, 1993); Michael Billig, Banal nationalism (Sage, 1995); Dominique Schnapper, La communauté des 
citoyens (Gallimard, 2003); Ernest Gellner and John Breuilly, Nations and nationalism (Cornell University Press, 
2008).  
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French are singularly blamed. Meanwhile, despite their differences, scholars of nationalism 
representing separate schools do agree on one issue: the so-called nation-state emerged at the end 
of a particularly brutal trajectory of homogenization and organized violence during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Secondly, it was the political entity that sought to define a firm national 
identity in order to justify its existence, internally and externally, and, not vice versa. This is not 
to suggest that nationalism was purely myth and invention, or that it did not have historical roots. 
This observation does indicate, however, that there was as much politics involved in the 
emergence of modern nations as there was culture. Furthermore, it is also generally agreed that 
with the growth of not only the concept but also the reality of a nation-state came the idea of 
societies-cum-nations to be controlled by a centralized system of government with a complete say 
over the livelihood of its citizens. As such, any dealings with entities outside of the “national 
jurisdiction” had to be regulated otherwise. Here are the beginnings of international law as known 
today.214  
The question remains, however: what kind of international law? Until the beginning of the 
20th century, relations between nation-states were almost exclusively dictated by treaties, which 
are in essence legally unenforceable agreements obliging the concerned states to behave in a 
certain way towards each other or another state, based on the threat of use of force.215 At the 
other end of the spectrum were customary practices, mainly applicable in the field of warfare, 
such as jus in bello and jus ad bellum. As the 20th century progressed, a number of extremely 
destructive armed conflicts and unprecedented forms of organized violence, particularly WWI, 
WWII and the Holocaust, starkly exposed the underbelly of this semi-voluntary/semi-militaristic 
system of international law, at least as far as relations between states were concerned. After 
WWI, the model of international law as it pertained to interstate relations was that the League of 
Nations, which lasted only until the outbreak of WWII. In the aftermath of the two World Wars, 
in an attempt to create a more entrenched and encompassing system of rules and laws to prevent 																																																								
214 See the seminal article of William Coplin, "International law and assumptions about the state system” (1965) 17 
World Politics 615. On the origins of international law in minority rights issues, see Jennifer Jackson Preece, 
"Minority rights in Europe: from Westphalia to Helsinki” (1997) 23 Review of international studies 75; Jennifer 
Jackson Preece. National minorities and the European nation-states system (Oxford University Press, 1998); 
Jennifer Jackson Preece, "Ethnic cleansing as an instrument of nation-state creation: changing state practices and 
evolving legal norms” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 817.  
215  See Martti Koskenniemi, "What is international law for?" (2003) 89 International law 110, and, Martti 
Koskenniemi, "The fate of public international law: between technique and politics” (2007) 70 The Modern Law 
Review 1.  
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similar future conflicts, a new vehicle for the application of international law was found in the 
form of the United Nations (UN), which came to encompass several international law-making 
bodies. So far, this narrative follows a standardized and also, at least in the eyes of critical 
international studies scholars, apoliticized history of public international law. 216  Skeptical 
readings of this account are also quick to point out that international law is a somewhat young, 
and in effect essentially Eurocentric, creation, and to define it does not require going back to 
some assumed seventeenth-century fathers. While legal scholarship in this area dictates that the 
idea of international law was extant before the nation-state system came to dominate the political 
universe of statehood, other angles on the issue make every conceivable effort to separate the 
worlds of Grotius, Vattel, and Kant from that of the International Court of Justice and other legal 
bodies with an international mandate. For the purposes of the present study, the question that 
persists among these categorically different takes on the origins and meaning of international law 
is whether or not system-oriented developments in international law have managed, at least in 
select areas, to take power away from states and governments, and to cede it to international 
bodies with a clear mandate. In other words, regardless of one’s position on its roots (intellectual 
as well as historical), has international law evolved to such a point that it now exists separately 
from the mere consent of states or other relevant actors?217 Or, as vehemently maintained by the 
current government of the United States of America, for instance, is state sovereignty to be 
regarded as the only true principle of international law?218 At a different but related plane of 																																																								
216 See Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal. No. 12. (Cambridge University Press, 
1995); Karen Knop, Diversity and self-determination in international law. Vol. 20. Cambridge University Press, 
2002; Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, sovereignty, and self-determination: the accommodation of conflicting rights 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).  
217 One of the most articulate accounts of this particular question is provided by O. A. Elias and C. L. Lim’s work on 
consensualism in international law. Their work is complimented by Robert Keohane’s take on reciprocity (2002). 
These two themes are further developed in Benedict Kingsbury’s questioning of the meaning of public in 
international law. See Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in international relations” (1986) 40 International 
organization 1; Olufemi Adekunle Elias, and Chin L. Lim, The paradox of consensualism in international law 
(Kluwer law international, 1998); Benedict Kingsbury, "Sovereignty and inequality” (1998) 9 European Journal of 
International Law 599; Robert Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (Routledge, 2002); 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, “The emergence of global administrative law” (2005) 
68 Law and contemporary problems 15; Joel Rosenthal, Ethics and International Relations (Routledge, 2017).  
218 Stephen Krasner’s markedly hostile take on sovereignty, as well as a growing field of scholarship in international 
relations questioning both the history and current validity of the notion of state sovereignty, does of course merit 
attention here. See Stephen Krasner, "The hole in the whole: Sovereignty, shared sovereignty, and international law” 
(2003) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1075. On this issue, also see his earlier work, Stephen Krasner, "Compromising 
westphalia” (1995) 20 International security 115, and Jack Goldsmith and Stephen D. Krasner, “The limits of 
idealism” (2003) 132 Daedalus 47.  
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analysis, is it possible to discern a legislative and judicial process endemic to international law 
that actually parallels such processes within domestic law? For any of these questions to be 
attended to satisfactorily, the sources of international law need to be re-examined. This is exactly 
what has been happening in both of the fields of expertise being studied here: legal scholarship 
on the one hand, and international relations scholarship on the other. 
Legal scholarship clearly posits that there are three recognized sources of international 
law: international treaties, customary law, and general principles of law. 219  Specifically, 
international treaty law is comprised of obligations that states expressly and voluntarily accept 
between themselves through treaties. Customary international law, on the other hand, is assumed 
to have derived from the consistent practice of states accompanied by opinio juris, i.e. the 
conviction of states that a legal obligations requires a consistent practice. Finally, the judgments 
of international tribunals and courts, as well as legal scholarship, have traditionally been regarded 
as a source for international law.220 Accordingly, the common narrative account of the emergence 
of the current regime of international law suggests that attempts to codify customary international 
law assumed decisive momentum after WWII with the formation of the International Law 
Commission (ILC).221 The ILC was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
in 1947, with the specific purpose of codifying and promoting international law, although it is 
acknowledged that this project begun with the activities of the League of Nations from 1924 
onwards.222  																																																								
219 These are also cited in this order in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. For the full text, 
see the online version at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/HumanRightsSP10/CourseDocs/1ICJ%20Art_38.pdf [15.04.2017]. 220	On the publicists debate, see D. F. Vagts, “Hegemonic International Law” (2001) 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 843, and, S. 
Sivakumaran, “The influence of teaching of publicists on the development of international law” (2017) 66 Int. & 
Comp. Law Quarterly 1. Although the category of “teachings of publicists” is not a homogeneous one, it broadly 
comprises of two groups: entities empowered by States to conclude teachings, such as the International Law 
Commission and expert groups, such as the Institut de Droit International, and “ordinary” publicists. The teachings 
of ordinary publicists include digests, treatises, textbooks, monographs, journal articles, etc. The standard 
assessments of influence focus on the extent to which these teachings are cited by courts and tribunals, in particular 
by the International Court of Justice. However, that approach privileges the role of courts and tribunals in the 
development of international law at the expense of other actors. Therefore, in full agreement with Sivakumaran, I 
concur that we cannot limit the debate on “other sources” solely to citations in court judgments. 	221	For a counter argument that goes further back, see Umut Ozsu, Formalizing displacement: Internatioal law and 
population transfers (Oxford University Press, 2015). I was a member of the doctoral supervision team of Ozsu and 
his work is indeed reflective of a growing trend among the new generation of international law scholars of looking 
back to the age of Empires for discerning the roots of the current regime.		
222 See Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland, Public international law (Routledge, 2015).  
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In general, codification in international law is achieved either through the production of a 
binding interpretation of an underlying custom by agreement, or through a treaty. What was 
unique about the ILC was that in the case of acts of codification undertaken by this body, states 
not party to such treaties were nonetheless expected to accept the work of the ILC in the name of 
customary law.223 This was declared possible because the general principles of international law 
were seen as concurrent with those commonly recognized by the major legal systems of the 
world. Meanwhile, non-legal scholarship on this issue points out that only a very small section of 
international law achieves the binding force of peremtory norms (jus cogens) and thus could 
include all states with no permissible derogations. Despite this uneven state of affairs in terms of 
legal certainty as to what international law stands for in its post-WWII format, both jus cogens 
and opinio juris are persistently cited as among the fundamental principles of international law. 
This is despite the fact that, unlike ordinary customary law that traditionally requires consent and 
allows the alteration of obligations between states through treaties, neither jus cogens nor opinio 
juris could be violated or questioned by any state.224 An added complication is that the actual list 
of peremptory norms is not exclusively catalogued. In legal terms, they are not listed or defined 
by any singular authoritative body. Rather, they often arise out of case law, customary law, and, 
in cases such as crimes against humanity, as a direct result of changing social and political 
attitudes within the institutional bodies now given power to produce new laws, such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Generally included in this list are prohibitions on waging 																																																								
223 On ILC’s working principles, see Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, “The premises, assumptions, and 
implications of Van Gend en Loos: Viewed from the perspectives of democracy and legitimacy of international 
institutions” (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 85; and Lusa Fernando Bordin, "Reflections of 
Customary International Law: The Authority of Codification Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International 
Law” (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 535.  
224 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which was adopted on May 22, 1969 and entered into force 
in January 1980, any treaty in violation of a peremptory norm is declared as null and void. The Vienna Convention 
allows for the emergence of new peremptory norms, although it does not itself specify any peremptory norms. Still, 
the Convention is regarded as the primary source for the codification of pre-existing international customary law. 
The work on the Vienna Convention was also conducted under the auspices of the International Law Commission. 
Although only 105 states ratified the Convention, it is again regarded as binding upon those who are not signatories 
as it is considered as a founding pillar of customary international law. However, it must be noted that the scope of the 
Convention is quite limited. It only applies to treaties concluded between states (Article 1 of the Convention), and 
excludes treaties between states and international organizations as well as treaties among international organizations 
themselves. At least in its original version, it was explicitly and unapologetically state-centric. Other aspects of 
international law came to be governed under the subsequent 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations. See Ineta Ziemele, 
Reservations to human rights treaties and the Vienna Convention regime: conflict, harmony or reconciliation 
(Springer, 2013). 
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aggressive war, war crimes, piracy, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, and torture, in 
addition to crimes against humanity. Despite the seemingly clear weight of condemnation related 
to such practices, the division of international legal norms into a hierarchy causes serious 
problems regarding both consensual ratification and enforcement. Furthermore, there are 
disagreements over whether a particular case violates a peremptory norm, and how and by whom 
such an occurrence is to be determined. As in other areas of international law, states generally 
insist on reserving the right to interpret these norms. Where there are disputes about the exact 
meaning and application of international law, ultimately their resolution is deemed the 
responsibility of national courts, unless otherwise specified as in the case of the ICC. In other 
words, to decide what a particular international law means or how it could be interpreted rests 
with the superior domestic courts, unless extenuating circumstance dictate otherwise. Legal 
entities such as the ICC or the ICJ are allowed to enter into the debate only if the national courts 
fail to give “true meaning” to the jus cogens interpretation of a specific violation.225 Meanwhile, 
domestic practices of providing a rendition for jus cogens often lead to a compromise between 
three different forms of legal interpretation. 226  The textual approach dictates a restrictive 
interpretation based on the “ordinary meaning” of the norm or ruling in question;227 the 
subjective approach considers the idea behind the letter of the law, as well as the context within 
which it came into existence or was put into force; and finally, interpretation can also be 
conducted in the light of both the object and the purpose of a given norm or ruling. These 
variations in interpretation imply differences in the understanding and entrenchment of 
																																																								
225 In the case of the ICJ, states can, upon mutual consent, submit disputes for arbitration by the Court. The 
judgments given by the Court in these cases are binding, although the court possesses no means to enforce its rulings. 
The Court may also give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be 
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request. There have been at 
least 150 primary cases receiving judgment since the ICJ evolved from the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in 1945. Decisions made through other means of international arbitration may be binding or non-binding depending 
on the nature of the arbitration agreement, whereas decisions resulting from contentious cases argued before the ICJ 
are always binding on the involved states. See Taslim Elias, The international court of justice and some 
contemporary problems: essays on international law (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013); as well as Paula 
Wojcikiewicz Almeida and Jean-Marc Sorel, eds. Latin America and the International Court of Justice: 
Contributions to International Law (Routledge, 2016).  
226 See Antonio Cassese et al, Cassese's international criminal law (Oxford University Press, 2013); Gerhard Werle 
and Florian Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law (OUP Oxford, 2014); Karel Wellens, Negotiations in 
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227  On the issue of intrepretation of international legal norms, see Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. 
Beck, International law and the use of force: beyond the UN Charter paradigm (Routledge, 2014).  
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international law within the domestic sphere, as is to be expected.228 In other words, as much as 
legal scholarship would like to capitalize the importance of opinio juris and jus cogens, 
international relations scholars in all camps are equally determined to reveal the highly political 
nature of these principles celebrated in the field of international law.  
 
III. JUS GENTIUM AND THE OUTER LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Historically, international relations scholars have regarded international law with a 
marked degree of distance, on the presumption that what exists in the domain of law could only 
be a reflection of what goes on in the domain of politics.  In other words, although the world of 
all things legal distinctly assumed its autonomy, international relations scholars saw this self-
perception and self-presentation as nothing more than a comforting illusion for those who 
subscribe to it.229 In particular, the lack of a systemic inclusion of the issue of the exercise of 
power by states into the study of legal processes and structures has long been taken as a 
demonstration that legal scholarship suffers from a lack of depth and width in its understanding 
of how power is organized, operationalized, and, of course, maintained.230  I would disagree with 
this conclusion and attribute it in part to the lack of dialogue between these two spheres of 
scholarship. However, it is important to make a note of this disjunct here as it clouds our 
perception of what to do with power and hegemony, and in general history, in the context of 
internal debates on international law. This is particularly relevant for the exercise of determining 																																																								
228 The only obvious area where interpretation is less open to differences of national opinion is cited as the UN 
Charter. Violations of the UN Charter by members of the United Nations are to be raised by the aggrieved state in 
the General Assembly for debate. The General Assembly cannot make binding resolutions, but under the resolution 
GA/RES/0377 it could authorize the use of force if there had been what is considered as “Breaches of the Peace” or 
“Acts of Aggression,” provided of course that the Security Council failed to act due to a negative vote of a 
permanent member in the first place. The United Nations General Assembly could also call for other collective 
measures such as economic sanctions if the situation is considered as constitutive of a milder threat to international 
peace. If these issues are raised at the level of the Security Council, this particular body is equipped to pass 
resolutions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to recommend “Pacific Resolution of Disputes.” Still, none of these 
resolutions are binding under international law, being ad hoc solutions to emergent problems. On the workings of the 
UN in the area of international law, see Thomas Weiss et al, The United Nations and changing world politics 
(Westview Press, 2016), and Simon Chesterman, Ian Johnstone and David M. Malone, Law and practice of the 
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229 See David Kennedy, A world of struggle: How power, law, and expertise shape global political economy 
(Princeton University Press, 2016).  
230 See Simon Archer, Daniel Drache, and Peer Zumbansen, eds. The Daunting Enterprise of the Law: Essays in 
Honour of Harry Arthurs (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2017).  
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the limitations of universalized applications of international law, which is an important part of the 
focus of this dissertation.  
Needless to say, a judicious assessment of both the limits and possibilities inherent in the 
conduct of international law requires that a bridge be established between these two domains of 
scholarship.231 Whether this would happen through the translation of the terms and workings of 
international legality into the language of political science, or through making the conceptual 
basis of international relations debates more transparent to scholars and practitioners of 
international law surely depends on the initial motivation for attempts at such a bridging act. Two 
main issues must be addressed in this context. First and foremost, debates on both the sources and 
the meaning of customary international law assume something without ever feeling the need to 
explicitly mentioning it; this is the “legal personhood of the state.” It then becomes extremely 
difficult for the unsuspecting eye of the non-legal scholar to identify the distinction between 
“opinio juris”’ and “consensual state practice” in international law scholarship. Secondly, what 
states might be legally obligated to do under the rubric of international law, and what they 
actually do and for which specific reasons (apart from legal ones), is as important as opinio juris 
in particular, and jus gentium in general.232 In this context, the first critical question concerning 
the connection between legal and political science inquiries, and the study of international law is 
to determine whether opinio juris gives the acts of a state their legal significance, and thus stands 
for more than a widespread consensus symbolizing a shared, though contextually bound, 
understanding among states. Only on the condition that opinio juris is larger and deeper than 
occasional moments of forced or voluntary consensus on specific issues could states receive their 
norms and guidance about what is legally relevant or consistent through jus gentium. The next 
question that troubles non-legal takes on international law is related to how the codification of jus 																																																								
231 See the classical debate initiated by Anne-Marie Slaughter and Kenneth Abbott on this issue, in particular Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stepan Wood, “International law and international relations theory: A 
new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship" (1998) American Journal of International Law 367-397; Kenneth 
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gentium takes place. In this regard, the “customary processes” depicted by legal theory are often 
deemed inadequate to diffuse widespread consensus regarding what jus gentium stands for and 
requires of states. Consequently, the articulation between customary international law, its 
codification practices, and exercises of power in international politics came to constitute a real 
divide between legal and political studies of international law.233 That is what is being attacked 
and systemically eroded via the interventions of TWAIL scholarship in particular, and critical 
debates emanating from the Global South in general.  
Power, needless to say, comes in many forms and disguises. Both consent and coercion 
are essential means through which power is exercised. In other words, effective control and 
dispensation of force, as well as claims of legitimate authority, are equally needed for the use of 
power. As such, the critical international relations scholar dares to question why legal scholarship 
on international law privileges or isolates the power of rules as the ultimate tool for constraining, 
persuading, and guiding behavior, at the expense of things that are overtly political in their 
nature.234 Why, when we study international law, are we to separate power as it is conceived 
within the framework of a legal system from power in its other embodiments? Could 
developments in international law solely be explained by the unfolding jurisprudence of 
international law alone? Could law generate its own source of legitimacy in an all-encompassing 
way? How could we understand the background to the foundational principles of international 
law, such as reciprocity, jurisdiction, legal personality and legitimate expectations, as well as 
their effects in constraining and influencing how states behave, without paying attention to the 
very mechanisms that define and sustain these states? Why is it that the idea of obligation 
constitutes the distinguishing mark of an international law scholar’s worldview, as opposed to the 
idea of conflict? In international relations literature, the same world of interstate relations is 
defined by anything but the principle of obligation and the rule of law, regardless of the school of 
thought a particular scholar ascribes to. Furthermore, current critical scholarship in IR goes as far 
as suggesting that obligations and rules sanctified by international law are often used to qualify 
																																																								
233 On the development of jus gentium, see Arturo Escobar, "Thinking-feeling with the Earth: Territorial Struggles 
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the abuse of power within the international system by bigger and richer states against others.235  
Legal scholars could of course posit that the obligations of international law are designed, 
first and foremost, to constrain violence and excessive use or abuse of power, in addition to 
framing rights that are at least in principle applicable to all members of the “international 
community,” as they are bound by international law.236 Yet, what about obligations, such as those 
related to “humanitarian law,” that can generate a correlative right to apply power against select 
states despite the right to territorial integrity or immunity from interference, as exemplified by the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq?237 If the foundational principles of international law are 
indeed there to condition states in their attempts to modify customary international legal rules 
within the bounds of judicial merit and legitimate expectation, then explicit respect is paid to the 
legal personhood of the state at the expense of other international entities. If international law is 
open to change emanating from within the system—as long as it is consistent with its founding 
premises—this amounts to a protection of the existing status quo of unequal relations and 
historical injustices. Among the principles of international law cited above, reciprocity emerges 
as primary in international legal relations. It is assumed to ensure—at least in principle—that the 
activities and claims of powerful states could be moderated by the knowledge that other states or 
conglomerations of states have the right to engage in similar activities or to make similar 
claims.238 International relations scholarship on international law, on the other hand, openly 
depreciates the principle of reciprocity as a mere front, and not an effective device in regulating 
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interstate relations—or indeed any other form of inter- or transnational politics.239 This is despite 
the fact that the legal principle of legitimate expectation encompasses powerful norms such as 
pacta sunt servanda.240 In contrast, from the classical legal scholarship point of view, the 
principle of legitimate expectation combined with the principle of reciprocity could build into the 
system of international law the desired degree of stability, both in the operation of its rules and in 
the structure of its institutions. Here the assumption is that there is indeed a stable set of 
constraints operating on powerful states in international law, and thus fears that it will only serve 
the interests of the mighty is unjustified. Legal scholarship has traditionally insisted that once 
norms are created in international law, based on shared understandings of the customary 
processes, the relationship between law and politics is no longer a one-way street. 
In summary, whichever route one takes to a full-fledged understanding of international 
law, the intersection of politics and law appears a key preoccupation. Legal scholarship on 
international law cannot avoid debates on the power/law nexus, and the contributions of critical 
legal studies scholarship, the New Haven School, debates on transnational law, and TWAIL 
scholarship readily attest to this inevitability. 241 On the international relations side of things, the 																																																								
239 See Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in international law (OUP Oxford, 2015); Franz von Benda-Beckmann and 
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long-lived doctrinal triumph of realism has not helped to create conditions for an interdisciplinary 
examination of international law. In particular, “realist” international relations scholarship of the 
1940s and 1950s showed a very strong dislike for the “idealist” international law of the inter-war, 
and later on post-war, period. Scholars as high profile as Hans Morgenthau branded international 
law scholarship— refererring explicitly not only to legal positivism but also to liberal idealism--
as naïve, dangerous and morally dubious.242 The peculiar relationship between legal positivism 
and political realism thus assumes a long history, with each constituting the “classical paradigm” 
for their respective disciplines. One may in fact go as far as arguing that they are in effect fully 
complementary with each other’s projects, particularly regarding the issue of the state. Both are 
state-centric, though legal positivism is so inherently and intrinsically, when compared to 
realism’s formulaic focus. Both take the state for granted, the former by not talking about it other 
than in a subsidiary manner or as background, and the latter by always starting the debate from 
state interests. Equally significant for the purposes of the present analysis is the fact that although 
neither school now enjoys the intellectual dominance once characteristic of them, both realism 
and positivism have left strong legacies. Any critical activity in international relations literature 
on international law, for instance, begins with a well-versed attack on either or both; this includes 
but is not limited to work by liberal internationalists and cosmopolitanists, neo-Marxists, 
constructivists, institutionalists, and of course critical theorists of a post-modernist persuasion. 
Legal positivism, on the other hand, is a common target for both critical legal scholars of myriad 
schools and transnationalism debates in international law. The remaining question is whether, by 
attempting to surpass both legal positivism and realism in a sweeping motion, these new 
developments in either of the fields have managed to tackle the issue that both have in common 
while being acutely unaware of its shared status: the state. Furthermore, whether it is the same 
state we are talking about in each case is a question mostly avoided outside of particular cases 
such as TWAIL scholarship.243 																																																																																																																																																																																			
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Int'l L. 525.  
242 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Alfred Kopf, 1948). Also see Gerry Simpson, "The situation on 
the international legal theory front: the power of rules and the rule of power” (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 439.  
243 For an idealist take on the issue of the state in international law, see Malcolm Langford, Global justice, state 
duties: the extraterritorial scope of economic, social, and cultural rights in international law (Cambridge University 
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IV. JUS COGENS OR NOT—DILEMMAS? 
The standard account of customary international law is that it arises from the widespread 
and consistent practice of states acting out of a sense of legal obligation, though this is in turn 
owed to many hegemonic practices and global hierarchies. This account, although commonly 
recited, is plagued by evidentiary, normative, and conceptual difficulties, and has been subjected 
to increasing criticism.244 A fundamental problem with much theorizing about international law is 
that it fails to identify the decision-maker(s) under study. Instead, the discussion proceeds as if 
international law exists in the abstract, without any particular political entity to interpret and 
apply it.245 In contradistinction, the application of a fundamental norm like jus cogens cannot be 
understood without paying attention to the preferences of the relevant legal actors. In the absence 
of a controlling treaty, these preferences provide the actual content of jus cogens above and 
beyond the letter of the law, perhaps somewhat akin to the judicial development of Anglo-
American common law.246 Immunities in international law expose multifaceted tensions between 
the conflicting goals of international stability of the state-system and legal accountability of the 
states. The laws arranging immunities do not provide conceptual and doctrinal coherence in terms 
of the relationship between state immunity and jurisdictional universalism. Foreign sovereign 
immunity and official status-based immunity are jurisdictionally sound, and protective of the 
existing state system in that they block the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by foreign states’ 
courts. However, these immunities do not necessarily preempt the prescriptive jurisdiction of 
foreign states’ laws to regulate conduct—even conduct inside other states—if a basis of 
prescriptive jurisdiction exists in international law such as the kind dictated by jus cogens norms. 
This is particularly important in the case of universal jurisdiction for state criminality. The 
question is to understand what determines a particular violation’s status as subject to peremptory 																																																																																																																																																																																			
Press, 2013). For a comparative analysis of the treatment of the state in international law scholarship, see David 
Bederman and Chimene Keitner, International law frameworks (West Academic, 2016). For a heavily critical take, 
see Simpson, Gerry, “The sentimental life of international law” (2015) 3 London Review of International Law 3.  244	See Leonard Hammer, A Foucauldian appraoch to international law: descriptive thoughts for normative issues 
(Routledge 2007) as well as Bederman and Keitner, International law frameworks, supra note 236, particularly the 
section on legal obligation.  
245 See Dinah Shelton, "International law and ‘relative normativity’” (2004) 2 International law 159.  
246 For an authoritative and all encompassing treatment of jus cogens, see Marteen den Heijer and Harmen van der 
Wilt, eds. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2015: Jus Cogens: Quo Vadis?. Vol. 46. (Springer, 2016).  
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norms and prescriptive jurisdiction in international law. Considering the notion of a hierarchical 
international legal order whereby (certain) norms are elevated to a superior level, classical 
scholarship posits that international law has largely developed as a horizontal system of norms. 
The most prominent exception to this is the concept of jus cogens, which denotes a substantive 
hierarchical superiority in international criminal law. Since most of the accepted items clustered 
under jus cogens norms belong to the domain of human rights violations and state criminality, 
there is a tendency to presume that human rights concerns sit at the top of the pyramid of 
international legal norms. Yet it remains highly questionable whether the jus cogens-based 
substantive norm hierarchy is anything more than theoretical or aspirational. Due to the rather 
narrow interpretation of the scope of jus cogens norms in both domestic and international judicial 
practice, in reality they remain within the horizontal scope of international law, unless used by 
powerful legal actors.247 
I would argue that this dynamic endemic to the relationship between state sovereignty and 
universal jurisdiction holds two important consequences for the current state of international law. 
The connection between immunities and applications of jus cogens is a very important one in the 
sense that the latter introduces practices that are against the mandate of the former in international 
law, in particular in the domain of criminal law. A few caveats are necessary here. First, the 
relevant law preempting immunities normally accorded to the state is the law in existence when a 
court determines whether to entertain suit, and not the law in existence at the time of the domestic 
conduct leading to the international adjudication of the issue. As a result, the viability of claims 
from the same underlying facts could and does change along with shifts in international law. This 
in turn causes complaints concerning legal certainty of adjudication under the aegis of 
international criminal law. Second, peremptory norms doctrines by and large lack rule-of-law 
coherence, since they are often embroiled with problems of their accepted legality and possible 
retroactive applications. This has been particularly troubling in the interpretation of ICC 
judgments discussed in previous chapters, and it is an issue receiving further elaboration in the 
next chapter of this work on hybrid courts and tribunals.  If we were to assess violations of jus 
cogens, or peremptory norms of international law, compared with the relatively settled laws of 																																																								
247 See William Conklin, "The peremptory norms of the international community” (2012) 23 European Journal of 
International Law 837, and Robert Kolb, Peremptory International Law-Jus Cogens: A General Inventory 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).  
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foreign sovereign and status-based immunities, it would become apparent that international law 
of conduct-based accountability and removal of immunities is in a state of flux. Since customary 
international law arises from state practices and opinio juris, arguments used to avoid direct 
collisions between state sovereignty and jus cogens do not necessarily lend themselves to a 
distinct doctrine of international law in this area. Most prominently, arguments suggesting that 
jus cogens addresses substantive prohibitions under international law may not even apply when 
the acts at issue are to be brought to trial under conduct-based jurisprudence and in ad hoc 
settings. Bending towards accountability norms whereby the law about state criminality is 
unsettled is not a high priority in international law. The only exception to this seems to emerge 
where international legal bodies are engaged in determining culpability and accountability 
concerning the acts of the states and high ranking officials representing the state in the Global 
South. Only then, it appears, do jus cogens norms become well and alive. If so, jus cogens norms 
do not hold such a unique position in the hierarchy of international law. The presumption that, 
unlike treaty law, peremptory norms abide no derogation and are binding on all states regardless 
of their willingness to be bound by them translates, in actual practice, into something else. As a 
result, I would argue that the authority of peremptory norms cannot be adequately explained by 
positivist, institutionalist, and voluntarist explanations of their authority. Perhaps the only other 
option available is an explanation from natural law or its derivatives, if the authority of 
peremptory norms is to avoid the conceptual difficulties engulfing their traditional renditions.248 I 
will further explicate this issue in the last chapter of this dissertation, on collective responsibility 
and applied political philosophical debates on the notion of justice as it relates to virtue ethics on 
the one hand, and natural law theories on the other.  
Meanwhile, in the next two chapters of this dissertation, I will first attend to the 
applicability of the principle of legal certainty to the category of crimes against humanity and 
highlight some of the missing connections between jus cogens norms, erga omnes crimes and 
actual international law adjudication of egregious criminal conduct. I will further exemplify my 
misgivings on the issue of the application of universal jurisdiction concerning crimes against 
humanity legislation through a discussion on limits of ICC jurisprudence and potential avenues 																																																								
248 See Dan Dubois, "The authority of peremptory norms in international law: state consent or natural law?" (2009) 
78 Nordic Journal of International Law 133.  
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for alternative practices in the form of hybrid courts and tribunals. However, before advancing 
the debate on universal jurisdiction in that particular direction, first I will summarize my findings 
concerning the doctrinal limits of universal jurisdiction in terms of its applications in the Global 
South.	
CONCLUSION 
The thrust of this chapter was the critical examination of the matter of the state in 
contemporary international law, in relation to the work done by international relations scholars on 
the same subject; and to determine how these findings relate to some pertinent issues concerning 
statehood and sovereignty in the Global South under the aegis of the global application of jus 
cogens norms. This examination was essential for understanding the limits of universal 
jurisdiction, which is the main tenet of adjudication of crimes against humanity.  
The central motif of this chaper was understanding how conceptualizations of the state—
as emblematic of power relations in general—shape the context as well as content of processes 
and practices of international criminal law in the Global South. The original idea for this inquiry 
emerged from the observation that a noteworthy conglomeration of recent trends in international 
relations seemed to insist that they have solutions to offer for deficits in the study of international 
law. However, upon closer examination, it has become apparent that the leading cadres of 
international relations scholarship today no longer takes much interest in the state, and rather treat 
it either as a relic or as a nuisance. The claim that it is possible to bring these two enterprises, 
namely international relations and international law scholarship on the subject of law, together in 
the form of a dialogue without sorting out what separated them in the first place has thus proved 
absurd. There is no foundation upon which one can appeal for a common understanding of 
international law other than the one that engages with power, hegemony and histories of 
discontent. As such, one comes across a series of semi-independent conversations amongst 
individuals familiar with each other’s intellectual traditions and methodological preoccupations. 
In this sense, the most distinctive feature of the current study of international law could be 
determined as the decisive conflation of its subject and its object, the state. The possibility of an 
external normative order grounding the equality and morality of the state on an autonomous 
system of legal sources and processes is currently all the rage. Oddly enough, now that the 
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classical bastion of state-centric analyses of politics—i.e. international relations—no longer cares 
much for the state, one is faced with the illusion that legal and non-legal scholarship are indeed 
engaged in a new kind of dialogue, despite all their previously missed opportunities. The 
characteristics of contemporary legal arguments on international law as a result remain elusive.  
The evasive rhetoric of the discipline regarding the state in particular, and power relations in 
general, provides the ultimate guarantee for its intellectual and professional autonomy. The 
traditional circles within which this kind of noble self-isolation would have been methodically 
scrutinized, international relations scholarship, is too busy with other questions.  
In this context, the suggestion made in this chapter is two-fold. First and foremost, the 
debate about the state should at least remain a point of discomfort for international law 
scholarship. Second, the grammar of legal theory attending to international law should include 
the state as a problem-laden point of reference, rather than a foundational pillar, and 
contextualize it both geographically and historically. Perhaps then we could finally start a 
genuine conversation about why the state no longer seems to matter as much as international law 
once assumed it to. Through interdisciplinary dialogue, we may indeed develop a deeper 
understanding of law’s secretive over-dependency on the state. Unlike the immediate post-war 
years, the international law scholar’s ultimate wish to dispense with the need for the consent and 
compliance of the sovereign state now very much coincides with the reality that his/her 
counterparts work with across the disciplinary fence, in the field of international relations. 
However, the challenge now comes from elsewhere, the Global South, whereby the state re-
emerged as a bastion of hope against the invasive forces of neoliberalism and global 
constitutionalism. Coming back full circle, on the issue of how to relate to the state in the context 
of Global South’s engagements with international law, a major consequence of the new global 
restructuring of states, societies and economies has been the double process of further and deeper 
integration to the global market on the one hand, and, social exclusion, dispossession, and 
emergence of novel forms of widespread insecurity and precarity, on the other. These processes 
have led to an exponential growth of marginalized and deinstitutionalized subaltern classes, 
especially in the Global South, rendering them all the more vulnerable to becoming subjects of 
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state criminality. 249  Critically navigating through prevailing perspectives on international 
criminal law pertaining to violent acts and crimes committed by states against their own people-- 
otherwise known as crimes against humanity, the next three chapters of the dissertation will thus 
strive to propose an alternative outlook. In the spirit of a “quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” I 
will address crimes against humanity first normatively, then as seen through the mechanisms of 
international law as they are sought to apply in the Global South, and finally from within the 
states and societies wherein they are committed.250  
International law, and in particular international criminal law, reproduces many of the 
oligarchic tendencies in global governance, while also creating ambiguities and a new 
multilateral ethos of indifference. Within these parameters of a dialectics of stability and change, 
practices and processes not only inhibit global transformations and reproduce some of the most 
oppressive conditions of the existing order, they also lead to new openings. As the following 
discussion on crimes against humanity will illuminate, international criminal law is not immune 
to these coexisting forces and, as such, it can harbour promises as much as it casts long dark 
shadows.  
 
  
																																																								
249 On this issue, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, eds., Law and globalization 
from below: towards a cosmopolitan legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005), and Stephen Gill, 
ed., Globalization, democratization and multilateralism (Springer, 2016).  
250For a similar use of the phrase of ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ but in a different context, see Asef Bayat, 
"From Dangerous Classes' to Quiet Rebels' Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South” (2000) 15 
International sociology 533. 
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Chapter IV. Crimes Against Humanity Legislation in International Law and The Conundrum 
of Jurisdictional Certainty 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter pursues the question of what distinguishes crimes against humanity from 
other crimes, as well as why and how they fall under the purview of universal jurisdiction. To 
this end, it examines the jurisprudential architecture of crimes against humanity legislation in 
order to determine whether jurisdictional certainty alone would suffice for establishing the basis 
for adjudication to ensue. In this work, crimes against humanity is the key category of criminal 
conduct codified by international law that I chose to use as the basis of my analysis concerning 
limits of universal jurisdiction. This is so not because the crimes that fall under its aegis 
constitute in any way less than a frontal assault on human dignity and humanity at large. Rather, 
the conundrum concerns the impossibility of removing the vestiges of a historically skewed 
regime of accountability in international law regardless of the severe and egregious nature of 
such crimes. In other words, the problem rests with the way international [criminal] law operates 
and not with the applicability of the norm of universal jurisdiction to crimes against humanity. In 
this context, let me start this somewhat unsettling discussion with the citation of a very recent 
incidence befitting the definition of such crimes, and use this vignette as a starting point to 
analyze the current impossibility of legislating an applicable punishment scheme against many 
such crimes.  
In August 2016, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) published a report in 
which it documents in detail the crimes against humanity and war crimes that led to the complete 
depopulation of Darayya city.251 The SNHR is an independent, non-governmental human rights 
organization founded in June 2011, and is a certified source for the United Nation of statistics 
about human rights violations in Syria. The report notes that all truces and reconciliations 
regarding circumstances in Darayya were implemented while negating basic international 																																																								
251 See the Report, ‘Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes are the reason behind the Forced Migration in 
Darayya: Siege, Chemical Weapons, Barrel Bombs, and International Silence’ at 
http://sn4hr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/Crimes_against_humanity_forced_displacement_for_Daraya_en.pdf 
[03.03.2017] 
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humanitarian and human rights law.252 Negotiations were carried out under oppression and 
dictated by siege, indiscriminate bombing, starvation, and the prohibition of civilian residents and 
aid from getting into or out of the city. According to the report, the crime of en masse forced 
displacement was carried out in a blatant manner in Homs, Darayya, and Banyas. 253 This 
particular report is one example amongst many documenting mass political violence committed 
by states against their own citizens since 1945. In this sense, it does more than shed an at least 
partial light on the drastic changes in the demography of Syria over the past six years as a result 
of the killing, indiscriminate and deliberate bombing, and destruction of livelihood of civilian 
communities. It also provides an inlet into a more nuanced understanding of the limits of the 
applications of crimes against humanity legislation in situ. In Syria, close to seven million people 
have been displaced and became refugees, while 6.3 million people have become IDPs.254 Such 
demographic changes undoubtedly pose threats to the wellbeing of the peoples of the entire 
region, but equally importantly they raise the additional challenge of establishing an 
accountability regime in the aftermath of the still-ongoing war. In the specific case of Daraya city, 
for instance, the report records the killing of no less than 817 civilians, including 67 children and 
98 women, during the time period covered by the report. These numbers and associated 
circumstances of the killing of civilian populations constitute an additional concern for the 
determination of the extent of crimes against humanity committed during the Syrian War, even as 																																																								
252 On the basis of ICTY and ICTR case law, one of the main issues raised in the context of mass transfer of 
populations during armed conflict is the question of assessing whether people have chosen to leave conflict zones of 
their own free will—or at least as much free will as can be expected under circumstances of war. Thus, what really 
counts as “genuine choice” in each particular case cannot be established once and for all a priori. A careful 
consideration of the specific circumstances must be carried out before reaching any definitive conclusion. Secondly, 
international criminal law would benefit from further clarification of the meaning of the clause “displacement of 
persons from the area in which they are lawfully present” as one of the constitutive elements of the crimes of 
deportation and forcible transfer. While the reading of the term “lawfully” suggested by the ICTY is reasonable, 
especially in the context of a conflict where different national groups and political parties confront each other in what 
effectively amounts to a civil war, this is not helpful in other circumstances. Internally displaced persons often lack 
proper residency permits or registration, and often they move multiple times. Consequently, there might be 
“penumbral” situations that are not at all straightforward for adjudication purposes. This is an area where greater 
cross-fertilization between international refugee law and international criminal law would lead to a better 
understanding of how to address mass human suffering in these specific situations. Even the difference established 
by the ICTY between deportation and forcible transfer does not change the basic point that all of these acts are 
criminal, and that forcibly transferring people within a country is as serious a threat to their livelihood as deporting 
them across a State border. 
253 On the Lebanese case of the relationship between forced displacement and crimes against humanity, see 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4e09a5622.pdf [03/03/2017].  
254 Nergis Canefe, “Management of Irregular Migration: Syrians in Turkey as Paradigm Shifters for Forced 
Migration Studies” (2016) 54 New Perspectives on Turkey 9; and Nergis Canefe, ‘Post-Colonial State and Violence: 
Rethinking the Middle East and North Africa outside the Blindfold of Area Studies’ (2015) 45 Refugee Watch 7.	
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they are naturalized as wartime casualties. Again according to the report, government forces-
owned helicopters dropped no less than 7,846 bombs on the city, including barrel bombs loaded 
with a flammable substance that is evidently napalm. The report then documents that the siege 
imposed on the city and its fallouts, such as shortages in food and medicine, resulted in civilian 
deaths as well. Finally, there are 4,311 forcibly-disappeared persons from Darayya who were 
arrested by government forces, while later on the authorities denied their existence.255 
The commonly accepted understanding of the modern concept and related jurisprudence 
of crimes against humanity is that this section of international law is a product of the horror of the 
crimes committed during the two World Wars. It was then revitalized due to the growing 
consensus amongst both European and post-colonial states that certain crimes committed within 
national borders and by the states against their own citizens should be legitimate subjects of 
international law and adjudication.256 However, unlike war crimes and genocide, the law of 
crimes against humanity has primarily developed through piecemeal additions to customary 
international law.257 Today, the statutes of most international and internationalized tribunals such 
as the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute contain definitions of these crimes, though 
there are significant differences in terms of the jurisprudence employed by different international, 
regional and hybrid courts.258 To say the least, the evolution of the definition of crimes against 																																																								
255 The summary description provided above clearly shows the complexities of subsuming the atrocious crimes 
related to forced displacement under clear-cut legal categories for the purpose of international criminal prosecution. 
These difficulties arise from the complexity of identifying the most appropriate approach to legally characterizing 
widespread violations of fundamental human rights amounting to forcible transfer and deportation. Especially when 
committed with a discriminatory intent and as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians, this type 
of conduct does fall under the purview of crimes against humanity. The case law in this area already established the 
criminal nature of certain types of forced displacement and the need to prosecute those responsible for forced 
displacement situations. However, the problem lies in finding the venue and the court, and, more generally, finding 
political consent for the trial of these atrocities.  
256 On the politics of the establishment of the ICC and the drafting and ratification of the Rome Statute, see D. F. 
Orentlicher, ‘Politics by Other Means: The Law of the International Criminal Court,’ (1999) 32 Cornell Int'l LJ 489.  
257 On the history of crimes against humanity in international law, see G. Robertson, Crimes against humanity: the 
struggle for global justice (The New Press, 2013); A. F. Lang Jr, Punishment, justice and international relations: 
ethics and order after the cold war (Routledge, 2009); M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. International Criminal Law, Volume 
2 Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms (Brill, 2008); L. May, Crimes against humanity: a normative 
account (Cambridge University Press, 2005); D. Luban, ‘A theory of crimes against humanity’ (2004) 29 Yale J. Int'l 
L. 85; D. Robinson, “Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference” (1999) 93 The American 
Journal of International Law 43. 
258 For an historical overview of the contents of the definition, see in chronological order:  
1945 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter), Article 6(c): “murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations, before or 
during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
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humanity as an international instrument has not been linear.259 As far as the practices of 
international courts are concerned, later definitions are often more expansive, while at the 
regional level domesticated definitions tend to be narrower than their international counterparts. 
Furthermore, the contents of the legal norms jus cogens and erga omnes obliging state parties to 
punish crimes against humanity remain subject to greater controversy than has been the case in 
the prescribing of punishment for genocide and war crimes.260  
Overall, one might say that these are internal disputes, jurisprudential matters to be settled 
in the courts themselves. In this work, however, I will argue otherwise, and posit that many of 
these seemingly jurisprudential disputes actually relate to the criteria used for the determination 
of what constitutes crimes against humanity on the ground. Therefore, there is actually an 
intrinsic politico-normative challenge on the issue of their universal applicability. In 																																																																																																																																																																																			
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.” [This definition was also used in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.] 
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Article 5: 
“…the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and 
directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) 
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane 
acts.” 
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Article 3:  
“…the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population 
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) 
Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) 
Other inhumane acts.” 
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Article 2: 
“…the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population: a. Murder; b. 
Extermination; c. Enslavement; d. Deportation; e. Imprisonment; f. Torture; g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence; h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or 
religious grounds; i. Other inhumane acts.” 
The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), Article 5: 
“…any acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, on 
national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds, such as: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; 
imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; other inhumane acts.”  
259 For instance, in 2002, the USA asked all countries who were part of the ratification scheme for the ICC to sign 
agreements exempting US citizens from prosecution by the Court, and threatened economic sanctions if they refused. 
Some countries yielded to this pressure even after ratifying the ICC Statute, while others chose to honor their original 
commitments. Why some countries were more responsive to US influence than others is not a question that will be 
dealt with in here. However, no doubt state vulnerability to attempts of influence through the lens of economic 
sanctions played a significant role. What is important for the present context is the introduction of bilateral immunity 
agreements (BIAs) into the architecture of the Rome Statute. For further debate, see I. Nooruddin and Autumn 
Lockwood Payton, “Dynamics of influence in international politics: The ICC, BIAs, and economic sanctions” 
(2010) 47 Journal of Peace Research 711. 
260 On the disputed nature of the norm, see P. Wald, “Genocide and crimes against humanity” (2007) 6 Wash. U. 
Global Stud. L. Rev. 621; R. K. Paterson, ‘Resolving Material Culture Disputes: Human Rights, Property Rights and 
Crimes against Humanity’ (2006) 14 Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 161. 
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jurisprudential terms, the primary challenge in defining crimes against humanity is to identify the 
precise elements that distinguish these offenses from crimes exclusively subject to national laws. 
The definition itself not only determines the scope of international jurisdiction, it also gives rise 
to a number of important consequences concerning trial structure, conditional and selective 
removal of immunities and the commuting of sentences. Unlike the majority of domestic crimes, 
these offenses are generally considered outside the purview of statutes of limitations. Equally 
importantly, the immunities that often shield state representatives and high-ranking public and 
military officers from criminal responsibility are categorically removed in the context of crimes 
against humanity, at least when trials are held before international tribunals or domestic courts 
employing universal jurisdiction. Although the concept of universal jurisdiction—the principle 
that certain crimes are subject to jurisdiction by all states—remains controversial vis-à-vis the 
capacities of domestic courts, proponents of universal jurisdiction invariably include crimes 
against humanity within its scope. If put into practice, the principle would deliver the following 
result: while the crime of murder could only be tried in a court with a jurisdictional link to the 
act, a murder committed as a crime against humanity could be tried in any criminal court in the 
world. Finally, the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a jus cogens norm of international 
law, thus certifying that its derogation is not pardonable or to be permitted under any 
circumstance. As a result of its special status, at least in theory, states have an obligation under 
international law either to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity or to extradite them 
to states intending to pursue prosecutions, hence the erga omnes part of the equation pertaining to 
this particular set of crimes. In light of the serious legal consequences of designating an offense a 
crime against humanity, as well as the severe moral condemnation the label entails, the 
importance of understanding the exact judicial nature of these offenses needs no further 
emphasis. However, this chapter is not an exercise in that vein. Although it does provide a brief 
historical sketch of the evolution of the norms and jurisprudence prohibiting crimes against 
humanity, as well as an assessment of the current state of the definition with respect to each key 
element of its constitutive crimes, the core of the argument developed in the following pages 
pertains to another and, I would purport, an equally important issue: the politico-normative 
framework within which these offenses find meaning and are deemed worthy of trial in the 
domestic setting. In this sense, the focus is to be shifted away from institutions such as the ICC to 
hybrid courts and the overall possibility of the domestication of this particular category of 
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international crimes. 
In essence, crimes against humanity are mass crimes committed against the fundamental 
human rights of a civilian population. In this context, I make the point that their common 
inclusion under humanitarian, rather than human rights, law is misleading and has grave 
consequences. They are rightfully distinguished from egregious state crimes such as genocide in 
that they need not target a specific group, but may aim at the civilian population in general. Thus, 
they include crimes against political and or other groups, and creating conditions of generalized 
trauma and loss. In contrast to genocide, it is not necessary for the perpetrator to intend to destroy 
a group as such, in whole or in part. Similarly, crimes against humanity should be regarded 
different from war crimes insofar as the criminal conduct may be directed not towards the legally 
defined enemy's popluation but against the perpetrator's own; hence the difficulty of their 
legislation. In the following pages, an appeal is thus made to understand the politico-normative 
precepts of crimes against humanity jurisdiction, in an attempt to render them meaningful and 
useful within the domestic realm, where these crimes are perpetrated, rather than being seen as an 
imposition by an international court or a consortium of states (the latter format commonly known 
as “victor’s justice”).  
I. JURISPRUDENTIAL ARCHITECTURE OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
In international law, crimes against humanity found their first explicit formulation as a 
category of crime in Article 6 (c) of the Nürnberg/Nuremberg Charter which emerged from the 
Tribunal.261 The offenses categorized as crimes against humanity were also included in Article 5 
(c) of the Tokyo Charter and Article II (1) of Control Council Law No. 10.262 While the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters required that crimes against humanity evidence a connection to 
aggressive war or war crimes, this supplementary requirement was left out of Control Council 
Law No. 10. The Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and the International 																																																								
261 See The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – History and Analysis: Memorandum submitted by the 
Secretary-General, Document A/CN.4/5 at  
http://www.cininas.lt/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/1949_UN_ILC_N_statuto_koment.pdf [03.03.2017]  
262 For the full text, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp [03.03.2017]. The list includes the following: 
atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, 
torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.  
	 130	
Criminal Court have then reaffirmed the customary law character of crimes against humanity, 
and the prohibition of crimes against humanity was recognized as having the status of jus cogens 
and belonging to the domain of erga omnes.  
The legal phrase “crimes against humanity” was first employed earlier, in a 1915 
Declaration by the governments of Great Britain, France and Russia which condemned the 
Turkish government for the alleged massacres of Armenians as “crimes against humanity and 
civilization for which all the members of the Turkish Government will be held responsible 
together with its agents implicated in the massacres.”263 Despite this early use of the term, 
however, the first full prosecutions of crimes against humanity did not take place until after the 
Second World War in 1945, in the form of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at 
Nuremberg, Germany. The charter establishing the Nuremberg IMT defined crimes against 
humanity as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or prosecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in the execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where they were 
perpetrated. Subsequent to the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter of 1946 established the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, incorporating the same definition of crimes 
against humanity. Following the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of 1945-1946, no other 
international tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes against humanity was established until the 
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals. However, in 1947, the International Law Commission was 
charged by the United Nations General Assembly with the formulation of the principles of 
international law recognized and reinforced in the Nuremberg Charter and judgment, and drafted 
a “code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind,” which included crimes against 
humanity.264 In 1996, this Draft Code from 1947 was brought to the attention of jurists who 
reinstated crimes against humanity as inhumane acts including murder, extermination, torture, 
enslavement, persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds, institutionalized 
discrimination, arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population, arbitrary imprisonment, 																																																								
263 See G. Robertson, Crimes against humanity: the struggle for global justice (The New Press, 2013); and D. Matas, 
‘Prosecuting crimes against humanity: the lessons of World War I’ (1989) 13 Fordam Int'l LJ 86.  
264 See the Commentaries document on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind 
regarding the reference to International Law Commission at 
 http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf [03.03.2017] 
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rape, enforced prostitution, and other inhuman acts committed in a systematic manner or on a 
large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group within the 
boundaries of a state.265 This latter definition differs from the one used in Nuremberg in the sense 
that, as stated above, the former only targeted criminal acts that were committed “before or 
during the war,” thus establishing a prescriptive nexus between crimes against humanity and 
armed conflict. Prior to the 1996 definition, in 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established by the UN Security Council in order to investigate and 
prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity which had taken place in the 
former Yugoslavia, have already opened up the 1947 draft definition. However, it did so only for 
the specific case of the former Yugoslavia. Although the ICTY’s connecting of crimes against 
humanity to both international and non-international armed conflict led to the expansion of the 
list of criminal acts used in Nuremberg to include imprisonment, torture and rape, as per Article 5 
of the ICTY Statute, this was done so with reference to a specific case. In 1994, the UN Security 
Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) pursuant to the 
genocide that had taken place between April and July 1994. This second ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal yet again changed the scope of the definition of crimes against humanity. In the 
ICTR Statute, the linkage between crimes against humanity and an armed conflict of any kind 
was dropped. Rather, a new requirement was added that the inhumane acts must be part of a 
“systematic or widespread attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, 
racial or religious grounds,” as per Article 3 of the ICTR Statute.266 This change was stipulated 
due to the concern that, given the internal nature of the conflict in Rwanda, crimes against 
humanity would likely not have been applicable if the nexus to armed conflict had been 
maintained.  																																																								
265 The International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), 
Article 18: 
“…any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed 
by a Government or by any organization or group: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Torture; (d) Enslavement; (e) 
Persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds; (f) Institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or 
religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously 
disadvantaging a part of the population; (g) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population; (h) Arbitrary 
imprisonment; (i) Forced disappearance of persons; (j) Rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse; 
(k) Other inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such as 
mutilation and severe bodily harm.” http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/7_4_1996.pdf 
[03.03.2017] 
266 See the full body of the Statute at http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ictr_EF.pdf [03.03.2017] 
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The most up-to-date definition of crimes against humanity came with the establishment of 
the permanent International Criminal Court in 2002. In its founding treaty, the Rome Statute, 
crimes against humanity are stated somewhat differently than in any of the preceding legal 
definitions. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or 
forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced 
disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; and other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.267 
Essentially, the Rome Statute employs the same definition of crimes against humanity that the 
ICTR does. However, it removes the requirement that the attack have been carried out “on 
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.” In addition, the Rome Statute definition 																																																								
267 Here, in actual treaty language, an “attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack; “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, 
inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population; “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a 
person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children; “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced displacement of the persons concerned by 
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under 
international law; “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions; “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful 
confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be 
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy; “Persecution” means the intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity; 
“The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts ... committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of 
systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with 
the intention of maintaining that regime; and, “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts 
of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. 
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offers the most expansive list of specific criminal acts to be covered by international criminal 
law. Despite the extensive degree of legislation, however, international law scholars have 
repeatedly pointed out the need for a specialized convention on crimes against humanity.268 This 
is in part due to the fact that its current framing could be problematic in light of the limited 
application of select principles of legality to such crimes. For instance, the maxim nullum crimen 
sine lege, a fundamental principle of international criminal law, dictates that an individual can 
only be convicted for specific acts which, at the time of commission, were known to be of 
criminal nature. The aforementioned ad hoc tribunals could not limit their jurisdiction with that 
maxim. However, there is at least a partial solution offered to this conundrum in international 
jurisprudence. Fundamentally, crimes against humanity are inhumane acts committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against civilians by their own state or an organized political 
authority with jurisdiction over that territory. The connection to a broader or systematic attack is 
then what justifies the exercise of international criminal jurisdiction and thus removes the burden 
of such crimes not being already codified within the confines of domestic jurisprudence. 
Similarly, the erga omnes category dictates the necessity for any legal party to pursue 
punishment, even in the event of the impossibility of domestic adjudication of crimes against 
humanity. No doubt the erga omnes clause is weaker than the nullum crimen sine lege dictum, 
though together they do form a defense of the applicability of crimes against humanity legislation 
for both past and present cases. It is also true that some scholars make a distinction between 
substantive and procedural law in the context of nullum crimen sine lege.269 According to this 
view, a change in substantive law leading to liability must occur before a criminal act is 
committed, but a change in procedural law leading to liability may occur after the act is 
committed. For example, extending the statute of limitations to allow the prosecution of crimes 
that occurred in the past would constitute a change in procedural law.270 This would directly 
apply to acts punished by international criminal tribunals that were of ambiguous legality in the 
immediate context of the conflict or atrocity situations in which these acts were committed. In 
this regard, nullum crimen sine lege as the legality principle as it pertains to international law 																																																								
268 M. C. Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law, Volume 2 Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms 
(Brill, 2008). 
269 M. Boot, Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes: nullum crimen sine lege and the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 12 (Intersentia, 2002).  
270 G. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1998).  
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jurisprudence requires a procedural reading in the case of crimes against humanity. Finally, 
though the exact wording of the definitions of crimes against humanity differ in the cornerstone 
documents that provide it a juridical standing, each definition is made up of similar underlying 
criminal elements (e.g., murder, extermination, rape, and so forth) as well as common contextual 
elements under which the criminal act must have been committed.  
As far as the structure of these crimes is concerned, the material element of crimes against 
humanity requires the commission of a specific individual act in the course of a widespread or 
systematic attack on a civilian population.271 The attack on the civilian population represents the 
contextual element of the crime. The mental element requires intent and knowledge regarding the 
material elements of the crime, including the contextual element. These crimes affect not only the 
individual victim, but as already mentioned, constitue a systematic or widespread attack on the 
fundamental human rights of a civilian population as a whole. This particular context of 
organized violence calls into question the responsibilities of humanity as a whole against the 
atrocities committed by a state against its own people. At least in principle, the norm also protects 
individual human rights, including the individual victim's life, health, freedom and dignity.272  
The object of these crimes is, without exception, harming the civilian population, though 
this explicit focus does not apply to the category of war crimes, the latter category including both 
military personelle and civilian populations in the category of victims. Furthermore, crimes 
against humanity are directed against a civilian population at large and not merely against select 
individuals. A civilian population is any plurality of persons that are connected with each other 
by common characteristics, including but not limited to ethnicity, religion, race, nationality, and 
political belief, and any one of these characteristics could render them the target of an attack. The 
most contentious section of this definition is the criterion that the presence of a limited number of 
combatants among an attacked civilian population does not negate its civilian character. At times 
of ethnic civil war, for instance, the state cannot justify its actions in attacking civilian 
populations through the reasoning that they have a military/guerilla arm. Neither is it necessary 																																																								
271 See Article 7 of the ICC Statute as document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 
 at https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf 
[03.03.2017] 
272 Again according to the definition in Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute, an "attack on a civilian population" 
denotes "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack."  
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for the entire population of a state or territory to be affected by the attack. The civilian character 
of the attacked population and persons applies both in civil war and during peacetime. Therefore, 
for the purpose of determining the criminal element, a distinction between civilians and non-
civilians is not possible solely by applying the terms of customary international humanitarian 
law. In the context of crimes against humanity, application of the notion of harming the civilian 
population for criminal adjudication aims to protect the fundamental rights of every human being 
against any form of systematic violation. The essential determining factor is the victims’ need for 
protection, and the presumption of their defenselessness vis-à-vis the state, the military or other 
types of politically organized force. By derivation, anyone who is not part of this organized 
political power using force is considered a civilian. Furthermore, it is not the formal status—such 
as membership in the military forces—but a person's actual role at the time of commission of 
these crimes that determines their culpability under the purview of crimes against humanity. In 
other words, members of military forces or other armed groups who have laid down their arms or 
have otherwise been rendered hors de combat are not to be subjected to culpability criteria.  
Another very important feature concerning the jurisprudential architecture of these crimes 
is the idea of “attack.” This element describes a specific course of conduct involving the 
commission of acts of violence. Such a course of conduct must include the "multiple 
commission" of acts listed in Article 7 (1) of the ICC Statute. However, this does not mean that 
the perpetrator needs to act repeatedly by him- or herself.273 Rather, what is in question is the 
widespread or systematic character of these acts of violence. Specifically, the criterion 
“widespread” describes a quantitative element related to the crimes committed. The widespread 
nature of the attack can arise either from the number of victims or from the extension of its 
effects over a broad geographic area. The criterion of a systematic attack, on the other hand, is a 
qualitative qualifier. It refers to the organized nature of the committed acts of violence, and thus 
serves to exclude isolated acts from the notion of crimes against humanity. Earlier case law of the 
ad hoc tribunals required that an individual act that is adjudicated based on the definition of 
crimes against humanity must follow a predetermined plan or policy. However, the Appeals 
Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal then distanced itself from such a requirement and set a 
																																																								
273 Also see D. Luban, ‘A theory of crimes against humanity’ (2004) 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 85. 
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precedent for limited coverage. 274  Accordingly, although attacks on a civilian population 
typically do follow a predetermined plan, this does not make the existence of a plan or policy an 
element of crime. This argument relies on the principle that, under customary international law, 
crimes against humanity do not call for the proven presence of a policy element. However, 
Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute extended the definition again and stipulated that crimes 
against humanity jurisdiction requires that the attack on a civilian population must have been 
carried out "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such 
attack."275  
Finally, there is the issue of perpetrators. Perpetrators need not be members of the State or 
an organization involved in the crime, but can include all persons who act to implement or 
support the policy of the State or the organization in question. These individual acts include 
killing (Art. 7 [1] [a] of the ICC Statute); extermination (Art. 7 [1] [b]); enslavement (Art. 7 [1] 
[c]); deportation or forcible transfer of population (Art. 7 [1] [d]); imprisonment (Art. 7 [1] 
[e]); torture (Art. 7 [1] [f]); sexual violence (Art. 7 [1] [g] of); persecution (Art. 7 [1] [h]); 
enforced disappearance (Art. 7 [1] [i); apartheid (Art. 7 [1] [j]), and ‘other inhumane acts’ (Art. 7 
[1] [k]). For all these acts, it must be proven beyond doubt that the perpetrator acted with intent. 
He/she must have acted with knowledge of the attack on the civilian population and must be fully 
cognizant that the action constituted a part of the attack.276 
In the ICC’s jurisprudence, then, emphasis has been placed on the criteria to be fulfilled 
for the possibility of persecution of crimes against humanity as defined by post-Second World 
War jurisprudence. This led to a narrower interpretation of the term “civilian.” Prior to the Rome 																																																								
274 See the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia jurisprudence in the section on 
judgment and sentencing at http://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers [03.03.2017].  
275 The judicial commentary on the article reads as the following: “2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: (a) "Attack 
directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack; Article 7(2)(a) clarifies that it needs to be a State or organizational policy. One Pre-
Trial Chamber declared that the term ‘State’ was self-explanatory but added that the policy did not have to be 
conceived ‘at the highest level of the State machinery’ [Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic 
of Kenya, ICC-01-09, 31 March 2010, para. 89, citing Prosecutor v Blaškić, ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 3 March 2000, 
para. 205]. Therefore, also a policy adopted by regional or local organs of the State could satisfy this requirement 
[Ibid.].” See https://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-hub/icc-commentary-clicc/commentary-rome-
statute/commentary-rome-statute-part-2-articles-5-10/ [03.03.2017] 
276 On the issue of intent, see G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2005), 
and G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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Statute, in some cases courts have interpreted the term “civilian” by incorporating hors de 
combat. However, both the ICTY and the ICC have moved towards a more restrictive 
interpretation of the term, potentially excluding members of the armed forces. This move may be 
regarded as regressive, going against the spirit in which the category of crimes against humanity 
was created and leading to a protection gap which crimes against humanity legislation was 
initially intended to close. In hindsight, the exclusion of members of the armed forces from the 
definition of “civilian” may have been a concession extended to increase the number of signatory 
states to the Rome Statute.277  
In summary, crimes against humanity pertain to both past and present atrocities, and two 
new concepts have been introduced into the international landscape as a result: the first one 
describes the violence, oppression, or persecution undertaken or allowed under law by the state 
itself (international crime component), and the second one encompasses the variety of responses 
to these acts of violence, oppression or persecution (transitional justice component). With the 
establishment of the ICC, the hope arose that common citizens, whose lives were marked by the 
violence of genocide, crimes of war, and crimes against humanity, have finally found a platform 
to ask for justice and the punishment of persons responsible for these atrocities. However, the 
truth is much more complicated, and justice for crimes against humanity is far more evasive than 
what a flat reading of the Rome Statute might suggest.  
A reexamination of the Tokyo Trial in comparison with the ICC reveals interesting 
characteristics concerning the evolution of international criminal law. The background of the 																																																								
277 As Payam Akhavan argues, if conduct is consistent with the laws of war, it may be hard to prove that it 
nonetheless falls under a category of crimes against humanity during an armed conflict. Initial legislation pertaining 
to crimes against humanity extended the protection of the laws of war to a perpetrator's co-nationals. Although this 
new category initially required a nexus with an international armed conflict, it is now an autonomous concept based 
on human rights law that criminalizes large-scale atrocities in both war and peacetime. However, crimes against 
humanity committed during an armed conflict continue to be shaped by the laws of war. There is substantial 
convergence between the normative core of “non-derogable” human rights and the minimum humane treatment 
standards in the Geneva Law. Meanwhile, there is considerable divergence with respect to combat operations where 
the Hague Law applies as lex specialis concerning human rights norms. Akhavan states that the ICTY jurisprudence 
clearly demonstrates some of the instinctive tensions inherent in reconciling human rights law with armed conflict. A 
notable instance is the Gotovina case, in which the Trial Chamber held that the laws of war do not apply to 
‘deportation’ qua crimes against humanity such that there is no distinction between forcible displacement of civilians 
in occupied territories as opposed to combat operations. If so, the temptation to dilute the laws of war through 
reclassification of the conduct as crimes against humanity should be resisted, because it may in effect lead to a 
decrease of protection for civilians in times of armed conflict. See P. Akhavan, ‘Reconciling Crimes Against 
Humanity with the Laws of War Human Rights, Armed Conflict, and the Limits of Progressive Jurisprudence,’ 
(2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 21. 
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Tokyo Trial was somewhat different from that of the Nuremberg Trial, and it had a unique 
jurisprudential context due to the declarations made specifically on Japan by the principal Allied 
Powers. Among the crimes provided for in Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter, crimes against peace, 
for which there was to be individual responsibility, were the most disputed legislation during the 
trials. Furthermore, war crimes and crimes against humanity were not clearly distinguished in 
either the Indictment or the Judgment of the Trial.278 Later discussions on international criminal 
law led to the necessity of posing some new questions on the position of peremptory norms in 
international law, which were not addressed during the Tokyo Trials. As a safeguard, the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties introduced the concept of jus cogens into international 
law.279 Still, the related category of erga omnes obligations remains one of the most problem-
laden areas in international law. The rule that every state has the right to define its international 
legal position remains in force. In this regard, the judgment of the English House of Lords in the 
Pinochet case is of special interest280, as the problem of criminal responsibility of individuals for 
grave violations of international law was trumped by the concerns about the personal immunity 
of heads of state, combined with another problem of (quasi-) universal jurisdiction within British 
administrative law.281 
																																																								
278 See M. Futamura, War crimes tribunals and transitional justice: the Tokyo trial and the Nuremburg legacy 
(Routledge, 2007), as well as Y. Tanaka, Tim McCormack, and Gerry Simpson, eds., Beyond Victor’s Justice? The 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Martinus Nifhoff, 2010) accessible at 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Yoriko_Otomo/publication/282818305_The_Decision_Not_to_Prosecute_the_
Emperor/links/561d6c5508aec7945a2532e9.pdf [03.03.2017]. 
279 See M. E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Brill, 2009); and C. 
Bassiouni, ‘International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes,’ (1996) 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63.  
280This judgment was given on 25 November 1998. The appeal was allowed by a majority of three to two and  
the House restored the second warrant of 23 October 1998. Of the majority, Lord Nicholls and Lord Steyn each  
delivered speeches holding that Senator Pinochet was not entitled to immunity: Lord Hoffmann agreed with their  
speeches but did not give separate reasons for allowing the appeal. Lord Slynn and Lord Lloyd each gave separate  
speeches setting out the reasons for their dissent. As a result of this decision, Senator Pinochet was required to  
remain in the UK to await the decision of the Home Secretary whether to authorise the continuation of the  
proceedings for his extradition under section 7(1) of the Extradition Act 1989.  
See the actual text of the judgment at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990115/pino01.htm 
[14.10.2017].		
281 Since this case, the impact (if any) of Spanish and British Court rulings on the Pinochet case on human rights 
progress in Chilean courts has been widely debated. Chilean judges chafe at the notion that foreign courts exerted 
any influence on them, arguing that, based solely on Chilean law and the evidence already before them, they were 
empowered to strip Pinochet of his immunity. Human rights critics, on the other hand, allege that the courts had been 
thoroughly immobilized for decades by the authoritarian legacy to which they were enjoined. No progress at all 
would have occurred were it not for the dramatic verdicts handed down in British courts for the rest of the world to 
see. The botched trial certainly achived this much: it shamed the Chilean Government into pressuring its own high 
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In a larger view, the emergence of legal rules governing criminal liability for genocide 
represents the response of society in the face of criminal phenomena that cannot be categorized 
otherwise. Punishing those responsible for committing such abominations led to a strong 
consecration of the criminality of mass killings at the hands of the state in international 
humanitarian law. Regulations concerning the methods and means of war, limiting or prohibiting 
the use of certain types of weapons and ammunition, and requiring protection of victims of armed 
conflict, a body of legislation known as war crimes, are another example. These may be treated as 
prerequisites for the criminalization of actions and deeds circumscribed by crimes against 
humanity. Unlike these two other prototypical international crimes—war crimes and genocide—
the proscription against crimes against humanity remains to be enshrined in a domestic 
constitutional context. While the former two are primarily used for international law purposes 
outside the domain of domestic jurisdiction, and historically in international courts, crimes 
against humanity relates to internal affairs of the state and, as such, requires additional steps to be 
taken at the national level to enable its local adjudication. As already discussed, the legislation 
pertaining to crimes against humanity has developed piecemeal, largely through the legal 
instruments and jurisprudence of various courts and tribunals established for adjudicating crimes 
that fall under this description. This process has yielded enduring normative difficulties as well as 
doctrinal ambiguities. Still, the law against crimes against humanity promises to fulfill a function 
that no other body of jurisprudence is or has been capable of in the context of human rights law 
or humanitarian law. 
 
II. COMPETING POLITICO-NORMATIVE VISIONS 
	 Despite the long struggle to reach a certain level of jurisdictional certainty, there are 
foundational normative questions that crimes against humanity legislation is not fully poised to 
answer, such as what makes an inhumane act a crime against humanity, or what is the distinct 
purpose of establishing such a category of crimes. This is the case despite the fact that, in the 
drafting of the Rome Statute, the differentiation of these crimes from war crimes and genocide 																																																																																																																																																																																			
courts to deliver a modicum of justice to the victims of Pinochet. See A. Bianchi, “Immunity versus human rights: 
the Pinochet case” (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 237.	
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needed to be fortified with substantive legal reasoning. 282  Furthermore, during the Rome 
Conference and in its aftermath normative discussions were always circumscribed by the 
conflicting political goals of individual states.283 At least in some cases, delegations were willing 
to compromise their vision of crimes against humanity if the alternative was to write off the 
entire prospect of a permanent international criminal court. As such, the Rome Conference 
produced a definition of crimes against humanity without an underlying or overtly expressed 
normative consensus. Instead, several normative visions of crimes against humanity competed, 
and continue to do so, for recognition in the law, jurisprudence, and scholarship related to these 
crimes. In order for the ICC or other national or international judicial bodies to be able to 
exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, it is essential that they be able to identify 
accurately and consistently situations in which these crimes have been committed. This is not 
exclusively a jurisdictional matter. As well, for judicial bodies to attribute individual criminal 
responsibility for such crimes without violating the principle of legality, they must have clear 
guidance of principles with reference to indictment, defense, and sentencing. This again is not 
simply a jurisdictional matter. Finally, in order for states to justify universal jurisdiction in 
addressing the commission of crimes against humanity, the scope of these crimes must be clearly 
defined. This is perhaps the only aspect of crimes against humanity with an exclusively 
legislative focus. Even there, however, politico-normative concerns determine the threshold for 
resorting to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, i.e., trying nationals of another country above 																																																								
282 Offering an ethical critique of the “right to punish,” Bill Wringe argues that the principles that govern 
extraterritorial punishment under international law advocate an interest-based theory of punishment rather than a 
normative one. Accordingly, competing justifications for legal punishment based on grounds of universality have to 
shed their exterior of consequentialist and deontological reasoning in order to substantiate the establishment of core 
legislation for practices of international criminal law. See B. Wringe, ‘Why punish war crimes? Victor’s justice and 
expressive justifications of punishment’ (2006) 25 Law and Philosophy 159. 
283 As another case in point, the institutional design of the new United Nations (UN) human rights organ, the Human 
Rights Council (HRC), was heavily contested between the North and the South: while the former opted for an 
exclusive body with a high membership threshold, the latter pressed for an inclusive structure and cooperative 
mechanisms. Consequently, the eventual institutional design of the HRC features a moderate membership threshold. 
This was the outcome of a discursive struggle between the North, which promoted the paradigm of civilization, and 
the South, which endorsed the paradigm of expansion and inclusion of differences. The same dynamic was in place 
during the drafting of the Rome Statute. On this issue, see Larry May’s work, including L. May, Genocide: a 
normative account (Cambridge University Press, 2010), L. May, Crimes against humanity: a normative account 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), L. May, and Stacey Hoffman, eds., Collective responsibility: Five decades of 
debate in theoretical and applied ethics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), as well as J. T. Kelly, “The moral 
foundations of international criminal law” (2010) 9 Journal of Human Rights 502, and Scheipers, Sibylle, 
“Civilization vs toleration: the new UN Human Rights Council and the normative foundations of the international 
order” (2007) 10 Journal of International Relations and Development 219. 
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and beyond the requirements of nationality-territoriality nexus. 
 Despite the heavily normative nature of the establishment, adoption, and application of 
definitions pertaining to crimes against humanity, declaring them as worthy of international law 
jurisdiction simply on the basis that they threaten the peace and security of the world was the 
central justification for the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment as reflected in the war nexus.284 In 
other words, it was the context of war that justified the adjudication of such crimes. Atrocities 
committed within a state with no connection to war were regarded as concerning that state alone. 
Indeed, some participants in the Rome Conference endorsed this perspective as late as 1998. 
With the Rome Statute’s coming into effect, however, a broader view of the peace and security 
rationale was adopted, which encompasses threats posed by internal armed conflict as well. This 
latter perspective also provided the legal basis for the establishment of the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter.285 Ultimately, the elimination of the requirement of any context of armed conflict from 
the definition trumped the peace and security rationale for these crimes. However, what is to 
replace the war nexus is yet to be determined. Crimes committed in peacetime by a sovereign 
state pose unique challenges for international law. The trials about the horrendous crimes of the 
Khmer Rouge provide an apt example. In justifying the continued detention of one of the 
defendants charged with crimes against humanity, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (‘ECCC’) echoed the old peace and security rationale. 286  The Rome Statute’s 
rationale, on the other hand, rests more on the gravity of the crimes than on any concrete threat to 
international peace and security. One of the most frequently invoked justifications for crimes 
against humanity is then that they “shock the conscience of humanity.”287  																																																								
284 M. Badar, “From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: defining the elements of crimes against humanity” 
(2004) 5 San Diego Int'l LJ 73; and G. Robertson, Crimes against humanity: the struggle for global justice (The New 
Press, 2013).  
285  For Chapter VII of the UN Charter’s full text, see http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/ 
[03.03.2017] Chapter VII pertains to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression.  
286 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia  
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,  
NS/RKM/1004/006 (2004), Art. 5, and, Nuon Chea (ECCC-002/14-08-2006), Provisional Detention Order, 19 
September 2007, para. 5.  
287 This language evokes the Martens’ Clause’s “laws of humanity” and “dictates of the public conscience” as stated 
in the Preamble to the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899). The clause states that 
“[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that 
in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection 
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 This view of crimes against humanity is duplicated in the human rights law framework, as a 
result of which crimes against humanity are depicted as particularly severe violations of 
fundamental human rights. According to this perspective, the purpose of the overarching category 
of crimes against humanity is to capture this seriousness through the requirements of a targeted 
“population” and a “widespread or systematic attack.” Proponents of the gravity rationale reject 
the notion that crimes against humanity should require a government or organizational policy or a 
discriminatory intent. Unfortunately, the difficulty with this latter normative vision is that it 
necessitates a scale for judging the gravity of the crime in question. This task is not a legitimate 
component of international law, much less of the legislation pertaining to crime against 
humanity. Nevertheless, the gravity of the crimes probably remains as the most pervasive 
normative justification for crimes against humanity legislation thus far.288  
 In addition to the peace and security argument and the justification from the gravity of the 																																																																																																																																																																																			
and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, 
from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.” See T. Meron, “The Martens Clause, 
principles of humanity, and dictates of public conscience” (2000) 94 The American Journal of International Law 78. 
288 The contours of the prohibition of crimes against humanity with reference to proceedings before the ICTY and 
deliberations at the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (ICC) prove that, because of the relatively contemporary status of these offenses under international law, a 
particular reference to the genesis and re-interpretation of the war nexus requirement is essential. The task at hand is 
identifying the elements of these offenses to distinguish them from “ordinary” municipal crimes (e.g., murder, 
assault or false imprisonment) and to justify the exercise of international jurisdiction that would otherwise be the 
subject of domestic adjudication. For the drafters of the Nuremberg Judgment, the war nexus originally served this 
purpose. The ICTY indeed devised an ingenuous solution to the problem of delimiting international jurisdiction and 
distinguishing crimes against humanity from “ordinary” crimes: the Trial Chamber did not require proof of a 
substantial link between the defendant's inhumane act and a state of war. Rather, the Chamber defined crimes against 
humanity in terms of the mens rea of the defendant and the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population. However, at the same time, a Trial Chamber of the Tribunal added additional elements to the 
definition of crimes against humanity, further complicating the definition and the Prosecution's burden of proof. The 
Appeals Chamber did overturn the Trial Chamber’s decision in this regard in the Tadic case (INTERNATIONAL 
DECISION: Prosecutor V. Tadic (Judgement). Case No. IT-94-1-A. 38 ILM 1518 (1999). International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, July 15, 1999). During the drafting of the Statute for the 
permanent ICC, both the ICTY Statute and the work of the Tribunal were used in drafting a consensus definition of 
crimes against humanity that will govern prosecutions before the new permanent international court. In this latter 
case, the drafters of the Rome Statute defined crimes against humanity with reference only to the existence of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and the mental state of the individual defendant. In so 
doing, they recognized that once abuse of civilians surpasses a particular threshold, the prescriptions of international 
law are activated and individual perpetrators can be held internationally liable for their acts of murder, assault, rape, 
or unlawful detention. As such, the principles guiding the contemporary codification of international criminal law 
has shifted considerably since the Nuremberg Judgment. Condemning injurious conduct and guaranteeing the 
accountability of individuals who subject others, including their compatriots, to inhumane acts, have found adequate 
codification. However, this does not eliminate the politico-normative concerns debated in the present work. See M. 
McAuliffe deGuzman, “The road from Rome: the developing law of crimes against humanity” (2000) 22 Human 
Rights Quarterly 335.  
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offenses, there is a third normative perspective that envisions crimes against humanity as offenses 
committed exclusively by state actors and, as such, the ethos of crimes against humanity emerges 
as punishment for the misuse of state power to attack rather than to protect.289 If so, it is the 
misuse and abuse of state power that renders these crimes non-justiciable in the domestic sphere, 
and the likelihood they will go unpunished mandates the availability of international jurisdiction. 
Proponents of this view promote the inclusion of a state policy element in the definition of crimes 
against humanity. In other words, only inhumane acts dictated by a state policy to commit such 
violence would merit designation as a crime against humanity. This vision relies heavily on a 
historically descriptive point of view. At the same time, it also reflects an overreliance on a rigid 
understanding of state sovereignty, especially concerning crimes perpetrated by regional alliances 
and non-state actors intervening in a civil war situation or during a military occupation. While it 
is true that domestic legal systems are generally unwilling or unable to prosecute either their own 
state or non-state actors, it is far from clear that international courts could easily step in to remedy 
the lacunae in adjudication of such crimes. In this regard, though the critique of state sovereignty 
is the strongest normative standpoint for the justification for crimes against humanity legislation, 
it falls short of identifying the political and institutional route required to try these cases in non-
domestic courts. This weakness is at least partially remedied by emphasis on the group harm 
elements of the crimes against humanity legislation.290 This requires that the targeted group share 
particular characteristics beyond the geographic proximity of its members, such as nationality, 
race, religion, or ethnicity.291 This brings the normative basis of crimes against humanity 
legislation close to the prohibition against genocide, although without the requirement of intent to 
destroy the group in whole or in part. The focus on group-based harm undoubtedly captures one 
of the primary features of crimes against humanity. Still, it lacks the large-scale and systemic 
attack component, and thus is weakened in its coverage.  																																																								
289 Both Cherif Bassiouni and William Schabas believe that the concept of crimes against humanity embraces only 
serious and egregious violations of human rights perpetrated by members of the state or state-like actors against their 
own citizens. See W. Schabas, “State Policy as an Element of International Crimes” (2008) 98 Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 959; M. Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court (Transnational 
Publishers, 2005), particularly pp. 151-5;, and R. Vernon, “What is a Crime Against Humanity?” (2002) 10 Journal 
of Political Philosophy 242.  
290 For David Luban, for example, the rationale for crimes against humanity lies in the interest all humans share ‘in 
ensuring people are not killed solely because of their group affiliation’. See D. Luban, “A Theory of Crimes Against 
Humanity” (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 139.  
291 Legal philosopher Larry May also suggests that group-based harm can justify attaching the label crimes against 
humanity. Supra note 32. 
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 In summary, only a composite analysis of existing approaches would provide a complete 
rationale and normative foundation for crimes against humanity legislation. Thus far, none of 
them is capable of redefining the applicable nexus, due to their emphasis on select elements or 
aspects of these crimes. No single vision of crimes against humanity has predominated in 
scholarship, law, or jurisprudence. Instead, from the Nuremberg judgment onwards, various 
approaches continue to compete for the provision of a solid basis for the adjudication of these 
crimes. The ILC has also experimented with different rationales. The 1954 Draft Code adopted a 
combination of state action and discrimination, while the 1991 Draft Code relied on seriousness, 
introducing the criteria of “systematic” or “mass scale.” Finally, the 1996 Draft Code combined 
the seriousness and state action requirements. All of the post-Nuremberg statutes pertaining to 
crimes against humanity have carried forward inconsistencies in their justifications. The ICTY 
resurrected the nexus with armed conflict; the ICTR required both seriousness and 
discrimination; the ICC injected a requirement of state—or at least group—action; the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) relied almost exclusively on seriousness; and the ECCC re-
injected the element of discrimination.292 The resultant lack of normative uniformity in the 
legislation has led to important doctrinal questions remaining perpetually unresolved. The current 
state of affairs also clearly indicates the importance of the politico-normative context of the 
adoption and usage of crimes against humanity legislation.  
 
III. ADJUDICATION, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW: LIMITS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Since 1945, there have been myriad kinds of prosecutions for crimes against humanity. In 
addition, charges for particular crimes against humanity are often brought in conjunction with 
charges for particular war crimes in a given prosecution.293 The changing nexus within which 
these prosecutions took place has already been discussed. In this section, this debate will be 
extended to address another issue, that of collective responsibility. As already stated, under 
Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, crimes against humanity require that a widespread or 
systematic attack on a civilian population be committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 																																																								
292 Supra note 239.  
293 A lengthy list of crimes against humanity cases can be found in the International Criminal Database (ICD) at 
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Cases/ByName [03.03.2017].  
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or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Here, both the term state policy and the 
interpretation of the term “organization” remain controversial. Normative and jurisprudential 
debates on the exact meanings of these terms lead to varying conclusions. Now, if these terms 
were understood as reflecting the ordinary meaning of the concept and including any association 
of persons with an established structure of political authority, perhaps the dubiousness of their 
coverage would erode. What is it, then, that makes such a wide and yet simple interpretation, 
associating responsibility with the state or state-like organizations and people acting on their 
behalf, so cumbersome a task? 
The missing link between the adjudication of crimes against humanity and a principled 
acknowledgement of their defining relationship with the acts of the state or state-like political 
authority harks back to the painful debate that emerged in the aftermath of the 1961 Eichmann 
trial in Jerusalem.294 The Eichmann trial is part of a series of Holocaust-related trials widely 
known and studied among Holocaust scholars, but which rarely enter into other debates on 
international criminal law. Specifically, Holocaust scholars have come to employ the tripartite 
concept of information, knowledge, and awareness for the determination of accountability based 
on the study of these of trials. Their work maintains that an awareness gap exist between 
information flow, its processing and interpretation into general knowledge, and the crystallization 
of the recognition of the consequences of criminal actions.295 In many ways, these trials directly 
contributed to building a consciousness about individual responsibility for state crimes. In this 
regard, in addition to the Nuremberg Trial, the trials of Jewish functionaries during the Holocaust 
(otherwise known as the Kapo trials), the Malkiel Gruenwald trial (otherwise known as the 
Kastner trial), and the Eichmann trial are cornerstones of legally inclined Holocaust research.296 
Insofar as the Holocaust was so aberrant and unprecedented an event, these trials also set a 
formidable precedent for tracing the complex paths that acts constituting crimes against humanity 
follow before they amount to mass destruction.  																																																								
294 With regard to the trials, the primary text referred to through out this section is H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem 
(Penguin, 1963).  
295 H. Yablonka, “The development of Holocaust consciousness in Israel: The Nuremberg, kapos, Kastner, and 
Eichmann trials” (2003) 8 Israel Studies 1.  
296  See the judgment of the Nuremberg trials at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf 
[03.03.2017]. For the case summaries of the remaining Holocaust trials, see M. J. Bazyler and Frank M. 
Tuerkheimer, Forgotten Trials of the Holocaust (NYU Press, 2015).  
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Unlike the way that ICTY or ICTR are examined, however, these trials are generally 
accepted as offering significant clues concerning the politico-normative underpinnings of crimes 
against humanity adjudication. The Nuremberg trials (1945-1947), which took place during the 
period immediately prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, were marked by the intensive 
diplomatic and military struggle against the British for Jewish independence in Mandate Palestine 
and the sanctification of national freedom. The "Kapo trials" and the Kastner trial (1948-1959) 
occurred during the transition from a pre-state community (Yishuv) to sovereign statehood, and 
took place under the circumstances of Israel’s War of Independence, mass immigration, and the 
building of the new state’s legal, economic, and security infrastructure. At this time, Israeli jurors 
also crafted the Law no. 64, "Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law" (1950), designed to 
bring Nazis and their proxies to justice through the quasi-legal practice of universal 
jurisdiction.297 The Eichmann Trial (1960-1967) came after these two initial sets of trials; it 
received public attention at a time of economic and political growth of the Israeli state and was 
used to make that state’s voice heard in international law. Holocaust scholars are not at all 
reticent in stating that each of these trials proceeded according to the national spirit and political 
environment of the times. Each trial was also associated with a specific agenda: the Nuremberg 
trials reflected the Allies’ victory over Nazi Germany, while the Kapo trials were an expression 
of the postwar mass immigration that put its stamp on Israeli society. The political dimension of 
awareness of the Holocaust as an international crime stood at the core of the Kastner trial. The 
Eichmann trial, on the other hand, focused on the operative meaning of state sovereignty, the 
privatization of the Holocaust, and the place of crimes against humanity in the wider context of 
World War II. In the post-Nuremberg era, we rarely associate political agendas with courts, 
tribunals and trials working towards the adjudication of crimes against humanity, but in the 1960s 
Holocaust scholars readily did so.  
The remainder of this section will focus on the interpretation of crimes against humanity 
during and in the aftermath of the Eichmann trial, and compare the context within which this 
debate took place with the current obsession on the universality of the Rome Statute.	According 
to Hannah Arendt, men are not capable of forgiving what they cannot punish, nor are they 																																																								
297 For the full text of the law, see the International Red Cross Archives at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-
nat.nsf/0/9D6164171FA43DE7C12575AE0034A437 [03.03.2017].  
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capable of adequately punishing what is unforgivable. Indeed, the most distinguishing feature of 
crimes against humanity, in the form that they were articulated during the Eichmann trials, is 
their imprescriptibility.298 The Arendtian claim concerning the impossibility of punishment in 
certain cases such as crimes against humanity is a clear indicator of the limits of positive law. 
This is what Arendt calls the “radical evil,” the inadequacy of existing sentences and punishment 
schemes in addressing the damage caused, both because of the unprecedented nature of the 
crimes committed and due to their extreme cruelty constituting an obstacle to the very idea of 
adequate punishment. According to Arendt, during the Eichmann trial, the monstrous scale of the 
Nazi crimes made any punishment provided for them inadequate and absurd. 299  More 
specifically, in Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship, Arendt stated that the horror of the 
Nazi crimes themselves, in their naked monstrosity, transcended all moral categories and 
exploded existing standards of jurisdiction.300 Hence she reached the conclusion that such crimes 
were neither adequately punishable nor suitable for forgiveness. In the same text, she further 
claimed that, contrary to the statements made by the Israeli courts, reasons such as the need for 
society to be protected against these kinds of crimes, the rehabilitation of criminals, the 
dissuasive force of the example, or measures of retributive justice would not bring a complete 
closure. Thus, our ordinary sense of justice does not suffice in the case of crimes against 
humanity. In her later work, however, in particular in The Human Condition, Arendt admitted a 
possible combination of forgiveness and punishment concerning crimes against humanity.301 
Still, she clearly stated that punishment is an alternative to forced forgiveness by the dictates of 
history and not its opposite.302 Punishment and forgiveness have one crucial aim in common: an 
attempt to put an end to something that without interference could lack closure and repeat itself 
endlessly. Forgiveness is not alien to politico-normative judgment. In other words, forgiveness 																																																								
298  For the full text of the proceedings of the Eichmann Trial, see http://remember.org/eichmann/charges 
[03.03.2017].  
299 See H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Meridian Books, 1962). Similar to Arendt, philosopher Vladimir 
Jankélévitch advocated the idea that if no proportional punishment can be found, the crime remains unforgivable. 
According to him, forgiveness died in the death camps. See V. Jankélévitch, L'imprescriptible. Pardonner? Dans 
l'honneur et la dignité (Le Seuil, 2015).  
300 H. Arendt, “Personal responsibility under dictatorship” in Responsibility and judgment (Schocken Books, 2003): 
17-48.  
301 H. Arendt, The human condition (University of Chicago Press, 2013). On the issue of forgiveness, also see J. 
Derrida, On cosmopolitanism and forgiveness (Psychology Press, 2001).  
302 This is despite the fact that confusion blurring the boundaries between forgiveness, apology, remorse, amnesty, 
and prescription remains problem laden. 
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could not be routinized, and it remains an exceptional act. Meanwhile, we make the opposite 
claim for crimes against humanity legislation: it is meant to be the supreme example of the 
regularization of international law and its universal codification.  
To think more deeply about this seeming antinomy, it is necessary to consider the context 
in which both the “globalization of forgiveness” and universal jurisdiction pertaining to crimes 
against humanity emerged.303 Especially in the Global South, but also in the heart of what were 
once the colonial empires, scenarios of repentance, confession and forgiveness have multiplied 
since the end of the Second World War. The Catholic Church’s request for forgiveness for the 
Second World War crimes, that of the Prime Minister of Japan to the Korean and Chinese, that of 
the Belgian government for not having acted on the genocide in Rwanda, the Chilean armed 
forces’ confession of their crimes, and the Canadian prime minister’s apology to the Native 
Peoples of Canada are just a few examples that were widely advertised in this avalanche of a 
desire for forgiveness for crimes that cannot be punished. This proliferation of scenes of regret 
and requests for forgiveness coincides with the renewed urgency of memorials, of self-
accusation, and of repentance. It appears to be a symptom of a larger yearning for redemption. As 
such, forgiveness and its solicitation are directly conditioned by the weight of guilt felt on the 
shoulders of the public. What is worrisome about this trend is not so much that we choose to 
remember and to give account for, but the simulacrum of healing that comes with repentance. 
This calculative aspect of public apology is indeed troubling, considering the egregious nature of 
the crimes committed that constitute the subject matter of historical apologies. Consequently, the 
general character of requests for forgiveness could be paramount to collective guilt rather than 
collective responsibility. Perhaps this is the point at which one re-embraces the strong reasoning 
for celebrating the legislation of crimes against humanity in international law. This particular 
branch of criminal jurisprudence emerges as the only chance for freeing societies from the 
repentance-redemption equation or its opposite, the total denial of heinous and most egregious 
crimes. A publicly appointed body could not forgive on behalf of either the direct victims of 																																																								
303  D. Levy and Natan Sznaider, “Forgive and not forget: Reconciliation between forgiveness and 
resentment” Taking wrongs seriously: Apologies and reconciliation (2006): 83-100, and R. Bernstein, ‘Derrida: The 
aporia of forgiveness?’ (2006) 13 Constellations 394. 
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egregious crimes or the public at large who suffered in relation to or as a result of such crimes. 
The State, its institutions and courts cannot force wronged peoples to forgive simply because an 
apology has been extended to them. Through the adjudication of crimes against humanity, on the 
other hand, the culpable person(s) is punished for unforgivable acts, and yet without being 
redeemed. That is a much stronger form of claiming responsibility for mass violence, rooted in 
politics, history and normative grounds, than what forgiveness alone could provide.304  
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the universal jurisdiction clause attached to them, much like forgiveness crimes 
against humanity have politico-normative foundations that determine the shape and content of 
their adjudication. And much like foregiveness for mass societal and political crimes, crimes 
against humanity legislation should not be normalized and become routine in international law. 
By the very nature of the crimes it attends, this body of legislation must remain exceptional and 
extraordinary, putting impossibility to the test, as if it interrupted the ordinary course of human 
temporality. Only then it would assume the power to intercept the flow of events that sanctify 
egregious crimes. This chapter opened with the question of what distinguishes crimes against 
humanity from other crimes. The answer to this question cannot be determined solely on the basis 
of the jurisprudential architecture of crimes against humanity legislation. Their distinct status has 
a deep connection with Hannah Arendt’s narration of the “banality of evil” with reference to the 
Eichmann trials. More than half a century ago, as Arendt witnessed the proceedings of the trial of 
Adolf Eichmann as one of the major figures in the organization and conduct of the Holocaust, she 
coined two separate terms: “radical evil” and the “banality of evil.” The latter term has since 
become something of a legal and normative conundrum. Arendt certainly did not mean evil had 
become ordinary, or that Eichmann and his Nazi cohorts had committed ordinary crimes. Rather, 
she was convinced that the crimes committed were so exceptional, they demanded a new 																																																								
304 Again for Arendt, forgiveness is a purely human experience, rather than having anything to do with divinity or 
sacred realms. Yet if forgiveness is a grand societal and historical gesture, the essence of which could not be 
captured by any existing, past or future law, it cannot sustain the presumption of symmetry between itself and 
adequate punishment. This is a very important debate in the transitional justice literature pertaining to mass societal 
and political crimes, which, however, falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. See P. Hazan, “Measuring the 
impact of punishment and forgiveness: a framework for evaluating transitional justice” (2006) 88 International 
Review of the Red Cross 19.  
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approach to legal judgment itself.305 Concomitantly, she offered several challenges to traditional 
conceptions of legal judgment. The first one was related to legal intention. The key question here 
is whether the courts had to prove that Eichmann intended to commit genocide in order for him to 
be convicted of the crime. Eichmann may well have lacked the required legal intention, insofar as 
he failed to even think about his acts as constitutive of a crime. Though Eichmann acted in full 
conscious capacity and without being affected by insanity, he lacked a mode of rationality that 
would yield intentionality. This observation led Arendt to claim that although national socialism 
was capable of making individuals implement policies that led to egregious crimes, it also 
equipped them with a cathartic state of assuming no responsibility for their actions and attributing 
no intentionality to their involvement in the making and sustenance of a criminal regime. In order 
to claim intentionality, one has to convey the capacity or knowledge needed to think reflectively 
about the consequences of one’s willful actions. The banality Arendt names thus corresponds to 
the inability to think and understand the weight of one’s own actions as a legal/political being. 
 Arendt was not trying here to establish an exceptional case for Israel or the Jewish 
people. Rather, she was trying to establish the backbone of a theory of crimes against humanity, 
one that would acknowledge the destruction of not just Jews, but also Catholics, Gypsies, gay 
people, communists, the disabled and the ill under the Nazi regime.306 In her thinking, the 
destruction and displacement of these populations on a categorical basis was an attack not only 
on those specific groups, but on humanity itself. As a result, Arendt objected to a specific nation-
state such as Israel conducting the trial of Eichmann exclusively in the name of its own 
population. She was cursed and almost crucified for her interpretation of the crimes of the Nazis. 
And yet her interventions also made it possible to talk about crimes against humanity above and 
beyond the Jewish case and the Holocaust. As the history of crimes against humanity legislation 
proves, after the particular historical juncture of the Eichmann trial it indeed became necessary to 																																																								
305 Since 1945, the gulf between the visibility of evil and the paucity of international legal resources for coming to 
grips with it has narrowed. However, in the works of the three post-Holocaust thinkers—Emmanuel Levinas, Hans 
Jonas, and Hannah Arendt—radical evil, a term originally coined by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, found 
a disturbing new meaning that casts a shadow over the gains of the jurisprudential successes of crimes against 
humanity legislation. On the meaning and implications of both “radical evil” and the “banality of evil”, see S. 
Neiman, Evil in modern thought: An alternative history of philosophy (Princeton University Press, 2015); and C. 
Card, The atrocity paradigm: A theory of evil (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
306 See J. Kristeva, Hannah Arendt. Vol. 1 (Columbia University Press, 2001); and R. Fine, “Crimes Against 
Humanity Hannah Arendt and the Nuremberg Debates” (2000) 3 European Journal of Social Theory 293. 
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devise new structures of international law that identify and propose punishment for crimes 
against humanity in a generic sense. There is a critical aspect of Arendt’s observations of the 
Eichmann trial, however, that fell aside in international jurisprudence. This aspect concerns the 
“banality” of such crimes, indicating that they were committed in the midst of daily life and 
routines, without opposition to their conduct, and without being named as a crime at the time that 
they were committed. In a sense, Arendt’s calling a crime against humanity banal allows us to 
conceptualize the socially accepted, routinized nature of these crimes which are committed 
mostly through policy enactments and, as such, without moral revulsion, political indignation or 
resistance. Thus, her interpretation of crimes against humanity calls for a new mode of political 
and legal reflection. Combined with the notion of radical evil, this opposition between the radical 
nature of the crimes committed and the ordinariness that their committal assumes invites us to 
rethink the almost mechanical reiteration of crimes against humanity legislation in the post-Rome 
Statute era of international law. 
Arendt was long blamed for trivializing the Holocaust and the Nazi crimes, as she was 
seen as attributing them to the Nazis’ and their collaborators’ simple failure to think before they 
act. For her, however, the degradation of thinking worked hand in hand with the systematic 
destruction of populations. What drew the ire of Jews at the time against Arendt’s interpretation 
of the Eichmann trials was also the fact that she showed the audacity to quarrel with the 
reasoning put forward at the trial, and confronted the Israeli courts in terms of their legal 
reasoning and conduct, though not their final verdict. She thought the trial needed to focus more 
on the acts that Eichmann committed, acts that left an imprint on the whole of humanity, not only 
the millions of European Jews who perished as a result. This is partly due to the fact that, similar 
to the legal philosopher Yosal Rogat before her, Arendt did not think that anti-semitism in 
Germany could be tried in a courthouse.307 She thus objected to the ways that Israel used the 
Eichmann trial to establish and legitimate its own legal authority and national aspirations as a 
Jewish state. She was severely displeased by the fact that Eichmann was made to stand for all of 
anti-semitism and for every Nazi. In her view, this was far too simplistic an interpretation of who 
Eichmann was and what he stood for. For Arendt, the Eichmann trial also necessitated a deep 																																																								
307 See Y. Rogat, “The Judge as Spectator” (1964) 31 University of Chicago Law Review 213. 
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critique of the idea of collective guilt, as well as a broader reflection on the historically specific 
challenges to collective and moral responsibility under dictatorships and authoritarian rule. 
Eichmann was guilty because he failed to take distance from the requirements that Nazi law and 
policy imposed upon him in a legal order that was impeccably legitimate on paper. Thinking 
about Eichmann in terms of his obedience, his lack of critical judgment despite his high status 
and rank, and his failure to think about the results of his actions, is the lasting of Arendt’s 
struggles with the Israeli courts at the time; and it is a very precious legacy indeed. 
There remains, then, a question that, from the legal point of view, has provoked several 
discussions and still lacks a definitive answer. It pertains to the politico-normative foundations of 
the adjudication of egregious crimes such as crimes against humanity. The first time we heard of 
acts that could be defined as crimes against humanity was 100 years ago, in 1915, when France, 
Great Britain and Russia used this concept in a diplomatic note. They were considering issuing a 
warning concerning the massacre of the Armenians at the hands of the Ottomans. The first legally 
sanctioned instance of the adjudication of this category of crimes appeared at the Nuremberg 
trials, set up to judge major Nazi criminals. At Nuremberg, it became a practical necessity to 
create a special category of crimes that did not fit into the conduct commonly classified as war 
crimes. This need to create a new framework was partly due to the fact that Germany’s 
persecution of its own citizens could not be classified as a war crime. It is true that a country’s 
expulsion, deportation, and mass murder of its own citizens was not unheard of in the history of 
war. However, the degree to which these acts were orchestrated and publicly condoned by the 
German state constituted a unique case. What was once considered unique, however, became a 
normalized category on its own, expected to deliver a sense of closure for societal morass and 
collective responsibility. Thus, the current normative framework that characterizes crimes against 
humanity as a frontal attack on plurality and human diversity in effect became a pro forma 
acknowledgement of the conducts that constitute crimes against humanity as part of the 
maintenance of the Westphalian system of sovereign statehood. Addressing	this	issue	requires	a	closer	study	of	the	way	that	international	law	has	played	out	in	court	and	litigation-based	accountability	measures	systems,	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	Global	South,	which	is	the	task	undertaken	in	the	next	chapter.	 	
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Chapter V. Through the Looking Glass: Hybrid Courts and International Criminal Law in the 
Global South 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers a critical analysis of a particular set of courts in international criminal 
law, which have emerged since 1990s. This constitutes a continuation of the debate over the 
limits of universal jurisdiction in the Global South that was covered in the first three chapters of 
the present work. These are the third generation of international criminal bodies and they are 
commonly known as hybrid courts. 308  The term has been used to address at least three 
jurisdictions, all of which were created between 1999 and 2001. They include the Crimes Panels 
of the District Court of Dili, The “Regulation 64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo and the Court 
for Sierra Leone.309 To this list, one should also add the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia,310 and the Extraordinary African Union Chamber in the Court of Senegal.311 Most of 
the earlier hybrid courts have closed their operations and thus it is possible to ascertain the 
outcomes of these trials. Indeed, there is significant merit in examining the promise or potential 																																																								
308 The first-generation courts are the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, while the second-generation courts are the 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC. See the Project on International Courts and Tribunals at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/courts/hybrid.html [25.04.2017].  
309 Cesare Romano, André Nollkaemper & Jann K. Kleffner, eds., Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
310 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) were established in 2004 through an agreement 
between the United Nations (UN) and the Cambodian government, as a means to address the crimes committed 
during the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. The ECCC encompasses both national and 
international elements in its structure, composition and jurisdiction. As with the other hybrid courts, it was expected 
to allow for a higher degree of participation by national actors, and to be better placed to produce long-lasting 
effects. The value added by the participation by various national actors in the judicial proceedings is indeed the key 
feature of the ECCC, despite concerns raised about the judicial independence of the court. See Elizabeth Bruch, 
"Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens” (2010) 28 BU Int'l LJ 1.  311	The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) was created by the African Union (AU) and Senegal in 2012, 
specifically to try former Chadian president Hissène Habré and his officials for atrocities allegedly committed during 
his time in office between 1982 and 1990. Habré was accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture. 
Some 40 000 surviving victims were directly represented in court and 92 witnesses and experts have recounted his 
fierce repression. The Habré trial represents the first trial by an African state of a former head of state of another 
African state. As the first internationalized tribunal to have been established with the involvement of the African 
Union, the EAC will also provide valuable insight into what a regional approach to internationalized justice may 
look like. It is also important to note the consistency of the EAC Statute with the nullum crimen sine lege principle. 
See Sarah Williams, “The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalise Courts: An African Solution to an 
African Problem?” (2013) 15 J of Int. Crim. J. 1139;  
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benefits of hybrid tribunals and courts for the future of international criminal law in the Global 
South as an alternative to the centrifugal model, which than leads to severe limitations in terms of 
the application of the universal jurisdiction model concerning crimes against humanity 
legislation. This chapter thus attempts to identify the distinct features of hybrid courts while 
acknowledging the variation amongst those that have thus far been created. It is true that 
literature in the field has moved away from analyzing or attempting to examine the promise of 
hybrid courts. Current commentaries on existing hybrid tribunals or courts are more inclined to 
examine specific issues or areas in the jurisprudence or statutes of hybrid courts. The approach 
presented in this chapter differs in that it focuses on the general promise of the mechanisms 
offered by hybrid courts as an important tool to be used for criminal adjudication in the Global 
South. To this end, the discussion presented in the following pages is divided according to three 
separate themes. These are: TWAIL [Third World Approaches to International Law] scholarship 
and discussions surrounding the Global/ North/South dichotomy and its effect on accountability; 
exploration of hybrid courts as viable mechanisms of criminal justice in cases of state criminality; 
and the ICC and the principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity.  
Like preexisting international judicial bodies, such as the International Court of Justice or 
the European Court of Human Rights, hybrid courts are composed of independent judges, 
working on the basis of predetermined rules of procedure, and rendering binding decisions. They 
are subject to the same principles governing the work of other international judiciaries, including 
but not limited to due process, impartiality and independence. Within this wider class of 
international courts, however, hybrid courts belong to a specific order. They are specialized 
criminal organs with a limited mandate, and prescribed to fulfill their function with reference to a 
predetermined time period. Meanwhile, although their goal is to sanction serious violations of 
international law, and in particular international humanitarian law and human rights law, they are 
part of transitional justice regimes rather than being an ongoing feature of the legal system in any 
of the given constituencies. Similarly, although they impose criminal penalties, their primary 
obligation is to the state and society within which they are situated, rather than addressing the 
international community. Akin to the ICTY and the ICTR, but unlike the ICC, they are ad hoc 
institutions, created as the result of singular political and historical circumstances. Still, similar to 
other international criminal institutions, in order to carry out their mission hybrid courts need to 
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rely on international jurisprudence and judicial assistance from states and international 
organizations, although their peculiar legal status gives an utmost priority to the bridging act of 
creating hybrid jurisprudence which resonates with the national legal system. In some cases, they 
are part of the judiciary of a given country, while in others they have been grafted onto the local 
judicial system through the intermediary action of international bodies. One constant feature they 
exhibit, however, is that their jurisdictional portfolio is mixed, incorporating international and 
national features.312 This chapter argues that on the critical issues of criminal accountability and 
responsibility, hybrid courts exhibit a unique promise for states and societies in the Global South. 
The literature on international criminal law has already welcomed hybrid courts as a new 
type of international crimes courts, asserting that they have the benefits, while avoiding the 
drawbacks, of both purely international and purely domestic trials. A closer examination of 
current examples of hybrid courts, however, in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Cambodia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, reveals something else as well. Attributing a promise to hybrid courts 
as a fixed category has raised false expectations, as each court has fundamental differences and 
distinct features. I will argue that this variation is endemic to any genuine transitional justice 
project, and should be welcomed rather than shunned. Hybrid domestic-international tribunals 
and courts offer an important new angle to institutional approaches to international law and to 
transitional justice, whose formulatation is often given by donor institutions in the Global North. 
The processes by which societies provide accountability and reconciliation for mass atrocity in 
their own terms is often overlooked. Hybrid courts are courts in which both the institution and the 
applicable law consist of a blend of international and the domestic jurisprudence. In many cases, 
foreign judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by 
teams of local lawyers working with those from other countries. At the same time, the judges 
apply domestic law that has been reformed to include international standards. Furthermore, these 
courts have developed in an ad hoc way, the result of on-the-ground innovation rather than grand 
institutional design, which carries the seed of a genuine political involvement from within. 
Typically, they have emerged in post-conflict situations to address cases involving mass atrocity, 
usually where no politically viable full-fledged international tribunal exists, as in East Timor or 																																																								
312 Etelle R. Higonnet, "Restructuring hybrid courts: local empowerment and national criminal justice reform" (2005) 
23 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 347. 
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Sierra Leone, or where an international tribunal exists but cannot cope with the sheer number of 
cases, as in Kosovo or Cambodia. Yet despite these features, they have often been marginalized 
as yet another failed project of the Global South. The truth is more complicated, and worthy of 
real attention. 
 
I. MAPPING RESPONSIBILITY FOR MASS ATROCITIES 
Theories of transgovernmental and transnational networks, when applied to cross-border 
regulation regimes in areas such as international finance, antitrust regulation, environmental 
protection, or securities law, have steady purchase amongst international law scholars. One area 
to which this type of theorization has not yet been fully applied, however, is international 
criminal law.313 Until recently, international criminal law had not been conceptualized within the 
framework of the transnational networks that have caught our attention in other legal fields.314 
With few exceptions, the predominant conception has been that international criminal law is 
enforced primarily through a universalized idiom and with a top-down approach. However, as 
critical debates in the area of human rights scholarship amply demonstrate, this picture is far from 
accurate. Human rights lawyers, activists, and advocates as well as investigators, prosecutors, and 
judges dealing with specific categories of crimes have long been acting in degrees of 
collaboration or consultation, with their peers across borders and with their counterparts at other 
national or international courts and regulatory bodies.315 In the following pages, some of these 
developments are evaluated in reference to hybrid courts dealing with cases of mass atrocities. 
Providing a conceptual framework within which transnational networks are not seen as an 																																																								
313 As an exception, see Jenia I. Turner, "Transnational networks and international criminal justice” (2007) 105 
Michigan Law Review 985. The theory of transgovernmental networks Turner uses describes how government 
officials make law and policy on issues of global concern by coordinating across borders, but without legal or official 
sanction. Banking, antitrust, environmental protection, and securities law are sample areas in this regard.  
314 Ibid at 1020-1025. 
315 For select recent debates on how international human rights law “works,” see Kurt Mills & David Jason Karp, 
eds. Human Rights Protection in Global Politics: Responsibilities of States and Non-State Actors (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015); Alexandra Huneeus, "Human Rights between Jurisprudence and Social Science" (2015) 28 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 255; William Armaline, Davita S. Glasberg & Bandana Purkayastha, eds., The Human 
Rights Enterprise: Political Sociology, State Power, and Social Movements (John Wiley & Sons, 2015); Courtney 
Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through 
International Law (Oxford University Press USA, 2013); Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 
The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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anomaly, in the context of a nexus between international human rights law and international 
criminal law, is essential in this regard. International human rights law, which in essence 
embodies a constant mediation between claims about the core values of justice and dignity, on 
the one hand, and hard-fought contingent politico-historical battles, on the other, is in particular 
need of a richer exchange between the North and South. As amply illustrated by TWAIL [Third 
World Approaches to International Law] scholarship, political geography has much to contribute 
to the critical study of international law, above and beyond connecting rights discourse with 
particular contemporary justice agendas.316 As TWAIL scholars declare, for instance, human 
rights struggles, even when they are regarded as part of independence struggles, reveal a global 
gap of consistent practices of violence, which necessitated current human rights practices in the 
first place.317 The ways that responsibility for systemic and structural violence has been claimed, 
denied, ascribed, enacted, or avoided have cartographical anchorage. The North takes the credit 
for creating discourse and jurisprudence, while the South carries the burden of the heaviest 
violations and at the same time is singled out as the worst violator. We need a new and more 
evocative lens for understanding the place of human rights law and its variants, within a global 
framework of emancipatory politics.318 As Vijay Prashad puts it ever so succinctly, “The Third 
																																																								
316 Here, I rely heavily on the following sub-section of TWAIL scholarship: Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki 
Nesiah (Eds), Bandung, Global History and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); K. Mickelson, “Taking stock of TWAIL histories” (2008) 10 International Community Law 
Review 355; Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Critical Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL): theory, 
methodology, or both?" (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 371; M. Khosla, “The TWAIL Discourse: 
The emergence of a new phase” (2007) 9 International Community Law Review 291; Obiora Chinedu Okafor, 
"Newness, imperialism, and international legal reform in our time: a TWAIL perspective” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 171; Makau Mutua & Antony Anghie, “What is TWAIL?" (2000) Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, The 
American Society of International Law.  317	See Anthony Anghie, “Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the 
Mandate System of the League of Nations,” (2002) 34 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 513, at 517; Jose Manuel Barreto, ed. Human rights from a Third World perspective: critique, history and 
international law (Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013), in particular his introductory essay, as well as Amy Maguire, 
“Contemporary Anti-colonial Self-Determination Claims and the Decolonisation of International Law,” (2013) 22 
Griffith Law Review 238, and Amy Maguire & Jeffrey Mcgee, “A Universal Human Right to Shape Responses to a 
Global Problem? The Role of Self-Determination in Guiding the International Legal Response to Climate Change,” 
(2017) 26 RECIEL 54. Maguire and Mcgee contribute to the existing debate on the relevance of human rights 
struggle in the Global South in the specific context of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. They focus on 
the foundational principle of the self-determination of peoples as a collective human right, which has emerged in the 
context of movements of decolonization and emancipation of oppressed peoples. In their belief, self-determination 
might offer an alternative logic of duty on high-emitting States to the plight of populations who find their territories 
under threat from anthropogenic climate change.	
318 Nicole Laliberté, "Geographies of Human Rights: Mapping Responsibility" (2015) 9 Geography Compass 57. 
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World was not a place. It was a project.”319 TWAIL scholarship both specifies and expands upon 
the sense in which Third World or Global South was never a place per se. In the same spirit, in 
the following pages the Global South, as well as the North-South divide, are treated as part of a 
grand political project of some elusive universal legal order, which is subject to constant 
reinvention. Here, the emphasis will be put on alternative lineages of the Global South, outside 
the realm of state-based narrations of post-colonial politics, as explicated in the methodology 
section of the Introduction to this work. Indeed, it is essential to foreground aspects of the North-
South divide that hinge upon the premise of intertwined regimes of accumulation, regulation, 
culpability, and responsibility. Only then can we truly challenge the top-down approach—the 
siren call of international human rights law and international criminal law in the Global South—
and offer something more palatable in its place, based on a transnational politics of rights 
struggles, accountability for mass crimes, and substantive human emancipation.  
A. More Than Each unto His Own -- Hybrid Courts in the Global South 
This chapter singularly focuses on the distinctive characteristics of regional, sub-regional 
and hybrid courts operating outside of Europe. Their operations clearly suggest that in terms of 
universal jurisdiction and the application of international law, the Global South is not an 
unwilling participant at best and an insignificant addendum at worst. Tailgating TWAIL 
scholarship, I strongly argue otherwise, and the examples chosen here amply illuminate the 
reasons for insisting upon alternative vantage point.  
To begin with, there is a growing number of new international courts, tribunals, and quasi-
judicial review bodies that exercise compulsory jurisdiction over states parties which are located 
not only located in the North but also in the Global South. Secondly, established hybrid and 
international tribunals, despite all their failings, trials and tribulations, have been steadily 
expanding their authority over a wide range of legal actors, including but not limited to states. 
Many of these courts owe their strength to their limited-subject-matter mandates and conscribed 
geographic and chronological reache. Thus, the argument that the North subjects the Global 
South to neo-colonialism via international criminal law is nullified to a large degree. The 
majority of these courts and tribunals, in fact, attend to regional affairs and internal conflicts that 																																																								
319 Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South (London: Verso, 2012).  
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entail massive human rights violations. In other words, they constitute a new terrain for the 
establishment of fragmented and yet reasonably operational accountability regimes in the Global 
South. There is, it’s true, grounds for fear of a growing trend towards the judicialization of 
politics at a global scale in this regard. We certainly cannot take it on faith that creating new 
international courts or hybrid tribunals will necessarily provide solutions to deep-seated societal 
and political problems. Rather, the role of law in various struggles for social and political justice 
in the Global South, some of which take are waged against post-colonial states themselves by 
their own citizens, should be the focus here. The case of hybrid courts signal the emergence of 
alternative forms of international law, ones which call for new legal theories capable of capturing 
the potential of, and the tensions endemic to, counter-hegemonic forms of globalization.  
Although the legitimacy of domestic courts is no doubt more established than that of their 
international or hybrid counterparts, the risks of depending solely on domestic adjudication at 
historical junctions in relation to transition from civil war, ethnic cleansing, genocide, occupation, 
etc. are far greater than resorting to divergent interpretations of international criminal law in these 
settings. Furthermore, third-generation courts are often regional in scope and thus cover both 
states and subterranean or non-state actors within their jurisdiction. This is yet another advantage 
they have over domestic courts. They have the ability to contextualize a given conflict, a most 
urgent need in the cases of mass political violence in Africa, the Balkans, or South East Asia. 
Equally importantly, while traditional international courts have had shallow—i.e. optional—
jurisdictional powers, hybrid courts tend to have a much deeper jurisdictional basis that leads to 
compulsory jurisdiction, since they act over a limited number of issues in conjunction with a set 
number of parties.  
Thus far, perhaps, international courts and hybrid tribunals have made only limited 
contributions to the resolution of high-politics disputes. At the same time, concerning broader 
trends in international adjudication, it is safe to suggest that based on the increasing number of 
rulings produced by regional tribunals and hybrid courts in Africa, Latin America, and Eurasia, 
there is an emerging litigation pattern that may be significantly different from those of 
international or European courts.320 These rulings span a broad range of subjects, including 																																																								
320 The Andean Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, the 
Caribbean Court of Justice, the Court of Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for the Harmonization of 
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customs, taxes, and tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, as well as criminal proceedings. In 
these alternative settings of international jurisdiction, national as well as international judges, 
administrative officials, and private parties participate in litigation. The symbiotic relationship 
between international and national law exemplified by these courts and tribunals also has a 
broader significance. Even when (national) law proves moot, a distinctive group of sub-state 
actors including human rights movements, NGOs, political movements, and judges, can serve as 
conduits to bypass the indifference or even the resistance of governmental institutions to 
delivering justice where (though rarely when) it is due. Alas, such is the nature of criminal law.  
II. THE CLARION CALL OF DOMESTICATED UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
One of the more recent and noteworthy episodes in international criminal law pertaining 
to a rising demand for hybrid, as opposed to centralized, courts is the Darfur crisis. In July 2008, 
the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague sought the indictment 
of the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, on charges of genocide and war crimes. 321 
Subsequently, foreign diplomats, regional leaders, and many Sudanese activists, including 
members of the political opposition in the country, expressed divided opinions in their evaluation 
of this indictment. It is true that some supported the idea of prosecuting President Bashir and his 
leading cadres for the human catastrophe they are alleged to have inflicted on Sudan’s western 
province of Darfur.322 At the same time, a growing number of NGOs, political groups, and legal 
scholars in the Global South were not comfortable with the indictment of a serving president by 
an international court situated in Europe due to two factors: its neo-colonialist optics, and the 
indictment’s possible negative effects on the Sudanese society. For instance, human rights circles 																																																																																																																																																																																			
Business Laws in Africa, and the East African Community Court of Justice are some of the leading examples of non-
European regional courts with a strong human rights-related track record of rulings.   
321 For the text of the ICC indictment as well as the text of the April 2009 arrest warrant, please see the relevant 
documents at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/0EF62173-05ED-403A-80C8-F15EE1D25BB3.htm [15.03.2017]. 
Specifically, the indictment indicates that the Sudanese President is suspected of being criminally responsible, as an 
indirect co-perpetrator, for intentionally directing attacks against a selected part of the civilian population of Darfur, 
Sudan, and, murdering, exterminating, raping, torturing and forcibly transferring large numbers of civilians, and 
pillaging their property. This is the first warrant of arrest issued for a sitting Head of State by the ICC. 
322 For a general global survey regarding the perception of the indictment, see the IPS poll results published in July 
2009 at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47678 [15.03.2017]. The survey results indicate that the publics in four 
majority Muslim and African nations, contrary to the positions of their governments, largely approved of the 
indictment of President Bashir by the International Criminal Court. This is despite the fact that many fellow African 
and Muslim leaders have supported Bashir and argued that the indictment was politically motivated.  
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repeatedly stated that a vindictive Bashir could resort to a number of violent strategies in 
response to the ICC’s indictment, which could indeed make the situation in Sudan worse than 
before.323 They argued that President Bashir’s repertoire of actions could include ending the 
already fragile peace process in Darfur, expelling UN troops from the region, and retarding the 
implementation of a peace agreement between his government and the former rebels in south 
Sudan.324 Differences in interpretation persisted when in April 2010 President al-Bashir won 
Sudan's first multi-party elections in 24 years, despite the fact that observers criticised the 
election as falling short of international standards. Many opposition parties withdrew from the 
race, alleging widespread vote rigging and intimidation. 
In the light of the developments and concerns exemplified by the case of Sudan, it is 
timely to ask whether a better mechanism of international criminal law could be envisaged to 
hold individuals responsible for the type of atrocities perpetrated in Darfur, and elsewhere in the 
Global South, without jeopardizing the safety of local populations or creating an aura of 
neocolonial moral and legal superiority. This inquiry is linked with the larger question that runs 
through this entire dissertation: how meaningful and beneficial is it for crimes against humanity 
to be subject to universal jurisdiction if the local constituency, including the victims’ groups, 
rejects or disagrees with the charges, methods of trial, or both? More specifically, what are the 
implications of trials held in an international court, removed from the original locale where the 
crimes were committed, rather than being deemed as an internal affair of the societies in 
question? In Sudan, for instance, in response to significant worries about escalation of violence in 
the aftermath of the ICC indictment against President al-Bashir, Sadıq al-Mahdi, the country’s 
																																																								
323  On this issue, see the manifesto of Doctors without Borders at 
http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=3516&cat=op-eds-articles [15.03.2017]. Their worry 
was directly related to the fact that with attacks on remaining aid workers increasing, the Sudanese president had 
declared that all international humanitarian aid organizations must leave the country in the foreseeable future, thus 
further endangering the delivery of food, water and medical care to millions of people in the war-scarred region. 
These expulsions are seen as a reprisal against groups suspected of being involved with the ICC investigations as 
well as against governments that support the indictment of President al-Bashir. 
324 Elections were swiftly delayed in the aftermath of the ICC indictment. Under the 2005 peace deal to end years of 
war in the south, these elections were supposed to be held in 2009. The SPLM, former rebels from the south, were 
expected to field a candidate against President Omar al-Bashir. In 2010, there were six elections: national, 
presidential, and parliamentary, the south Sudanese presidency, state governors, the southern parliament and state 
assemblies. The polls were Sudan's first democratic elections in more than two decades. See BBC news at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7980032.stm [15.03.2017].  
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most prominent opposition politician, urged for a “third way” solution.325 Like many in human 
rights circles, he believed that an ICC indictment of President Bashir would lead to further chaos 
in Sudan.326 He did not agree that hauling the Sudanese president to the Hague would achieve 
much in terms of the crimes in Darfur. Instead, he suggested setting up an independent “hybrid” 
court for Darfur, which would have both Sudanese and international judges, and would sit in 
Sudan as opposed to Europe, the land of ex-colonial powers. The idea of mixing national and 
international jurisprudence and legal procedures, and of holding difficult trials for societal and 
international crimes on home turf, has already been accepted in Sierra Leone and Cambodia, 
among others.327 It is true that these two examples have thus far yielded only mixed success. Still,  
the overall prospect of hybrid courts possesses both legal and political attractiveness. In the case 
of Sudan, for instance, a hybrid or “internationalized” court could dispense justice close to the 
scene of the crime, and at the heart of the society directly affected by the atrocities committed. 
Additionally, if such a special court were deemed to be a genuine, impartial attempt to obtain 
justice, the ICC could defer its indictment of President Bashir under Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute.328 Finally, a hybrid court with a strong domestic element would have the strength to 
counter the furious denounciations of the ICC charges and indictments as a Western imperialist 
plot against the Bashir government and its supporters.  
 Based on the understanding of these potential gains for transitional justice as a societal 
project with a strong historical dimension, rather than a package of mechanized solutions, the 
remainder of this chapter will examine past examples of hybrid courts, as relevant cases for 
emerging models of transnational justice and for the dissemination of international criminal law 																																																								
325 Al-Mahdi had been the head of the Umma party as well as the last democratically elected prime minister in 1986 
before being toppled by a coup. He is also the spiritual leader of the powerful Ansar sect in the region. For his 
political profile, see his biography published by the Club of Madrid, an independent pro-democracy consortium at 
http://www.clubmadrid.org/cmadrid/index.php?id=397 [15.03.2017].  
326 For a sample of these arguments, see http://africanarguments.org/2009/03/the-icc-sudan-and-the-crisis-of-human-
rights/ [15.03.2017]. African Arguments Online is a counterpart to the African Arguments book series, edited jointly 
by Alex de Waal and Richard Dowden, published by Zed Books in the U.K. and Palgrave Macmillan in the U.S. 
327  For a detailed account of the jurisprudence of these hybrid courts, see the UN documents at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HybridCourts.pdf [15.03.2017]. 
328 The Rome Statute establishing the ICC contains a provision, Article 16, which allows the UN Security Council to 
pass a resolution (under its Chapter VII authority) to defer an ICC investigation or prosecution for a renewable 
period of 12 months. Article 16 states in full that "No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the 
Council under the same conditions." For a debate on the use of Article 16 of the Rome Statute in the Darfur context, 
see http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/15/q-article-16 [15.03.2017].  
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jurisdiction in a genuine fashion. The fragmented nature of the international legal regime of 
accountability—despite the post-ICC solidification of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction for 
international crimes—is not something to be shunned but a development to be embraced. The 
benefits of the limited application of universal jurisdiction, as endorsed by the hybrid courts that 
have emerged under the guidance of or in consultation with the ICC during the last decade, are 
yet to be explored. Legal literature has already welcomed hybrid courts as a new type of 
international crimes courts, asserting that they could avoid the drawbacks of purely international 
and purely domestic trials.329 Upon closer examination of the recent examples of hybrid courts in 
Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it becomes clear, 
however, that the current set of hybrid courts differ from one another in critical respects. To 
attribute promise to the category of hybrid courts as a whole may be to raise false expectations. A 
more realistic approach to major new developments in international criminal law, such as the idea 
of universal jurisdiction with reference to select categories of crimes, may be to evaluate hybrid 
courts as part of a large continuum of fragmented practices, which include truth and 
reconciliation commissions, local adaptations of the Rome Statute, and expansive application of 
human rights mechanisms to improve general standards of societal responsibility in the event of 
mass crimes. There is no doubt that hybrid mechanisms blending international and domestic 
elements have the capacity to deliver improved justice measures—especially when they are 
undertaken via local judicial reforms, thus initiating a process of serious commitment to legal 
accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity in post-atrocity states.  
Furthermore, at the institutional level, the claim of universal jurisdiction put forward by 
the ICC has severe limitations. To begin with, many crimes currently ailing post-conflict 
societies cannot be tried by the ICC, since conflicts which occurred before the Rome Statute went 
into effect, or ongoing conflicts in non-signatory nations, lie beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Secondly, even when the ICC has jurisdiction over a set of crimes, its mandate is primarily 																																																								
329 See, for instance, Laura Dickinson, “The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case 
of Kosovo” (2003) 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 1059; as well as her “Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, 
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law” (2002) 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1407 and “The 
Promise of Hybrid Courts” (2003) 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 295. Also see Abdul Tejan-Cole, “The Complementary and 
Conflicting Relationship Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission” 
(2003) 6 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 139; Suzanne Katzenstein, “Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East 
Timor” (2003) 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 245; and Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).   
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limited to calling for the involvement of a handful of senior figures. In other words, societal 
responsibility is not within the reach or the mandate of the Court with reference to the overall 
process of transitional justice. Last but not the least, the ICC has thus far entertained a binary 
approach to societal crimes, either providing wholly international justice or leaving the conflict to 
local post-atrocity courts, an approach that often goes against ensuring genuine accountability.  In 
the light of these concerns, a closer look into the promise of a fragmented embrace of universal 
jurisdiction in the form of hybrid courts, and what they entail for both the current project of 
international criminal law, must be synchronized with a tally of local endeavours for transitional 
justice and societal accountability for mass atrocities. Going back to the case of Sudan, on 13 
October 2016 the African Union Commission (AUC) launched a campaign to “restore the dignity 
of women and to ensure accountability in South Sudan.”330 This campaign was intended to lobby 
for accountability and an end to the atrocities that have disproportionately affected women in 
South Sudan. It was organized in solidarity with the women of South Sudan, and spearheaded by 
the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace, and Security in Addis Ababa.331 The outcomes of the 
campaign were to be presented to high-ranking South Sudanese officials. While accountability 
has been touted as a key element for peace and reconciliation in South Sudan, it remains to be 
seen whether the envisaged hybrid court for South Sudan would be able to try sitting leaders and 
senior government officials who had involvements with the atrocities in the country.332 Human 
rights reports on the South Sudanese conflict consistently point out that the country’s leaders bear 
responsibility for the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in the country, and 
have in fact benefited from these offenses.333 Thus any real effort to ensure accountability in 																																																								
330 See the African Union report on the launch at https://www.au.int/en/newsevents/31469/press-conference-launch-
african-union-campaign-restore-dignity-women-and [15.03.2017].  
331  For the full manuscript of Bineta Diop, see http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/40-5676-static-bineta-diop 
[15.03.2017].  
332  Concerning the latest efforts for establishing a South Sudanese hybrid court, see 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/02/28/the-hybrid-court-for-south-sudan-looking-for-a-way-forward-part-2/ 
[15.03.2017]. Also see Nicki Kindersley & Oystein Rolandsen, “Briefing: Prospects for Peace and the UN Regional 
Protection Force in South Sudan,” (2016) African Affairs, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adw067 
[14.10.2017] South Sudan is a country in transition that is still struggling with the consequences of the 50-year civil 
war as well as resurging internal ethnic conflict. The most recent ethnic clashes in South Sudan are evidence that one 
of the main challenges for the newly independent country in its continued effort in state building is the 
implementation of an accountability regime for organized political violence in the midst of more than 60 different 
ethnic groups. 
333 These include key reports by the AU Commssion of Inquiry Report at http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/final-
report-of-the-african-union-commission-of-inquiry-on-south-sudan [15.03.2017], the Human Rights Watch Report 
on Sudan at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/sudan [15.03.2017], the United Nations 
	 165	
South Sudan needs to engage the role of the South Sudanese leaders. Efforts continue at the legal 
affairs department of the AUC to mobilize funds and finalize the memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) for the establishment of the hybrid court. This is in line with the Agreement on the 
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed by former vice-president Riek 
Machar and President Salva Kiir.334 According to the peace agreement and the MoU, the mandate 
and the jurisdiction of the proposed hybrid court should have been finalized within six months of 
the formation of the government of national unity, which took place in April 2016. The hybrid 
court was to be operational within 12 months of that date, April 2017. However, the ongoing 
violence, and the replacement of Machar with Taban Deng Gai as vice president of the 
government of national unity, are stalling this process, and attention is instead focused on ending 
the most recent crisis. As it is, the authorities refuse to execute arrest warrants issued by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). The security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, Blue Nile, 
and South Kordofan states remains dire, with widespread violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law. Furthermore, evidence points to the use of chemical weapons by 
government forces in Darfur. The rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful 
assembly are repeatedly and arbitrarily restricted and critics and suspected opponents of the 
government have been regularly subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention and other violations. 
These “internal hindrances” aside, a crucial question remains: will the AU Assembly of heads of 
state and government—its highest decision-making body—draw up legislation for a hybrid court 
that enables it to try leaders and senior government officials? For instance, Chapter 5 of the peace 
agreement stipulates that the hybrid court “shall not be impeded or constrained by any statutes of 
limitations or the granting of pardons, immunities or amnesties. No one shall be exempt from 
criminal responsibility on account of their official capacity as a government official, an elected 
official or claiming the defense of superior orders.”335 Meanwhile, the AU remains in favor of 
immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. This development came after 																																																																																																																																																																																			
Human Rights Council Report on Sudan at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoHSouthSudan/Pages/Index.aspx [15.03.2017] and Amnesty 
International Report on Sudan at https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/sudan/report-sudan/ [15.03.2017].  
334  For the full text of the Agreement signed on 17 August 2015, see 
https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_proposed_compromise_agreement_for_south_sudan_conflict.p
df [15.03.2017].  
335 Also see the legal opinion expressed in the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights document on the 
issue at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/tunisia/247346?download=true [15.03.2017] 
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the ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant for President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan in 2009. The AU’s 
new immunity stance led to the inclusion of an immunity clause in Article 46A of the 2014 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights.336 
 In effect, prior to the Sudan issue, the AU has fought desperately, in the case of Kenya 
and Sudan, for the lifting of ICC charges against leaders in office. The AU also recently called 
for an inquiry into a collective withdrawal from the ICC based on the differences over immunity 
concerns in Africa.337 To date, Burundi, South Africa and The Gambia have already announced 
their withdrawal from the ICC.338 The dilemma is that, according to the peace deal, the same 
leaders who would have to be tried by the hybrid court are meant to occupy leadership positions 
in the transitional government of national unity. The South Sudanese deal keeps South Sudanese 
leaders in the positions they occupied before the war started. The dynamics among the member 
states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), who are mediating in the 
South Sudan conflict, indicates that the question of leadership accountability is a contested issue. 
Hence, there is not enough regional support for the issue to deter South Sudanese leaders from 
orchestrating further violent atrocities. The hybrid court for South Sudan could thus end up 																																																								
336 This new article is to replace the 2008 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
which had no immunity clause. For the immunity clause, see the relevant AU document and the full text of the article 
at http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/07/02/african-union-approves-immunity-for-heads-of-state-in-amendment-to-
african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights-statute/ [15.03.2017] Accordingly, “no charges shall be commenced or 
continued before the court against any serving AU head of state or government or anybody acting or any entitled to 
act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.” 
337  See the ICTJ document on the AU’s request for collective withdrawal at https://www.ictj.org/news/au-
withdrawal-icc-non-starter [15.03.2017].  
338 The treaty leading to the Rome Statute (2002) had 124 member states including 34 African states, which 
represents the largest regional bloc of member states. Since then, many African countries have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Court and have accused it of bias. Gambia announced on October 25, 2016 that it would 
withdraw from the ICC, calling the Court an “International Caucasian Court” for the persecution and humiliation of 
people of color, especially Africans. Similarly, Burundi labeled the ICC as a “Western tool to target African 
governments.” Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni called the ICC “useless,” and praised South Africa’s decision 
to leave. Namibia is also reconsidering its membership. Additionally, the African Union earlier this year said it 
would consider a mass withdrawal from the Court––a proposal initiated by Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, who 
had previously appeared at The Hague on allegations of crimes against humanity. Despite this, the Court also has 
supporters in the region. At the African Union summit meeting in July 2016, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia were among the countries that opposed a Kenyan-led drive for a group 
walkout. Currently, nine out of 10 cases the Court is currently investigating are in African countries (Mali, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Libya, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo). Georgia is the 
only country not in Africa facing an investigation. One example given of bias is the fact that the Gambia has 
pressured the ICC to try and punish the European Union for the deaths of thousands of African migrants trying to 
reach its shores, yet has been unsuccessful. See Jean-Baptiste Jeangebe Vilmer, "The African Union and the 
International Criminal Court: counteracting the crisis” (2016) 92 International Affairs 1319.  
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prosecuting lesser officials and soldiers of both Kiir and Machar factions. Due to these concerns, 
some observers attending the issue of accountability in South Sudan have recommended that an 
alternative international body should provide the necessary checks and balances.339 Others have 
recommended that the South Sudanese leaders should be bound through the peace agreement to 
ratify the Rome Statute, thereby enabling the ICC to intervene if they attempt to undermine the 
efforts of the hybrid court—though no doubt given the present climate this is one of the most 
unrealistic solutions proposed. Although the peace agreement is vague about the role of the 
transitional government in the workings of the hybrid court, Chapter 5(1.1) of the agreement 
states that the transitional government “shall initiate legislation for the establishment of the 
transitional justice institutions,” and Chapter 5(1.5) expects the hybrid court to cooperate with the 
AU and the international community in its operationalization.340 This gives the transitional 
government some leverage to influence the establishment and mandate of the hybrid court from 
the outset. In the end, the liability of South Sudanese leaders for the heinous atrocities and human 
rights abuses in the country rests on the balance of societal pressure and political negotiations, 
and not just on the form or legislative intent of the proposed hybrid court per se. Neither could 
these dynamics be reversed or undone by the sheer presence of ICC indictments. In the case of 
mass political violence, (criminal) law and politics go hand in hand to introduce change, rather 
than the former leading the latter in providing solutions and rectificatory and restitutive justice.  
 
A. The ICC and Domestic Applications of the Rome Statute  
 Overall, this chapter purports that the establishment of the ICC by no means lessened the 
need for regional, lesser, or hybrid courts. Instead, it argues for an increased appreciation of the 
fragmented nature of international criminal law as an accountability regime. Even in treaty terms, 
pursuant to Article 11 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes 
committed after the Treaty came into force in 2002. Consequently, there is a marked judicial 
vacuum concerning crimes identified by the Rome Statute as subject to universal jurisdiction in 																																																								
339  See the American Bar Association’s Report on South Sudan at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/sudan/aba_roli_sudan_assessment_final_report_0614.a
uthcheckdam.pdf [15.03.2017] 
340 Supra note 321. Also see Rosanna Lipscomb, "Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: 
A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan" (2006) Columbia Law Review 182. 
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the period prior to ICC’s establishment, as well as regarding countries that are not signatories.341 
With reference to these limitations, hybrid forms of endorsing international legal accountability 
have become the focal point of a growing number of discussions on the ICC.342 Those who 
support hybrid courts’ functioning in tandem with the Rome Statute argue that national/municipal 
courts and the ICC constitute “two layers of judicial institutions” that can cooperate in bringing 
perpetrators of international crimes to justice.343 This state of heightened expectation from multi-
level judicial dialogue is partly due to the fact that the question of the limited potential of the ICC 
to affect the international criminal justice system, and more specifically to sustain an 
international legal regime of accountability as the leading institution, remains unanswered. In 
reality, the ICC is a carefully constrained legal institution in its structure and reach, despite the 
fact that it relies on universal jurisdiction for the crimes falling under its purview.344 Not only is 
the jurisdiction of the court limited, as exemplified by discussions of the above-cited Article 11. 
The Rome Statute also requires that either the state where the crimes have occurred, or the state 
of which the accused is a national, must be a party to the Statute. Crimes committed on the 
territory of a non-consenting or non-party State by the nationals of a non-consenting or non-party 
State may not be prosecuted before the ICC, unless the case is referred to the Court by the 
Security Council of the United Nations. This is a current problem clouding the prospects of, for 
instance, those who wish to bring the case of Israeli war crimes in Gaza to the Court’s 																																																								
341 Article 11 defines jurisdiction ratione temporis in the following terms: “The Court has jurisdiction only with 
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute, and, if a State becomes a Party to this Statute 
after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry 
into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.” For the 
full text of the treaty item, see http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm [15.03.2017]. 
342 On this issue, see Payam Akhavan, “The International Criminal Court in Context: Mediating the Global and Local 
in the Age of Accountability” (2003) 97 Am. J. of Int’l L. 712.  
343 See William W. Burke-White, “Regionalization of International Criminal Law: A Preliminary Exploration” 
(2003) 38 Tex. Int’l LJ 729 at 755–61; Thomas Buergenthal, “Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is 
It Good or Bad?” (2001) 14 Leiden J. Int’l L. 267 at 272; Jonathan I. Charney, “Is International Law Threatened by 
Multiple International Tribunals?” (1998) 271 Recueil des Cours 125.  
344 Complementarity has been extolled as the pioneering way for the ICC to navigate the difficulties of state 
sovereignty when investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Victims have often been held up to justify and 
legitimize the work of the ICC and states complementing the Court through domestic processes. In Uganda, for 
instance, new laws, legal procedure, and accountability for international crimes has been introduced over the past 
decade, all based on the complementarity principle, culminating in the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo. After several years 
of proceedings, however, it has yet to move to the trial phase, due to the issue of amnesties. While there has been a 
profusion of provisions to allow victims to participate, with protection measures and planned reparations, in practice 
very little has changed for them. There are indeed dangers of complementarity being proposed as the sole solution to 
protracted conflicts, in particular in the area of the realization of victims’ rights. See Harmen van der Wilt, 
"Complementary Jurisdiction (Article 46H)" The African Criminal Court (TMC Asser Press, 2017) at 187-202. 
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attention.345 The limitations that come with a territorial or nationality-based nexus to the crime in 
question could be overcome only to a certain extent through the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by states that are a party to the Rome Statute. For universal jurisdiction to take effect, these state-
parties must be willing to try the case in their own courts in accordance with international 
criminal law as embedded in their national legal systems. Again in the Israeli case, so far only 
Belgian courts have expressed a willingness to consider a trial at a future date. Added to these 
constraints are the complexities of the complementarity principle, as well as limitations regarding 
subject-matter jurisdiction and the parliamentary overview of critical judicial matters, as 
exemplified by the final decision concerning the Pinochet extradition case in the United 
Kingdom.  
Given all this, what does universal jurisdiction [re]defined by the Rome Statute of the 
ICC add to the already existing regime of accountability in international criminal law?346 The 
core idea of universal jurisdiction is that some crimes are so heinous that they lead to a duty, in 
every society and in every system of substantive law, to prosecute the perpetrators when the 
opportunity arises. The very category of “crimes against humanity” captures this notion at its 
best: it refers to criminal acts that constitute an offense to every human being, and a 
corresponding obligation to take action against the perpetrator(s) regardless of the specific 
circumstances of the crime or limitations to jurisdiction.347 Although the concept of crimes 
against humanity had specific roots as one of the key justifications for the Nuremberg trials of 
Second World War criminals from 1945 to 1949, it came into much more common use after the 
collapse of dictatorships in Latin America during the 1980s.348  
																																																								
345 For a full coverage of the crimes under consideration, see Richard Falk’s report published in Le Monde 
diplomatique (March 2009) titled Israel’s war crimes: Calls for investigation into Gaza attacks. For the full text, see 
http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_id=19322&username=guest@tni.org&password=9999&publish=Y&print_
format=Y [15.03.2017].  
346 Here, I define accountability regimes in international law on par with Steven Ratner and Jason Abram’s definition 
in their work Accountability For Human Rights Atrocities In International Law: Beyond The Nuremberg Legacy 
(Oxford University Press, 2001). Accordingly, accountability regimes in current international law are those that 
respond to the necessity of holding individuals and legal subjects accountable for gross human rights violations.  
347 For an authoritative account of crimes against humanity not just from a legal but also from a historical 
perspective, see Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
348 On the issue of the use of the legal category of crimes against humanity in the context of transitional justice, see 
“What is Transitional Justice?” A Voice for Victims, New York: International Center for Transitional Justice Annual 
Report 2004/2005 1; and Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena, eds,. Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First 
Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
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Here attention should be turned to transitional justice measures and their relationship to 
accountability regimes in international criminal law. The overall aim of transitional justice 
projects is to end impunity deriving from official or personal exceptions accorded to state 
representatives and high-ranking officers, and to guarantee personal accountability for gross 
human rights abuses and societal crimes. In this vein, for instance, the impetus behind the 
reactivation of the legal category of crimes against humanity against Latin American 
dictatorships was the hope that universal jurisdiction in relation to these crimes would help to 
bring torturers and murderers to justice when national jurisdictions were failing to try them. 
Another pertinent reason for the call for universal jurisdiction in the case of crimes against 
humanity is that many deposed oppressors have sought amnesty outside of their own country and 
claimed asylum on neutral grounds. By removing the territorial nexus of the crime, it was hoped 
that universal jurisdiction litigation would allow for the capture of fugitive statesmen, army 
officers, and former dictators. In summary, universal jurisdiction for international crimes would, 
at least in principle, obligate governments to prosecute the perpetrators of a certain set of crimes 
wherever they were found. While the government of the country where the atrocities occurred 
might be severely compromised to prosecute these persons, the idea is that another government 
without a history of complicity in these crimes could reach out and punish the concerned 
criminals based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. As early as 1999, the very date that 
marks the formulation of the ICC jurisprudence on crimes against humanity, Amnesty 
International reported that twenty-four national jurisdictions had adopted universal jurisdiction 
for serious international crimes such as genocide, among them Spain and Belgium.349 Since then, 
however, there have been very few prosecutions. Perhaps as to be expected, the most notable case 
was in Britain and Spain against the Chilean ex-dictator Augusto Pinochet, prior to the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. The success of this particular 
rendition of universal jurisdiction, however, remains far from obvious.350  
The Pinochet case is of interest for understanding both the internal and institutional 																																																								
349 See Cherif Bassiouni, "Chronology of efforts to establish an International Criminal Court" (2015) 86 Revue 
internationale de droit pénal 1163.  
350 See for instance, David Pion-Berlin, “The Pinochet Case and Human Rights Progress in Chile: Was Europe a 
Catalyst, Cause or Inconsequential?” (2004) 36 Journal of Latin American Studies 479; David Sugarman, “From 
Unimaginable to Possible: Spain, Pinochet and the Judicialization of Power” (2002) 3 J. of Spanish Cult. Stud. 107; 
Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction (2001) 80 Foreign Affairs 86; and A. Bianchi, “Immunity 
versus human rights: the Pinochet case” (1999) 10 Eur. J. of Int’l L. 237. 
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limitations of universal jurisdiction as endorsed by the ICC. As far as the ICC is concerned, the 
claim in its statute that the Court's jurisdiction is “complementary” to that of the nations that 
endorse it emphasizes its underlying purpose: to drive societies to prosecute criminals in the 
places where the crimes were committed, or in countries which are signatories to the Rome 
Statue, but not at the Hague itself. In this sense, the Court supplements rather than dictates 
universal jurisdiction. It is constituted as a transnational tribunal to try only a select set of 
international crimes when all else fails. If it is to provide outreach services or to act as a 
centrifugal force, this should take place at the level of jurisprudential framing provided by the 
Rome Statute, rather than in the actual proceedings of the court. A legitimate question that needs 
to be answered in the context of the Pinochet case, for instance, is the following: if Chile, 
currently a democratic state peopled by many of the victims of Pinochet's regime, did not want to 
prosecute the ex-dictator in 1998, on what basis could a magistrate in Spain interfere in Chile’s 
internal affairs or past crimes committed by its state officers? Furthermore, when a Spanish court 
claims to exercise universal jurisdiction over Pinochet’s crimes, how could Britain refuse to 
honour Spain's request for extradition, despite the fact that Britain herself is a signatory to the 
Rome Statute and a dedicated state-party to the ICC? In this regard, the internal and historical 
facts of the Pinochet case allow us to examine a different and mostly overseas dimension of the 
universal jurisdiction debate. Chile granted amnesty to Pinochet as a way to break his grip on 
local politics and to return to democratic governance.351 Still, this should not have shielded the 
retired General from justice for his gross human rights violations, and specifically the crimes 
against humanity associated with his regime. The only reasonable explanation for this local lapse 
of justice is that Chilean prosecutors and investigating magistrates, while enjoying institutional 
independence, were bound to operate within the strictures of Chilean law and politics. These 
legal authorities had to answer to appeals courts and to other officials, and they had to honour 
statutory obligations, one of which is stated as the immunity of General Pinochet in perpetuity. A 
legal authority outside Chile may not claim to have a direct interest in the affairs of the nation 
where the crime occurred. And yet, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, they would have 
the freedom to indict and to prosecute. This paradox repeats itself in African and other cases as 
well.  																																																								
351 See John Dugard, “Dealing With Crimes of a Past Regime. Is Amnesty Still an Option?” (1999) 12 Leiden J. of 
Int’l L. 1001.  
	 172	
A more recent example that further illustrates the pros and cons of universal jurisdiction 
exercised by foreign courts taking on cases pertaining to international crimes, rather than the 
issue being referred to the ICC, is the case of Belgium and the investigation it launched against 
Israel’s military offensives in Gaza and Lebanon during the last few decades.352 Human rights 
groups hailed the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision as another stepping stone for international 
justice, following the path heralded by the arrest of the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet 
in Great Britain on a Spanish warrant. The high-profile Sharon case complemented the 1993 
Belgian universal jurisdiction law, which permits lawsuits to be filed in Belgian courts for war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and genocide regardless of the time and place of the 
crimes committed and regardless of any national or geographical link to Belgium by the plaintiffs 
or the accused.353 This is despite the fact that the Belgian law had to go through a series of 
																																																								
352 See the Haaretz article, dated October 31st, 2009 on the developments regarding the relations between Israel and 
Belgium on this issue. On October 30th, 2009, the Belgian Supreme Court ruled that Defense Ministry director-
general Amos Yaron could be prosecuted for his involvement in the Sabra and Shatila massacres in 1982 in Beirut, 
when he was commander of the IDF forces in the Lebanese capital at the time. The court also ruled that Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon can be put on trial for his alleged involvement in the affair, but only after he ceases to be 
prime minister, when he no longer has diplomatic immunity. Back in 2001, two separate claims against Mr Sharon 
were brought under a 1993 Belgian law which allows war crimes and genocide to be tried in Belgium, even if the 
events took place elsewhere, and even if none of the victims was Belgian. The first case, charging Mr Sharon with 
responsibility for the deaths, was lodged by a group of Palestinians, Lebanese, Moroccans and Belgians. The second 
suit for alleged crimes of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes was filed by 23 survivors of the 
massacres and five eyewitnesses. Initially, in 2002, the Belgian appeals court ruled on June 26 that the law was not 
applicable in Sharon’s case because the accused was not on Belgian territory. However, the later verdict reversed that 
decision. Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat was also in line for prosecution in Belgium, in the wake of 
complaints filed against him by Israeli terror victims. On December 10, 2008, a formal complaint was filed against 
Ehud Barak to the ICC, on suspicion of war crimes and crimes against humanity because of the siege of Gaza." For 
full details of both complaints, see 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=262391&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContra
ssID=0&listSrc=Y [15.03.2017]. 
353 For full citation of this law, see Cherif Bassouni (2001-2002), supra note 304. Proponents of universal jurisdiction 
commonly argue that the principle is well established in international law and that a wide range of human rights 
offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction. One such prominent group drafted the “Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction,” which held that the following offenses can be tried by any court in the world without regard 
to where the crime occurred or who committed it: piracy, slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and torture. Typically, legal specialists recognize five bases for jurisdiction under international 
criminal law. The two best-established jurisdictional bases concern the territoriality and nationality principles, in 
which states have jurisdiction over crimes committed in their territory or by their nationals. Two other jurisdictional 
bases have received less consistent acceptance: passive personality, based on the nationality of the victim, and 
protective clause, based on the existence of serious threats to a state. The fifth jurisdictional base, the universality 
principle, refers to claims based only on the nature of the crime, for which none of the other forms of jurisdiction are 
present in any substantial way. For an all-encompassing debate on the fate of universal jurisdiction, see Antonia 
Cassesse, “Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction” (2003) 1 J. of 
Int’l Crim. Justice 589. For the Princeton Principles document, see  
http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf [15.03.2017].  
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amendments.354 The specific case against Sharon was brought by a group of Lebanese citizens, 
who charged him with war crimes in connection to his indirect role in the 1982 massacre of at 
least 800 Palestinians by Phalangist troops in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps outside Beirut, 
while the camps were under Israeli control. Sharon was found “indirectly responsible” for the 
massacre by an Israeli judicial commission in 1983, and was barred for a time from holding high 
office in Israel. In 2002, a Belgian appeals court ruled that Sharon could not be tried in Belgium 
because he was not physically present in the country; the Belgian Supreme Court reversed that 
ruling in 2003. This latter decision acknowledged diplomatic immunity only for serving heads of 
state or ministers. Based on this nuanced reading of immunity, Belgian prosecutors could open 
proceedings against other Israelis allegedly involved in the massacre, including former Israeli 
army chief of staff Rafael Eitan and current Defense Ministry Director General Amos Yaron, 
who was the Israeli army commander in Beirut at the time. Consequently, in addition to the 
possibility of arrest on Belgian soil, Israeli officials became worried about possible extradition 
demands from other European states. Israel has extradition treaties with most European countries, 
and all members of the European Union have conventions requiring that an extradition request by 
a member state is be considered by others.  
The plot thickened in January 2017, A Belgian court ordered the arrest of former Israeli 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tzipi Livni, when she disembarked the plane on her upcoming 
scheduled trip to Belgium. Livni is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against 
humanity during her time as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2006-2009. She oversaw the Israeli 
military operation "Cast Lead" in the Gaza Strip, from which the crimes allegedly stem. In effect, 
Livni was one of several Israeli officials named in the lawsuit filed by a group of victims in 2010 
in response to the military activities in Gaza. Livni, who is a member of the Israeli parliament, 
was set to meet with Jewish leaders in Brussels, but canceled the trip before the report of the 																																																								
354 The 1993 law, amended in 1999 and again in 2003, gives Belgian courts the authority to prosecute persons 
accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes regardless of where the crimes took place or whether 
the suspect or the victims are Belgian. The new version of the 1993 law, however, grants immunity to serving heads 
of state or government, as well as ministers. It also acknowledges the preeminence of the ICC, which will have 
priority in prosecution of crimes committed after its establishment on July 1, 2002. Finally, the law creates a “filter” 
against abusive lawsuits by granting the prosecutors’ office the option of rejecting complaints if they are deemed 
unfounded or politically motivated. It is noteworthy that the Belgian law has also served as a basis for complaints 
against a series of other foreign leaders, including Yasser Arafat. For a detailed analysis of the Belgian ‘anti-atrocity’ 
law, see the Human Rights Watch report at  
http://thewe.cc/contents/more/archive2003/july/belgium_law_on_atrocities.pdf [15.03.2017].  
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arrest order came out. Back in 2010, Livni had been set to speak at the Jewish National Fund 
Vision 2010 conference in London, but again cancelled her travel plans after a British court 
issued an arrest warrant for her. In 2011, however, the UK announced that Livni would enjoy 
diplomatic immunity. The practice of giving immunity to foreign officials who are accused of 
serious crimes under international law, in order for the host country to avoid having to arrest 
them, readily receives criticism. Proponents of the warrants argue that countries giving immunity 
to these officials are not living up to their responsibility under international law, and are thus 
complicit in creating impunity for international crimes.355 Belgium and the UK are not the only 
countries to have enshrined elements of universal jurisdiction in their laws during the process of 
ratifying the Rome Statute. With Spain and Canada coming on board, the endorsement of the 
Rome Statute moved to the far end of the spectrum in terms of domestic law’s engagement with 
international criminal law according to the principle of universal jurisdiction.356 Other notable 
countries opting for institutionalizing universal jurisdiction as defined by the Rome Statute 
include Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and South Africa, all of which have amended their 
laws to provide for the opening of investigations without any of the traditional nexus 
requirements.357 
Situated at the other end of this spectrum, where rejection of “international jurisprudential 
intervention” constitutes the distinguishing feature of thedomestic judicial order, are the United 
States and Israel. Still, even these states have legal mechanisms that allow foreign acts to be 
prosecuted in their courts.  For instance, the Alien Torts Act allows foreigners to sue in United 
States Federal Court if acts were committed against them in violation of the law of nations or an 																																																								
355 See the Jurist article on the issue at http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/01/belgium-court-orders-arrest-of-
former-israel-top-official-for-war-crimes.php [15.03.2017] 
356 Canada became the first country in the world to incorporate the obligations of the Rome Statute into its national 
laws when it adopted the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (CAHWCA) on June 24, 2000. To ensure 
that Canada can fully cooperate with ICC proceedings, the CAHWCA also amended existing Canadian laws like the 
Criminal Code, Extradition Act and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. For the full text of the act, see 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Canada.CrAgH.WcrEng.pdf [15.03.2017]. The first case under Canada's Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) opened at the main courthouse in Montreal on March 26, 2007. The 
defendant, Désiré Munyaneza, a Rwandan charged with genocide, faced seven charges in the indictment cover the 
period from April 1, 1994 through the end of July 1994, roughly corresponding to the 100 days of the genocide in 
Rwanda. Munyaneza, a Hutu, faced two counts of genocide, two counts of crimes against humanity and three counts 
of war crimes. For a case summary, see the International Criminal Database report at 
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1176 [15.03.2017] 
357 It is notable, however, that South Africa first withdrew from the ICC in 2016, and then reversed its withdrawal in 
March 2017. See the New York Times article (March 8, 2017) on the issue at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html?_r=0 [15.03.2017] 
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American treaty. This act was used by a group of Bosnians against Serb leader Radovan Karadzic 
for crimes committed in the Balkans. Similarly, in Israel, the Knesset passed an amendment to 
the Penal Code in 1995 that is almost identical to Belgium’s 1993 law.358 Israel also passed 
legislation making it responsible for the protection of every Jew around the world, whether or not 
such protection is requested. According to this law, anyone committing a crime against a Jew 
anywhere in the world breaks Israeli law and is liable to punishment by the Jewish state. In this 
sense, it would be apt to suggest that Israel herself has long been a pioneer among nations in 
forcefully applying universal jurisdiction, though only in select areas.359 
Based on the two examples of the Pinochet case and the Belgian law for universal 
jurisdiction, it is apt to suggest that the key question concerning the limits of universal 
jurisdiction is whether the problems that are appearing in its current applications in national and 
international courts are likely to weaken its usefulness or legitimacy. In this context, some argue 
that hybrid courts established closer to the scene of the crime and in direct contact with the 
societies involved could be more effective in delivering universal justice for international 
crimes.360 Where the scope of a state’s application of universal jurisdiction is wide, as seen in 
Belgium for instance, the problems may indeed increase in some areas. As a case in point, in 
2000 Belgium sought to extradite the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs for speeches that 
																																																								
358 See Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal. Perspectives (Oxford University 
Press, 2003).  
359 To mention the most famous trial in this regard, in 1960, Israeli agents kidnapped the Nazi official Adolf 
Eichmann in Argentina. They brought him to Jerusalem to be tried for crimes against humanity committed in Europe 
during the 1940s, before Israel achieved statehood. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide and was hanged in 1962. Eichmann was charged under a 1950 Israeli law enacted to punish Nazis and their 
collaborators. He was charged on 15 counts. Charge 1: He was ultimately responsible for the murder of millions of 
Jews; Charge 2: He placed these Jews, before they were murdered, in living conditions designed to kill them; Charge 
3: He caused them grave physical and mental harm; Charge 4: He took actions which resulted in the sterilization of 
Jews and otherwise prevented childbirth; Charge 5: He caused the enslavement, starvation, and deportation of 
millions of Jews; Charge 6: He caused general persecution of Jews based on national, racial, religious and political 
grounds; Charge 7: He spoiled Jewish property by inhuman measures involving compulsion, robbery, terrorism and 
violence; Charge 8: That all of the above were punishable war crimes; Charge 9: He deported a half-million Poles; 
Charge 10: He deported 14,000 Slovenes; Charge 11: He deported tens of thousands of gypsies; Charge 12: He 
deported and murdered 100 Czech children from the village of Lidice. The final three charges involved membership 
in organizations which were judged to be criminal by the Nuremberg Trials: the S.D., Gestapo, and S.S. The first 12 
counts of the indictment each carried the death penalty as the maximum punishment. For a critical case history of the 
Eichmann trial, see Shoshana Felman, “Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the 
Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust” (2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8. 
360 See Laura Dickinson, “The Relationship between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case of Kosovo” 
(2003) 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 1059 and also her “The Promise of Hybrid Courts” (2003) 97 Am. J. of Int’l L. 295. 
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allegedly incited to race-hatred in the Congo.361 Given Belgium's troubled history of colonial 
engagement in the Congo, such a complaint opened the country to a charge of neo-colonialism. In 
response, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stepped in and declared that an incumbent 
minister of foreign affairs was immune from Belgian criminal proceedings. The principal 
problem in this case was less with the process of filing and administering complaints than with its 
political character. In contemporary international criminal law, the majority of the states that 
ratified and embedded the Rome Statute into their constitution and/or criminal law are ex-
colonial powers. Complicating matters further, the majority of the cases that fall under universal 
jurisdiction take place in the Global South, and therefore in ex-colonies. This brings forth the 
critical issue of trust, and opens domestic courts such as the Belgian courts to charges of neo-
colonial domination of the Global South through the means of international criminal law, and via 
the premise of universal jurisdiction.  
There is another concern, too, when domestic courts take on international criminal cases 
above and beyond the traditional nexus requirements. They tend to act as a magnet for 
complaints, regardless of their merit, leading to arguments that both the claims and the resultant 
complaints against the claims are rooted in regional or global political vendettas. On the other 
hand, international power politics tend to narrow jurisdiction and to cut off complaints, as in the 
case of claims made against Israel. This latter situation then leads to the argument that when 
domestic courts exercise universal jurisdiction concerning cases that affect other societies, 
meritorious complaints could be stifled due to extraneous issues not germane to the case itself. 
Domestic criminal jurisdiction, where it embraces universal jurisdiction, aspires to be free of 
politics and discrimination. However, it is also true that, since the Second World War, interest in 
universal jurisdiction has grown partly because of the biases in and failures of domestic 
jurisdiction. International criminal jurisdiction, for all its shortcomings, has been compensating 
for the failures of the domestic courts. If this is so, how could we rely on domestic courts to 
deliver justice based on the principles of universal jurisdiction? Is the solution simply a matter of 
someone else’s domestic courts doing the difficult work? If high-ranking Israeli soldiers and 
leaders could not be tried in Israel, is their trial in Belgium the ultimate solution to the suspicion 																																																								
361 For the arrest warrant, see Chanaka Wickremasinghe and Malcolm D. Evans, “Case concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)” (2001) 50 Int’l and Com. L. Quarterly 
670. 
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and accusation of war crimes, for instance? 
The answer to the question of the pros and cons of universal jurisdiction exercised by 
organs other than international or transnational courts is two-fold. By virtue of being 
complementary to the domestic system, the workings of international criminal justice organs such 
as the ICC could create a dialogue, however limited, that in turn would increase the possibility of 
establishing of a legal regime of accountability for international crimes. In the Pinochet case, the 
British authorities managed to avoid his extradition based on the defendant's alleged illness. 
However, the British courts also recognized that his crimes were heinous enough to support 
extradition to Spain where he would have had to stand trial. That development alone could be 
considered a key element that has driven Chilean courts to undertake their own case against 
Pinochet, despite the many internal obstacles leading them to avoid this for decades. This has 
been pinpointed by legal scholars such as Stephen Ratner as the “democratizing effect” of 
international law, despite the fact that international law itself may not qualify as a democratic 
edifice in its origins.362 The second point to be made is that unless and until we accept 
international accountability regimes such as international human rights law or international 
criminal law as fragmented regimes composed of variant elements, rather than centre-heavy and 
fixed structures, we will continue to have far too many (and often unrealistic) expectations from 
organs such as the ICC. This could in turn create effects to the detriment of the very regime we 
purport to uphold, as these courts and their proceedings often reflect power dynamics in global 
politics that in turn render their reach uneven, and sometimes problem-laden. This is in addition 
to the fact that, unlike the ICJ for instance, ICC is defined as a court of last and not first resort.  
In the remainder of this section, the critical role of the complementarity principle as a 
defining feature of the post-ICC regime of accountability for international crimes will be 
examined. Select cases of hybrid courts will also be brought into the picture, to determine the 
degree of their contribution to international criminal law in terms of the expansion of universal 
jurisdiction, especially in the context of transitional justice. The goal of this exercise is to 
determine the relationship between international, domestic, and hybrid courts, and to revisit the 																																																								
362 On this issue, see Stephen Ratner’s work on transnational corporations, “Corporations and Human Rights: A 
Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111 Yale L.J. 443; as well as his work on international crimes, Steven R. 
Ratner, Jason S. Abrams & James Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law Beyond 
the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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idea of the fragmented nature of international criminal law as an accountability regime in terms 
of its future promise.  
 
B. The ICC and the Importance of the Complementarity Principle for the International Legal 
Regime of Accountability 
The basic stated objective of the establishment of a permanent international criminal court 
was to replace a culture of impunity for the commission of very serious crimes with an 
international legal regime of accountability.363 To this end, the provisions of the Rome Statute 
expressly address a specific set of crimes—i.e. genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and the crime of aggression—as indictable crimes. Prior to the founding of the ICC, there were 
numerous other tribunals with an international mandate. However, bodies such as the ad hoc 
Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were necessarily limited in scope, due to their 
context-specific and time-sensitive characteristics. To a certain degree, the idea of a permanent 
court was also a response to the UN Security Council's monopoly on international tribunals, 
which many states in the Global South deemed as being far too selective in “distributing” 
international justice. 364  Still, there is an ongoing argument about the deterrent effect of 
international tribunals or courts in general, whether permanent or ad hoc in their constitution. 
There is also the much larger question of what universal justice means for different societies, and 																																																								
363 In this regard, the relevant parts of the Preamble to the Rome Statute read as the following: “[A]ffirming that the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their 
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation, determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes, recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes … determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to 
establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations system, 
with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, emphasizing 
that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions, resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice…” Christopher 
Mullins, David Kauzlarich & Dawn Rothe, “The International Criminal Court and the Control of State Crime: 
Prospects and Problems” (2004) 12 Crt. Crim. 1205.  
364 The question of the relationship between the international criminal court and the Security Council was only 
partially settled at the Rome Conference. Aspects of the power differences between Security Council members and 
lay members of the UN system in the application of international law remain subjects of a heated debate. Among 
them, to say the least, is the role of the Security Council with respect to the trial of the crime of aggression, a body 
that includes United States of America as a permanent member. For a critical account of this issue, see Louise 
Arbour, "The Relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council" (2014) 20 Global Governance: A Review 
of Multilateralism and International Organizations 195.  
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whether some are treated “more equal” than others within its reach, especially under the purview 
of Europe-based international courts such as the ICC. 365  The common response to the 
establishment of the ICC emanating from scholars and practitioners of international law is that 
the effectiveness of such international tribunals and courts must be judged within a long-term 
perspective.366 Accordingly, the impact of these relatively new bodies cannot fairly be compared 
to that of longstanding institutions such as the Security Council or the ICJ. Specifically, the ICC 
is seen as part of a framework of measures brought into effect in order to establish and sustain a 
new international regime of accountability, including increased domestic prosecution of such 
crimes, the greater and wider use of common jurisdiction, and greater international and 
transnational cooperation and coordination in the addressing of international crimes.  
The cornerstone of this anticipated legal regime is the principle of complementarity, as 
reflected in Articles 18 and 19 (containing procedures) and Articles 17 and 20 (containing the 
substantive criteria) of the Rome Statute.367 This principle was agreed upon as a result of long 
negotiations. It was put in place to ensure that “State Parties” will always have primacy if they 
choose to investigate and prosecute crimes within domestic jurisdiction or in accordance with the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly, it is only where States are unwilling or unable to act 
within the meaning of the Statute, or where they are simply inactive, that the ICC will take on a 																																																								
365 In brief, the ICC is structured in the following format. The Office of the Prosecutor is an independent organ of the 
court, and it decides whether there is a reasonable basis to investigate possible crimes. As already stated, cases are 
referred to the court either by a State Party or by the UN Security Council. The Pre-Trial Chamber has authority to 
issue an arrest warrant after considering submissions by the prosecutor. When a wanted person appears before the 
court, the Pre-Trial Chamber holds a hearing to confirm the charges that will be the basis of the trial. The Trial 
Chamber is where the actual hearings take place. If the charges are confirmed, the court assigns the case to the three-
judge Trial Chamber responsible for conducting fair and expeditious proceedings. After the conclusion of testimony, 
the Trial Chamber issues its decision, acquitting or convicting the accused. If the person is convicted, the Trial 
Chamber issues a sentence of imprisonment and may also order reparations to victims. Finally, throughout the 
proceedings the parties can appeal decisions to an Appeal Chamber of five judges. The Trial Chamber’s verdict or 
sentence may also be appealed by the prosecutor or by the accused. 
366 On this issue, see the work of one of ICC’s founders, Phillippe Kirsch, in his and John T. Holmes’s “The Rome 
Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process” (1999) 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 2; his “The 
International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives” (2001) 64 L. and Contemp. Prob. 3; and his “The 
Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International Criminal Law” (2007) 22 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 53.  
367 According to Article 17, Section I, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible whereby: (a) The case is 
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable to 
genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from 
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person concerned has already been tried for 
conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.  
The full text of the Statute can be accessed at http://www.icc-cpi.int/legaltools/ [15.03.2017].  
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case. Moreover, if a State has started proceedings, the ICC will only be able to take on the case if 
it is shown that domestic authorities acted with an intention to shield the person(s) concerned 
from justice, or in a manner that was inconsistent with the intent to bring the person(s) concerned 
to justice. Without such a finding, lack of observance of international standards of due process or 
differences in sentencing practices does not constitute a valid reason for ICC to step in. At the 
same time, there are complementarity provisions to guide national authorities towards 
incorporating the Rome Statute definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
into their domestic law. As such, the primacy of State Parties for investigation and trial purposes 
does not go against the principle of universal jurisdiction and the demand for the faithful 
adoption of its current legal articulations by the Rome Statute. On the contrary, the 
complementarity principle reflects the belief that universal jurisdiction is best achieved through a 
multi-level and complex model of jurisprudential expansion that links international and domestic 
spheres. Meanwhile, it is important to note that this still remains a centrifugal model; the ICC 
acts as the epicenter, and produces the blueprint to be appropriated wherever a certain set of 
international crimes are concerned. Both State and non-State Parties are expected to adopt the 
principles and format of codification developed by the Court, in order to make a legitimate claim 
that their legal regime is on par with the international-cum-transnational one in this specific area 
of criminal law.  
In this context, the “proper implementation” of the Rome Statute within the national law 
of States Parties is of key importance for the establishment and sustenance of a legal regime of 
accountability. This is in addition to the required cooperation between the ICC and affected 
States Parties in the investigation and preparation of cases, as outlined by the elaborate machinery 
set out in Part 9 of the Statute.368 Indeed, there is a set of specific stipulations put in place to 
ensure the desired coordination for investigation and adjudication purposes. First, States Parties 
are under an unequivocal obligation to cooperate fully with the Court (Article 86) and to modify 
national law as necessary to allow the forms of cooperation required by the Statute (Article 
88).369 States Parties are also obliged to arrest and surrender suspects to the Court (Article 89), 																																																								
368 Part IX outlines principles of International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance. For full text of the Rome Statute 
Part IX, see http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm [15.03.2017].  
369 Meanwhile, whether a separate law should be adopted to provide for the required cooperation, or whether existing 
legislation can be modified, depends entirely on the legal context of a particular State Party.
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and to provide other forms of cooperation as requested, such as the questioning of witnesses, the 
conduct of searches and seizure of evidence, the protection of witnesses, and the tracing, 
freezing, and seizure of assets related to the crimes under investigation (Article 93). The grounds 
allowed for refusing cooperation are extremely limited. States Parties cannot refuse to extradite 
their own nationals, and immunities available under national law cannot be used to refuse to hand 
over one’s own nationals to the Court. Notwithstanding these precautionary mechanisms, suffice 
it to say that national security concerns can always provide a limited basis for refusal to 
cooperate, provided all the consultation measures set out in Article 72 of the Statute are 
undertaken. It is in this larger context of complementarity that ICC and the Rome Statute function 
as guideposts for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. No doubt the domestic jurisprudence of a 
State Party to the ICC provides the critical mass of laws and principles specifically designed to 
govern and protect its people and its borders. However, the majority of recent cases brought to 
the attention of the ICC proved that while these domestic laws can prosecute individuals for 
crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery, and larceny, they often do not equip the national 
judicial system with the competence to try perpetrators of serious violations of International 
Human Rights Law or International Humanitarian Law.370 Hence the need to enact laws that can 
address egregious crimes committed both in conflict and during peace-time. The standard route 
for this is the domestication of the Rome Statute by the States Parties.371 The assumption behind 
this prescription is that the domestication process would provide the legal framework for the 
implementation of ICC jurisprudence, inching towards a wider network of universal jurisdiction 
in the case of select international crimes, and hence a sustainable legal regime of accountability. 																																																								
370 Here, International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is defined as a system of laws, domestic, regional and 
international, designed to promote human rights. States that ratify human rights treaties at least in principle commit 
themselves to enact domestic human rights legislations. Human rights law is related to, but not the same as 
International Humanitarian Law or Refugee Law. In contrast, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is defined as a 
set of rules that seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. IHL’s aim is to protect persons 
who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and to restrict or regulate the means and methods of 
warfare. IHRL and IHL are two distinct but complementary bodies of law. Both seek to protect the individual from 
arbitrary action and abuse. However, while IHRL is worded to protect the individual at all times, IHL only applies in 
situations of armed conflict. The ICC’s mandate covers both areas due to the specific set of crimes it is set to codify 
and when applicable, adjudicate. However, its mandate does not exhaustively cover either body of law since it deals 
with a very specific set of crimes concerning crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression in addition 
to war crimes.  
371 For a detailed discussion of the domestication procedures of the Rome Statute and for a sample of implementation 
packages, see http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation [15.03.2017]. The list of packages available for 
public review include those used by Uruguay, France, the Arab League, Commonwealth, Columbia, Bolivia, Kenya 
and Argentina as well as the ICC’s own recommendations for implementation.  
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As a final note, the Rome Statute makes provisions for victims’ participations at all stages 
of proceedings. As a result, at least in principle, the ICC assures the victims’ access to and 
participation in the adjudication process. In international law, this is regarded as a unique 
development in the structure and operations of international tribunals. The ICC also takes into 
account issues of reparations for victims beyond the traditional punishment and deterrence 
objectives of domestic courts. Specifically, Article 79 of the Rome Statute provides for the 
establishment of a trust fund for victims and their families.372 This does not only address the issue 
of reparation, it also guarantees legal representation to allow victims to participate at all stages of 
the proceedings. The court can determine the extent of damages, and can order perpetrators to 
compensate victims as such. Furthermore, adhering to international standards, the ICC does not 
use the death penalty as punishment. Article 77 of the ICC’s Statute provides that the court can 
only institute penalties such as life imprisonment, imprisonment for a designated number of 
years, and fines, but cannot institute the death penalty.373 Domesticating the Rome Statute could 
therefore constitute a significant step to expunge capital punishment from domestic jurisdictions.  
These points may appear as tangential to the issue of universal jurisdiction. However, in 
effect, they could also be seen as part and parcel of the transfusion of a legal culture of 
accountability and the globalized endorsement of a new approach to international crimes, 
especially those committed by state authorities and people in position of power, a process that has 
included victims as legal actors since Nuremberg trials. In summary, the ICC’s complementarity 
principle is essential to the workings of a new legal regime of accountability for select 
international crimes. This principle operates at three levels. First, it dictates the set of crimes that 
fall under the purview of universal jurisdiction. If local, domestic legal authorities and courts do 
not act on these crimes, and if these crimes are brought to the attention of the Court, it then 
becomes a court of last resort and, in select cases at least, proceeds to try those accountable for 
the identified crimes. Alternatively, if there is not a case brought directly to ICC’s attention, or, if 
there are local attempts to achieve accountability that are hindered by domestic circumstances, 																																																								
372 Article 79 is on the issue of Trust Fund, according to which a Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the 
Assembly of States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families 
of such victims. Section 2 then states that the Court may order money and other property collected through fines or 
forfeiture to be transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund. 
373 In addition, again in Article 77, it is stated that a fine could be issued under the criteria provided for in the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, or a forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that 
crime could be confiscated, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.  
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the ICC then provides a reservoir of legal expertise, as well as guidelines for juridification for 
these trials and transitional justice projects-in-the-making. Hybrid courts fall under this last 
category. This induction is based on a nuanced rendition of the complementary principle both by 
the Court itself and also by domestic legal and political actors.  In this chapter, examples of 
hybrid courts and their workings have been presented in order to illustrate their potential, but also 
to underline the fact that they are not the ultimate solution to the problems with a centrifugal 
model of universal jurisdiction. Indeed, their operations are much more complex than have thus 
far been foreseen by proponents of universal jurisdiction in the area of international criminal law.  
 
III. HYBRID COURTS: FRACTURED OR OVERLAPPING LEGAL REGIMES OF ACCOUNTABILITY? 
To reiterate, due to disappointments and difficulties with both local trials and 
international tribunals in the area of international criminal law, hybrid courts and tribunals are 
increasingly seen as a compromise that could benefit from the strengths of international 
jurisprudence while minimizing the weaknesses and “side effects” of central institutions such as 
the ICC, particularly concerning the charge of neo-colonialism.374 A hybrid tribunal is indeed a 
distinct instrument of international criminal law. It is a court in which international judges and 
local judges sit side-by-side, drawing their decisions from a blend of both local and international 
jurisprudence. From the point of view of an international/transnational regime of accountability, 
hybrid courts are expected to benefit from the outreach of universal jurisdiction and the 
codification of international criminal law achieved by various conventions and the Rome Statute, 
while honoring domestic legal traditions. During the post-ICC era, the first hybrid court was 
established in Kosovo in 2000. As discussed, this was followed by hybrid courts in East Timor, 
Sierra Leone, and Bosnia. Cambodia is in the final stages of a hybrid court to address crimes 
committed by the Khmer Rouge,375 and Lebanon is yet another country to have expressed desire 																																																								
374 Mary Kimani, “ICC and Africa: Pursuit of justice or Western plot? International indictments stir angry debate in 
Africa” (2009) 23 Africa Renewal 3; and Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court and its work in Africa: 
Confronting Myths (ISS Paper 173, November 2008). 
375 The Khmer Rouge seized power in Cambodia in 1975 and killed more than a million people during its four-year 
rule. It was only in March 2003 that the United Nations reached a draft agreement with the Cambodian government 
for the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to try former Khmer Rouge 
leaders. The agreement took five years of negotiations and only came into effect 24 years after Khmer Rouge were 
driven from power. The ECCC consists of both Cambodian and international judges and has exclusive jurisdiction 
	 184	
to create a hybrid tribunal.376 As mentioned in the earlier sections of this work, there were also 
internal and external political demands for the Sudan’s President Bashir to be tried by a hybrid 
court rather than by the ICC. Then there is the successful resolutoion of the trial of the former 
dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, in the Senegalese hybrid court.  Concerning this last example, 
the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, known as the Malabo Protocol,377 truly reconceptualized the idea of transitional 
justice mechanisms and purported that transitional justice mechanisms can encompass regional 
and transnational efforts to respond to mass political violence. In this sense, the Protocol actively 
seeks to correct for perceived biases in international criminal justice. As such, it offers the 
Continent, and Global South at large, a substantive alternative vision of local and regional 
criminal justice and criminal accountability for state criminality targeting a state’s own civilian 
population.378 In keeping with these developments, in the final section of this Chapter, the 
workings and institutional characteristics of some hybrid courts established since the 
establishment of the ICC and the coming into effect of the Rome Statute will be further 
scrutinized.  
My starting premise on hybrid courts has been that domestic criminal justice systems 
have options for flexible responses not currently available to the ICC, and that these options 
extend beyond criminal proceedings to encompass civil proceedings. The right to sue 
governments and out-of-court settlements supervised by judges that allow for the participation of 
those harmed also promise a wider range of potentially satisfying compensatory activities for 
government-induced harms. These and other strategies of litigation inch towards restorative 
justice measures, and do not limit accountability for societal harm to criminal proceedings. That 
is perhaps where hybrid courts have so far been underutilized, due to their dependency on the list 
of crimes and trial procedures defined by the Rome Statute. Restorative justice, in contrast to 																																																																																																																																																																																			
over selected crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979. However, only one person has 
been indicted due to interference from the government and resource issues, as well as responsible persons passing the 
age of 70. For further details on the ECCC, see https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/international-law-
courts-tribunals/international-hybrid-criminal-courts-tribunals/ [15.03.2017].  
376 See Mettraux, G., International crimes and the ad hoc tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2005).  377 	For the actual text of the Malabo Protocol, see Amnesty International document 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR0130632016ENGLISH.PDF [14.10.2017]. 378	On the promise of a new model of international criminal justice emerging from the African context, see Leigh 
Stewart, “International Justice in Africa: Defining Authority and Localizing the Global.” (2017) iCourts Working 
Paper Series No. 86, accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2917110 [14.10.2017]. 	
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retributive justice as embodied in international criminal law, does not focus solely on the 
punishment of the offender, but rather seeks to address the needs of both victim and the offender, 
with the goal of restoring the broader wellbeing of the individuals and communities involved.379 
An equally important point is that contemporary prosecutions at international criminal courts and 
tribunals have demonstrated that, where individuals are convicted of core international crimes, 
the resources available for reparations and are grossly insufficient to meet even the basic 
restitutionary needs of both the victims and the society at large. Most of the wealth that might 
exist as a result of crimes such as crimes against humanity or war crimes is likely to be in the 
hands of individuals via corporations or other artificial persons who have gained property and 
income through these mass human rights violations. None of the international criminal courts and 
tribunals (together known as the ICCTs) has adjudicative jurisdiction over artificial persons of 
any sort. This means that any progress on restitution and restorative justice must come through 
national tribunals. This applies to both core international crimes and the broader category of 
human rights treaty crimes, which remain outside the authority of ICCTs.380 Translating the 
experiences of restorative justice into international criminal law dealing with mass atrocities is 
not simple. While restorative justice is traditionally used in response to lower-impact crimes such 
as property damage or fraud, it has also been successfully used in response to higher-order 
offenses such as sexual assault or murder, for example, where the victim or their family and the 
offender agree to participate, and where traditional retributive forms of punishment, such as 
imprisonment, could not resolve the issue of long-standing damages. As a case in point, the 
potential utility of restorative justice measures in the context of hybrid court trials and for past 
mass atrocities was a lively public debate and in and around the Juba Peace Talks in Uganda.381 																																																								
379 An important part of the debates on restorative justice is a critical analysis of how the main “crime stakeholders” 
(victim, offender and the community at large) are represented within policy framework and legal statutes. The most 
recurrent normative representations of the victim, offender, and community exhibit a range of typified features. In 
real cases, however, there is no ‘ideal’ victim or offender and communities are often implicit in mass crimes, 
pinpointing many overlaps. Finally, the political and cultural contexts within which these representations have 
emerged historically influence both policy and laws pertaining to their litigation. Here, restorative justice is taken as 
to offer more than a critical reflection on the normative dimension of western penal policies. On the restorative 
justice debate, see Daniel W. Van Ness & Karen Heetderks Strong, Restoring justice: An introduction to restorative 
justice (Routledge, 2014); and Gerry Johnstone, Restorative justice: Ideas, values, debates (Routledge, 2013).  
380 See Kerry Clamp, "Clearing the conceptual haze: restorative justice concepts in transitional settings" (2016) 
Restorative Justice in Transitional Settings 1; and Philio McCready, Can restorative practices work in a Loyalist 
area?: a case study on restorative responses to community conflict of a Loyalist area in South Belfast. Diss. (Ulster 
University, 2016).  
381 The war in Northern Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Government of Uganda (GoU) 
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The July 2007 agreement between the Ugandan Government and the LRA on Accountability and 
Reconciliation stated that traditional justice mechanisms as practiced in the communities affected 
by the conflict shall be promoted, with necessary modifications, and that restorative justice 
measures would be treated as a central part of the framework for accountability and 
reconciliation. 382  Although the Final Peace Agreement was not signed, various forms of 
traditional restorative justice in northern Uganda have been used extensively with lower-level 
LRA members who have returned to their communities.383  
No doubt there are inherent problems with traditional forms of justice, and overreliance 
on them could also lead to an evasion of the retributive justice embodied in indictments by the 
ICCTs. Still, some of the practical questions faced by both the state and the society during the 
Uganda peace talks reveal the essential element of limitations posed by criminal trials alone. For 
instance, how should abducted children who committed atrocities be treated, when they are both 
victims and perpetrators? Can traditional justice work both for formerly abducted children who 
became LRA fighters under duress, and for LRA commanders and those who enlisted voluntarily 
as adults? Traditional forms of restorative justice that are locally rooted and adapted for the 
purpose of reconciliation, truth-telling, and advancing peace for a just social and political future 																																																																																																																																																																																			
forces dates back to 1986. In 2006, the Juba Peace Talks were held between the GoU and the LRA, mediated by Riek 
Machar, the Vice President of South Sudan. However, LRA leader Joseph Kony refused to sign the final peace 
agreement, and the LRA has been at large since. Military campaigns by all parties to the 20-year-conflict led to fierce 
attacks on civilian populations across Northern Uganda, which included raping, mutilating and abducting civilians, 
raiding villages, and looting and burning houses. The conflict has had disastrous economic, physical, social and 
psychological effects on the entire civilian population. It is essential to note that both during and after the conflict, 
women played important roles as combatants, in support roles in the military as well as the domestic sphere and in 
initiating community-led approaches to ending the violence. Nonetheless, transitional justice discussions in Uganda 
almost exclusively focus on male parties to the conflict only. For a policy brief describing gender-based violence, its 
occurrence and effects on local communities during and after the conflict in Northern Uganda, see Sylvia Pinia and 
Frederike Bubenzer, Gender Justice and Reconciliation in Uganda (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2011).  
382 For the full text of the government’s declaration, see the Report by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting at 
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/can-traditional-rituals-bring-justice-northern-uganda [15.03.2017].  
383 A small sample of the critical literature on Ugandan Peace Talks includes the following: Ronald R. Atkinson, 
“From Uganda to the Congo and Beyond: Pursuing the Lord’s Resistance Army” New York: International Peace 
Institute, December 2009 at www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/e_pub_uganda_to_congo.pdf [15.03.2017]; 
Adam Branch, “Uganda’s civil war and the politics of ICC intervention” (2007) 21 Ethics and International 
Affairs 179; Mareike Schomerus, “Small Arms Survey. The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and 
Overview” (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007); Moses Chrispus Okello, “The false 
polarisation of peace and justice in Uganda” Expert paper “Workshop 2—Justice in Situations of Ongoing Conflict” 
Conference organized by International Center for Transitional Justice. Nuremberg, Germany, June 
2007. www.peace-justice-conference.info/download/WS-2-Expert%20Paper-Okello.pdf [15.03.2017]. The author of 
the present manuscript had the privilege of working with Moses Okello and Chris Dolan in Uganda on issues 
pertaining to transitional justice measures and forced migration in the summer of 2012. 
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order do not have to take place in opposition to or in isolation from ICCT involvement.384 
However, the question remains as to whether simply prosecuting and convicting Kony and a few 
of his senior commanders would indeed satisfy the needs of justice in the Ugandan context.385 
Rather, a multi-layered, locally nuanced set of approaches to finding justice and peace is more 
likely to deliver the needed results, a possibility that could be made into reality through the 
mechanisms of a hybrid court. Overall, the verdict from the Global South is that the ICC in 
particular pursued a narrow criminal justice mandate under the Rome Statute to investigate and 
prosecute those primarily responsible for committing mass atrocities.386  
As stated, according to the ICC’s defining principle of complementarity, the Court will 
take on an atrocities case only if the domestic courts are “unable or unwilling” to do so. The 
Court may also agree to hand over the prosecution of a case in midstream, if its judges are 
convinced that the proposed special domestic (or hybrid) court would be as strict and fair in its 
application of justice—including its sanctions—as the ICC itself. This is an option that could be 
put into practice for cases pertaining to countries such as Sudan and Uganda. It may indeed 
become a necessary route to take, as in recent years the ICC has faced a growing degree of 
suspicion since its first trial was suspended and the defendant, the Congolese warlord Thomas 
Lubanga, was subsequently ordered to be released.387 In the meantime, a decade of war began in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s 1996–1997 campaign to 
overthrow the repressive rule of Mobutu Sese Seko in the country then known as Zaire.  
Here is how this peculiar story seems to have unfolded: in resource-rich Ituri province in 
the country’s northeast, Thomas Lubanga led the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and its 
militia, the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo. In 2004, the DRC herself invited the 																																																								
384 Lucy Hovil and Joanna Quinn, “Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda” Refugee Law 
Project Working Paper No. 17. (Kampala: Refugee Law Project, 2005) at 
www.refugeelawproject.org/working_papers.php [15.03.2017].  
385 International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda: The road to peace, with or without Kony. Africa Report No. 146, 
10 December 2008. 
386 See Franziska Boehme, "‘We Chose Africa’: South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation with the 
International Criminal Court" (2016) 24 International Journal of Transitional Justice.  
387 Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga was found guilty of war crimes in recruiting and using child soldiers. The 
prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has vowed to seek the maximum sentence for Lubanga and called the conviction a 
victory for humanity. However, it is worthy of note that the case was twice delayed due to stays imposed by the 
judges in response to the office of the prosecutor’s failure to disclose information to the defense. Consequently, the 
trial chamber ordered the release of Lubanga and the trial almost came to a premature end. See the BBC News article 
(March 28, 2012) on the issue at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18779726 [15.03.2017].  
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ICC to investigate and prosecute war crimes that had occurred in the DRC since July 1, 2002.388 
Meanwhile, DRC authorities arrested Lubanga in March 2005 and charged him with genocide 
and crimes against humanity, based on provisions of the DRC’s military criminal code. These 
charges concerned the UPC’s alleged participation in the killing of civilians in the villages they 
attacked. In March 2005, DRC authorities issued a second warrant charging Lubanga with illegal 
detention and murder. After these two warrants, the ICC issued a complementary arrest warrant 
accusing Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of war crimes for conscripting children as soldiers in 2006. 
However, the Court had to cancel the beginning of his trial in June 2008 because of what is stated 
as “complex procedural issues.” The two other Congolese warlords, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui and 
Germain Katanga, are awaiting trial in The Hague, while a fourth, Bosco Ntaganda, has been 
indicted but is still at large.389 None of these long-drawn-out proceedings has helped matters 
concerning how to deal with the ICC in particular, and ICCTs in general, as they become 
involved with mass crimes in the post-colonial world. The growing tendency and desire is to see 
locally rooted and regionally legitimate institutions come on board instead.390 
 
																																																								
388 In 2004, the Congolese government invited the ICC to investigate and prosecute war crimes that have occurred in 
the DRC since July 1, 2002. The ICC has issued four arrest warrants concerning the conflict in the Ituri district of the 
DRC, for Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and the following suspects: Germain Katanga, alleged commander of the Force de  
Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI). The ICC charged Katanga with multiple counts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Katanga has been in ICC custody since 2007. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, alleged former leader of the 
Front National Intégrationiste (FNI) and a colonel in the National Army of the DRC (FARDC). The ICC charged 
Ngudjolo with multiple counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ituri. Ngudjolo was transferred to ICC 
custody in February 2008. The ICC has joined Ngudjolo’s case with that of Germain Katanga. In September 2008, a 
Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges against Ngudjolo and Katanga. Bosco Ntaganda, alleged former deputy 
chief of the general staff of the FPLC and alleged current chief of staff of the Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple (CNDP). The ICC unsealed an arrest warrant for Ntaganda on charges focusing on recruitment of child 
soldiers. Ntaganda remains at large. In addition to the four ICC cases concerning the Ituri conflict in the DRC, the 
ICC has arrested another Congolese suspected war criminal: Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, leading Congolese 
opposition figure, president of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), senator and former vice-president. 
Bemba was arrested in Belgium in May 2008 on an ICC arrest warrant charging him with war crimes committed in 
the Central African Republic in 2002-2003. He was then transferred to ICC custody in The Hague in July 2008. See 
the special report by the International Justice Monitor at https://www.ijmonitor.org/category/germain-katanga-and-
mathieu-ngudjolo-chui/ [15.03.2017].  
389 For the full text of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber decision concerning the Case: The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
Situation: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo made in 2008, see https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/04-01/07-717 [15.03.2017].  
390 See Ben Okolo, "African Renaissance, African Conflicts and the Regional Security Complex” (2010) 16 The state 
of Africa 2010/11: Parameters and legacies of governance and issue areas 103.  
	 189	
CONCLUSION: HYBRID COURTS AS NEW ACTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN THE 
GLOBAL SOUTH? 
Major cases that have taken place before hybrid tribunals all merit close examination in 
terms of their legal and political context, as well as their procedural details and jurisdictional 
outcomes. To this end, in the remaining pages a select number of these cases will be examined. In 
the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), for instance, there are two 
particularly critical cases: Case 001 (Kaing Guek Eav a.k.a. “Duch”), and Case 002 (with 
defendants Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and Ieng Thirith). The individuals mentioned 
were each charged with war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes under 
Cambodian Law.391 Meanwhile, Case 003 and Case 004 have been opposed by the Cambodian 
government, as a result of which several members of the court’s international staff resigned from 
the tribunal. At the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the trials for the Civil Defense Forces 
(CDF; including Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, and Allieu Kondewa), the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF; including the surviving leaders Issay Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine 
Gbao), and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC; Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu), along with the indictment, arrest, and prosecution of Charles 
Taylor, are of particular concern for the future of international criminal law from the perspective 
of its future in the Global South.392 There are also the cases of Julio Fernandez and Joao 
Fernandez, The Los Palos Case, and the indictment of General Wiranto before the Special Panel 
for Serious Crimes, Dili. At the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber, the Foča Rape Camp Trials as well 
as the Kravica Case, focusing on violence related to the Srebrenica massacres in 1995, are of 
significant concern. Similarly, in Kosovo, the trial of Milos Jokic as well as the Racak massacre 
and the 2001 bombing of the Nis Express (Florim Ejupi) are to be followed closely, in terms of 
both their results and their reception in the larger context of bringing closure to the war and 
atrocities that marred former Yugoslav Republics in South-Eastern Europe.  
All of these hybrid courts of the Global South operate based on the same principles that 
guide international criminal law and human rights law nexus in other, larger, regional and 																																																								
391  For details of these cases, see the documents published by ECCC at 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1?page=6 and https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1299 [15.03.2017].  
392 For detailed information and case summaries, see Aaron Fichtelberg, "Leading Cases of the Hybrid Courts" in 
Hybrid Tribunals (Springer New York, 2015) at 113-175.  
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international courts. First and foremost, whether they appear as witnesses, victim participants, or 
civil parties in mass crimes proceedings, victims contribute vital evidence and insight bearing on 
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Their testimony is accepted as a categorically valid 
contribution to the truth-telling function of the process, and under some circumstances used as a 
base for coming to terms with societal trauma. However, as has been widely discussed, victim 
testimonies can also lead to re-traumatization.393 Furthermore, from a jurisdictional point of view, 
they could compromise the fairness or efficiency of the judicial process if emotional distress is 
regarded as a factor that undermines the testimony’s relevance, credibility, or focus. Inherent 
tensions are inevitable due to the nature of courtroom experience for victims, who are subjected 
to pointed questioning and cross-examination on the details of very traumatic events as part of 
standard procedures that are essential for a fair criminal trial. What is unique about the hybrid 
courts is the way they deal with such tensions, and the flexibility and innovativeness they exhibit 
compared to the much more rigid structures embraced by the larger courts. A key example in this 
regard is the UN-backed hybrid court established to address crimes of the Pol Pot era. The ECCC 
has tried to facilitate victim testimony both through formal procedures and through informal trial 
management strategies, including two important innovations in international criminal justice. 
Specifically, the ECCC spearheaded the special “victim impact hearings” and “statements of 
suffering,” both of which allow civil parties to describe harms they endured under Khmer Rouge 
rule before a judgment is reached. These types of interventions help ease the tension between 
survivors’ interests and the rights of the accused, which is for the benefit of the society at 
large.394  
When it comes to mass atrocities and egregious crimes, the techno-legal transitional 
justice paradigm and the heyday of transitional justice institutions funded by the global North but 
operating across the Global South is beginning to pass. Therapeutic legalism did not deliver.395 
This creates a wonderful window of opportunity for the societies in the Global South. Similar to 
standard international judicial bodies, such as the International Criminal Court or the European 																																																								
393 See Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed experience: Trauma, narrative, and history (JHU Press, 2016); Ross McGarry & 
Sandra Walklate, Victims: Trauma, testimony and justice (Routledge, 2015); and Dominick LaCapra, Writing 
history, writing trauma (JHU Press, 2014).  
394 Brianne McGonigle Leyh, "Victim-Oriented Measures at International Criminal Institutions: Participation and its 
Pitfalls" (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 375. 
395 The term “therapeutic legalism” was coined by Duncan McCargo. See Duncan McCargo, "Transitional Justice 
and Its Discontents” (2015) 26 Journal of Democracy 5. 
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Court of Human Rights, the hybrid and “internationalized” criminal organs are composed of 
independent judges, working on the basis of predetermined rules of procedure, and rendering 
binding decisions. They are subject to the same principles governing the work of all international 
judiciaries, including due process, impartiality, and independence.396 Within this wider class of 
international judicial bodies, however, hybrid courts belong to a specific order. Similar to the 
ICC, ICTY, and ICTR, their goal has been to sanction serious violations of international law in 
the area of international humanitarian law and human rights law, to secure individual 
accountability, and to act as a deterrence mechanism against future violations. To serve these 
functions, these internationalized criminal courts impose criminal penalties. This is perhaps the 
most critical feature setting this group of judicial bodies apart from other international judicial 
bodies. Moreover, like the ICTY and ICTR, but unlike the ICC, they are by their nature ad hoc 
institutions. They have been created to address particular situations, for a limited period of time, 
and they respond to singular political and historical circumstances. Finally, like all other 
international criminal organs, in order to carry out their mission the hybrid courts rely on 
cooperation from international legal organs such as the ICC and judicial assistance by individual 
states, as well as the endorsement of international organizations such as the UN. In summary, 
hybrid courts, as a specific form of internationalized criminal institutions, constitute a group of 
their own, and yet they operate within the larger field of other international judicial and political 
institutions and entities. They possess common characteristics that set them apart from other 
cognate entities. In some cases they are part of the judiciary of a given country, while in others, 
they may have been grafted onto the local judicial system by outside actors and posses a semi-
independent status. In all the cases covered in this chapter, however, their make-up is markedly 
mixed, incorporating international and national features, and their mandate is circumscribed and 
issue-specific. They all are composed of international and local staff (judges, prosecutors, support 
staff), and apply a compound of international and national substantial and procedural law. The 
remaining question is whether these hybrid courts constitute the future of international criminal 
law in terms of the dissemination of jurisprudence produced and endorsed by central institutions 
such as the ICC. More specifically, one must carefully examine their significance in terms of an 																																																								
396 For a detailed critique of the workings of the ICC and both its strengths and its failings in terms of upholding 
foundational principles of criminal justice, see Larry May & Shannon Fyfe, International Criminal Tribunals: A 
Normative Defense (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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international regime of accountability regarding the crimes that now fall under the purview of the 
Rome Statute.  
Throughout this chapter, I posited that international criminal law on war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide—perhaps better clustered together as societal crimes—
constitutes a fragmented accountability regime. The common mistake regarding this regime is to 
limit the roster of actors that constitute it to state parties and international institutions such as 
international courts. The ICC is an independent, permanent court that tries persons accused of the 
most serious crimes of international concern under its aegis. The ICC was established based on a 
treaty, which was originally joined by 108 countries.397 However, the ICC is a court of last resort. 
It will not act if a case is investigated or prosecuted by a national judicial system unless the 
national proceedings are not genuine, for example if formal proceedings were undertaken solely 
to shield a person from criminal responsibility. In addition, the ICC can only try those accused of 
the gravest crimes. One of the great innovations of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence is the series of rights granted to victims. For the first 
time in the history of international criminal justice, barring the Eichmann trials that took place in 
a domestic court, victims have the possibility under the Statute to present their views and 
observations before the Court. Participation before the Court may occur at various stages of 
proceedings, and it may take different forms. Although it is up to the judges to give directions as 
to the timing and manner of participation, the victim-based provisions within the Rome Statute 
provide victims with the opportunity to have their voices heard and to obtain, where appropriate, 
different forms of reparation. At least in theory, it is this balance between retributive and 
restorative justice that enables the ICC to carry out a mandate of not only bringing criminals to 
justice, but also helping the victims to obtain justice and have a sense of closure. However, as we 
have seen from the existing trials, in reality hybrid courts are much better equipped than the ICC 
to ensure such results.  
In setting up the ICC, its founders stated two main aims: to end impunity for the worst 
																																																								
397  See the lengthy tally of state behavior provided in Nasser Zammit, Human Rights and Responsibility 
(Connaissances et savoirs, 2012).  
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mass crimes, and to deter would-be perpetrators.398 Since its inception, three States Parties to the 
Rome Statute—Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Central African 
Republic—have referred situations occurring on their territories to the Court. In addition, the 
Security Council has referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan—a non‐State Party. The Court’s 
Prosecutor has opened and conducted investigations in all of the above-mentioned situations.399 
Given that the Court’s first four cases are all in Africa, no doubt the accusation of neo-colonial 
bias is raising its head. This is despite the fact that, in Congo, Uganda and the Central African 
Republic, it was the governments themselves that requested the court to investigate. There are 
also charges that accuse the Court of being used by corrupt leaders and dictators in the Global 
South, who use the Court as a stage to wage battles against the opposition in their countries. In 
this context, hybrid courts do seem to offer a much-needed new platform for accountability in 
international criminal law. Another recent case that caused immense controversy is that of 
Charles Taylor. In May 2010, the trial of Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) took a dramatic twist as prosecutors requested the judges to issue a subpoena to 
supermodel Naomi Campbell, requiring her appearance before the Chambers.400 The SCSL 
Prosecutors made an application that they be allowed to reopen their case, which was closed in 
February 2009, or to bring evidence in rebuttal against Taylor by calling three additional 
witnesses, Campbell, Carole White, and Mia Farrow. Campbell was required to testify as a 
witness about a diamond gift she allegedly received from Taylor in South Africa in 1997. 
Campbell’s evidence eventually supported the Prosecution’s allegations that the Accused used 
rough diamonds for personal enrichment and arms purchases for Sierra Leone, particularly during 
the AFRC/RUF period. As the actual recipient of the accused’ gift of diamonds, Campbell was in 
a position to provide material evidence about this event. This case indicated that the cooperation 
of states whose citizens are subpoenaed is essential to the functioning of these hybrid judicial 
bodies. The witness’ voice is of key importance to justify the exercise of extraordinary judicial 
power in international criminal law. That being said, concerns remain about the efficacy of hybrid 
																																																								
398 See, for instance, the transcript of the group discussion titled “Millennium 2000: Would an International Criminal 
Court Help or Hinder Pursuit of Global Justice,” available online at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0001/02/bp.00.html [15.03.2017].  
399 The information on the ongoing trials and cases in the Court is taken from ICC’s official site, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (last accessed on November 22nd, 2009).  
400 See Charles Call, "Is transitional justice really just?" (2004) 11 The Brown journal of world affairs 101.	
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courts in carrying forward the mandate of the Rome Statute. Yet, what is the alternative? Perhaps 
the problem lies with our expectations from transitional justice, or the rigidity of institutional 
forms that the existing framework for international criminal law imposes rather, than the hybrid 
courts themselves. 
On a final note, although the inherent pluralism of international criminal law has gained 
increasing acceptance in recent years, scholarship on sentencing, for instance, remains 
surprisingly universalist. Leading scholars advance sentencing principles that are intended to 
apply to international crimes, no matter where they are prosecuted.401 Here, I wish to challenge 
this viewpoint and the resultant flat reading of ICC jurisprudence in that regard, both empirically 
and normatively. Scholarly expectations of sentencing consistency across international courts are 
premised on the misguided and factually unsupported notion that international courts constitute 
central components of a unified international criminal justice system. Sentencing disparities 
across hybrid courts not only can be justified, but are normatively desirable because they respond 
to a host of crucial differences in domestic criminal prosecutions pertaining to international 
crimes, including differences in the kinds of atrocities that occurred, the rank and status of the 
perpetrators who can be prosecuted, and the hybrid courts’ own mandates. These differences 
create the need for differentiated sentencing schemes across different tribunals and courts. It is 
high time that we accept domestic sentencing norms as a particularly crucial factor that should 																																																								
401 Sentencing in international criminal law is an under-attended field. Based on the statutes and decisions of the 
current International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), one critical aspect of 
sentencing emerges as how judges assess the harm caused by the perpetration of international crimes. The 
aforementioned Tribunals' judges had great discretion in imposing sentences. All crimes within their jurisdiction 
were punished with terms ranging from one day to life imprisonment. This resulted in a lack of uniformity in 
sentencing decisions, both in sentence length and in methodology. There is indeed a need for in-depth conversations 
concerning the framework for evaluating the harm associated with the different kinds of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICCTs as well as hybrid courts. The crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC have two sets of 
elements: the chapeau, which confers international jurisdiction over the offense, and the enumerated acts, which 
resemble domestic crimes. Most hybrid courts consider only the harm associated with the enumerated act when 
imposing an appropriate sentence. However, it is critical that the courts also consider the chapeau elements in their 
harm determinations. These international criminal elements encode important information about the secondary harms 
caused by the offenses. Equally importantly, they reflect the norms underlying the internationalization of the crime 
and thus reinforce the distinction between international and domestic criminal offenses. In this regard, the 
consistency and ultimately the legitimacy of international criminal law as it is applied in hybrid courts are of 
paramount importance for existing and future enforcement regimes. See Andrea Carcano, "Sentencing and the 
gravity of the offence in international criminal law" (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 583;  
Allison Marston Danner, "Constructing a hierarchy of crimes in international criminal law sentencing" (2001) 
87Virginia Law Review 415, and William Schabas, "Sentencing by international tribunals: a human rights 
approach" (1996) 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 461.  
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influence every hybrid court’s specific sentencing scheme. As I discussed in the opening chapter 
of this dissertation, traditional accounts of international law entertain a distinction between 
monist and dualist legal systems.402 In monist systems, courts apply international law directly. In 
dualist systems, direct application is not an option, so courts apply international law indirectly, or 
not at all. Although this distinction may be formally correct, it tells us very little about the 
functional role of domestic courts in the international legal system.  
In this chapter, both a functional and a normative account of hybrid courts was presented, 
with a particular focus on the distinctions among the horizontal, vertical, and transnational legal 
obligations and merits of such courts. Modern international law regulates horizontal relationships 
between states, vertical relationships between states and private parties, and transnational 
relationships between private parties whose interactions cross state lines. In conjunction, the role 
of domestic courts in interpreting and applying international law varies greatly, depending on 
whether the international rule at issue is horizontal, vertical, or transnational. As the examples 
examined here demonstrate, the willingness or the ability of state-based courts to apply 
international law is not solely a legal matter. It depends heavily on the political nature of the 
subject matter of the trials. In effect, domestic courts rarely interpret horizontal rules. Rather, 
they refer to treaties that regulate the horizontal relationship between states as ultra vires in 
nature. As a result, implementation of horizontal obligations as dictated by international law 
jurisdiction typically involves executive and not judicial action. Furthermore, this is true for both 
monist and dualist regimes. However, the role of domestic courts in interpreting and applying 
vertical rules, such as human rights treaties, tends to be different. Particular political relationships 
may affect the willingness of domestic or hybrid courts to implement international law, and to 
effect legal change based on their own initiative. This chapter drew on materials from several 
jurisdictions, all of them situated in the Global South, to present a holistic account of the role 
played by hybrid courts in interpreting and applying horizontal, transnational, and vertical 
international legal rules. As these cases demonstrate, the history of the application of universal 																																																								
402 See the original formulation of this opposition in Gabriel Joseph Starke, "Monism and dualism in the theory of 
international law" (1936) 17 Brit. YB Int'l L. 66. In more recent times, Leslie Green’s work particularly reintroduced 
this debate. See Robert A. Friedlander, "The Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present-Day 
Inquiry" (1983) 15 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 13; and Leslie C. Green, "An International Criminal Code-Now" (1976) 3 
Dalhousie LJ 560.  
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jurisdiction over core international crimes has been uneven. Non-governmental organization 
(NGO) activism has been regarded as a significant factor in this regard, but much less attention 
has been paid to the political composition of the public in terms of their willingness to bring 
certain matters to the courtroom. After the Pinochet case in the UK, the “amputation” of the 
universal jurisdiction laws in Belgium in 2003 and Spain in 2009 and 2014 made it clear that 
expecting one’s unfinished business to be settled in another country’s courts was not all that 
realistic.  
Subsequently, an alternative view of this history emerged. Universal jurisdiction is not 
necessarily on the decline. The number of universal jurisdiction-related statutes and trials has 
increased significantly in recent years, indicating the fact that the trajectory of universal 
jurisdiction is shifting towards hybrid and at-home courts. Perhaps it is time to revise received 
wisdom concerning the operation of international criminal law in the Global South. Rather than 
seeing the matter as an ongoing competition between two conceptions of the role states play in 
the universal jurisdiction regime (i.e. national versus international accountability and 
enforcement regimes), the emphasis could be put on the mandate of the jurisdiction itself. States 
are not necessarily the “global enforcers” of the Rome Statute verbatim. Although signatory 
states have a role in preventing and punishing core international crimes committed anywhere in 
the world, which is the “no safe haven” conception, states should not be seen as the guardian of 
the victims of crimes perpetrated by other states, either.403 More to the point, the anti-impunity 
rationale of international criminal law should not be reduced to legalistic position and a zealously 
Northern rhetoric about universal jurisdiction. The “post-colonial legalism” approach to 
international law has already established a critical jurisprudential tradition that asks how actors 
use and apply law, in order to understand how law obtains meaning, is practised, and changes 
over time.404 Combined with TWAIL scholarship, it is possible to ask different questions about 
the possibility of life after Rome Statute, so to speak. The rise of transnational activity that led to 
an enlarged scope of both national and transnational problem-solving strategies through 																																																								
403 Máximo Langer, "Universal Jurisdiction is Not Disappearing The Shift from ‘Global Enforcer’ to ‘No Safe 
Haven’ Universal Jurisdiction" (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 245.  
404 See Partha Chatterjee, "Introduction Postcolonial Legalism" (2014) 34 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa 
and the Middle East 224. This is a special issue that explores the specific field of postcolonial practices of the law in 
four countries: India, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and South Africa. The key concern in all discussions of the legal-
constitutional framework of postcolonial politics is the question of social transformation induced by law rather than 
law’s superior position as an abstract construct.  
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international law further enhances this viewpoint. Debates on universal jurisdiction concerning 
gross and systemic humanitarian law violations have long suffered from a single focus on 
institutional certainties or a neutered state-centric worldview.405 It is time to look closely at the 
realities of universal jurisdiction on the ground, and to give up the obsession with what goes on in 
the chambers of international courts or national courts in the North, to come up with strategies 
and answers about human suffering in the Global South from within.  
 
 
																																																								
405 Nancy Combs, "Seeking Inconsistency: Advancing Pluralism in International Criminal Sentencing" (2015) 41 
Yale Journal of International Law 387. 
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Chapter VI. Mea culpa, Sua culpa, Tua Maxima Culpa: Collective Responsibility and Legal 
Judgment406 
 
INTRODUCTION 
ad auctores reddit sceleris coacti culpa –the guilt of imposed crimes lies on those who impose 
them. 
     Seneca.407 
cavendum est ne major poena, quam culpa, sit—care should be taken in all cases, that the 
punishment not exceed the guilt. 
     Cicero.408  
 
 If only we would abide by the ethical guidelines offered by the Romans, problematic 
aspects of collective responsibility in law and legal morality could perhaps be successfully 
avoided. However, a harmonious relationship between social life and political peace is not so 
easy to attain or sustain during deep crises and mass violence in our current era. Issues 
concerning justice and personal desert at times of turmoil and uproar such as genocidal violence, 
ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity cannot be reduced to proven links between 
punishable individual actions, international criminal law and related regimes of responsibility-
cum-accountability. The intricacies of mass political violence and societal crimes render such 
direct and methodical solutions lacking. This final chapter of the dissertation thus invites the 
																																																								
406 I am in debt to Les Jacobs for guiding me through the debate on Aristotelian ethics, re-reading Arendt and in 
general in terms of how to appraoch the law and society relationship in a critical and yet methodical manner. The 
latin term Mea culpa, Sua culpa, Tua Maxima Culpa could be  translates as “through my fault, through your fault, 
we are where the fault lies most" and is an acknowledgement of having done wrong collectively.  
407 See the Latin-English dictionary Eudict online at  
http://www.eudict.com/?lang=lateng&word=ad%20auctores%20redit%20sceleris%20coacti%20culpa [21.03.2017] 
For the full text of Seneca’s work on Melancholy from which this quote comes, see 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10800/10800-h/ampart1.html [21.03.2017].  
408 For the translations, see Eudict at 
http://www.eudict.com/?lang=lateng&word=cavendum%20est%20ne%20major%20pœna,%20quam%20culpa,%20s
it;%20et%20ne%20iisdem%20de%20causis%20alii%20plectantur,%20alii%20ne%20appellentur%20quidem 
[21.03.2017].  
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reader to consider the limitations of seeking societal peace and political transformation mainly on 
the grounds of achieving criminal accountability concerning the individual perpetrators of mass 
atrocities. All of the examples covered in the previous pages pertain to post-WWII applications of 
universal jurisdiction concerning egregious crimes. They also belong to a particularly difficult 
field of inquiry: transitional justice. The field of transitional justice is increasingly characterized 
by the dominance of legalism to the detriment of advocacy, politics, scholarship and practice.409 
My fear is that correctives to such leanings are by and large missing in legal scholarship. 
Furthermore, the tendency towards aggrandizement of litigation-related measures is further 
supported by the success of hybrid courts and other localized applications of universal 
jurisdiction in international criminal law.  In this closing chapter, I will thus venture a politico-
philosophical inquiry underlining the importance of legal humility and contextualizing the 
criminology of transitional justice. As law's place at the heart of transition from societal and 
political conflicts becomes increasingly secure, the time is right for a more honest appraisal of the 
limitations of legalism and a correspondingly greater willingness to countenance the role of 
forms of knowledge pertaining to accountability for mass atrocities. Specifically, an endowed 
debate on the difficult subject of collective responsibility will both thicken the subject of criminal 
accountability for mass violence, and deliver a methodological insight to more effective changes 
on the ground.	
How far are our lives implicated by what other people do to each other indirectly? How 
much responsibility falls on our shoulders from the harms that flow from the social, economic, 
and political institutions in which we are embedded, even if we do not inflict harm while 
occupying positions of authority? Do our relations as individuals to spheres of collective 
existence lead to complicity and collective responsibility in the event that they lead to harm for 
select sectors of the society?410 In the following pages, I will argue that the relationship between 
collective responsibility, individual guilt and criminal accountability is a very critical albeit 
difficult one, often avoided entirely in international criminal law. And yet, it provides a precious 																																																								409	See Nergis Canefe, ed., Transitional Justice and Forced Migration: Critical Perspectives from the Global South 
(Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).  
410  As Christopher Kutz’ work shows, the two prevailing theories of moral philosophy, Kantianism and 
consequentialism, both have difficulties resolving problems concerning complicity in collective violence. See 
Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Also see the 
classical work of Andrew Arato, “The Bush Tribunals and the Specter of Dictatorship” (2002) 9 Constellations 457. 
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point of entry to the nature of our relations with society and the state, of which we are a part and 
for which we are the harbingers of legitimacy. Here, I posit that international criminal law 
scholarship needs a richer theory of accountability, in which our understanding of individual 
responsibility in relation to societal acts of violence not only allows for but demands an analysis 
of collective action and thus contextualizes litigation in this select area. Specifically, I will argue 
that what should be sought after is not more complicated punishment schemes but rather a 
substantive way of addressing harm we give to each other both by commission and by 
omission. 411  In this context, intentional and purposeful collective action, collective moral 
responsibility and collective guilt, individual responsibility for (and in) collective wrongs, 
collective legal obligations to victims of societal and political crimes, and individual moral 
responsibility with regard to wrongful social and political acts constitute key entries to a 
meaningful politico-legal debate on collective responsibility and legal judgment. I will pursue 
these questions in a context originally set by Hannah Arendt’s work on legal judgment.  
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, her account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt used the 
phrase “the banality of evil,” describing how a man who was neither a monster nor a demon 
could nevertheless be an agent of the most extreme and evil acts of violence and destruction.412 
This subsequently prompted her to readdress fundamental questions and concerns about the 
nature of [collective] violence and our making of moral choices. Her Responsibility and 
Judgment, a sequel to her work on Eichmann in this regard, gathers together unpublished writings 
from the last decade of Arendt’s life.413 In these later works, she strived to further explicate the 
meaning of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. At the heart of this series of essays lies a profound 
ethical investigation concerning the use of traditional moral truths as politico-legal standards to 																																																								
411 On this issue, see Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account. (Cambridge University Press, 
2007). May’s work is the first book-length treatment of the philosophical foundations of international criminal law. 
His focus is on the moral, legal, and political questions that arise when individuals who commit collective crimes, 
such as crimes against humanity, are held accountable by international criminal tribunals. These tribunals challenge 
one of the most sacred prerogatives of states—sovereignty. Breaches in this sovereignty can be justified only in 
limited circumstances, which constitutes the minimalist threshold of the justification for international prosecution. 
May’s work began an important discussion inside the field of international criminal law. What I purport here is to 
carry this discussion forward in conjunction with moral theories of judgment in applied legal philosophy and legal 
ethics. 
412 See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (Penguin, 1963). Also see Jacob Robinson, And the Crooked Shall 
Be Made Straight: the Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Catastrophe, and Hannah Arendt's Narrative (MacMillan, 1965); 
and Seyla Benhabib, "Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem" in Dana Richard Villa, ed. The Cambridge Companion to 
Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 65-85.  
413 See Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment (Schocken Books, 2003).  
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judge criminality as it relates to mass violence. Arendt’s analysis of judgment tests to its limits 
our ability to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong. The radical evil she had addressed 
in her earlier work on totalitarianism evolves into a much more pernicious account of evil, almost 
independent of political ideology, whose execution is limitless when the perpetrator feels no 
remorse and can erase the memory of his/her acts as soon as they are committed. For such acts, 
individual criminal responsibility, even if it comes tied to mass crimes such as crimes against 
humanity, does not suffice for us to understand the true nature of the harm and wrong implicated 
by such violent acts. Arendt’s conclusion has serious repercussions for contemporary conceptions 
of accountability at the level of international criminal law, and the debate presented here is a 
token of dedication to think further in that vein.  
 We are currently witnessing a bewildering variety of developments in regimes of control 
articulated in domestic legislation of criminal justice. These range from demands for execution or 
preventive detention for sexual predators, paedophiles, and persistent violent offenders to the 
development of dispersed, designed in-control regimes for the continual, silent and largely 
invisible work of the assessment, management, communication and control of risk-laden groups 
deemed prone to commit crimes. Political programmes of crime control cycle through the 
alternatives from “prison works” and “boot camps,” through “community corrections,” 
“reintegrative shaming,” “therapeutic rehabilitation” to’ “lifetime imprisonment without parole” 
and ultimately the death penalty. Concerns about illegality and crime at the individual level are 
clearly articulated both by judicial institutions and security practices. Nonetheless, at a more 
general level, little attention is paid to the inner workings of mass political violence and systemic 
societal crimes. In an attempt to address this lacuna, I will pinpoint the ways in which 
accountability regimes in international criminal law have been severely individualized with 
regard to practices of government illegality and state criminality. In the post-Rome Statute era of 
international criminal law, the pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime as the juridical subject 
of the rule of law is no doubt a great leap forward towards the erosion of unjustified defense of 
state sovereignty and related individual immunities. However, the forms of legal knowledge and 
modes of jurisprudential expertise that are implicated in these new techniques and rationalities of 
criminalization of state conduct also carry the danger of blinding us towards larger socio-political 
realities of mass crimes. 
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 In criminal justice, individual autonomy is used as a bench-mark and an ideal that refers 
to the capacity to be one's own person, and to live one's life according to reasons and motives that 
are taken as one's own and not the product of manipulative, coercive or distorting external forces. 
Individual autonomy is also the central value in the Enlightenment tradition of moral philosophy. 
Starting with Kant, it is given fundamental status in John Stuart Mill's and his successors’ 
versions of utilitarian liberalism. Examination of the concept of autonomy similarly figures 
centrally in debates over legal freedoms and rights (such as freedom of speech and the right to 
privacy), as well as moral and political theory pertaining to justice.414 In the realm of moral 
theory, seeing autonomy as a foundational value stands in contrast with alternative frameworks, 
such as ethics of care and ethics of virtue. Consequently, these concepts are rarely brought into 
debates on criminal justice. Autonomy has traditionally been thought to connote independence, 
and hence to prioritize individual agency in moral thinking and political decision-making.  
 In the specific context of individual autonomy and its relation to the banality of evil 
connoting societal crimes, the existing arsenal of concepts we have does not suffice to deal with 
the massive problem in hand: namely, how to understand the weight of individual choices in 
producing unforgivable forms of societal and mass harm. In the following pages, I argue that we 
therefore have to turn to another concept, albeit one that Arendt did not contend with at all. In 
order to make sense of the conundrum of common-place and rule-bound choices made by 
individuals leading to collective forms of violence and societal wrongdoing, I will examine the 
idea of collective responsibility.415 In legal philosophy, starting with Joel Feinberg’s work, the 
debate on collective responsibility has been kept alive like a slowly burning flame, looming at the 
background of questions concerning accountability but rarely entering the registers of litigation-
oriented takes on applications of international law in the context of transitional justice measures 
																																																								
414 See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in I. Kant, Ethical Philosophy, James W. 
Ellington, trans. (Indianapolis, IA: Hackett Publishing [1785/1983]); and his Metaphysical Elements of Justice, John 
Ladd, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, [1797/1999]); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, David Spitz, ed. (Norton, 
[1859/1975]). Also see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon 1986); Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconcieving 
Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities” (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 7; and Ben Coburn, 
Autonomy and Liberalism (Routledge, 2010).  
415 In legal scholarship, the concept was taken up mainly in the context of blameworthiness for litigation purposes. 
The first important intervention in this regard came in the form of the suggestion that actions could serve as 
legitimate bases for blame without objective wrongdoing per se. Here, intent is identified as the key. See Jan 
Narveson, "Collective responsibility" (2002) 6 The Journal of Ethics 179.  
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and in post-conflict societies.416 It has received ire from many corners, as it goes against the basic 
principle that no one can be responsible, in the properly ethical or criminal sense, for the conduct 
of another, and that criminal responsibility squarely belongs to the individual. Concerning mass 
political violence and state criminality, the implications of exclusive reliance on the principle of 
individual criminal liability are more damaging than is evident at first.417 In international criminal 
law, reverting to the barbarous notion of collective or group responsibility for litigation purposes 
is considered an absolute derogation of rights, and rightfully. What I am pursuing here is rather 
different: it is the notion of accountability for atrocities as societal responsibility in a distinctively 
moral and socio-political sense, and thus as an element that foregrounds the socio-political 
acceptance and legitimacy of criminal trials targeting egregious acts such as crimes against 
humanity.418 
 My purpose is not to attribute a diminishing importance to causation in criminal law, 
whether domestic or international in its application. In ideal circumstances where harm is not 
involved, the outcome of an act does not and should not effect our assessment of the moral 
quality of the act. In cases of acts blameworthy due to their resulting in harm or near harm, 
however, should our moral assessment be neutral? Furthermore, concerning acts that are 
committed under the aegis of state criminality, should we not look elsewhere than the individual 
mens rea component? Do such criminal acts not require societal endorsement, support and 
condoning? Should larger outcomes never matter in our assessment of a person's individual 
criminal conduct? Back in 1968, when D. E. Cooper proposed the thesis that collectives can be 
held responsible in a sense not reducible to the individual responsibility of members of the 
collective, he also stated clearly that it is not moral responsibility which is involved in such 
																																																								
416 See Joel Feinberg, "Collective responsibility" (1968) 65 The Journal of Philosophy 674. Also see Virginia Held, 
"Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible?" (1970) 67 The Journal of Philosophy 471. Held’s 
article was taken up and reevaluated extensively in Stanley Bates, "The Responsibility of Random Collections" 
(1971) 81 Ethics 343.  417	See Amy Harbin and Jennifer Lewelyn, “Restorative Justice in Transitions: The Problem of ‘The Community’ 
and Collective Responsibility,” in Kerry Clamp (ed.), Restorative Justice in Transitional Settings (Routledge, 2016) 
133-151.  
418 Starting with Hywel D. Lewis, "Collective responsibility" (1948) 23 Philosophy 3, the spectrum of works to be 
consulted in this regard include Larry May, Sharing responsibility (University of Chicago Press, 1992); Larry May & 
Stacey Hoffman, eds. Collective responsibility: Five decades of debate in theoretical and applied ethics (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1992); Angelo Corlett, Collective responsibility (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2001); and 
Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and law for a collective age (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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accountability.419 I strongly concur with Cooper, and invite us to revisit the somewhat dated 
collective responsibility debate420 at the current historical junction of criminal acts pertaining to 
state criminality, civil war, military occupation, and neo-colonialism, almost all of which are now 
within the reach of the current regime of accountability in international criminal law and the 
universal jurisdiction jurisprudence. We have nothing to lose in this regard, and perhaps much to 
gain, by at least temporarily suspending our overdependence on legal institutions for finding 
cures to our societal ills via litigation of state criminality and political violence solely based on 
individual accountability.  
 
I. BEYOND EICHMANN: ON THE NECESSITY OF JUDGMENT  
Half a century ago, while writing Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt struggled to 
defend the possibility of judgment against the manifold problems we encounter in our attempts to 
offer legally valid and morally meaningful verdicts concerning those who have committed crimes 
in morally bankrupt and legally defunct communities.421 No doubt some of Arendt’s conclusions 
concerning Eichmann are equivocal. Her theory of judgment in the Eichmann manuscript itself 
could even suggest that Arendt may have remained trapped within a set of Kantian assumptions 																																																								
419 See the Cooper/Downie debate at David E. Cooper, "Collective responsibility" (1968) 43 Philosophy 258, and 
Robert Silcock Downie, "Collective responsibility" (1969) 44 Philosophy 66. Also see Howard McGary, "Morality 
and collective liability" (1986) 20 The Journal of Value Inquiry 157.  420	Of the most recent vintage, see Mark Osiel, Mass atrocity, ordinary evil and Hannah Arendt: criminal 
consciousness in Argentina’s dirty war (Yale University Press, 2001) and Mark Osiel, Obeying orders: Atrocity, 
military discipline and the law of war (Routledge, 2017); Robbie McVeigh, “Hate and the State: Northern Ireland, 
Sectarian Violence and ‘Perpetrator-less Crime” in A. Haynes  et al. (eds) Critical Perspectives on Hate Crime 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 	
421See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 397 and Hannah Arendt, "Eichmann in Jerusalem: An 
exchange of letters between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt" (1964) 22 Encounter 51. Commentaries on 
Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem are generally one of two kinds. The first group confronts the historical relevance of 
Arendt's observations and attempts to ascertain whether her presentation of Eichmann's trial complements or 
corresponds to the reality of the incommensurable suffering of the Jewish people during the Second World War. The 
second variety focuses on the meaning of her term “the banality of evil” by placing Arendt in a long tradition of 
moral and political philosophy concerned with the problem of judging evil and harm. See, for instance, Peg 
Birmingham, “Holes of Oblivion: The Banality of Radical Evil,” (2003) 18 Hypatia 80. If one reads Arendt’s treatise 
on Eichmann in light of Walter Benjamin's conceptions of history and storytelling, a third route emerges, and it 
becomes clear that Eichmann in Jerusalem was not intended to reflect reality objectively. On the contrary, Arendt 
aimed at avoiding the cold and detached neutrality of historicism, or as she calls it the “tradition of sine ira et 
studio,” the Latin term meaning "without anger and fondness" or "without hate and zealousness." For Arendt, such 
an approach to Eichmann and the crimes he committed would represent a renunciation of his and others’ 
responsibility for them. See Annabel Herzog, “Reporting and Storytelling: Eichmann in Jerusalem as Political 
Testimony” (2002) 68 Thesis Eleven 83.  
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in her philosophy of history, and thus ended up defining the question of freedom to act in a 
binary way. In contradistinction, proposing that judgment has an antinomical character and 
emphasizing the importance of elements of reason and sense as well as circumstance and context 
may allow for a better understanding of the collective nature of responsibility for societal 
crimes.422 In Theodor Adorno’s terms, judgment becomes the very test for the limits of agency 
and autonomy suffered by the potentially free but essentially “unfree subjects” of modernity.423 
Contemporary readers of Eichmann in Jerusalem sometimes cast it as a juridical text, due 
to the fact that it is presumably more concerned with justice than with politics or ethics. Such 
juridical readings of Arendt’s treatise on Eichmann in particular, and crimes against humanity in 
general, focus attention on what Arendt calls the primary challenge of the case—namely, the trial 
of Eichmann's unprecedented crimes against humanity in a domestic court.424 However, putting 
so much emphasis on the nature of crimes against humanity legislation leads to our failing to 
attend to Arendt's principled resistance to a merely juridical response in such cases. This is 
clearly evidenced in her criticism of both procedural and substantive aspects of the Jerusalem 
Court's ruling. Taking my cue from Arendt's resistance to the Israeli Court's approach, here I 
argue that Eichmann in Jerusalem does not authorize a solely juridical approach to the 																																																								
422 For a timely discussion on the presence of “ethical” narratives and images of the Holocaust in debates and 
demonstrations around the recent conflicts in Gaza and the need for a new form of foundation for legal reflection, 
legal judgment and legal justice in the Arendtian tradition of rethinking law, see David Seymour, “From Auschwitz 
to Jerusalem to Gaza: Ethics for the Want of Law” (2011) 6 Journal of Global Ethics 205.  
423 During the 1960s, Theodor Adorno became the most prominent challenger of both Karl Popper's philosophy of 
science and Martin Heidegger's philosophy of existence. The scope of Adorno's influence stems from the 
interdisciplinary character of his research and the critical influence of Frankfurt School to which he belonged. The 
thoroughness with which he examined the Western philosophical traditions from Kant onward, and the radicalness of 
his critique of contemporary Western society remain pivotal for any critique of moral claims concerning individual 
autonomy. It should also be noted that for both Adorno and Arendt, a critical reading of Kant’s Third Critique is the 
indispensable means by which it is possible to locate a path pointing beyond the chiasmic structure suggested by the 
modernist tradition of history. See Theodore Adorno, Can One Live after Auschwitz?: A Philosophical Reader, ed. 
R. Tiedemann, trans. R. Livingstone et al. (Stanford University Press, 2003). Also see Susan Buck-Morss, The 
Origin of Negative Dialectics; Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute (Free Press, 1977). 
424 In the course of her 1964 interview with Günter Gaus, Arendt stated her distaste for “intellectual business” that 
arose from witnessing the widespread and “relatively voluntary” Gleichshaltung (co-ordination) of German 
“intellectuals” with the Nazis in 1933. This raises the following question: what does lack of conscientious 
engagement with one’s own acts—as exemplified by Eichmann—tell us about the relation between reason, judgment 
and harm? For a select list of critical readings on the subject, see Shoshana Felman, “Theatres of Justice: Arendt in 
Jerusalen, The Eichmann Trial and the Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of Holocaust” (2001) 27 Critical 
Inquiry 201; Paul Formosa, “Thinking, Conscience and Acting in the Face of Mass Evil” in Andrew Schaap, 
Danielle Celermajer and Vrasidas Karalis, eds., Power, Judgement and Political Evil: In Conversation with Arendt 
(Ashgate, 2010); Roger Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz & Thomas Keenan, eds. Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on 
Ethics and Politics (Fordham University Press, 2010).   
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unprecedented and egregious crimes under discussion, namely crimes against humanity. Instead, 
it could lead us to think about the importance of an “agonistic understanding of law.”425 Such a 
take would foreground law's dependence on the political acceptance or contestation of legal 
strictures, maxims, and constraints. Especially with the advent of mass crimes such as crimes 
against humanity, Arendt asks us to attend to law's dependence on the human capacity to resist 
‘illegal’ compulsions, and urges us to redefine the meaning and merit of legal institutions in light 
of the responsibility of all concerned for their maintenance, sustenance, and functioning.426  
 Foregrounding this debate, in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt 
detranscendentalizes Kant by linking Kant’s judgment of taste to empirical sociability and lived 
experience.427 However, she does not confuse Kant’s idea of enlarged thinking with an actual 
dialogue with others. Instead, she introduces the notion of interdependence between judgment 
and speech (or communication). In this sense, Arendt interprets Kant’s Critique of Judgment not 
as a theory of aesthetic judgment, but as an answer to the more general question of “how do I 
judge?” She also draws a distinction between common sense and community sense, a notion 
further explored in the work of Jennifer Nedelsky and others writing in the area of human rights. 
Working with the notion of community sense, Arendt uncovers a foundation not only for humans 
as political beings but also for the idea of humanity at large, a finding that is often overlooked in 
the literature on her theory of judgment.428 Here, I would like to bring back this sense of the 																																																								
425 See Lida Maxwell, “Towards an Agonistic Understanding of Law: Law and Politics in Hannah Arendt’s 
Eichmann in Jerusalem” (2010) 11 Contemporary Political Theory 88. On the issue of morality and politics of law 
concerning Nazi crimes, see Diana Taylor, “Hannah Arendt on Judgment: Thinking for Politics” (2002) 10 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 151; Craig Reeves, “Exploding the Limits of Law: Judgment and 
Freedom in Arendt and Adorno” (2009) 15 Res Publica 137; Seyla Benhabib, ed. Politics in Dark Times: Encounters 
with Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
426 The literature on this debate is immense. For a select set of critical readings that concentrates precisely on this 
subject, see Samir (2004) “Writing and Judging: Adorno, Arendt and the Chiasmus of Natural History” Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 30 (4): 445-475; Parekh, Serena (2008) Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity: A 
Phenomenology of Human Rights Routledge; Gandesha, Goldman, and Avery (2010) “An Antinomy of Political 
Judgment: Kant, Arendt and the Role of Purposiveness in Reflective Judgment” Continental Philosophy Review 43 
(3): 331-352; Degryse, Anthony (2011) “Sensus Communis as a Foundation for Men as Political Beings: Arendt’s 
Reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment” Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (3): 345-358; Villa, Dana (2012) 
“From the Critique of Identity to Plurality of Politics: Reconsidering Adorno and Arendt” in Lars Rensmann and 
Samir Gandesha, eds., Arendt and Adorno: Political and Philosophical Investigations. Stanford University Press.  
427 See Hannah Arendt & Ronald Beiner, Lectures on Kant's political philosophy (University of Chicago Press, 
1989).  
428 On this issue, see Ronald Beiner, “Rereading Hannah Arendt’s Kant Lectures” (1997) 23 Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 21; Paul Formosa, “Thiking, Willing, Judging” (2009) 4 Crossroads 53; Avery Goldman, “An Antimony 
of Political Judgment: Kant, Arendt and the Role of Purposiveness in Reflective Judgment” (2010) 43 Continental 
Philosophy Review 331; Roger Berkowitz & Majid Yar, “From Actor to Spectator: Hannah Arendt’s Two Theories 
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political groundedness of collective action vis-à-vis our notion of collective responsibility and 
extend this debate to criminal judgments pertaining to individual acts leading to state criminality, 
political violence, or both. This is the very category of criminal acts that fall under the purview of 
crimes against humanity legislation, the key focus of this dissertation. 
 Of Arendt's completed works, the “Postscriptum” to Thinking, the first volume of The Life 
of the Mind, and her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy are widely considered to be her 
definitive remarks on judgment. These texts are privileged for two reasons. First, they were 
written after Arendt's controversial text, Eichmann in Jerusalem. It was Arendt's recognition of 
the role that Eichmann's inability to think played in his war crimes which motivated her to 
analyze more fully not only the “human activity” of thinking, but those of willing and judging as 
well. In addition, in both The Life of the Mind and the Kant Lectures, Arendt treats judgment as a 
distinct human activity with a unique potential. In these later works, though Arendt does indeed 
reformulate her notion of judgment, she does not depoliticize it. On the contrary, the effects of 
what Arendt refers to as “dark times” are long-term and pervasive and, moreover, the function of 
making judgments within such an expanded context remains as politically germane as it was in 
the immediate aftermath of WWII.  
 The basic project of Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy could be identified 
as an attempt to ground the idea of human dignity within the context of the publicly displayed 
“words and deeds” that constitute the realm of human affairs and, of course, politics. Her attempt 
to redefine human dignity also involves a strong philosophical response to Plato's impugning of 
dignity from the polis. The Kant Lectures bring this distinct philosophical take on the political 
nature of genuine human conduct to its completion: the enactment of public deeds presupposes a 
company of engaged spectators who draw meaning by judging what is enacted in the public 
sphere. In other words, Arendt appropriates and reconceptualizes Kant’s work in such a way that 
judgment, while a distinct faculty, nonetheless retains an utmost political character. To put 
Arendt’s conclusion in a specific international criminal law and crimes against humanity context, 
it is not possible to kill, plunder, violate, rape and decimate entire populations using state power 
or official condonement unless there was wide-spread complicity for such egregious acts on the 																																																																																																																																																																																			
of Judgment” (2010) 26 Philosophy and Social Criticism 1; and Roger Berkowitz, ed. Thinking in Dark Times: 
Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics (Fordham University Press, 2010).  
	 208	
ground.  
 
II. TOWARDS AN ENGAGED THEORY OF JUDGMENT AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
 The notion of collective responsibility indeed proves legally and morally unsustainable if 
it is taken to be an unqualified application of the Kantian model of individual moral 
responsibility to society at large.429 However, it emerges as a more coherent phenomenon if we 
choose to formulate it in terms of moral choices leading to willing acts that are above and beyond 
the singular capacity of autonomous individual agents.430 Our desire for accountability in the case 
of  actions of groups and institutions that cause harm and injustice in the society at large could be 
satiated, at least partially, if we allow the lens of collective responsibility to refocus our attention 
from intentionality of harm to processes concerning its production or possible curtailment.431  
 In the field of legal theory pertaining to criminal justice, the biggest controversy 																																																								
429 For a strong philosophical critique of the direct application of the Kantian model with reference to legal 
obligations, see David Copp, “What Collectives are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory” (1984) 23 Dialogue 
249; and Kendy M. Hess, “Because They Can: The Basis for the Moral Obligations of Collectives” (2014) 38 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 203. Philosophers who reject rank individualism and a self-interested legal culture 
tend to reject schisms between legal norms and community values, institutionalized separation of law from morals, 
supremacy of intricate regimes of legislation, and adjudication over social truths. They also tend to stand against the 
culture of rampant litigation for seeking justice. The alienation of individuals from each other and from their 
communities is easily bred within highly complex political and legal systems. This issue is squarely taken up by 
communitarian critiques of law in legal theory. See for instance, Chantal Mouffe, "Democratic citizenship and the 
political community" in her Dimensions of radical democracy: Pluralism, citizenship, community (Verso, 1992) at 
225-239.  
430 On the legal significance of the concept, see Joel Feinberg’s work, especially his Doing and deserving; essays in 
the theory of responsibility, supra note 6. Also see Linda Raznik, “Collective Responsibility and Duties to Respond” 
(2001) 27 Social Theory and Practice 455; Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social 
Connection Model” (2006) 23 Social Philosophy and Policy 102; Ronald Tinnevelt, “Collective Responsibility, 
National Peoples and the International Order” (2009) 2 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 147; and Margaret 
Gilbert, “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions” (2009) 144 Philosophical Studies 167.  
431 On the issue of “communities of judgment,” Jennifer Nedelsky makes a strong argument in support of the social 
foundations of judgment. Nedelsky posits that the debates over “universal” human rights versus abuses in the name 
of culture and tradition are best understood as conflicts between different communities of judgment. Using Hannah 
Arendt’s work on judgment as a starting point, she addresses the problems and possibilities that arise out of Arendt’s 
view that judgment relies on a “common sense” shared by members of a community of judging subjects. Nedelsky 
points out that “common sense,” “community,” and “other judging subjects” are concepts not fully developed in 
Arendt’s theory. This leads to her account of the concept of “enlarged mentality” as the basis for human rights. There 
remains, however, the thorny question of how one could decide to change or oppose “common sense” when it seems 
to be presupposed for judgment to be possible. As we attend to concrete manifestation of the problem of judgment 
across communities, our linked capacities for autonomy and judgment emerge as complementary rather than 
contradictory faculties and capacities. Nedelsky’s insights on Arendt’s theory of judgment prove most useful in the 
context of collective responsibility. See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Communities of Judgment and Human Rights” (2000) 1 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 245.  
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concerning collective responsibility involves the method of its attribution. Without grounds for 
ascertaining collective responsibility, received wisdom has it that there is no possibility for 
judgment. Legally speaking, collective responsibility is defined mainly in terms of duties to 
respond to the victims of collective crimes. Therefore, it invokes a reverse reading that is heavily 
situation-bound. Accordingly, reasonable fear on the part of victimized groups and communities 
creates duties to respond that concern both members of the perpetrating group and the society at 
large. This circumscribed account of collective responsibility may offer us a justification for 
making judgments about collective responsibility that are compatible with the separateness and 
autonomy of persons. However, it still leaves a number of critical questions unattended. For 
instance, could we defend the claim that collective responsibility can be assigned based on group 
membership?. For the purpose of examining the nature of legal judgment under the strenuous 
circumstances of egregious crimes, collective responsibility is indeed best understood in terms of 
societal duties to respond to the victims of collective crimes rather than attribution of collective 
guilt and culpability. 432  If applied to individual accountability-based adjudication of state 
criminality, this presupposition would translate into the need to determine whether a person in a 
position of high office and responsibility used all available means to subvert and constrain 
damages that were implicated by egregious acts committed using public resources, in addition to 
the determination of whether the individual in question partook in these acts.  
 The responsibilities moral agents have in relation to global structural social processes 
with unjust consequences constitute another good case in point for further debate on the 
inadequacies endemic to existing criminal liability schemes when applied to mass crimes. How 
ought moral agents, whether individual or institutional, conceptualize their responsibilities in 																																																								
432 Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties and thus only moral agents could be subjected to 
criminal attribution. This standard places serious constraints on the determination of which collectives can bear 
action-demanding duties or be rendered accountable for societal harm. It is erroneous to assume that individual 
agents can bear duties and full scale of legal obligations regarding actions that only a collective could perform. This 
leaves us at a loss when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally 
desirable action and no collective exists. It also causes problems concerning attribution of guilt and adjudication of 
crimes involving collectivities. Collectivization of duties and introduction of notions such as “public responsibility” 
may alleviate some of the problem. Specifically, we could define individual duties to take steps towards forming a 
collective sense of responsibility, which then incurs a duty over collective and cumulative action. However, this 
problem cannot be so easily overcome with the adjudication of mass crimes and attribution of guilt. See Marion 
Smiley, “From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs: Rethinking Collective Moral Responsibility” (2010) 1 Journal 
of Law and Policy 171; Tracy Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Context (Oxford University Press, 2011); 
and Anne Schwenkenbecher, “Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations” (2013) 26 Ratio 310.  
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relation to global injustice, for instance, if they do so at all? In this case, a model of collective 
responsibility deriving from global social connections and interdependencies may serve as the 
foundation for defining obligations of justice that arise from structural social processes. As 
detailed in the work of Iris Marion Young, for instance, such a social connection model of 
responsibility dictates that all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes 
that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices.433 This is quite 
different from the standard model of criminal responsibility that puts emphasis on liability. This 
alternative model does not isolate perpetrators. Instead, it judges background conditions of action 
as well as consequences. It is forward-looking and relies upon shared responsibility. Furthermore, 
it can be discharged only through collective action and as such, would not fit into the criminal 
justice model per se but would necessitate the inclusion of alternative modes of justice. As such, 
Marion Young’s social connection model and Arendt’s notion of community sense have more in 
common than at first meets the eye, and this is a hopeful overlap for any future discussion on 
collective responsibility in international criminal law under circumstances dictated by mass 
atrocities and state criminality.  
 
A. The Threshold Question 
 In terms of commission of mass crimes such as those defined by crimes against humanity, 
which is the subject matter of this work, could we possibly redefine the legal threshold to 
determine whether a collective shares the intention to harm a select group, which is the 
distinctive feature of collective as opposed to individual responsibility? There are at least three 
criteria of adequacy for an account of shared criminal intention, namely disjunction, concurrence, 
and obligation.434 Accordingly, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly 
committed to intend as a body to commit an act in the future. In other words, there is the element 																																																								
433 See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford University Press, 2011). On the application of 
restitutive justice at a global scale, see Jacob Schiff, “Confronting Political Responsibility: The Problem of 
Acknowledgement” (2008) 23 Hypatia 99; Henning Hahn, “The Global Consequences of Participatory 
Responsibility” (2008) 5 Journal of Global Ethics 43; and Todd Calder, “Shared Responsibilty, Global Structural 
Injustice and Restitution” (2009) 36 Social Theory and Practice 263. 
434 See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998); Michael 
Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Elisabeth Pacherie, “Framing Joint Action” (2011) 2 Review of Philosophy and Psychology 173; and Darrell Cole, 
“War and Intention” (2011) 10 Journal of Military Ethics 174. 
	 211	
of premeditation as well as active participation in the commission of a violent act or acts. The 
problem is that, in the case of societal and political crimes, many instances of wrongdoing and 
violence appear to be of a distinctly spontaneous kind, without clear signs of premeditation. It is 
true that when one group commits genocide against another, the genocide is collective in the 
sense that the wrongfulness of genocide is morally distinct from the aggregation of individual 
murders that make up the genocidal killings in their entirety.  Even then, however, it may not be 
possible to prove, or indeed to find a clear framework for, determining shared intentions for 
genocide for each of the perpetrators of these criminal acts. The problem, which I would rephrase 
as the problem of collective wrongdoing, is how to assign blame to individual contributors for 
distinctly collective acts of violence, when none of those individual contributors is singularly 
guilty of the Wrongdoing (with a capital W) in question.  
 In such instances, suffice it to say that intention is not merely a private mental act known 
only by those who express their intentions in public. Rather, intention is a communal act. 
Meanwhile, it is only observable circumstances and consequences that determine the justiciability 
of intention in criminal law. Here, Christopher Kutz’s Complicity Principle provides a good 
starting point for tackling the problem of intentionality in societal and political mass crimes.435 																																																								
435See Christoper Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge University Press, 2000). On the 
issue of collective complicity, also see Larry May, “Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age” (2002) 111 
Philosophical Review 483; Garrath Williams, “No Participation without Implication: Understanding the Wrongs we 
do Together” (2002) 8 Res Publica 201; Torbjorn Tannsjo, “The Myth of Innocence: On Collective Responsibility 
and Collective Punishment” (2007) 36 Philosophical Papers 295; Tracy Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective 
Contexts (Oxford University Press, 2011); Uwe Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability and the Moral Equality of Combatants” 
(2012) 16 Journal of Ethics 339; and Brian Lawson, “Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing” (2013) 16 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 227. Over the past decade or so political leaders around the world have begun to 
apologize for, and seek reconciliation between the perpetrators and victims of, large-scale moral wrongs such as 
slavery, past campaigns of ethnic cleansing, and official regimes of racial segregation. This movement towards a 
politics of “moral healing” and the emergence of an official regime of requesting forgiveness is in effect at odds with 
full-fledged reconciliation concerning societal wrongs, unless it leads to concrete policies of amelioration, structural 
change, and implementation of restorative justice measures. For wrongs caused by state-sanctioned moral atrocities, 
and requiring mass participation and endorsement, interpersonal reconciliation is not likely to be a promising model 
for providing closure. In this context, Isaacs’ work is particularly relevant. She relates intentional collective action to 
collective moral responsibility, as distinct from collective guilt. She also traces the pedigree of individual 
responsibility for (and in) collective wrongs and links collective obligations with individual obligations. The 
remaining question, at least in the context of criminal law, pertains to individual moral responsibility and possibilities 
of accountability in wrongful and harmful social and political practices. An interesting case in this regard is the 
matter of combatants discussed by Steinhoff. According to the dominant position in the just war tradition from 
Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no “moral equality of combatants” for criminal justice purposes. In 
other words, combatants participating in a justified war may kill enemy combatants participating in an unjustified 
war. In the meantime, where combatants violate the rights of innocent people—known as collateral damage in 
humanitarian law—they are in fact liable to attack by the combatants even on the unjustified side for self-defense. 
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Kutz’s work examines the relationship between collective responsibility and individual guilt. He 
presents a rigorous philosophical account of the nature of our relations to social groups in which 
we participate, and then links this debate to contemporary moral theory. For him, there are two 
prevailing theories of moral philosophy, Kantianism and consequentialism, both of which have 
difficulties dealing with the issue of complicity in a legal context. For Kutz, similar to Arendt, a 
richer and more grounded theory of accountability demands that our understanding of collective 
action not only allow but call for redefining individual responsibility in collective settings via 
complicity. 
 No doubt Kutz’ principle ought to be expanded to link it with the legal phenomenon of 
attribution of collective responsibility. In this context, the view I purport is that individuals are 
blameworthy for collective harms insofar as they knowingly participate in those harms, and that 
said individuals remain blameworthy regardless of whether they succeed in making a causal 
contribution to those harms.436 In this sense, my argument for collective responsibility is based on 
contra-factual reasoning. For instance, if a collective takes no active responsibility for the 
conservation of life and livelihood of all of its members but especially ignores those with 
vulnerabilities, then it is right to presume that there emerges collective responsibility for the harm 
that ensues from lack of provision for any necessary protections.437 This is one way to avoid the 																																																																																																																																																																																			
That fact on its own gives us a hint about the fluidity of the concepts of liability, culpability, and accountability, even 
under the most rigid circumstances such as active warfare.  
436 In support of my proposition, see Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject 
Theory (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000). One of the most distinguished social philosophers of our times, 
Margaret Gilbert develops her arguments around a plural subject theory of human sociality, first introduced in her On 
Social Facts and Living Together. See Margaret Gilbert, Living together: Rationality, sociality, and obligation 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), and her earlier work, On social facts (Princeton University Press, 1992). In 
Sociality and Responsibility, Gilber presents an extended discussion of her proposal that joint commitments 
inherently involve obligations and rights, and thus proposes a new theory of obligations and rights that deviates from 
individualistic agency arguments. Presenting political obligation, collective remorse, collective guilt, shared 
intention, and important classes of rights and obligations from a plural subject theory perspective, Gilbert’s work is 
very relevant to legal scholars who engage the subject of collective responsibility. Also see Margaret Gilbert, 
“Collective guilt and collective guilt feelings” (2002) 6 The Journal of Ethics 115; and her Joint commitment: How 
we make the social world (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
437 For a strong take on environmental justice and collective responsibility, see Mary Oksanen, “Species Extinction 
and Collective Responsibility” (2007) in The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy (Vol. 3 
at 179-183). On the issue of what we owe to the world at large, David Zoller argues that while it is well-recognized 
that many everyday consumer behaviors, such the purchasing of sweatshop goods, come at a very heavy cost to the 
global poor, it has proven difficult to argue that contributors are somehow morally complicit in those outcomes. The 
problem concerning marginal contributions to distant harms stems from lack of explicit knowledge of the 
aforementioned consequences which consumers could have born in mind. Critics taking this approach reasonably 
argue that distant and inadvertent acts that cause harm provide insufficient grounds for moral or legal blame. 
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problem of intentionality that clouded Arendt’s path, in terms of identifying wrongdoing that is 
not seen or known as wrongdoing by either the person who commits it or by those who condone 
it.  
 At this point, the writings of David Miller on national responsibility, read alongside Karl 
Jasper’s work on societal responsibility, are of great relevance. In his work on national 
responsibility and global justice, Miller conceptualizes and justifies a particular model of national 
responsibility—a model that may be helpful in devising a wholesome approach to collective 
responsibility in terms of justice.438 His conceptualization proceeds in two steps. He starts by 
developing two models of collective responsibility, the like-minded group model and the 
cooperative practice model. He then proceeds to discuss national responsibility as a species of 
collective responsibility, and argues that nations have features such that both models of collective 
responsibility apply to them. I would argue that Miller’s like-minded model does not provide a 
plausible conceptualization of collective responsibility in the politico-legal realm at all, as it tends 
to rely upon a bucolic, romanticized notion of a nation as an ethically cohesive unit.439 The 
collective practice model, on the other hand, could provide a strong argument for formulating 
state criminality-related collective responsibility, as is widely present in the context of crimes 
against humanity. The standard example used in this context is, of course, the conceptualization 
of crimes pertaining to societal and political violence under the Third Reich.440  																																																																																																																																																																																			
However, the damage that agents bring about through their contributions to distant collective wrongs ultimately 
depends upon our morally sparse and individualistic take on everyday purchases and decisions. In this instance, 
contributors who knowingly disregard distant harms, rather than being reckless or negligent about consequences they 
could have foreseen, directly perpetuate the moral invisibility and the lack of recognition from which the global poor 
generally suffer. For Zoller, this provides agents with clearer moral reasons to refrain from knowing participation in 
unstructured collective harms. See David Zoller, “Moral Responsibility for Distant Collective Harms” (2015) 18 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 995. Also see Bjorn Pettersson, “Co-responsibility and Causal Involvement” 
(2013) 41 Philosophia 847. 
438 See David Miller, "National responsibility and global justice" (2008) 11 Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy 383. 
439 For a critique of Miller’s work, see Roland Pierik, “Collective responsibility and national responsibility” (2008) 
11 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 465; and K. Lippert-Rasmussen, “Responsible 
nations: Miller on national responsibility” (2009) 2 Ethics & Global Politics 21.  
440 To reiterate an otherwise well-known historical vignette, Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany by the 
President of the Weimar Republic Paul von Hindenburg on January 1933. The Nazi Party then began to eliminate all 
political opposition and consolidate its power. By 1934 Hitler became dictator of Germany, by merging the powers 
and offices of the Chancellery and Presidency. This was further entrenched by a national referendum held on 19 
August 1934, confirming Hitler as the sole Führer (leader) of Germany. Consequently, all power was centralized in 
Hitler's office, and his word became above all laws. As to be expected, opposition to Hitler's rule was ruthlessly 
suppressed and members of the liberal, socialist, and communist opposition were killed, imprisoned, or exiled. The 
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 In this regard, Miller attempts to attribute to nations the kind of responsibility that is 
generally vested in states as legal actors. Unfortunately, models of statist legal responsibility 
disregard society’s inner dynamics. In addition, they sanction the differences between intrastate 
and interstate forms of law as irremovable. Miller aims to build up the moral and historical 
prestige of the nation‐state to make it a viable agent embracing a claim of universal morality. 
Miller’s nations thus become political organizations capable of instantiating great moral truths. 
This results in an account that is compassionately cosmopolitan, and yet with very little interest 
in or engagement with local forms of delivery of justice that relate to mass violence either within 
state perimeters or globally.441 
 Overall, however, Miller’s work raises a number of interesting questions concerning both 
weak and strong variants of collective responsibility and state-centric law.442 For instance, he 
defends a theory of connections to address remedial responsibilities amongst states. His 
interventions on the subject of cosmopolitanism in particular endorse a position where states that 
are causally and morally responsible for deprivation and suffering in other states may be held 
remedially responsible for their actions. This is despite the fact that there is no international 
mechanism to ensure that remedially responsible states would offer assistance to or 
accountability for the suffering of affected states and societies, other than instances of victor’s 
justice and imposed war reparations. As such, this job squarely falls into the hands of 
international public law for purposes of enforcement. In this regard, Miller’s claims of universal 
morality as applied to international or transnational law are severely idealistic. In contradiction, I 
would argue that we must initiate a kind of deflation of both the nation and the state as 
foundational moral agents in international law. Just as the diminution of responsibility for mass 																																																																																																																																																																																			
implementation of the regime's racial policies culminated in the mass murder of Jews and other minorities in the 
Holocaust. For a detailed account of law during the Third Reich, see the historical pieces written and published 
during the Second World War: K. Loewenstein, “Law in the Third Reich” (1936) 45 The Yale Law Journal 716; V. 
L. Gott, “The National Socialist theory of international law” (1938) 32 The American Journal of International Law 
704; as well as the more recent debates such as D. F. Vagts, “International law in the Third Reich” (1990) 84 The 
American Journal of International Law 661; Martin Lippman, “They Shoot Lawyers Don't They: Law in the Third 
Reich and the Global Threat to the Independence of the Judiciary” (1992) 23 Cal. W. Int'l LJ 257; and David 
Dyzenhaus, "Legal theory in the collapse of Weimar: contemporary lessons?" (1997) 91 American Political Science 
Review 121. 
441 See T. J. Levy, “National and statist responsibility” (2008) 11 Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 485; and Margaret Moore, “Global justice, climate change and Miller’s theory of responsibility” 
(2008) 11 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 501. 
442 See in particular David Miller, "Collective responsibility and international inequality in the law of peoples" In 
Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (2006) at 191-205. 
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crimes from the collective entirely to the individual is faulty, the aggrandizement of individual 
moral agency and accountability to the grandiose entity of the state or the construct of the nation 
as the ultimate truth bearer is equally hyperbolical.  
 
B. The Outcomes Perspective 
 At this point, as an alternative to cosmopolitan and liberal accounts such as Miller’s work, 
I will examine collective responsibility from an outcomes perspective. A central feature of my 
analysis is to give precision to the idea that moral responsibility for criminal acts implies a 
reasonable demand and possibility that an agent should have acted otherwise. Allocation of moral 
responsibility to individuals concerning complex collective actions that result in mass harm is an 
issue that goes well beyond “the problem of many hands” as exemplified by the classic Frankfurt 
counter-examples.443 Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in terms of responsibility for 
past actions or as a question about the nature of moral agency. Yet the word responsibility also 
ushers in deep concerns about human agency, more than the answers it possibly elicits in legal 
terms. This particular take on responsibility also relates it to civic virtues that can be 
demonstrated both by individuals and organizations or institutions. Such a virtue-based account 
of responsibility occupies a distinctive place in the context of discussions of the moral and 
political needs of societies, especially those that have survived mass political violence and 
trauma.  
 This is an opportune moment to bring in Karl Jaspers’ work. When Hitler came to power 
in 1933, Jaspers was taken by some degree of surprise, as he had thought that this movement 
would destroy itself from within, leading to the reorganization and liberation of other political 																																																								
443 Matthew Braham & Martin Van Hees "An anatomy of moral responsibility" (2012) 121 Mind 601. As discussed 
in detail by Braham and Van Hees, Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples) were presented by 
philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the "principle of alternate possibilities", which holds that 
an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. Frankfurt infers that a 
person could still be morally responsible for what he has done even if he could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt's 
examples involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behaviour even though they lack the freedom to act 
otherwise. Frankfurt thus suggests that we question the fallacy of the notion that coercion precludes an agent from 
moral responsibility. See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility" (1969) 23 The 
Journal of Philosophy 829. This line of reasoning and debate on responsibility under coercion resurfaced in more 
recent work such as Jay R. Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard University Press, 1984); John 
Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); and Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will (Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
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forces active at the time.444 His expectations did not materialize, and because his wife was 
Jewish, Jaspers qualified as an enemy of the German state. Consequently, from 1933 onwards, he 
was excluded from the higher councils of the university. In 1935 the first part of his work on 
logic, entitled Vernunft und Existenz (Reason and Existence, 1955), appeared. This was followed 
by a book on Nietzsche in 1936, an essay on Descartes in 1937, and in 1938 his 
Existenzphilosophie.445 Meanwhile, a series of decrees were promulgated against him, including 
removal from his professorship and a total ban on any further publication. These measures 
effectively barred him from living and working in Germany. Permission was finally granted to 
him in 1942 to go to Switzerland, but a condition was imposed by the Nazis that required his wife 
to remain behind in Germany. Jaspers chose to stay with his wife and remain in Germany. Both 
of them had decided, in case of an arrest, to commit suicide. In 1945 he was told that his 
deportation was scheduled to take place on April 14. On March 30, Heidelberg was occupied by 
the American forces and Jaspers and his wife avoided deportation. 
 Marked by the events of the pre-war years, Jasper’s detailed philosophical examination of 
the contemporary state and nature of humankind, titled Man in the Modern Age. This is a seminal 
work that touches upon precisely the issue of our responsibility for our own and others’ future.446 
Elucidating his theories on a variety of topics pertaining to contemporary and future human 
existence, the volume meditates upon the tension between mass-order and individual human life, 
our present conception of human life, and the potential for a better future. Jaspers wrote this work 
before the advent of the Second World War, but at a time when Nazi ideology and institutional 
practices were beginning to run rampant in Germany. This particular volume constitutes the 
departure point for the next section of the present debate on collective responsibility.  
 Jaspers’ contribution to the literature on collective responsibility took an even more 
pointed form with the publication of Die Schuldfrage [The Guilt Question], which addressed the 																																																								
444  See the Karl Jaspers entry of Encyclopedia Britanica by Hans Saner at 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karl-Jaspers [21.03.2017].  
445 See Karl Jaspers, Vernunft und Existenz, Groningen: Wolters. Translated as, Reason and Existenz, trans. W. Earle( 
New York: Noonday Press, 1955); Nietzsche: Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens, Berlin: de 
Gruyter. Translated as Nietzsche: An Introduction to his Philosophical Activity, trans. C. F. Wallraff and F. J. 
Schmitz (University of Arizona Press, 1965); and Existenzphilosophie, Berlin: de Gruyter. Translated as Philosophy 
of Existence, trans. R. F. Grabau (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).  
446 See Karl Jaspers, Die Geistige Situation der Zeit, Berlin: de Gruyter. Translated as Man in the Modern Age, trans. 
E. Paul and C. Paul (London: Routledge, 1933). The original volume in German came out in 1931.  
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question of the collective responsibility of the German people for the criminal actions of their 
government.447 In that short treatise, Jaspers listed four types of guilt. The first category, criminal 
guilt, derives from violating unequivocal laws and is capable of being determined based on 
objective proof. Its jurisdiction rests with the courts. The second category, political guilt, 
involves the deeds of statesmen and implicates the citizens of a state as having to bear the 
consequences of the deeds of the state whose power governs them and under whose order they 
live. Jurisdiction of this type of guilt rests with the power and will of the victor if the state was 
defeated militarily, or, again with the courts if this was a civil war situation. The charge would be 
failure to exercise political prudence to mitigate arbitrary use of power. Then there is the category 
of the moral guilt. It pertains to the actions of those who cannot act otherwise than as an 
individual. They are nonetheless deemed morally responsible for all their deeds, including the 
execution of political and military orders. Its jurisdiction, however, purely rests with one’s 
conscience, and is retained within the community. This text was written prior to the Nuremberg 
and Eichmann Trials. In this regard, Jaspers’ last category, that of metaphysical guilt, is the most 
troubling one, and it also became a point of contention in his lengthy exchanges with Arendt 
during the post-War years. Accordingly, Jaspers assumes that there exists a solidarity among men 
as humans that makes each co-responsible for crimes committed in his presence or with his 
knowledge.  
 No doubt, the underlying assumptions of Jasper’s work on guilt can easily lead to the 
sanctimonious political moralism that has often been used to justify acts of vengeance and 
collective punishment. It may also lead to a conception of war as a crusade that requires 
unconditional surrender by the enemy.448 Still, there is still room for further deliberation. For 
instance, for Jaspers metaphysical guilt results from confining our solidarity to the closest human 
ties—family, friends, neighborus, ethno-religious brethren, etc.—rather than extending it to all of 
humanity. It makes us suffer from lack of proportion in terms of judging our world and human 																																																								
447 See the English translation as Karl Jaspers, The question of German guilt (Fordham University Press, 2009). This 
work was translated by E. B. Ashton and it was published in a series edited by John Caputo. The original version 
came out in German back in 1946 and the first English edition was published in 1947. See Karl Jaspers, Die 
Schuldfrage, Heidelberg: Schneider ([translated as, The Question of German Guilt, trans. E. B. Ashton] The Dial 
Press, 1947).  
448 See Hannah Arendt et al, Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 1926-1969. (Harcourt Brace Jonakovich, 
1992).  
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value. And most importantly, Jaspers acknowledges that jurisdiction over metaphysical guilt for 
mass political violence lies with no court. As such, this easily abused concept reminds us of the 
myriad ways in which our lives are entangled with, and may profit from, the suffering of others.  
 
III. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL JUDGMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
JASPERS ALTERNATIVE?  
 Ascertaining litigation for crimes reaching the dimensions of what Jaspers had in mind 
remains an ongoing quest, starting with the precedents set by post-WWII trials. Indeed, the trial 
of major Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg (1949) is considered a landmark event in the 
development of international criminal law, and continues to be highly influential in our 
understanding of international criminal law in post-conflict settings.449 The plethora of essays and 
manuscripts written on the Trial, discussing key legal, political, and philosophical questions 
raised both at the time and in historical perspective, are indicative of the crowned position it 
occupies in legal history. Those involved in the tribunal, the establishment of the tribunal, the 
trial process itself, and the debate that followed its judgment have all been subject to rigorous 
debate. Ranging from the contribution of Nuremberg, to the substantive developments in 
international criminal law, to the philosophical evaluation of legalism in post-conflict systems of 
justice, the persistent significance of Nuremberg is indeed worthy of attention.450 Examinations 
of the Nuremberg legacy in contemporary international criminal justice are already widely 
available.  
 However, the reason why I include a discussion of the Nuremberg Trials in this debate on 
collective responsibility for mass crimes is somewhat different than what is covered in the 
canonized literature on international criminal law. The Nuremberg Judgment is often counted as 																																																								
449 See Diane F. Orentlicher, "Settling accounts: the duty to prosecute human rights violations of a prior regime" 
(1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2537; Steven Ratner, Steven, Jason S. Abrams & James L. Bischoff, Accountability for 
Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
450 See Henry T. King Jr, "The Legacy of Nuremberg" (2002) 34 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 335; Christian Tomuschat, 
"The legacy of Nuremberg" (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 830; and Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. 
Abrams & James L. Bischoff, Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law: beyond the Nuremberg 
legacy (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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the benchmark in international law for the definition and adjudication of individual accountability 
for human rights abuses at a mass scale. In this sense, it did constitute a tipping point in the 
context of legal doctrines concerning the nature of legal responsibility. Still, as I will argue in the 
following paragraphs, this achievement did not alleviate Jaspers’ concern that, for such crimes, 
judgment cannot emanate from the courtroom alone.  
 During the Trial, the concept of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege was put to the test of war 
crimes and, despite a degree of inexactitude, both crimes against humanity and genocide have 
been retroactively codified as a result.451 These developments in adjudication of international 
crimes were then followed by the codification of slavery, forced labor, torture, forced 
disappearances, racial discrimination, and apartheid as indictable crimes. In this sense, the Trial 
also redefined the notion of culpability in international law. It introduced significant changes to 
our understanding of individual criminal responsibility, and despite statutes of limitations and the 
reasonable time period clauses, it opened the path for reinstituting the threshold of legal 
requirements for individual accountability for mass crimes. Aside from its importance for the 
codification of societal and mass crimes in international law, however, the Nuremberg Trial also 
forced us to address the problem of whether and on what basis a successor government must 
prosecute the human rights abuses of a prior regime. Contending that the rule of law and natural 
justice principles require that the very worst crimes be prosecuted no matter what the rank and 
status of the accused person(s), Nuremberg judges proposed that principles of international law, 
both in its customary and conventional forms, impose a duty to investigate and prosecute in such 
extreme cases.452 This take on legality and judgment has been accepted as a foundational premise 
for contemporary international criminal courts.453 However, in terms of the defenses available for 
the accused in international criminal law pertaining to war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
for instance, the generic standardization of prosecutions in national courts as well as in 																																																								451	See Makoto Usami, “Retroactive justice: trials for human rights violations under a prior regime.” In Burton 
Leiser & Tom Campbell, eds. Human rights in philosophy and practice (Routledge, 2001), and Kirsten Sellars, ed. 
Trials for international crimes in Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2016)  
452 See Aryeh Neier, War crimes: Brutality, genocide, terror, and the struggle for justice (Crown Publishing 
Group,1998). 
453 See Cherif M. Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law, Volume 2 Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement 
Mechanisms (Brill, 2008); William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); and the standard text book by Antonio Cassese et al, Cassese's international criminal law 
(Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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international tribunals is causing an increasing number of problems, with significant socio-
political repercussions. The most important substantive defenses at the international level include 
superior orders, command responsibility, tu quoque as a subcategory of argumentum ad 
hominem,454 military necessity, proportionality, and reprisals. Jurisdictional defenses applicable 
in national tribunals, on the other hand, include personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, 
and double jeopardy. Then there are defenses concerning the issue of the location of the tribunal 
or the trial, the status of the presiding judge or judges, and the legitimacy of the court producing 
the judgment.455  
 In this context, if we look at the victor’s justice argument posed about Nuremberg and 
Tokto trials from the point of view of the victims, it is possible to posit that although forgiveness 
is often taken to bear a close connection to societal reconciliation, there is a good deal of 
scepticism about its role in situations where there is no consensus on the moral complexion of the 
past and no clear admission of guilt on the part of the perpetrator. In other words, the conviction-
oriented framework of these post-WWII Military Tribunals are indeed troubling for societal and 
political crimes. Forgiveness without perpetrator acknowledgement aggravates the risk of 
recidivism, yields a substandard and morally compromised form of political accommodation, and 
leads to the silencing and patronizing of the victims, therefore potentially causing further social 
and political alienation and victimization. Guilt becomes inscribed in the collective memory of 
nations as a dividing line, but neither forgiveness nor true understanding emanates from the 
litigation of such crimes alone. Hence the need to underline the importance of legal humility 
concerning mass violence as the impetus for the penning of this last chapter.  
																																																								454	In terms of legal defense,	 arguing ad hominem in its original sense is a legitimate strategy of using an 
interlocutor’s concessions to show that the interlocutor is committed to a certain conclusion. The tu quoque, which 
emerged from this sense as an appeal to commitments implicit in the behaviour of one’s critic, legitimately 
challenges the critic to explain away an apparent inconsistency. The defensive ad hominem is an attack on an 
opponent’s ethos. The circumstantial ad hominem, which attributes the position of one’s opponent to self-interest or 
a dogmatic bias, raises legitimate suspicion about the credibility of the opponent’s statements and arguments. See 
David Hitchcock, “Is there an argumentum ad hominem fallacy?” In Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto, eds. 
Reason reclaimed: Essays in honor of J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (Vale Press, 2007), 187–199.  
455 James Meernik, "Victor's Justice or the Law? Judging And Punishing At The International Criminal Tribunal For 
The Former Yugoslavia" (2003) 47 Journal of Conflict Resolution 140; Victor Peskin, "Beyond Victor's Justice? The 
Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda" (2005) 4 Journal of Human Rights 213; Bill Wringe, "Why punish war crimes? Victor’s justice and 
expressive justifications of punishment" (2006) 25 Law and Philosophy 159; William A. Schabas, "Victor's Justice: 
Selecting Situations at the International Criminal Court" (2009) 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 535. 
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IV. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AS AN EPICURIAN CURE FOR THE CONUNDRUMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW? 
 From Epicurus onwards, the notion of moral responsibility based on a moral agent’s 
causal ownership of his/her actions, as opposed to the agent’s ability to act or choose otherwise, 
has troubled legal thinking. This is indeed the crux on which aforementioned Frankfurt examples 
were built.456 It also relates to the puzzles surrounding Arendt’s view on the banality of evil and 
the possibility/impossibility of the punishment of the unforgiveable. Epicurus considered it a 
necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it has been the agent and 
not anything else that brought the action about. 457  Thus, the central question of moral 
responsibility was whether the agent was a cause of the action, or whether the agent was forced to 
act by some other force. Accordingly, actions are to be attributed to agents if it is in their actions 
that agents, qua moral beings, manifest themselves. Here, the question of moral engagement 
becomes the most important component of [criminal] acts, which significantly differs from the 
outcomes perspective discussed above.458 In his narration of how humans become moral beings, 
Epicurus envisaged a complex theory of moral responsibility and moral development, which 
could indeed find application in the area of collective responsibility and mass crimes. Epicurean 
ethics does not have the function of developing or justifying a moral system that allows for the 
																																																								456	See Frankfurt counterexamples, supra note 459.			
457 See Epicurus, The Essential Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragments (Prometheus 
Books, 1993). This popular arrangement of fragments follows the outline set forth by C. Bailey's 1926 collection on 
the thinker. One of the major philosophers in the Hellenistic period (the three centuries following the death of 
Aristotle in 323 B.C.E.), Epicurus developed an unsparingly materialistic and empiricist epistemology, and is known 
for his hedonistic ethics. He rejected the existence of Platonic forms and an immaterial soul, and famously declared 
that gods have no influence on our lives. His gospel of freedom from fear proved to be quite popular, and 
communities of Epicureans flourished for centuries after his death. In Anglo-American philosophical traditions, 
Epicurean thought re-emerged primarily in the context of moral responsibility and intentionality. See Phillip Mitsis, 
Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability (Cornell University Press, 1988).  
458 Developing a core conception of moral responsibility, Epicurus’ writings pose the question of what human life 
without moral responsibility would be like. That exploration alone establishes that many robust forms of human 
relationship and situational normativity could continue, absent moral responsibility. However, accountability would 
become impossible. For a full debate on the Epicurean legacy concerning contemporary debates on moral 
responsibility, see Martin John Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Fischer’s work is particularly relevant in its emphasis on the connections between deliberation and action, and 
between free will, freedom of action, and moral responsibility/accountability. This frame of reference ties together 
responsibility for actions, omissions, and consequences.  
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effective allocation of praise and blame.459 Instead, it looks at the choices people make regardless 
of the system they are surrounded by. On the issue of free will and moral responsibility, Harry 
Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise, 
linked with the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept, 
indeed echoes the Epicurean call for deciphering individual agency in collective acts. Thus, the 
central question of moral responsibility in the context of mass crimes and societal violence 
becomes whether the agent was the cause of the action, or whether the agent was forced to act.  
 Some instances of wrongdoing are of a distinctly collective kind. When, for example, one 
group commits genocide against another, this is a collective act of crime in the sense that the 
wrongness of genocide is morally distinct from the aggregation of individual murders that make 
up the genocide. The problem, which I will refer to as the problem of collective wrongs, is that in 
traditional criminal law, how to assign blame for distinctly collective wrongdoing to individual 
contributors, when at least some of those individual contributors are not directly guilty of the 
wrongdoing in question, is a question habitually left unclear. I have already offered Christopher 
Kutz’s Complicity Principle as a starting point for solving this particular problem, although the 
principle ought to be expanded to include a broader and more appropriate range of cases than 
Kutz initially intended. The view I ultimately defend is that individuals are blameworthy for 
collective harms insofar as they knowingly participate in or collaborate in the committal of those 
harms, and that said individuals remain blameworthy regardless of whether they succeed in 
making a causal contribution to those harms.460 This is a distinctly Epicurean take on societal 
crimes and opposes the traditional outcomes oriented litigation methods. Suffice to say, however, 
I am not making this suggestion for it to be incorporated into the relevant bodies of international 
criminal law. Rather, the issue here is how to address mass crimes in a contextualized manner 
and with reference to forms of justice other than restitution.  
																																																								
459 On the issue of the allocation of moral responsibility to individuals in complex collective wrongdoings, see 
Kenton Machina, “Moral Responsibility—What is All the Fuss About?” (2007) 22 Acta Analytica 29; Neil Levy & 
Michael McKenna “Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility” (2009) 4 Philosophy Compass 96; and M. 
Braham & M. van Hees “An Anatomy of Moral Responsibility” (2012) 121 Mind 601. Braham and van Hees’ work 
is particularly significant for its examination of the structure of moral responsibility in relation to outcomes. A 
central feature of their analysis is a condition that they term “avoidance potential,” which indicates that moral 
responsibility implies a reasonable demand that an agent should have acted otherwise.  
460 On this issue, also see Brian Lawson, “Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing” (2013) 16 Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 227. 
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 Regarding this issue of [criminal] intent, another prominent political philosopher of the 
post-WWII era, Michael Bratman, made critical contributions to our understanding of the notion 
of intention and how it relates to criminal action in particular. In Bratman's view, when we settle 
on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct. The commitment involved in 
intending, and its implications for our understanding of shared intention and shared cooperative 
activity, lead to a richer discussion on moral responsibility.461 In the context of philosophy of 
action and moral philosophy, issues about the nature of agency, intention and practical reason, 
free will and moral responsibility, and shared agency are indeed much more easily brought to the 
fore compared to the difficulties we may face with regard to discussing these in the context of 
philosophy of law. In this sense, Bratman’s work Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987) 
permanently altered the landscape of both the philosophy of action and the theory of practical 
rationality by drawing our attention to the complex, constitutive roles that intention plays in 
human agency.462 In particular, his essays on shared agency are of utmost significance for the 
debate on collective responsibility.463  
 If we accept Bratman’s description, the notion of collective responsibility would refer to 
both the responsibility of moral agents for causing harm in the world and the blameworthiness we 
ascribe to them for having caused such harm. Hence, it would assume both a moral and a causal 
component. Criminal law does associate causal responsibility and blameworthiness with groups 
in rare cases such as genocide and crimes against humanity, but for litigation purposes the line in 
the sand is always drawn at individual culpability. Specifically, criminal jurisprudence locates the 
source of moral responsibility in collective actions only if collectives were directly involved in 
																																																								
461 See Michael Bratman, Faces of intention: Selected essays on intention and agency (Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 
462 What happens to our conception of the mind and of rational agency when we take future-directed intentions 
seriously? What is the role of intention as input for practical reasoning? Michael Bratman responded to these 
questions in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In his manuscript Intention, Plans, and Practical 
Reason, Bratman fully developed the main themes of the previous essays and proposed a full-fledged theory of 
intention. In this later work, intentions are treated as essential elements of plans of action. These plans play a basic 
role in practical reasoning, supporting the organization of our activities within a future oriented trajectory. Bratman’s 
work also explores the relationship between intention and intentional action, as well as the distinction between 
intended and expected effects of what one intends. All these issues are very critical for reaching a deeper 
understanding of collective responsibility. See Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (University 
of Chicago Press, 1987). 
463 Michael Bratman, Shared agency: A planning theory of acting together (Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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these acts of harm.464 Here, I beg to differ from this commonplace reference to the notion of 
collective responsibility as derivative of an assumed group morality. I am also standing against 
the assumption that collective responsibility violates principles of individual responsibility and 
fairness concerning criminal attribution. On the contrary, collective responsibility—as well as 
group intentions, collective action, and group blameworthiness—is a coherent construct, and can 
be ascribed to moral agents fairly in cases of societal and political crimes. This attribution, 
however, does not have to be punitive in nature.  
 My reservations about associating collective responsibility with group morality could 
perhaps be explicated further in the context of the structure of the argument that was augmented 
by traditions of religious thought, such as those found in the Old Testament (Tanakh) referring to 
the accounts of the Flood, the Tower of Babel, or Sodom and Gomorrah, as well as the New 
Testament blaming of Jews as an entire race for the killing of Jesus Christ. In these narratives, 
entire communities were punished for their supposed deeds, and to set an example for the rest of 
humanity. In Biblical narratives pertaining to the death of Jesus, for instance, the blame was cast 
not only on the Jews of the time but upon all future generations to come. The core of these 
religious arguments relates to a desire for communal forms of punishment for collective harms. 
No doubt, secular forms of this logic are equally widespread and troubling. Post-9/11 trends of 
anti-Islamism and resultant public policy measures are an all too familiar case in point. Collective 
responsibility translated into a rationale for collective punishment is also regularly used as a 
disciplinary measure in military units, prisons, and psychiatric facilities used for political crimes, 
such as those operated in Russia or in the post-Guantanamo Bay United States.465 Without fail, 
these measures breed distrust and desire for vengeance among the members of the punished 
group and their communities at large. These punishment schemes are also commonly practiced in 
situations of war, based on the presupposition of collective guilt. Collective guilt, or guilt by 
association, is a dangerous claim that assumes groups of humans can bear guilt and should be 
subject to punishment above and beyond the guilt of individual members. Luckily, contemporary 
criminal law operates on the principle that guilt shall only be attributed to a legal person and not 																																																								
464  For a debate on intergenerational collective responsibility, see Janna Thompson, (2006) "Collective 
Responsibility for Historic Injustices" (2006) 30 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 154. 
465 See Melvyn Freeman & Soumitra Pathare, WHO resource book on mental health, human rights and legislation 
(World Health Organization, 2005); and Steven Fish, Democracy derailed in Russia: The failure of open politics 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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to a group or community. Keeping these intricacies and problem-laden historical examples of 
attribution of collective guilt in mind, one must not equate collective responsibility either with 
collective punishment or the collective assignment of presumed moral failure to groups, 
communities or societies. However, this precaution should not restrain us from seeking a 
substantive definition of collective responsibility for mass crimes either.  
 While the majority of debates on collective responsibility continue to deliberate on the 
very possibility of it, a select group of scholars have ushered in two further concerns. The first 
has to do with whether groups can meet stringent conditions of moral responsibility that 
individuals do. Intentionality, as I touched upon briefly in the above paragraphs, becomes key in 
this context. The second concern has to do with the advantages and disadvantages of holding 
particular kinds of groups, such as communities or particular ethno-religious groups, or even 
states, morally responsible in response to harm caused by their direct or indirect actions.466 One 
key example to consider in this area is that of lustration. Often, after a regime-changing war, a 
state engages in lustration in order to secure the condemnation and punishment of dangerous, 
corrupt, or culpable members of the previous political system. Changes in the political structure 
of post-Apartheid South Africa, post-WWII de-Nazification of Germany, or the recent de-
Ba’athification in Iraq are commonly referred cases of lustration. This common practice poses an 
important dilemma from the perspective of how to define and put into practice collective 
responsibility, because even well planned, legally sound, and nuanced lustration involves 
condemning groups of people.467 It also raises important questions about collective agency and 
the rectification of historical injustices. While group treatment might be justified on grounds of 
convenience and political peace in times of transitional justice, there are also valid arguments 																																																								
466 For instance, the proxy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have put front and centre the problem of dealing with non-
uniformed combatants. They also led to questions concerning the legitimacy of resorting to martial violence under 
such circumstances of quasi-occupation. The location of legal agency for attributing responsibility to right the 
wrongs committed after the fact, and who to turn to for that end, remain major issues, especially for the American 
military establishment. The specific problem of non-uniformed combatants and the general problem of justifying war 
are profoundly linked. War is but only one form of generalized collective violence. Collective violence poses a 
particular set of challenges to the application of moral and legal principles within the context of the traditional model 
of criminal responsibility. See Anna Stilz, "Collective responsibility and the state" (2011) 19 Journal of Political 
Philosophy 190; and Christopher Kutz, "The difference uniforms make: collective violence in criminal law and war" 
(2015) 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 148.  
467 This problem is discussed in detail in Avia Pasternak, "The collective responsibility of democratic publics" (2011) 
41 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 99. The main reference used in this context is Hanna Pitkin’s work. See Hanna 
Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (University of California Press, 1967). 
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consistent with due process requirements for wholesale group punishment.468 
 Concomitantly, I would like posit a theory of combined criminal and political 
accountability based on an understanding of collective action and collective responsibility that 
not only allows for but demands individual responsibility. 469  In other words, instead of 
generalizing the sum total of individuals as a collective, the causation I propose implicates a 
movement from the collective back to the individual. No doubt, there isn’t a single, simple, and 
all-encompassing solution to the problem of the relationship between individual and collective 
responsibility for wrongdoing and harm. The one component that most obscures the fundamental 
requirement for ascribing responsibility is that of moral agency. Closer attention to matters of 
individual and collective agency may provide a defensible criterion for establishing when an 
individual is and isn't responsible for the untoward consequences of a collective act.470 For 
instance, not only individuals but organizations and institutions can act and exercise power, and 
thus could be deemed as accountable for harm. This is possible because they possess decision-
making structures that are formal. As such, they could be deemed as “legal persons.” The actions 
of such legal actors are not reducible to the actions of their individual members. Since these legal 
actors/agents could have acted differently or could have been re-organized to change the course 
of their harmful acts, they could also be deemed as morally responsible for the untoward effects 
of the power they exercise upon the larger population. Thus, at least in principle, they are 
blameworthy and could be subject to legal judgments. The ability to exercise power purposely, 																																																								
468 See Yvonne Chiu, "Liberal Lustration" (2011) 19 Journal of Political Philosophy 440. For a larger debate on war 
and justice, see Robert E. Williams & Dan Caldwell, "Jus post bellum: Just war theory and the principles of just 
peace" (2006) 7 International Studies Perspectives 309; Jens Meierhenrich, "The ethics of lustration" (2006) 20 
Ethics & International Affairs 99; Darrel Mollendorf, "Jus ex bello" (2008) 16 Journal of Political Philosophy 123; 
Mark Evans, "Moral responsibilities and the conflicting demands of jus post bellum" (2009) 23 Ethics & 
International Affairs 147; Anatoly Levshin, "Jus Contra Bellum in the Modern States System: Observations on the 
Anomalous Origins of the Crime of Aggressive War" (2015) 10 St Antony's International Review 141. 
469 See Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
470 Albert Flores & Deborah G. Johnson, "Collective responsibility and professional roles" (1983) 93 Ethics 537. 
This is a very interesting debate on the responsibilities of “the peg in the cog,” i.e. individuals working as part of 
large institutions and organization and towards a cumulative end result. The authors reach the conclusion that 
collective responsibility cannot be appropriated to individuals in such situations. Rather, it should be the specific 
individuals and offices that provide the overall design and goals of the organization and determine the distribution of 
duties that should be held responsible for erroneous acts of such organized bodies. For a counter argument on this 
issue, see W. H. Walsh, "Pride, shame and responsibility" (1970) 20 The Philosophical Quarterly 1. Also see 
Virginia Held, "Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible?" (1970) 67 Journal of Philosophy 
471. For Held, the crux of the matter lies in the defining characteristics of a “collectivity,” and how decisions that 
lead to harm are reached. She takes a strong position against “methodological individualism,” which I share full-
heartedly.  
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knowingly as opposed to recklessly or negligently, reveals a particular disposition to abusing 
power, since it is concentrated and institutionalized. Furthermore, I would argue that such legal 
actors’ disposition is not reducible to the dispositions or degrees of blame of the individual 
members who participated in the internal decision-making processes, or even those who led these 
organizations and institutions, which is the dictum used for litigation against crimes against 
humanity, for instance. Instead, there is a need for a larger discussion on the interdependent 
relationship between the individual and the collective in upholding a system of abuse, harm, and 
danger. Here, the Epicurean cure for the conundrums of the debate on moral responsibility comes 
to our rescue as the foreground allowing us to think about intentionality and causal involvement 
in collective acts, and as a call to assume responsibility for our own decisions to act or not to act.  
 
V. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF BLAMEWORTHINESS 
 Whether collective responsibility makes sense as a non-distributive phenomenon, that is 
to say whether it transcends the contributions of particular group members, is a debate that 
remains pivotal for legal theory. In this context, two claims are crucial. The first is that groups, 
unlike individuals, cannot be accountable for intentions, and hence cannot act or cause harm qua 
groups. The second is that groups, as distinct from their individual members, cannot be 
understood as morally blameworthy according to the criteria required by moral responsibility 
argument. Accordingly, we cannot isolate genuinely collective actions, as distinct from the 
identical actions of many persons; and groups, unlike the individuals who belong to them, cannot 
formulate intentions of the kind thought to be necessary to actions. Here, the main worry is about 
the fairness of ascribing collective responsibility to individuals who do not themselves directly 
cause harm, or who do not bring about harm purposefully.471 
 If group intention is a necessary condition of attributing collective responsibility, the 																																																								
471  See Steven Sverdlik, "Collective Responsibility" (1987) 51 Philosophical Studies 61. For him, moral 
blameworthiness requires the existence of bad intentions—or at least moral faultiness—on the part of those being 
held responsible. Otherwise, one cannot seek criminality. On this issue, also see Seumas Miller, "Collective 
responsibility" (2001) 15 Public Affairs Quarterly 65; and Jan Narveson, "Collective responsibility" (2002) 6 The 
Journal of Ethics 179. Miller’s emphasis is typical of the traditional criminal law approach to collective 
responsibility. He underlines joint actions, rather than omissions and complicity that cause grave harm. He also 
makes a clear distinction between retrospective and prospective responsibility, an issue best attended to in the 
context of debates on restorative justice.  
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question then becomes how it can be ascertained.472 In this context, collective behaviours are 
separated from collective actions, the latter arguably caused by the beliefs, desires and wants of 
the collective itself. As such, moral blameworthiness is grounded in the bad intentions of moral 
agents who cause harm, in defining both individual and collective responsibility. If so, how can 
groups, as distinct from their individual members, have bad intentions and demonstrate the ability 
to act on them? Could entire communities be deemed as appropriate bearers of moral 
blameworthiness, guilt, or shame? Critics of the collective responsibility argument concentrate on 
showing either that actions are associated exclusively with individuals, not groups or 
communities, or that groups cannot make choices or hold beliefs in the sense required by the 
formulation of intentions as defined by criminal law.473 Meanwhile, these same critics pay much 
less attention to the nature of collective actions. It may be true that collectivities may not have 
moral faults, since they don't make moral choices in the way that is commonly understood. And 
yet, does that mean by default that they cannot properly be ascribed moral responsibility for 
harmful actions that are only possible if and when individuals act collectively? 
 At the other end of the spectrum, defenders of the collective responsibility argument feel 
compelled to justify both the moral possibility of collective responsibility and the coherence of 
collective responsibility as a moral, and hence possibly legal, construct. To start with, precepts of 
methodological individualism are brought under attack.474 Accordingly, the collective blame that 
we ascribe in mass crimes cannot be realized in terms of individual blameworthiness. 
Furthermore, as exemplified by Larry May’s work, there is a class of predicates that can only be 
true of collectives. May uses the relational theory of Jean-Paul Sartre to argue that groups can 
legitimately be ascribed actions in cases where individuals act together in a manner that would 
																																																								
472  See Angelo J. Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment. Vol. 9. (Springer, 2009). For Corlett, collective 
intentionality is a required condition to ascertain collective liability. In this vein, he also argues that collective 
responsibility can only be ascertained if there was collective voluntariness and if a corporate moral agency for 
wrongdoing and harm can be identified.  
473 See, for instance, the classic work of Hywel D. Lewis, "Collective responsibility" (1948) 23 Philosophy 3, as well 
as David E. Cooper, "Collective responsibility" (1968) 43 Philosophy 258; and Robert Silcock Downie, "Collective 
responsibility" (1969) 44 Philosophy 66. 
474 See David E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility" (1968) 43 Philosophy 258; and Howard McGary, "Morality and 
Collective Liability" (1986) 20 The Journal of Value Inquiry 157. Peter French’s work on corporations is particularly 
useful in this context. See Peter A. French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person" (1979) 16 American Philosophical 
Quarterly 207. Interestingly, this debate dates back to late 1970s, well before the post-Marxist legal critiques of 
international public law.  
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not be possible if they acted alone.475 On the issue of group intentions, however, the legal 
problem of ascertaining intentionality is not easy to tackle, and it remains a threshold issue for 
criminal law-related determinations. If intentions play a fundamental role in an agent's practical 
deliberation and volition, the prospect of a shared intention introduces the specter of shared 
mental states. This is not included in the standards of proof for criminal law litigation and for 
very valid reasons, as it would lead to collective punishment.  
 If so, if the possibility of collective responsibility supposedly requires a collective mind, 
we might as well give up on the notion of collective responsibility altogether. Groups can 
legitimately be said to have shared beliefs and convictions, yet this is quite distinct from the 
proposition of a collective mind-set. These convictions are otherwise known as institutional 
culture, ideology, political movements, and so on. Hence, looking for a collective mind-set to 
ascertain collective responsibility for societal harm and wrongdoings is not the business of 
criminal justice litigation.476 And yet, it is a very important component of how to rebuild a sense 
of trust and societal peace in the aftermath of mass crimes. In the area of political philosophy, in 
Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller’s work these factors are named as “we intentions,” and they 
provide the springboard for joint commitments and actions.477 According to Tuomela, actions by 
collectives build upon the actions of the operative members of the collective in such a way that 
the properties of collectives, such as their intentions, beliefs, and desires, are both embodied and 
determined by the perspectives of individual members or representatives of the collective in 
question. This is an unusual intervention, with very important implications for the production of 
legal judgments concerning collective wrongs. Larry May similarly offers one of the most 																																																								
475 See Larry May, The Morality of Groups (University of Notre Dame Press, 1989); and Larry May & Stacey 
Hoffman, eds. Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1992) 
476 According to both Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman, the key is joint commitment. In other words, group 
intentions exist when two or more persons constitute the plural subject of an intention to carry out a particular action. 
See Margaret Gilbert, "Modelling collective belief" (1987) 73 Synthese 185; Margaret Gilbert, Living together: 
Rationality, sociality, and obligation (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996); Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and 
responsibility: New essays in plural subject theory (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Margaret Gilbert, 
"Shared intention and personal intentions" (2009) 144 Philosophical studies 167. Bratman’s most relevant work in 
the context of shared intention and mutual obligations is his Faces of intention: Selected essays on intention and 
agency (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Also see David J. Velleman, "What happens when someone acts?" 
(1992) 101 Mind 461.  
477 See Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller "We-intentions" (1988) 53 Philosophical Studies 367. Also see Raimo 
Tuomela, "We-intentions revisited" (2005) 125 Philosophical Studies 327 and Raimo Tuomela, The Philosophy of 
Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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interesting arguments of this sort in his defense of collective moral agency. Although he rejects 
accounts of group intentions that are tied to Kantian notions of moral agency, he reformulates 
group intentions with reference to a theory of interdependence and sociality. 
 Historically, for those who work on collective responsibility as a necessary notion for 
applied philosophy, ethics, and legal theory, the focus has been on nations, corporations, and 
other groups that have an institutional backbone and well-ordered decision-making procedures in 
place. Organizational and institutional mechanisms through which courses of concerted action 
have been decided upon and justified as rule-bound are deemed particularly important. Similarly, 
enforced standards of conduct for individuals that are stringent and disciplinarian constitute an 
important aspect of such forms of action. In turn, purposeful, planned and institutionally 
controlled actions could render groups and communities collectively responsible for harm caused 
by their joint acts, though most likely not in a criminal sense. In the case of social and political 
movements, as discussed in detail by Joel Feinberg in his body of work on collective 
responsibility, there is the added element of ideological directives and the resultant group 
solidarity leading individuals to pursue projects together as a collective agent.478 All of these are 
aspects of a very germane debate on collective responsibility that has been thus far overlooked by 
theories of international criminal law pertaining to mass crimes, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. This is a deep chasm that must be addressed without further ado, and this chapter has 
endeavored to provide a critical review of some of the key connections already built in this 
regard.  
 
 
 																																																								
478 See Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving; Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University Press, 
1970). In his later treatise Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Feinberg focuses on the relationship between interests and 
wants, and makes a distinction between want-regarding and ideal-regarding analyses of interests. In particular, he 
focuses on hard cases for the application of the concept of harm. Examples of the "hard cases" Feinberg uses are 
harm to character, vicarious harm, and prenatal and posthumous harm. Feinberg also discusses the relationship 
between harm and rights, the concept of a victim, and the distinctions of various quantitative dimensions of harm, 
consent, and offense, including magnitude, probability, and risk, as well as the importance of harm for both the 
individual and the society at large. See Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
1984).  
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CONCLUSION: THE DILEMMA OF THE SUM TOTAL VERSUS ITS CONSTITUTIVE PARTS 
 Since collective responsibility refers to the addressing of widespread harm and 
wrongdoing associated with the actions of collectivities, groups, societies and institutional 
bodies, the key components of its adjudication are directly related to constitutive aspects of 
social, cultural and political life. While there is a broad, often tacit, agreement regarding the basic 
model of moral and criminal responsibility when it is applied to individuals, there is considerable 
doubt, as we have seen, about how this notion might be applied to collectivities and their 
members at large. First and foremost, even the thought of adjudicating collective responsibility 
leads to disagreement about the very conception of collective responsibility.479 One version 
maintains that only individual human agents can be held morally and criminally responsible for 
harmful acts, while another conception insists that groups, collectivities, and institutions can be 
held morally and criminally responsible as collectivities, independently of their members’ 
individual actions. The former conception has, as its departure point, the conviction that 
collectivities and institutions are capable of actions that cannot be reduced to the actions and 
interests of their individual members. 480 Yet this belief or conviction alone does not render 
adjudication of collective responsibility a straightforward process. It does, however, indicate that 
the courtroom alone is not the solution for mass crimes. Furthermore, adjudicating egregious acts 
such as crimes against humanity does indeed require societal action and willful participation, 
particularly if these litigation-oriented strageties of transitional justice are to be pursued at the 
local and domestic level.  
 In this context, Joel Feinberg's now largely forgotten taxonomy of collective 
responsibility arrangements constitutes a critical contribution to the exploration of issues 
regarding the culpability of collectives and their members. In his classic treatise written back in 																																																								
479 The main texts I refer to in this regard are again those pertaining to the Arendt-Jaspers correspondence. Also see 
Hannah Arendt, German guilt (Jewish Frontier Association, 1945); Karl Jaspers, The question of German guilt 
(Fordham University Press, 2009); and his The Origin and Goal of History (Routledge Revivals Series, Routledge, 
2014). 
480 See Carl Wellman, A Theory of Rights: Persons under Laws, Institutions and Morals (Rowman & Allanheld, 
1985); Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations a Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society (University of 
California Press, 1986); and Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of the Ethics of Bureaucratic Organizations” (1996) 
6 Business Ethics Quarterly 419. These essays articulate a crucial and neglected element pertaining to the general 
theory of ethics of bureaucratic organizations, in both private and public realms. The key to the approach developed 
here is the thesis that distinctive ethical principles must be applicable to bureaucratic organizations due to their 
aggregate power-holding status. This arises from the nature of bureaucratic organizations as complex webs of 
principal/agent relations that cannot be reduced to individual actions.  
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1970, Doing and Deserving, Feinberg presents four distinct responsibility arrangements: (a) 
“Whole groups can be held liable even though not all of their members are at fault”; (b) “A group 
can be held collectively responsible through the fault, contributory or noncontributory, of each 
member”; (c) “Group liability [could be attributed] through the contributory faults of each and 
every member”; and (d) “Through the collective … fault of the group itself [the collective] bears 
liability independently of its members.”481 If we are to consider each of Feinberg’s constructs in 
order to reach a conclusion pertaining to the justiciability of collective acts leading to harm, the 
complications involved need to be adequately addressed.482  
 In Feinberg’s first case, if a whole group is liable for the faulty and harmful actions of one 
or several members of the group, there must be the accompanying assumption that this sort of 
collectivity possesses a significant degree of solidarity. No doubt, this presumption stands against 
the ideal of individual responsibility and autonomy. Punishment of all for the wrongdoing of a 
few is not defensible on moral or legal grounds. For both goods and harms to be defined as 
collective and shared, would promotion of a mutual sense of collective destiny suffice? Looked at 
through the lens of justiciability, the answer is negative. Courts often invoke one of the 
justiciability doctrines—standing, ripeness, and mootness—to bring potentially important public 
litigation to a definite conclusion. According to orthodox understandings of justiciability, these 																																																								
481 In his treatise Doing and Deserving, Feinberg covers the following notions that are most pertinent to the current 
debate on collective responsibility: Supererogation and rules, problematic responsibility in law and morals, justice 
and personal desert, sua culpa and collective responsibility. See Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the 
Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University Press, 1970). Also see his The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1984). This latter work is the first volume in a four-volume series entitled The Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law, which addresses the question of what acts the state may rightly render as criminal. Here, 
Feinberg identifies four liberty-limiting or coercion-legitimizing principles, each of which is the subject of a separate 
volume. In the first volume, he looks at the principle of harm to others, which John Stuart Mill identified as the only 
liberty-limiting principle. The other principles that Feinberg considers in subsequent volumes are (1) the offense 
principle—it is necessary to prevent hurt or offense (as opposed to harm) to others; (2) legal paternalism—it is 
necessary to prevent harm to the actor herself; and (3) legal moralism—it is necessary to prevent immoral conduct 
whether or not it harms anyone. Feinberg himself rejects legal paternalism and legal moralism, maintaining that the 
harm principle and the offense principle exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions. 
Feinberg's examination of the harm principle begins with an account of the concept of harm and its relation to other 
concepts like interests, wants, hurts, offenses, rights, and consent. He considers both the moral status of a failure to 
prevent harm and the problems related to assessing, comparing, and imputing harms. These discussions are essential 
for developing a robust, legally applicable understanding of collective responsibility.  
482 Justiciability is a key concept especially for constitutional and international law, due to the fact that it pertains to 
the determination of the limits posed upon legal issues over which a given court can exercise its judicial authority. It 
includes the legal concept of standing, which is commonly used to determine if the party bringing a legal suit is a 
party appropriate to establish whether an actual adversarial act or issue exists. Essentially, justiciability seeks to 
address whether a court possesses the ability to provide adequate resolution of a disputed matter. Where a court feels 
it cannot offer such a final determination, the matter is rendered “not justiciable.” 
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doctrines disempower courts from deciding certain kinds of cases. Of the three, mootness is the 
most relevant for our purposes, as it has the strongest moral moorings in terms of law’s compass 
in society. Collectives are not punishable where individual autonomy is held as a supreme value 
in the constitutional order. Furthermore, constitutional schemes often create a presumption in 
favour of preserving a degree of legislative control over jurisdiction. In the case of collective 
responsibility, courts would need to transform mootness from a constitutional doctrine into a 
prudential doctrine that would enable them to decide otherwise “moot cases” whenever a decision 
would help give true and concrete meaning to important public values. That is, however, an 
idealistic future projection rather than the present-day reality of litigation for societal and political 
crimes. 
Furthermore, in a standard criminal law setting, arrangements in which the whole group is 
punished for the faults or wrongdoing of a few constitute vicarious liability, and a person 
punished on account of another's wrongdoing is said to have been punished vicariously. 
Vicarious liability squarely conflicts with individual moral responsibility and, of course, the 
principle of individual accountability for criminal acts.483 For litigation purposes, vicarious 
attribution of group or collective liability is an arrangement unsuitable for most forms of harm or 
wrongdoing.484 However, the issue is not so clear when we are dealing with the actions of state 
institutions, for instance. In this changed setting, Feinberg's second arrangement of collective 
responsibility comes into the picture, which is based on the examination of implications for a 
group of individuals sharing a common agenda, or who could possibly have engaged in a similar 
harmful act. As such, the ascription of criminal or moral responsibility requires that an act 
causing harm has actually occurred rather than simply been intended.485  																																																								
483 This is despite the fact that Christian teachings interpret Jesus' crucifixion as his vicarious punishment for the sins 
of all humankind.  
484 See Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
485 An interesting case on the issue of vicarious liability is that of Lister v Hesley Hall [2002] 1 AC 215. In this case, 
the House of Lords reformed the law on vicarious liability, in the context of a claim arising over the intentional 
infliction of harm, by introducing the “close connection” test. The immediate catalyst was the desire to facilitate 
recovery of damages on the part of victims of child abuse. The precise form the revision assumed was derived from 
two Canadian Supreme Court cases: Bazley v Curry [1999] 174 DLR (4th) 45 and Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 174 
DLR (4th) 7. Compared with other common law practices, Canadian jurisprudence contains a detailed review of the 
policy factors underpinning the law of vicarious liability and expresses the view that the most significant of these is 
“enterprise liability.” See Douglas Brodie, “Enterprise Liability: Justifying Vicarious Liability” (2007) 27 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 493. On the larger issue of permissibility to harm others and related legal liabilities, see 
Charlie Webb, “What is Unjust Enrichment?” (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 215; Victor Tadros, “Duty 
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To conclude, as I have discussed thus far, legal-philosophical debates in the field of 
collective responsibility clearly prove that an exaggerated conception of fault and responsibility 
could easily lead to the ascription of blameworthiness to groups and communities without having 
a solid ground for justiciability. This is clearly observable in Feinberg’s categorizations, which 
constitute one of the finest examples of the legal-philosophical analysis of collective 
responsibility. If so, formal organizations, such as business corporations, nation-states, armies, or 
public bureaucracies appear to be the only legal actors to which we could accrue justiciable forms 
of collective responsibility. That locks us back into the problem of responsibility being allocated 
only to formal units and their representatives thereof, and leaves us astray when it comes to 
societal accountability for mass political crimes.  
Whether a true and systemic rectification of injury and harm aiming for corrective justice 
is at all possible concerning mass political crimes thus remains as a very troubling question. By 
whom justice must be performed is where almost all attention seems to have focused on up until 
now. If the injuries in question are divided into components of harm and wrong, each 
component’s rectification would have to be considered separately. Although pecuniary 
compensation for such harms is practically plausible, money cannot act as a mediator between 
severely damaged lives and abusers of political power. Not all harms could be compensated, nor 
can it be said that when compensation is paid, the status quo ante should be restored. There is no 
normative or conceptual reason for compensation to remedy societal harms. On the issue of the 
wrong, on the other hand, standard methods of rectification may or may not work, depending on 
the specific context of the injustice in question. For instance, to correct wrongdoing by rectifying 
harm may not be at all possible in the event of mass civilian deaths and disappearances. 
Deploying only punitive damages may not be of much benefit for thousands or millions of 
displaced populations, either. The third, most common option embraced by international criminal 
law, individual incarceration and punishment, remains by and large symbolic. There may well be 
a need for an admission of causal and moral responsibility, public and institutional repudiation of 																																																																																																																																																																																			
and Liability” (2012) 24 Utilitas 259; and Joanna Mary Firth & Jonathan Quong, “Necessity, Moral Liability and 
Defensive Harm” (2012) 31 Law and Philosophy 673. The last two articles build upon Jeff McMahan’s work on 
justified killing at times of war, which sets out a number of conditions for a person to be liable to attack, provided the 
attack is used to avert an objectively unjust threat defined in the following terms: (1) The threat, if realized, will 
wrongfully harm another; (2) the person is responsible for creating the threat; (3) killing the person is necessary to 
avert the threat; and (4) killing the person is a proportionate response to the threat. See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of 
Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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the criminal act, substantive reforms at the state level, and, in some cases, disgorgement and 
reparations to be performed as a sign of a good faith effort to share the burden of the victims’ 
suffering by the society at large. Although these cannot be forced onto members of the society, 
the state and its institutions are obligated to take an institutional lead in this regard. However, 
how much of a restoration these measures would lead to is truly dependent on how the society at 
large deals with the issue of collective responsibility for mass crimes in a non-criminal sense, as 
well. 
In this vein, this chapter has offered a refutation of the litigation-heavy focus of 
international criminal law as it has been applied to mass societal and political crimes. Instead, it 
embraced the view that if so used, criminal law essentially becomes a stunted system of 
corrective and restitutional rather than restorative justice. The concept of corrective justice is 
neither capable of offering solutions to society-wide problems nor is it poised to deliver 
restorative justice for historical wrongdoings. Rather, what is required in instances such as crimes 
against humanity is an essentially protective function and a future-oriented vision. The aim is the 
protection of legal subjects and valuable social interests from such harms in future. Here, I have 
also tried to address the question of whether a statute of limitations on a historical injustice is 
morally justified. In essence, rectificatory justice calls for the ascription of a right to ask for 
rectification once an injustice has been perpetrated, without reference to a set time frame. To 
claim a statute of limitations on historical injustices amounts to inserting a temporal limit on the 
legitimacy of rights to rectification—a set amount of time following injustice after which claims 
of rectification could no longer be considered valid. However, since ascribing a right to 
rectification for an injustice is a requirement of fundamental justice, and since the temporal limit 
called for by a statute of limitations on injustice is a constraint on that requirement, the idea of a 
statute of limitations on historical injustices is morally justified only if one has substantive 
reasons for accepting this constraint, such as the establishment and maintenance of societal peace.  
As a footnote to this entire debate, in legal philosophy there is a peculiar argument that 
has been widely applied to substantiate the validity of claims for historic justice. It is known as 
the “non-identity argument.”486 Accordingly, the harm to descendants of historically wronged 																																																								
486 The non-identity problem emerged as a lively ethical debate concerning our obligations to future generations 
during the 1970s. It figured strongly in the works of Derek Parfit, Thomas Schwartz and Robert M. Adams. See 
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peoples could be explained away not as deriving from the historic wrongs, but from the failure to 
provide rectification to the previous generation for the harm they suffered. In this chain of 
injustices, each failure to provide rectification becomes the source of wrongful harm to the next. 
Non-identity philosophers argue that such chains form a bridge between the historic wrong and 
the harm suffered by living individuals today. In other words, past wrongs, for which original 
wrongdoers are responsible, harm descendants of original victims. Still, how do we distinguish 
claims of descendants of historic victims and claims made by others with unrelated interests in 
the rectification of the previous generation? A supplementary solution may be offered in the form 
of focusing on group harm and group membership. This approach ties individual harm to group 
harm rather than limiting justice claims to individual restitution or compensation. For instance, 
did slavery not harm the descendants of slaves? This is the classical example proving the 
shortcomings of the individual responsibility argument applied to reject the validity of claims for 
historic justice based on harms to descendants of victims of historic wrongs. According to the 
individual responsibility argument, if descendants are never harmed directly and personally by 
historic wrongs, they have no right to ask for rectification. This conclusion may be legally sound 
but it is morally unintuitive and must be debunked.  
To conclude, due to the extensive nature of harm involved in historic injustices, one must 
try in earnest to overcome the hurdle posed by the individual responsibility argument wielded 
against justice claims. Many of the crimes adjudicated under the aegis of crimes against humanity 
do constitute or lead to historical injustices. These forms of injustice and the harms they generate 
are best understood as group or collective harms. The response to group harms has to have a 
collective component as well, because the remedies offered are again only meaningful in a social 
and political context. Claims for justice under such circumstances have to be grounded in harms 
currently suffered by living individuals as a function of the harms their group or community were 
subject to as part of historic wrongs. One common form of such harm, constitutive harm, 
significantly differs from the aggregative accounts of harm generally used by standard individual 																																																																																																																																																																																			
Derek Parfit, Reasons and persons. (Oxford University Press, 1984); James Woodward, "The non-identity 
problem" (1986) 96 Ethics 804; Doran Smolkin, "The Non-Identity Problem and the Appeal to Future People's 
Rights" (1994) 32 The Southern journal of philosophy 315; Derek Parfit & Samuel Scheffler, On what matters: 
volume one (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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criminal litigation processes. Constitutive harm could not be addressed in that limited context at 
all. It is the type of harm people suffer as members of historically wronged groups and 
communities. Therefore, historic injustice cases require a different account of responsibility, one 
that cannot be harnessed solely based on individual responsibility argumentation within the 
context of criminal justice jurisprudence. With all the reservations carefully examined in this 
chapter, we must make room for considerations pertaining to collective responsibility as a moral 
obligation, providing a context within which legal judgment should be firmly situated, though 
itself not catapulted to the status of a criminal charge.  
This chapter might at first seem as an aberration in terms of both its methodology and its 
subject matter vis-à-vis the core subject matter of this dissertation: universal jurisdiction and 
adjudication of crimes against humanity. However, the frame within which these two issues are 
debated throughout includes the parameters of “limitations” and the “Global South,” which 
changes the tenor of the arguments made and encourages a layered and historically informed 
understanding of how international law works in settings wherein it assumes a very problem-
laden identity. In this regard, I believe it is apt to look for societal and political sources that 
establish or increase the legitimacy of criminal litigation against mass crimes and societal 
violence from within as well as through the use of international jurisprudence concerning 
egregious acts such as crimes against humanity. This latter, I believe, could significantly benefit 
from an integrated discussion of collective responsibility in a non-criminal sense, as a 
foundational tenet of establishing the normative grounds for the desirability of trials and courts 
that attend to state criminality locally and regionally.  
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In Lieu of Conclusion: Deliverance of Justice in International Criminal Law and the Role of 
Political Judgment as Purposive Action 
 
...time shall in fine out breake 
When Ocean wave shall open every Realme 
The wandering World at will shall open lye, 
And Thyphis shall some newe founded Land Survay Some travellers shall the Countries 
farre escrye, Beyond small Thule, known farthest to this day. 
    Seneca, Medea (from the John Studley translation of 1581)  
Taken from Seneca’s tragedy Medea, these lines have become symbolic of a prediction 
that a “new found land” will indeed appear, discovered across the ocean by travellers, located far 
beyond the edges of the known world. This utopian impulse, or the commitment to and desire for 
imagining a different, better, or even perfect society is nothing new. In fact, there is always a 
dramatic increase in expressions of such a utopian impulse when times get harder. This “New 
World” of Seneca’s could take many forms, as it offers the potential actualization of novel ways 
of doing things, seeing things, and understanding anew. From Platonic dialogues to architectural 
treatises and plans, from literary and theatrical works to historical documents and legal texts, 
expressions of a yearning for what we are told we cannot have find their way by myriad means 
into our existing order of things as an outcry.  
Law and its ethos and pathos constitute a triplet that looks perhaps rather unlikely at first 
sight as a harbinger for a utopian impulse and a desire to transcend existing delimitations of legal 
regimes. They have a fundamental connection: all three have the common function of imposing 
structure and discipline while striving for the creation of an ideal order. As so clearly heralded by 
Plato’s late dialogues many centuries ago—namely Timaeus, Critias, and the Laws—in which he 
outlined the characteristics of the ideal society and of a divine creator as the architect of the 
universe, the yearning for a transformative ideal in the form of law has become a foundational 
belief. Indeed, while Timaeus, Critias, and Socrates are talking about the ideal society, Socrates 
wishes to see this ideal in action and find out if it works. Critias tells him that Athens once was 
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this ideal society. He heard that from Solon, who heard from an old man, who heard from an 
Egyptian that Athens was that ideal at the time they defeated Atlantis. Having no writing, the 
Athenians forgot this and are learning it all afresh. Timaeus then suggests that the world is a 
receptacle into which images of the eternal forms are stamped. Thus, physical things are copies of 
the eternal forms, and these copies are continually decaying though their essence remains. Then 
comes the place for Law. These late dialogues suggest that Athenians who defeated Atlantis have 
degenerated to the extent that their laws and thoughts moved away from the original divine form. 
The Platonic hope is that the essence of things could be restored and preserved by creating pure 
laws and institutions to fight off any diversion from the spirit of the divine presence.487 
These dialogues, as distinct from anything law-related as they may appear, speak in a 
language that one often hears about erga omnes crimes and jus cogens norms in particular, and 
customary international law in general. So does something even more remote from international 
law, the Ten Books of Architecture by Vitruvius, which display his belief in perfect geometric 
shapes forming the basis for universal order. The Renaissance embellished this idea of “perfect 
reflection” further to include the human form: Leonardo da Vinci and Cesare Cesariano 
illustrated it in what is now known as “Vitruvian Man,” based on Vitruvius’ discussion of the 
proportions of the human body inscribed in a circle and a square. From Plato onwards, the ideal 
city, the ideal state, the ideal order have always hinged upon a very strong sense of the existence 
of a self-contained order expressed in pure laws.  
In the opening chapters of this dissertation, I argued that recent scholarship on theories of 
international law with an interdisciplinary bent attributes the post-Cold War rejuvenation of 
interest in international law to at least two kinds of developments. On the one hand, I argued that 
“critical legal scholarship” has reshaped the discipline so profoundly that it has indeed provided it 
with new sensibilities and perspectives, thus rendering it desirable for a variety of other 
disciplines and discourses. On the other hand, I asserted that younger generations of international 
law scholars have succeeded in reaching out to international relations scholars and linked their 
work with theirs, forming a relationship which led to a recasting of the way in which legality, 
jurisdictional capabilities, and the state as a legal actor are approached. In the end, however, the 																																																								
487 See Gijsbert Jonkers, The Textual Tradition of Plato's Timaeus and Critias (Brill, 2016). The actual text could be 
accessed at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-timaeus/ [25.04.2017].  
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realization of a full-fledged reconciliation and dialogue among these disciplines is far from an 
easy task. The increasingly textured, adversarial and divisive debate about how to approach the 
study of international law should be regarded as an indication of how Herculean such an attempt 
is. In this work, I have hoped to contribute to this (ongoing) debate by focusing on common 
conceptions pertaining to the ideal of the state and what they leave behind, the residue, so to 
speak.  
Deliverance of justice is a central, and yet another highly contested, element in theories 
and debates on international law, particularly as far as international courts are concerned. As the 
justice claims of non-state actors increasingly clash with the largely statist basis of existing legal 
practices and institutions pertaining to the transnational level, it is again becoming increasingly 
critical that we question the role of international organizations, including the Courts, in creating 
and sustaining the illusion of a perfect global legal order.488 
As this detailed and multifaceted debate on the jurisprudential merits of international 
criminal law in the area of crimes against humanity proves, international organizations including 
courts such as the ICC will have to reconstitute some of their authoritative practices and render 
them open to the motives of both new and previously marginalized legal actors.489 Furthermore, 
international organizations have to be open to potential norm change and evolution based on 
claims unaddressed in the past, as well as claims related to current and newly emerging forms of 
injustice.490 This is notwithstanding the limited capacity of existing international organizations 
for realizing such claims. If and when they cannot do the job, alternative models of adjudication 
should be welcome as a true feature of the fragmented regime of accountability, with both 
fragmentation and poli-centricity characterizing the essential nature of international criminal law.  																																																								
488See Gerry Simpson, Great powers and outlaw states: unequal sovereigns in the international legal order 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
489 For a similar argument albeit with reference to the specific national context od India, see Shalini Randeria, "The 
state of globalization: Legal plurality, overlapping sovereignties and ambiguous alliances between civil society and 
the cunning state in India” (2007) 24 Theory, Culture & Society 1.  
490 A strict closure privileges existing authoritative legal practices, and thus mainly assumes a protective stance vis-à-
vis the status quo in international governance. See, for instance, Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: 
A Liberal Theory of International Politics” (1997) 51 International Organization 513; Richard Devetak & Richard 
Higgot “Justice Unbound? Globalization, States, and the Transformation of the Social Bond” (1999) 75 International 
Affairs 21; Taslim Elias, The international court of justice and some contemporary problems: essays on international 
law. Vol. 2. (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013); William A. Schabas, Gerry Simpson & Suzannah 
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I have also argued that the institutional masking of the hegemony of certain key actors 
within the international legal domain—needless to say not only core states—creates a blind spot. 
International organizations have in the past, and might again in the present, become the bulwark 
of hegemonic privilege.491 Last but not the least, the tempering of conflicting interests by judicial 
idealism does not guarantee that an international organization can or does provide a sufficient, 
widely recognized, and inclusive mechanism for dealing with the justice-related claims of 
different actors. Ongoing conflicts in global politics are carried onto the institutional and 
organizational realm as well, and bodies such as international courts constitute no exception to 
this phenomenon.  
As posited throughout this dissertation, normative theories of international law at least 
promise to adequately address these critical questions regarding the deliverance of justice.492 
However, a distinction is to be made between the deliverance of justice as a motive and as an 
authoritative legal practice. Accordingly, some international organizations aim at raising the 																																																								
491 On this issue, Steven Ratner’s The Thin Justice of International Law offers a comprehensive interdisciplinary 
theory of international law’s relationship with global justice. Ratner argues that the justice of legal norms that 
constitute our international legal order should be determined according to two criteria: the degree to which they 
causally bring about international and intrastate peace; and the degree to which they causally bring about a state of 
affairs in which basic human rights are respected. However, I disagree with Ratner’s commitment to rule 
consequentialism, his treatment of the state system as a fixed attribute of our international legal order, and his 
particular embrace of a political conception of human rights. In particular, Ratner’s commitment to rule 
consequentialism leads to the possibility that pillars of global justice might give way to more fundamental moral 
concerns relating to the attainment of human welfare and human flourishing. Similarly, his commitment to the state 
system as a fixed attribute of international legal order results in a conception of international law as a rigid system. 
Consequently, questions relating to international law’s distribution of sovereignty — its origins, the episodic 
recalibrations to which it is subject, especially during and after times of war, and its distributional consequences 
remain outside the normative sphere of global justice. Finally, Ratner’s endorsement of a political conception of 
human rights does not protect international law from a zealous aspiration to organize global politics into an 
international legal order. Human rights that speak to the mitigatation of some of these consequences —such as full-
fledged transitional justice schemes—merit recognition for the instantiation of global justice. See Steven Ratner, The 
thin justice of international law: a moral reckoning of the law of nations (OUP Oxford, 2015).  
492 Here, the work of Nardin, Cox, Held, Murphy, Welch and Rosenau are representative of the origins of this 
unfolding debate. See Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton University Press, 1983); 
James Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds. Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, 1992); David Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War (Cambridge University Press, 
1993); James Rosenau, Governance in the Twenty-First Century” (1995) 1 Global Governance 13; David Held, 
Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford University Press, 
1995); Daniele Archibugi & David Held, eds. Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Polity 
Press, 1995); Robert Cox, “An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism in the Twenty-First Century” (1997) 3 
Global Governance 1; James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent 
World (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Craig Murphy, “Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly 
Understood” (2000) 76 International Affairs 780. Also see Donatella Della Porta, et al. Global justice movement: 
Cross-national and transnational perspectives (Routledge, 2015); and Satvinder Juss, International migration and 
global justice (Routledge, 2016).  
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specter of lack of just practices in given areas of international law, while others such as the ICC 
are built upon the premise of deliverance of justice according to established legal norms and 
practices. Why states and other international actors would seek the construction of institutions 
that can authoritatively settle disputes about rights and entitlements is not the issue here. On the 
surface, the international legal obligations of a state are overwhelmingly based on its consent. 
This formal commitment to consent supposedly preserves the power of states, though with a bias 
towards the status quo. Historically, the regime of international law has not been equitable to all 
states that are a party to it.493 International law, given its background, has developed a variety of 
ways to live with the problem of consent. The expectation from international criminal law has 
been for it to overcome this hurdle via normative prerogatives such as those exemplified by 
universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. 494  Meanwhile, when states establish 
international organizations such as the ICC, they create an institution with a life of its own. There 
is always the risk that the institution would develop its own interests.495 How much of the 
existing landscape of international criminal law has been formed by state responses to acts such 
as crimes against humanity is somewhat dubious. Rather, what is at stake here is life after the 
ICC for international criminal law. As Kantian scholarship in this area has long insisted, seeking 
a legalized and institutionally guarded regime of accountability to constrain others has direct 
benefits in terms of avoiding random warfare in an age where such wars tend to bring more 
damage than profit. 496  In this context, justice delivered via international criminal law is 
considered a virtue. This peculiar understanding of political order relies on standardized 
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expectations, procedures and entitlements.497 There is no power in it, or no outright conflict. This 
brings us back to the longings we hear in Seneca’s play Medea: “The wandering World at will 
shall open lye…” 
It has also been commonly argued for decades that the essence of any meaningful and 
reasonable idea of international governance is the expectation that international law will be 
primarily about the rules and procedures that allow states to coexist.498 This take on international 
law and its engagement in the deliverance of justice is quite similar in its logic to the way 
constitutions are defined as frames within which societies and polities can accommodate change 
and conflict without breaking existing political systems apart. Why, then, is international law 
often deemed to be “practical” rather than purposive—and thus its organs portrayed as standing 
in contradistinction with the institutions through which the laws of national political communities 
are created?  Is it not so much a maker as it is a protector of the status quo? Even the jus cogens 
norms and erga omnes crimes do not constitute major exceptions in this sense. Consequently, in 
international criminal law justice is defined mainly in formal procedural terms. Bodies such as 
international courts become limited to clarifying the procedures to be observed by states and 
other international actors in the event that their actions fall under the purview of international 
law. There is very little room left for political judgment or norm creation to enter the debate, even 
concerning critical instances that challenge the founding pillars of the entire state system such as 
crimes against humanity.499 In this work, I have inquired about whether it is possible to strike a 
balance between normative and deliberative purposefulness and authoritative jurisdictional 
practices in international criminal law, in such a way that its legislative prowess is not just 
“effective” but also legitimate. My examination of the limits of the application of universal 
jurisdiction in the context of crimes against humanity and particularly in the Global South was a 																																																								
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testimony to the intrinsically challenging nature of such yearnings. This problem of disjunct 
between what legal theorists such as Hart named as primary and secondary rules is endemic to 
the dominant statist model of international law, and bars our vision from seeing it for what it is-–
a transnational and fragmented enterprise. Especially in the last two chapters, I posited that the 
whole array of non-state, transnational, individual, regional and communal actors have to be 
brought into the discussion concerning the legitimacy of jurisprudence produced by international 
criminal law and international courts. Acknowledgement of the wider plurality of political actors, 
as well as forms of legal and political action, is essential for achieving large enough scope of 
applicability for models of deliverance of justice beyond the confines of international courts. 
Needless to say, addressing this plurality alone cannot override the normative centrality of the 
state in international criminal law. However, as I indicated throughout my debate on hybrid 
courts, formal international criminal law is stagnating in its universalistic claims. Particularly 
disconcerting is the status of the treatment of injurious acts such as crimes against humanity, 
which have implications for the past, present and future of whole societies.  
In this vein, I argued that rather than crowning the achievements of international bodies 
such as the ICC as the ultimate point that international criminal law could reach, we must pay 
closer attention to “informal lawmaking” that involves new actors, new processes, and new 
outputs concerning the most heinous forms of state criminality. On many occasions, existing 
institutional structures of formal lawmaking have become shackles rather than instigators of 
judicial processes, hence the emergence of bodies such as hybrid courts or regional mediation 
mechanisms. The validation requirements of traditional international criminal law as it is spread 
through centrifugal adaptation of the Rome Statute have to be rethought. Crimes against 
humanity legislation adapted to local realities by hybrid courts and regional organizations vividly 
prove this point. It is erroneous to use the example of the Belgian courts as the test case for 
universal jurisdiction, as Belgium is a European country with its own heavy history of colonial 
crimes and involvements. To recommend that this example should be followed in India, Russia, 
China, Brazil, Uganda, Turkey, etc. only points to the continuing blindness of dominant 
international law scholarship to both the history and politics of how our post-WWII universe of 
state system was built, and at what costs it is maintained. If the ultimate criterion by which to 
evaluate the deliverance of justice at the international platform is to see how many legal borders 
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have been crossed, rather than what substantive benefits it can provide for societies, perhaps 
international organizations such as the ICC could be construed as effective in their mandate. 
However, the closure of justice claims as well as methods of deliverance within this model 
remains problematic for several reasons. In this work, I have presented these issues in detail, 
highlighting the necessary involvement of political judgment in the alignment of international 
and domestic law. This is essential for widespread endorsement and application of the current 
legal codification of crimes against humanity to become possible. In my view, it is a base 
requirement for international criminal law in this area to become purposive rather than remaining 
formalistic. Finally, the shift of focus I suggested in the above pages is also meaningful from the 
point of view of posing challenges to conventional configurations of power, authority, legality, 
and legitimacy at both national and international levels. 
The development of a justice-based dialogue above and beyond the confines of the 
sovereign state is possible only via political deliberation, legal arguments keen on persuasion 
rather than dictation, and the endorsement of multilateral legal premises rather than a monist or 
dualist legal framework in international criminal law. Both statist and purely intergovernmentalist 
models of international law require that demands for justice be either channeled through domestic 
policy processes, or appropriated within a top-down process of international jurisdiction.  In the 
specific case of crimes against humanity, there are widely observed and profound structural 
tensions between the human rights and humanitarian norms introduced into the framework of 
international law since World War II, and the Westphalian order according to which such norms 
are expected to be pursued. According to the existing model, international criminal law 
jurisprudence is attempting to adjudicate the crimes committed by the very actors that it protects, 
i.e. the state, by asking them to come to international courts or local courts of other states 
empowered by universal jurisdiction in the event these states fail to try their own leaders. In this 
sense, I believe the word ‘transnational’ continues to escape universal jurisdiction debates.500 Yet 
when it comes to issues such as crimes against humanity, how could such an argument be 
maintained: that human rights and human dignity must be met within the parameters determined 
by the limits of either the “national” understanding and domestic jurisdiction of such crimes, or 																																																								
500 As an exception, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, eds., Lawyers and the Rule of Law in an Era of Globalization 
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via litigation sought in the chambers of a distant international court or a European domestic court 
such as the Belgian ones, armed with universal jurisdiction? This is precisely the conundrum that 
triggered the methodological investigations and conceptual worries presented in this work.  
As signaled throughout this dissertation, a post-statist and transnational conception of 
international law and international organizations no doubt helps the matters a great deal.501 
However, this approach is heavily indebted to sociological theory and tends to keep its distance 
from legal enterprises such as international courts. At least as far as international criminal law is 
concerned, I strongly believe that we need to include both realms and think deeply about their 
present and possible future interactions. Ideally, in this new setting, the justice motives of a 
variety of actors beyond the state would become favourable to international law scholarship. 
However, the static and authoritative perception of law in this field often acts as an impediment 
for such a hybrid and well-endowed understanding of [global] justice. It is as if legal debates 
about the deliverance of justice are utterly uninterested in dealing with moral dilemmas, ethical 
concerns, normative reflections, and political deliberations.  
By introducing the notions of political judgment and collective responsibility for state 
criminality as necessary components of the debate on the deliverance of justice in international 
criminal law, this work exemplifies a concerted effort to bypass the dichotomy between the 
domestic and international spheres that is essentialized by the statist model of international 
law.502 Just as values and norms are affected by a wide plurality of actors and political forces 
both within and beyond states, so are the actual workings of international law, including 
international criminal law. There is very little reason to assume that international criminal law is 
purely formal and structurally sealed from the purposive claims of various political agents and 
legal actors. The crucial matter concerning the category of legal norms such as those pertaining to 																																																								
501 Exemplary of this point of view, see Chris Brown, “Review Article: Theories of International Justice” (2001) 27 
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502 See, for instance, the articulation of a similar ideal though in a different context in Robert O'Brien, Anne Marie 
Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte & Marc Williams, eds., Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions 
and Global Social Movements (Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
	 247	
crimes against humanity is not so much the presence of value plurality that they have to address, 
but whether there are limits and thresholds beyond which their very existence loses its validity. 
Whether these limits can be established based on deliberations among different parties, or 
whether such an agreement needs to be nurtured and fostered via normatively purposive 
international organizations such as the ICC, is a real matter of concern for the future of 
international criminal law. Given the weight of its subject matter, international criminal law 
cannot turn its back on voices of dissent, particularly those emanating from communities who 
currently suffer the most from state brutality and politically organized forms of criminality, 
which are no doubt not limited to those nations in the Global South. In this regard, ad hoc and 
hybrid tribunals’ jurisprudential contributions, their extra-legal impact and legacies, and the 
intrinsic relationship between transitional justice projects and international criminal law have to 
be brought into the canonized debates. The concept of state legacy is itself contested and the 
appropriateness of international courts’ (such as the ICC) efforts to consolidate it must be 
questioned. As attested in the pages of this work, a conceptual critique of the history of 
international criminal law pertaining to the legislation of crimes against humanity also provides 
an opportune moment to reflect upon the work of both international courts and hybrid courts, ad 
hoc tribunals and other transitional justice mechanisms, with a view to enriching the debate by 
the inclusion of more voices and with an ear on the ground for historic grievances.503  
On a final note, I would like to conclude this treatise on a hopeful note for the future of 
international law scholarship pertaining to expanding circles of application of universal 
jurisdiction in the context of crimes against humanity. In a series of speeches and occasional 
essays delivered in 1999 and 2000, Pierre Bourdieu, one of France’s leading sociologists of 
culture, called for a new European social movement to unite existing and future unions, new 
social movements, and intellectuals to struggle against globalization.504 In his outcry, Bourdieu 
denounced numerous evils of globalization, especially its guiding philosophy of neoliberalism, 
and he sketched specific roles that writers, scholars, artists, and research workers—otherwise 																																																								
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known as Bourdieu’s “intellectuals”—could play in this new composite movement. While this 
call to arms is not without contradictions, it offered encouragement to intellectuals to join the 
working classes (unionized and not), farmers, the unemployed, immigrants, activists, students, 
and militants to struggle against the depredations of the new world order. For Bourdieu, as for 
many other critics of globalization, what is particularly vexing is the recent retreat of national 
governments from funding welfare, medical care, housing, public transportation, education, and, 
of course, culture. The neoliberal focus of the past few decades on privatization, deregulation, 
and self-help, characteristic of the economies in the Global North but also becoming widespread 
policy initiatives in the Global South, argued Bourdieu, were unabashedly supported by 
international organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The quest for maximum short-term profits and reduced expenditures 
is seeping into the everyday life of citizens in an exponentially increasing number of states and 
creating a perpetual condition of insecurity. Ironically, noted Bourdieu, the transnational spread 
of this neoliberal social insecurity provides a solid and tangible foundation for a new form of 
politics.505  
 If one was to echo this quintessential call to unite all possible forces against unjust 
practices endorsed by institutions of global governance and against entrenched state criminality, 
whom could we call upon? Surely, the work of Pierre Bourdieu offers a potentially productive 
way to practice research in international relations. Does it also offer clues concerning how to 
practice international legal scholarship and advocacy perhaps with less jurisdictional certitude but 
more moral conviction and normative involvement with global injustices perpetuated by the very 
states that international criminal law deals with in such a circumscribed manner? Bourdieu’s 
work explores the alternatives in such a way that academia is invited to refuse an opposition 
between general theory and everyday life. His preference for this relational approach acts as a 
protective shield against two of the biggest handicaps affecting academic work in the area of 
international criminal law, as well: namely, essentialization and ahistoricism. In order to untie 
state centrism and to discuss the possible adaptations and transformations of international 																																																								
505 For a rather discontented critical analysis of academia in general, also see Pierre Bourdieu, Homo academicus 
(Stanford University Press, 1988), and Pierre Bourdieu, Franck Poupeau & Thierry Discepolo, Political 
interventions: Social science and political action (Verso Books, 2008). 
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criminal law, we must show the courage to reveal the power relations hidden beneath the perfect 
spectre of universal jurisdiction at national, subnational, and transnational levels. This 
dissertation attempted to do so within the specific context of the applications of the normative 
framework of universal jurisdiction to crimes that fall under the aegis of crimes against humanity, 
both within and beyond the confines of the ICC. Its findings encourage us to renew the debate on 
the growing network of international law institutions and the underpinnings of the transnational 
legal regime of accountability from the lens of an important web of regional, national, and sub-
national authorities and spaces along with non-governmental organizations, political movements 
and civic initiatives. These developments seriously undermine the substantive claims of a 
centrifugal theory of international [criminal] law. The complex nature of the transnational 
dimensions of universal jurisdiction as it pertains to some of the most egregious crimes 
committed by states against their own people or in lands where they reside as occupying forces 
renders such a change of optics necessary in both the short and medium terms. Amidst the rising 
tide of seeking justice for political and mass crimes, using the rubric of international criminal law 
for the questioning of individual responsibility for societal crimes at the local and domestic levels 
has indeed been a very important first step in that direction.506 This issue has been explicated in 
depth in my discussion on hybrid courts and other mechanisms that do not rely on the direct 
involvement of an international court such as the ICC in matters concerning states and societies 
in the Global South. However, I also urge the reader to take one more step forward and extend 
the normative frame of reference used to adjudicate crimes against humanity in the direction of a 
rejuvenated debate on the notion of collective societal responsibility for mass crimes. The 
resultant opening up of the horizon of jurisprudential scholarship in such a way as to allow for 
concerns about transitional justice and overall socio-political transformation of the societies in 
question would not erode the basis of universal jurisdiction in international law. On the contrary, 
it would engender new debates about its usefulness in domestic and local settings and thus 
introduce the elements of choice and volitional consent in the Global South for future uses of 
international law jurisprudence.  
 																																																								506	Antony Anghie and B. S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility 
in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2 Chinese J. Int'l L. 77.  	
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Only then, would the prediction of Seneca I cited in the opening of this conclusion find 
true meaning in international law scholarship: “...time shall in fine out breake / When Ocean 
wave shall open every Realme…” 
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